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Abstract 
Surpassing the Leaders - Laggards gap? Conditionality, Compliance and 
Europeanisation viewed from Romania and Bulgaria in the post-accession period 
By  
Corina Andreea FOLESCU 
 
While EU accession has been generally regarded as a highly successful process of policy, and 
institutional model diffusion, after the 2007 enlargement wave anxiety regarding post-
accession backsliding in the case of Romania and Bulgaria has raised the question of 
whether the impact of pre-accession conditionality is sustainable once membership is 
achieved. Against this background, the present thesis investigates the manner in which the 
two countries have abided by their obligations as EU members, while taking into 
consideration the particular effects generated by separate modes of governance and legal 
instruments.  
The thesis follows infringement cases initiated by the Commission against the two states, 
examines policy responses under the Europe 2020 Strategy, and explores the steps made by 
Romania and Bulgaria to fulfil the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism benchmarks. By 
researching compliance with hard law, as well as openness towards coordination 
mechanisms we are provided with a more comprehensive outlook over national 
engagement with both legally-binding commitments and voluntary action.  
Based on the obtained results, the thesis argues that lock-in effects with regards to 
institutional reforms conducted prior to the 2007 enlargement have anchored Romania in 
the face of political volatility. In the case of Bulgaria, the thesis contends that missed 
opportunities during the pre-accession phase have placed the country into an institutional 
stalemate. While backsliding has not been observed, little progress in reforming its judiciary 
has triggered successive appeals from the European Commission for concrete outcomes.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Research Background 
 
The European Union accession process has been considered as being among the most 
powerful forces for the international promotion of democracy and the rule of law1. 
However, after the EU’s fifth enlargement in 2004 and 2007, certain concerns regarding the 
new member states, especially Romania and Bulgaria, were raised. The main apprehension 
was that despite their governance and market reforms, the new member countries had not 
yet reached EU standards at time of their admission, but most importantly that they will 
backslide, abandoning the pre-accession pace of change and limiting their adherence to EU 
rules. In this sense, the degree to which these countries have been ‘Europeanised’ has been 
questioned. The present thesis will hence start off from the concept of Europeanisation 
which is understood as “a complex interactive ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ process in which 
domestic polities, politics and public policies are shaped by European integration and in 
which domestic actors use European integration to shape the domestic arena. It may 
produce either continuity or change and potentially variable and contingent outcomes”2.  
Our approach to Europeanisation will furthermore differentiate between a pre-accession 
phase in which EU directly influenced changes at the national level were dependent on 
conditionality or active leverage3 and a post-accession phase where domestic policy change 
would be expected to be a consequence of assumed responsibility of membership (i.e. 
passive leverage).  A number of pertinent studies have explored the pre-accession 
Europeanisation phase4, underlining the openness of national political elites to EU 
                                                          
1 See Whitehead, L. (ed.) (1996): The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
2 K. Dyson, K. Goetz (2003): “Living with Europe: Power, Constraint, and Contestation”, in K. Dyson, K. Goetz 
(eds.) Germany, Europe, and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford, oxford University Press), pp. 3-35, p. 20.  
3 See M. Vachudova (2005): Europe Undivided (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 65.  
4 G. Dimitrova (2002): “The Limits of Europeanization: Hegemony and its Misuse in the Political Field in 
Bulgaria”, Southern European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 69-92; H. Grabbe (2001): “How Does 
Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity”, Journal of European Public 
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influence, and the speed and breadth of measures required from candidate countries as 
factors that would influence the extent of institutional change. Furthermore, the presence of 
substantial incentives (economic and political benefits stemming from membership) and of 
sanctions (the threat of accession delay) have been previously quoted by the specialised 
literature as explanatory variables for the depth and speed of domestic adaptation and 
change resulting from external pressure. In the case of change occurring during post-
accession and conditioned by external pressure, the nature of explanatory variables 
available becomes more complex. Coman and Crespy argue that by modelling 
Europeanisation as a process whose dynamics and temporality are shaped by actors (bias 
towards agency), domestic change - understood to occur as a result of external European 
pressure - has been deemed as short-termed, piecemeal or incremental. While recognising 
the value of this approach, the authors argue that the transition from incremental to 
structural change can only be accommodated by a research design that would take into 
consideration not only the ability and intentionality of national actors to adapt to Europe, 
but also the potential of EU policy instruments to lead to a more profound transformation5. 
Hence, starting form this argument, we conduct our analysis of the extent to which Romania 
and Bulgaria have been subject to post-accession Europeanisation by integrating as well the 
impact of different EU modes of governance in triggering national institutional change. As 
such, the present thesis explores the extent to which Romania and Bulgaria have been 
“Europeanised” by following domestic adaptation and change that has occurred as a result 
of requirements attached to various European legal instruments. Our starting point is set on 
exploring the particularities of EU modes of governance and of subsequent instruments and 
seeking to identify the extent to which they generate a different type of change at the 
domestic level. Starting from Knill and Lenschow’s association between different EU 
governance patterns and the likelihood of far-reaching national change6, we examine the 
post-accession Europeanisation by analysing adaptation and domestic change generated by 
both soft and hard law mechanisms. While accounting for national-level variables such as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6, pp. 1013-31; D. Papadimitriou, D. Phinnemore (2004):”Europeanization, Conditionality and 
Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 619-39.  
5 R. Coman, A. Crespy (2014): “Still in Search of Europeanization: From Limited to Structural Change?”, in R. 
Coman, T. Kostera, L. Tomini (eds.) Europeanization and European Integration from Incremental to Structural 
Change (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan). 
6 C. Knill, A. Lenschow (2005): “Coercion, Competition and Communication: Different Approaches of European 
Governance and their Impact on National Institutions”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 581-
606 
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veto points, former political and economic systems or timing, we factor in as well the impact 
of the presence or absence of sanctions attached to the policy instruments observed. We 
thus conduct an analysis of the progress achieved by Romania and Bulgaria in meeting the 
benchmarks set forward through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), in 
complying with and timely transposing EU legislation and in coordinating their economic 
and social policies through the governance architecture of the Europe 2020 Strategy. The 
CVM is in essence a policy coordination instrument (applied so far only in the cases of 
Romania and Bulgaria) to which limited sanctioning has been attached. Due to its legal basis 
(two European Commission decisions referring to the Accession Treaties of Romania and 
Bulgaria) and limited sanctioning capacity, CVM is not considered as a fully soft law 
instrument. As the two countries are non-Euro area members (which excludes sanctioning 
under the Stability and Growth Pact and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure), 
monitoring carried out under the Europe 2020 Strategy during the European Semester is 
also deemed as a soft law practice. Finally, the third instrument considered by the analysis 
is represented by the instruments generated through the Community Method: EU legally-
binding directives, regulations and decisions.   
 
1.2. Research Question 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, EU enlargement has been associated with transition to 
democratic forms of government and market economy systems, with decreasing corruption, 
improving administration and securing the rule of law. But just before their accession to the 
EU, researchers focusing on European integration and Europeanisation have argued that 
based on their rather problematic record of achieving benchmarks and meeting accession 
criteria, both Romania and Bulgaria were prone to backsliding, meaning that the legitimate 
transformations that had been required by the EU would risk reversal in the absence of 
sanctioning and rewards. While seeking to address this hypothesis, we question the extent 
to which Bulgaria and Romania have assumed their EU membership obligations by looking 
at the two countries’ track records in transposing EU legislation, in internalising the targets 
and overall objective of the Europe 2020 Strategy and in progressing towards the 
benchmarks set by the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. In so doing we put forward 
a set of sub-questions revolving around the characteristics of each policy instrument across 
14 
 
which the assessment is done. The motivation behind the selection of these instruments is 
binary: on the one hand, as we have mentioned above, when considering the concept of 
Europeanisation, a more relevant analysis needs to consider the European Union’s capacity 
to induce domestic change via its modes of governance. Secondly, by looking at the various 
compliance strategies followed at the national level for each instrument, we also contribute 
to the modes of governance literature that attributes explanatory power to the nature of 
policy instruments when evaluating compliance and resistance.   
 
1.3. Rationale and significance of the research 
 
The literature focusing on the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ is highly extensive and complex, 
ranging from studies that pursue ‘top-down’ patterns of interaction and seeking to explain 
domestic reactions to pressures from outside, to analyses that explore the extent to which 
national, regional and local actors manage to include their preferences into EU-level policy-
making. With distinctions being operated between Europeanisation, harmonization and 
convergence, the current study will attempt to put forward a new model of evaluating 
Europeanisation while considering the cases of Romania and Bulgaria which have been less 
often explored, partly due to the still relatively recent EU accession date (January 2007), 
and partly to the complexity of veto points that oppose change. Studies on the two Member 
States have so far focused either on their EU accession process analysing obstacles to 
political, social and economic reform or on the progress registered during the post-
accession period in meeting the benchmarks set under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism. The approach that we are proposing here seeks to obtain a wider outlook of the 
first 8 years within the EU. While maintaining the same “top-bottom” approach in analysing 
domestic change triggered by external pressure, we aim to test the explanatory capacity of 
historical institutionalism and in so doing obtain an understanding of the factors that have 
led to a contrast in performance under the CVM. We also seek to explore assessments from 
national experts and relevant actors regarding the CVM’s efficiency in determining the 
speeding up of reform.   
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1.4. Research design and methods 
 
Before discussing the nature and reasoning for the selected toolkit of methods used in order 
to explore the extent and substance of domestic change resulted in the context of the 
process of European integration, we will begin this section by evidencing the ontological 
and epistemological presuppositions that structure the current study. While some authors 
have questioned the saliency and utility of ontological reflexivity in political science, 
especially in the context of disputes regarding the directionality of the relationship between 
ontology and epistemology7, these reflexive presuppositions remain nonetheless essential 
to the choice of methods used in order to explore the presence or absence of domestic 
change in the context of integration. The interconnectivity between ontology, epistemology 
and methods and the implications for the latter when establishing one’s ontological 
assumptions can be best explained by going back to the very definitions of each term.  
Thus, ontology represents a philosophical branch concerned with the nature of social reality 
or best defined by Blaikie as referring to the assumptions that a particular approach makes 
as to “what exists, what is looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact 
with each other”8.  When applied to the field of European integration, ontology implies the 
exploration of the structure and character of the Europeanisation process, providing an 
answer to the questions of what Europeanisation is and what its components are.  
Epistemology refers to “the claims or assumptions made about the ways in which it is 
possible to gain knowledge of (...) reality, whatever it is understood to be”9. It concerns itself 
“with such issues as the degree of certainty we might legitimately claim for the conclusions 
we are tempted to draw from our analyses (...) and, in general terms, how we might 
adjudicate and defend a preference between contending political explanations”10. Applied to 
the area of EU studies, epistemology discusses the method of exploring the Europeanisation 
process, “and in this sense it analyses what the object of the Europeanisation research is, its 
                                                          
7
 S. Bates, L. Jenkins (2007): “Teaching and Learning Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science”, 
Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 55-63.  
8
 N. Blaikie (1993): Approaches to Social Enquiry (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 6.  
9
 N. Blaikie (1993): Approaches to Social Enquiry, p. 7.  
10
 C. Hay (2002): Political Analysis: A critical Introduction (Basingstoke, Palgrave), p. 63.  
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relations between the theory and practice, or what its limits are”11.  The relation between 
ontological assumptions and epistemology can be considered as cyclical: while we cannot 
know what we are capable of knowing (epistemology) until such time we have settled on 
the nature of the context in which that knowledge must be acquired (ontology)12, invariably 
ontology is grounded in epistemology as it rests upon epistemological priors that enable 
claims about the structure of the real world13. Thus, assuming an ontological choice will 
influence the research questions that will be considered important (epistemology) and to 
take a step further it will also impact upon the methods that will naturally be picked to 
achieve results (the methodological choice)14.  In order to best explain the ontological 
grounding of this study we will briefly approach the structure-agency question, an 
ontological dualism representing the relationship between the political actors we identify 
and the environment in which they find themselves – relationship which in turn places the 
researcher closer to either a more agency-centred or a more structure-centred account. 
Structure is defined as the context or environment of political action which to a certain 
extent shapes the choices of actors and determines political outcomes15. Agency is defined 
as the exertion of causal power and the materialisation of political reality, actors pursuing a 
political agenda, defining policy problems, framing debates, and altering the structure 
through intended and unintended effects of their actions16.   
As this current study aims to explore the extent and nature of domestic change in the 
context of the integration process (focusing on the cases of Romania and Bulgaria), our 
approach will be more inclined towards a structuralist ontological stance, being interested 
in observing how a particular institutional configuration (the European Union and its 
political and legal instruments) has produced an observable outcome (be it transformation 
                                                          
11
 K. Wach (2015):”Conceptualizing Europeanization: Theoretical Approaches and Research Designs”, in P. 
Stanek, K. Wach (eds.) Europeanization Processes from the Mesoeconomic Perspective: Industries and 
Policies (Krakow, Cracow University of Economics), pp. 11-23, p. 18.  
12
 C. Hay (2006): “Political Ontology”, in R.E. Goodin, C. Tilly (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political 
Analysis (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p.8.   
13
 S. Bates, L. Jenkins (2007): “Teaching and Learning Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science”, 
Politics, Vol. 27, No.1, pp. 55-63.  
14
 N. Kauppi (2010): “The Political Ontology of European Integration”, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 
8, No. 1, pp. 19-36.  
15
 C. Hay (2002):Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan), p. 94.   
16
 I. Bache, S. Bulmer, D. Gunay (2011): “Metatheory and Europeanization Research: Let’s Get Critical!”, 
paper delivered at the European Consortium for Political Research General Conference (Reykjavik 25-27 
August, University of Iceland).  
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or incremental change). In this context, it is institutions, rather than rational individuals or 
social forces that are the main units of analysis. At the other end of the spectrum, an 
individualist stance would view the social environment that actors face as not having its 
own causal powers and hence, not autonomous from its components.   
Starting off from the hypothesis that the nature of the instruments used by the European 
Union in order to produce domestic change (legally-binding law, guidelines, targets and 
monitoring etc.) can have an explanatory power in terms of outcome achieved at the 
national level, the research is structured into three main analytical chapters – each based on 
different research methods – following different European modes of governance and 
exploring the extent to which the two member states comply with requirements 
respectively recommendations. In an attempt to avoid focusing on an exclusively ‘top-down’ 
approach, chapter 4 which follows the different track records of the two countries under the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) expands the model in order to introduce 
explanatory variables specific to a bottom-up approach. In this sense, it is argued that while 
permissive conditions (in the form of pressure mechanisms used by the EU during Romania 
and Bulgaria’s pre-accession period17) for change to occur exist in both cases, the absence 
or presence of productive domestic conditions (embodied by national change agents or 
norm entrepreneurs) influences the probability of a critical juncture to occur and for a new 
institutional path to become locked in over time. The toolkit used in this particular chapter 
includes process tracing and a series of semi-structured interviews carried out with 
government representatives, national experts on anti-corruption policies and the fight 
against organised crime and Members of the European Parliament. Process tracing which is 
a tool of qualitative analysis is a preferred method as it can make decisive contributions to 
evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses. The steps followed in applying this method 
include finding diagnostic evidence (the hypothesis of critical junctures being dependent on 
the co-existence of permissive and productive conditions) and descriptive inference 
(focusing on the unfolding of situations over time)18. A total of 11 interviews were secured 
with national experts and political actors on the one hand to corroborate the validity of the 
explanatory hypotheses evaluated through process tracing and on the other hand to obtain 
                                                          
17
 Pressure mechanisms understood here as increased monitoring, gate-keeping and differentiation 
strategies, provision of institutional models, financial assistance and twinning.  
18
 For further on process tracing see D. Collier (2011): “Understanding Process Tracing”, Political Science 
and Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 823-30.  
18 
 
a better understanding of the impact of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. The 
semi-structured interviews (integrating a combination of pre-planned and spontaneous 
questions in response to the participant’s answers) which typically lasted 50 minutes, were 
recorded using a digital recorder and were coupled with a subsequent transcription. 
Interviewee selection was considered a methodological question as well, in line with Bogner 
and Menz’s observations regarding the definition of the term “expert”. As such, according to 
Bogner and Menz, expertise is defined not only by functional aspects (knowledge in the field 
of professional activity), but also in terms of relevance19. As such an expert is defined by the 
potential influence of their knowledge and interpretations, by their possibility to implement 
their priorities (at least in part) and their ability to structure the conditions for other actors 
in their field of activity. In order to avoid a biased expert selection (risk that could 
materialise with snowball-sampling), a list of organisations was drawn so that both state 
representatives (attached to different ideologies) and civil society members would be 
included in the sample.  
For the analysis of the progress registered by Romania and Bulgaria in reaching their 
national targets set under the Europe 2020 Strategy, Country-Specific Recommendations 
elaborated during the European Semester have been examined, as well as successive 
National Reform Programmes, national and European statistics, governmental strategies 
and evaluations. Document analysis, understood as a qualitative research method implying 
the examination and interpretation of multiple sources of evidence for the development of 
empirical knowledge, was used in order to identify which objectives are more emphasised 
by the European Commission and the Council in their regular monitoring of the two 
member states. Document analysis was also used in order to follow national policy 
development over time. By following the National Reform Programmes of the two countries 
(starting from 2011 and analysing all of the yearly updates until 2015 for both countries) 
we were able to track changes and development in policies concerning employment and 
education. The resulting information was corroborated with national statistics on 
unemployment, school drop-out, and funding allocations in order to evaluate the distance 
between the nationally adopted targets (on employment, education, social inclusion etc.) 
under the Europe 2020 Strategy and the in situ progress achieved.  
                                                          
19
 A. Bogner, W. Menz (2002): “Das Theoriegenerierende Expertinterview – Erkenntnisinteresse, 
Wissensform, Interaktion” in A. Bogner, B. Littig, W. Menz (eds.) Das Expertinterview (Opladen, Leske & 
Budrich), pp. 71-95.  
19 
 
As the main objective of the study is to explore domestic change in Romania and Bulgaria as 
a response to various European instruments, the study will also be based on a dataset that 
clusters the population of instances of delay in transposition (translated as cases of non-
communication) and incorrect application into national legislation of European directives 
covered by the Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law between 
2007 and 2015. However, while restricting the dataset only to information on the 
transposition record of the two member states will allow us to test correlations between 
delay in integrating European directives into national legislation and different institutional 
variables (both EU directive specific variables and national implementing measure specific 
variables) in these two cases, we would not be able to extend our observations to the 
European level and to argue whether the proposed variables exert similar effects both in 
Romania and Bulgaria’s case and other EU member states. Taking into consideration the 
extensive amount of information to be collected even for the restricted period of five years, 
we will not have the possibility to put forward at this stage a cross-national analysis that 
would include all 28 EU member states. Nevertheless, in order to assure a representative 
sample, the dataset was constructed based on several criteria of state selection. The criteria 
account for the distinction between accession dates (i.e. founding, older and newer member 
states), the size of populations (differentiated according to the data provided by the 
European Commission20) type of legal system (i.e. civil law vs. common law), type of 
political system (i.e. federal vs. unitary structures) and evidenced compliance performance 
(relatively low vs. high numbers of infringements). Information was thus collected with 
respect to seven member states: Romania, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, 
Italy and Poland, creating a dataset of 7708 infringement cases for the period 2007-2015. 
The average number of days of delay was calculated for Romania and Bulgaria in order to 
test a series of hypotheses that assumed a correlation between voting power in the Council 
of Ministers, the number of national implementation measures and propensity towards 
delayed implementation of EU law. 
Overall, the research toolkit used by the study comprises different methods in order to limit 
the inherent individual weaknesses of each method. As such, elite interviews are used in 
order to obtain data unavailable through document analysis and which is central to 
comprehensive causal explanations which are in turn reached through process tracing.  
                                                          
20 Eurostat (2013): Population on 1 January 2013, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature review on Transposition and Implementation of 
European legislation 
 
 
The European Union is perceived today as having evolved from an instrument of 
centralising Europe’s steel sector into a potent regime that regulates an astonishing variety 
of policies21. The myriad of directives, regulations, and decisions corroborated by the web of 
related national laws form the fabric of the EU and despite the almost mundane character of 
rule production, the implementation of the EU legislation by member states is marked by 
diverse incentives to protract or even abandon the application of these norms.  
2.1. Defining Compliance 
 
In a legal context, compliance implies abiding by existing norms. In the context of EU 
legislation, compliance represents a complex process often requiring a preliminary, formal 
phase of adoption of the necessary national laws and regulations, the development of 
secondary rules interpreting and specifying the legislative framework, and conducting 
activities to ensure that the laws are applied in practice22. The formal phase is also known 
as the transposition process and it represents an essential step conducted by the public 
authorities (involving ministries, the government, or the Parliament depending on the 
circumstances). At this stage the national administrations will conduct technical processes 
such as identifying the internal legislation relevant to the directive, drafting the 
transposition measures and processing them through the rule-making machinery of the 
state23. The implementation phase encompasses the actions of the public authorities to 
                                                          
21 E. Mastenbroek (2005): “EU Compliance: Still a ‘Black Hole’?”; Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, 
pp. 1103-1120, p. 1103.  
22 D. Toshkov (2009): Between Politics and Administration: Compliance with EU Law in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Leiden, Leiden University, unpublished doctoral thesis, p. 4.  
23 Ibid., p. 58.  
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ensure that the legislation is transformed into practices. Hence in this context, compliance 
refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the provision of the accord and to the 
implementing measures that they have instituted24. Nevertheless, there are slightly 
different interpretations that consider transposition, enforcement (monitoring, controlling 
and ensuring the application of law) and application to be different stages of 
implementation which in turn is synonymous with compliance25.  
The debate about the compliance deficit in the EU began in the mid 80s, partly due to the 
European Commission’s interest in keeping the issue under attentive supervision in 
fulfilment of its role of guardian of the treaty26. However, the issue of norm compliance 
became stringent in the early 1990s, when the process of building a single European market 
implied the transposition of an impressive legislative programme comprising some 300 
measures. However, if in 1991 the transposition rate of the twelve member states averaged 
65 per cent27, currently, around 1.2 per cent of all EU directives in force are not transposed 
within the deadlines, according to official estimates28. The existing literature on the process 
of transposition can be broadly divided between studies that have as research focus several 
member states29 and in-depth analyses of implementation in one or two countries30.   
 
 
 
                                                          
24 H. Jacobson, E. Brown-Weiss (1995): “Compliance with International Environmental Accords”, Global 
Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 119-48, p. 123.  
25 G. Falkner, M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber, O. Treib (2002): “Transforming Social Policy in Europe? The EC’s Parental 
Leave Directive and Misfit in the 15 Member States”, MPIfG Working Paper No. 02/11 (Vienna, Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies), p. 1.  
26 E. Borghetto, F. Franchino, D. Giannetti (2006): “Complying with the Transposition Deadlines of EU Directives. 
Evidence from Italy”; Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche, No. 1, pp. 7-38, p. 8.  
27 J. Pelkmans (1991): “Toward Economic Union”, in Centre for European Policy Studies, Setting European 
Community Priorities 1991-1992 (Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies), pp. 39-100.   
28 European Commission (2011): Internal Market Scoreboard, Edition 23 (Brussels, September 2011).  
29 Such as A. Zhelyazkova, R. Torenvlied (2011): “The successful Transposition of European Provisions by 
Member States: Application to the Framework Equality Directive”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 
5, pp. 690-708; B. Steunenberg, D. Toshkov (2009): “Comparing Transposition in the 27 Member States of the 
EU: the Impact of Discretion and Legal Fit”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 951-970; T. 
Börzel, M. Dudziak, T. Hofmann, D. Panke, C. Sprungk (2007): “Recalcitrance, Inefficiency and Support for 
European Integration. Why Member States Do (Not) Comply with European Law”; CES Working Paper No. 151, 
(Massachusetts, Harvard University); M. Kaeding (2006): “Determinants of Transposition Delay in the European 
Union”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 229-53.  
30 E. Mastenbroek (2003): “Surviving the Deadline: the Transposition of EU Directives in the Netherlands”, 
European Union Politics (Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 371-95); E. Borghetto, F. Franchino, D. Giannetti (2006): “Complying 
with the Transposition Deadlines of EU Directives. Evidence from Italy”; F. Trauner (2009): “Post-accession 
compliance with EU law in Bulgaria and Romania: a comparative perspective”, EIOP, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 1-18.  
22 
 
2.2. Qualitative studies 
 
At the same time, there is a marked distinction between preferences for quantitative 
research approaches to the process of transposition and qualitative methods employed in 
order to explore the factors that determine variation in rule adoption. Researchers 
developing explanatory studies have generally preferred qualitative methods, the typical 
set-up being that of comparing compliance with a small number of directives (with notable 
exceptions such as Falkner et al. 2005)31. In analysing the factors that drive the 
implementation of directives, Duina considers the effects that the goodness of fit (degree to 
which the directive is in line with the current policy legacy of a country and with the 
organisation of interest groups), the attitude of a country towards the idea of Europe, the 
political opposition towards a directive and the complexity of the legislative processes 
within a member state. In order to test these hypotheses, the study focuses on the fate of the 
Equal Pay Directive in France, Italy and the UK, concluding that in order to benefit of a 
higher rate of transposition, the European Commission needs to design directives in light of 
the institutional contexts of each member state32.  
More recent qualitative studies put forward a vast range of explanatory factors for the 
dependent variable (compliance or its different phases). Börzel and Risse emphasise the 
importance of the adaptation pressures exerted by EU directives, noting though the 
imperative presence of other mediating factors such as the absence of multiple veto points, 
the presence of supporting institutions that would facilitate change, the positive influence of 
norm entrepreneurs (or change agents) and the existence of a cooperative political 
culture33. On the basis of empirical evidence from the transposition of six employment 
rights directives in Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK, Treib demonstrates the 
importance of domestic party politics in determining transposition performance34.  
Contrary to an extensive body of literature based on the goodness of fit as the main 
explanatory factor for transposition, Falkner et al. conclude that, for the field of labour 
                                                          
31 G. Falkner, O. Treib, M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber (2005): Complying with Europe? The Impact of EU Minimum 
Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).  
32 F. Duina (1997): “Explaining Legal Implementation in the European Union”, International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law, Vol. 25, pp. 155-79.  
33 T. Börzel, T. Risse (2003): “Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in K. Featherstone, C. Radaelli 
(eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford, Oxford University Press).  
34 O. Treib (2003): “EU Governance, Misfit and the Partisan Logic of Domestic Adaptation: An Actor-Centred 
Perspective on the Transposition of EU Directives”, Paper presented at the EUSA 8th International Biennial 
Conference (Nashville, 27-29 March 2003), also available at http://aei.pitt.edu/6566/1/001317_1.PDF.  
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policy, the administrative and legal problems playing a notable role. The study finds that 
member states with a remarkably good fit with the EU labour directives, such as France and 
Germany, were “laggards” in implementation, whereas the UK and Ireland tended to comply 
well and in due time despite the high degree of misfit35.  Moreover, this large scale research 
identifies different worlds of compliance (world of law observance, of domestic politics and 
of transposition neglect) rooted in the cultural and political characteristics of the member 
states which have in turn an impact on the timeframe of transposition. Using an actor-
oriented approach, Steuenenberg demonstrates that single-player coordination is better 
capable of adapting a directive to domestic preferences than is multi-player coordination. 
Multi-player coordination entails the implication of two or more higher-level players in the 
handling of a directive. The hypothesis is applied on the case of the transposition of the 
laying hens directive, whose implementation in the Netherlands was delayed with more 
than two years past the official deadline. Consequently, the different dynamics of the single-
player coordination was illustrated by the early implementation in the same member state 
of the cocoa and chocolate products directive36.  
Distinguishing themselves from the more agent-oriented approaches, Dimitrova and 
Rhinard analyse the importance of concordance between first, second and third-order 
norms and European directives. In their view, first-order norms refer to those rules guiding 
the management of policy programmes (e.g. safety guidelines, water purification standards 
etc.), second-order norms are those making claims on a wider section of the political 
community (e.g. approaches to managing markets, to environmental protection etc.). 
Finally, third-order norms are related to the basic foundations and societal cleavages. The 
authors argue, by illustrating through the case of the anti-discrimination directives and 
their transposition in Slovakia, that the level of domestic norm implicated by an EU norm 
affects the outcome of the transposition. If the highest order norms in a domestic setting are 
potentially affected by European directives, then this situation will lead to further problems 
with transposition37.  
Adopting an inductive research strategy, Trauner analyses Romania and Bulgaria’s recent 
transposition record, concluding that at a first glance the complexity of the legislative 
                                                          
35 G. Falkner, O. Treib, M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber (2005): Complying with Europe. EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in 
the Member States (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).  
36 B. Steunenberg (2006): “Turning swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay: National Policy Coordination 
and the Transposition of EU Directives”, European Union Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 293-319.  
37 A. Dimitrova, M. Rihnard (2005): “The Power of Norms in the Transposition of EU Directives”, EIOP, Vol. 9, No. 
16, pp. 1-25.  
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process, the problematic law enforcement structures and governance standards can be 
considered as the main explanatory factors for the registered shortcomings at the 
enforcement stage and the actual application of EU law in the two member states38. 
Focusing more on the relationship between member states and the European Commission 
and on the member state-provision dyad, Thomson illustrates how the Commission’s lack of 
explicit support for a provision can influence a member state’s incentive to comply. As such, 
the author presents the case of four labour market directives incorrectly or incompletely 
transposed in Germany, Spain and Portugal. The fundamental premise of the research 
project is the fact that the distinction between political decision-makers and implementers 
is blurred in the EU, since national governments are among the decision-makers and are 
also responsible for transposing directives. The study concludes that in the absence of 
explicit support for a provision from the Commission, states with incentives to deviate are 
three times more likely to exhibit protracted non-compliance than the states without 
incentives to deviate. One way in which the Commission can reiterate the need for a correct 
transposition of a directive is through the statements it makes prior to the adoption of 
directives or by offering member states the perception of an intense monitoring of 
compliance (willing to initiate infringement proceedings in the event of incorrect 
transposition)39.  
 
2.3. Quantitative Studies 
 
More recently, an increasing number of researchers have explored the causal relationships 
between different explanatory factors and compliance with EU law through quantitative 
studies40. Quantitative works have generally made recourse at a selected range of variables 
from which we mention political stability, attitude towards the EU, corporatism, efficient 
                                                          
38 F. Trauner (2009): Post-accession compliance with EU law in Bulgaria and Romania: a comparative 
perspective, Institute for European Integration Research Working Papers No. 1/2009 (Vienna, Austrian Academy 
of Sciences).  
39 R. Thomson (2010): “Opposition through the Back Door in the Transposition of EU Directives”, European 
Union Politics, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 577-96.  
40 A. Mbaye (2001): “Why National States Comply with Supranational Law”, European Union Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
pp. 259-81; E. Mastenbroek (2003): “Surviving the deadline: the transposition of EU Directives in the 
Netherlands”; B. Steunenberg, D. Toshkov (2009): “Comparing Transposition in the 27 Member States of the EU: 
the Impact of Discretion and Legal Fit”.  
25 
 
political institutions41, political power and administrative capacity42, the number of veto 
players involved in the transposition process, the number of legal instruments needed for 
full transposition, the level of corruption in the administration of a state43 the time 
employed to abide by EU law44 and the level of discretion45. The advantage of quantitative 
research is that it permits generalisation and the control for confounding variables. 
However, an important downside is that  it favours the use of indicators which allow easy 
measurements across countries.46  
In testing the influence upon transposition of a set of independent variables comprising a 
stable political culture, the mass opinion and attitudes towards the EU, the role of interest 
groups and the overall political institutional setting, Lampien and Uusikylä conclude that a 
stable political culture combined with efficient and flexible institutional politico-
administrative design are the best predictors of successful implementation of common 
European policies. The study is based on comparative implementation data from the Annual 
Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law produced by the European 
Commission and it observed the behaviour of twelve member states47.   
Analysing cross-national variance in infringement proceeding counts, Mbaye demonstrates 
a positive relationship between bargaining power in the Council of Ministers and non-
compliance. The study also illustrates that states comparatively more powerful 
economically perpetrate fewer cases of non-compliance, the potential explanation being 
that in an economically based European Union, economic powerhouses may have sway in 
crafting policies and hence have the interest to see them materialising48.  
Kaeding’s dual level analysis – national and European – concludes that transposition delay 
of more than six months was apparently more of a problem in the 1980s and 1990s than in 
recent transposition history. As the number of veto players grows and the transposition 
                                                          
41 R. Lampien, P. Uusikylä (1998): “Implementation deficit – Why Member States Do Not Comply with EU 
Directives”, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 231-51.  
42 T. Börzel, M. Dudziak, T. Hofmann, D. Panke, C. Sprungk (2007): “Recalcitrance, Inefficiency and Support for 
European Integration. Why Member States Do (Not) Comply with European Law”.  
43 M. Kaeding (2006): “Determinants of Transposition Delay in the European Union”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 
26, No. 2, pp. 229-53.  
44 E. Borghetto, F. Franchino, D. Giannetti (2006): “Complying with the Transposition Deadlines of EU Directives. 
Evidence from Italy”.  
45 B. Steunenberg, D. Toshkov (2009): “Comparing Transposition in the 27 Member States of the EU: the Impact 
of Discretion and Legal Fit”. 
46 E. Mastenbroek (2005): “EU Compliance: Still a ‘Black Hole’?”, p. 1113.  
47 R. Lampien, P. Uusikylä (1998): “Implementation deficit – Why Member States Do Not Comply with EU 
Directives”, p. 248.  
48 A. Mbaye (2001): “Why National States Comply with Supranational Law”, p. 275.  
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time set in the directive diminishes, the study observes more cases of longer delays in 
transposition. Moreover, Kaeding observes that the EU directive’s level of detail embodied 
by the number of recitals (which explain the background to the legislation and the aims and 
objectives that it has) slows down the transposition process and introducing a new topic of 
legislation requires more time to be fully complied with by the member states49.  
Approaching a deductive strategy for research, Börzel et al. test the independent variables 
put forward by three prominent compliance approaches in the International Relations 
literature: enforcement, management and legitimacy approaches. While enforcement 
approaches assume that states violate international norms voluntarily because they are not 
willing to bear the costs of compliance, in contrast, the management perspectives find the 
lack of necessary sources to be the reason for which states fail to comply. The third view ties 
compliance with the degree to which a norm is internalised and accepted as a standard for 
appropriate behaviour. In order to test these assumptions, the project relies on a 
comprehensive set of all of the cases that the European Commission has opened against 
member states violating European law between 1978 and 1999 (containing the nature of 
non-compliance, the type of law infringed on, the policy sector, the violating member state 
and measures taken by EU institutions in response). The empirical findings show that the 
combined model of enforcement and management approach has the highest explanatory 
power, illustrating that the best compliers are member states that have ample 
administrative capacity and lack the power to resist compliance, while the worst 
transposition records are held by countries with limited capacity, but enough power to 
resist the Commission’s enforcement efforts50.  
While focusing on the transposition record of Eastern Europe member states (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), Toshkov observes 
that implementing legislation is less likely to be transposed on time than regular directives, 
the Commission directives being usually considered of lesser importance – specifying or 
updating a regulatory framework already laid down elsewhere. Moreover, legislation is 
more likely to be timely transposed if the previous three years have been marked by the 
governance of a more pro-European party of coalition. Similarly, governments leaning 
towards the right on a left/right socio-economic dimension are again more prone to respect 
                                                          
49 M. Kaeding (2006): “Determinants of Transposition Delay in the European Union”, p. 248.  
50 T. Börzel, M. Dudziak, T. Hofmann, D. Panke, C. Sprungk (2007): “Recalcitrance, Inefficiency and Support for 
European Integration. Why Member States Do (Not) Comply with European Law”, p. 1.  
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the deadlines of directives. A strong negative relationship is also being observed in the case 
of the number of parties in government and the probability that EU legislation will be 
transposed on time. Nevertheless, Toshkov also observes sectoral differences in 
transposition performance, with the Internal Market legislation being significantly more 
likely to be transposed within the deadline. In contrast environmental legislation, being the 
most costly, is less likely to have been transposed on time51.  
 
2.4. Mixed Methods Studies 
 
As a result of the intense debates on competing explanations for the observed compliance 
patterns which have emerged in the past years among scholars developing projects based 
on qualitative and quantitative methods, a new body of work which is based on a productive 
combination of both approaches. As Luetgert and Dannwolf observe, the mixed method 
approach renders possible both an analysis of the key explanatory factors in the domestic 
transposition of EU directives and the identification of the decisive underlying structure of 
national transposition patterns across the member states and policy sectors52. As such, 
Luetgert and Dannwolf develop a nested analysis of transposition timeliness across nine 
member states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and Spain) and 1192 directives, and observe that both capacity and preferences matter, but 
possibly at different times. The study also illustrates cross-sectional differences in 
countries, an interesting dyad being that of Denmark and Italy. While in the case of 
Denmark the social and environment policies represent the fields with fewer transposition 
problems, for Italy the area identified as ‘common rules’ causes the fewest issues53.  
Another notable mixed method project tests the effects of technical fit, discretion, 
Commission warnings and conflict in the Council on the probability of member state 
transposition of separate EU policy requirements. Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied analyse the 
level of compliance of 15 member states with 27 major provisions laid down in the 
Framework Equality Directive. The study relies on elaborate content analysis of numerous 
                                                          
51 D. Toshkov (2008): “Embracing European Law. Compliance with EU Directives in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, European Union Politics, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 379-402, pp. 392-95.  
52 B. Luetgert, T. Dannwolf (2009): “Mixing Methods. A Nested Analysis of EU Member State Transposition 
Patterns”, European Union Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 307-34, p. 310.  
53 Ibid., p. 325.  
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implementation reports about the transposition of the directive by the 15 member states 
and also applies statistical models to a single case by moving to a lower level of analysis: the 
provision level. The results of the project indicated poor transposition of the provisions of 
the Framework Equality Directive years after the deadline had passed and despite the fact 
that all member states had communicated transposition measures to the Commission. The 
researchers also notice that states are more likely to comply with provisions that require 
only marginal changes to the existing documents, that discretion facilitates member states’ 
transposition success for medium levels, but not for low levels of technical fit and 
nevertheless that countries that received a formal warning by the Commission in the past 
have achieved a better transposition record later on than those that were not sanctioned54.  
In contrast to studies focusing on compliance with legally-binding instruments, Terpan 
argues that in the case of soft law instruments – distinguished from hard law through the 
absence of the obligatory character, enforcement is about procedures aimed at ensuring 
compliance without necessarily resorting to coercion or constraint. In this case compliance 
only depends on the actors’ political will and the extent to which they assume a normative 
commitment55.  
As we have observed up until now, different sets of variables that would explain the 
transposition record of EU member states have been explored both through qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Different worlds of compliance have been identified and cases have 
been clustered into ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states. Debates have been generated when 
judging the primacy and need for more parsimonious and generalizable hypothesis over the 
development of more in-depth study cases. The range of possible explanations for the 
compliance performance is, from our overview on the existing literature, extensive, 
encompassing goodness of fit, power, institutions, number of involved actors, culture, etc. 
The levels of analysis also vary – national, European, policy sector, provision etc. Moreover, 
almost all of the existing studies are rather eclectic in the theoretical perspectives from 
which they borrow different concepts. As it is visible, a clearer cut distinction is between the 
methods of research employed rather than the intellectual stance that the authors take in 
their research. 
                                                          
54 A. Zhelyazkova, R. Torenvlied (2011): “The Successful Transposition of European Provisions by Member 
States: Application to the Framework Equality Directive”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 5, pp. 
690-708, p. 704. 
55 F. Terpan (2015): “Soft Law in the European Union. The Changing Nature of EU Law”, European Law Journal, 
Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 68-96.   
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Chapter 3 
Conceptualising the impact of institutions upon actors’ 
behaviour: of institutions-as-constraint, path-dependency 
and isomorphism 
 
 
In order to understand the degree to which the European Union has exerted its 
‘transformative power’ during the post-accession period generating institutional change 
within Romania and Bulgaria’s domestic structures, we will start off by exploring the 
concept that represents the foundation of institutional adaptation and change as a 
consequence of EU integration: Europeanisation. As the areas of influence to which the 
concept applies have been broadened by an impressive variety of academic works, we need 
to set the taxonomy or the explanatory toolbox that would demarcate both the objectives of 
our research and implicitly its limits.  
The next step is to delineate the hypotheses of the study which attempt to respond to our 
research question – to what extent and under what conditions has the EU shaped 
institutional and policy choices in Romania and Bulgaria after 2007? We specifically focus 
on the post-accession period, as we intend on differentiating between incentives for rule 
abidance associated with maximising gains (when the transformative power of the EU is 
strongly connected to the candidate countries’ objective of obtaining EU membership 
during the pre-accession, the opening and the course of accession negotiations56) and 
constraints and incentives that generate specific patterns of behaviour which are 
determined by the institutional path taken by a state. As hypotheses play the role of a 
vehicle for testing the validity of theoretical assumptions, we firstly demarcate the main 
points of differentiation between the three main branches of the new institutionalist theory 
– rational choice, historical and sociological – while introducing mediating factors and 
potential outcomes which would aid in determining the extent of EU post-accession 
influence.  
                                                          
56 T. Haughton (2007): “When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in 
Central and Eastern Europe”, Political Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 233-246.  
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In addition, we differentiate between the domestic and the EU level mechanisms of 
Europeanisation, the former set of triggers forming the dependent variable while the latter 
being operationalised as the independent variable. Whereas variation in the dependent 
variable is assumed by the theoretical framework, variation in the independent variable will 
follow Knill’s fundamental principle which substantiates his policy-analytical framework – 
the potential for change at the domestic level varies with respect to EU governance 
patterns57. As such, one of the main assumptions of this study underlines the connection 
between the continuous and gradual evolution of the EU system, the changes of the EU 
decision-making process, and the variation in compliance at the national level.  
Understanding the impact that the European Union has had upon institutional and policy 
change in Romania and Bulgaria both during the pre-accession phase, but especially after 
membership had been granted entails an initial analysis of the range of modes and 
instruments of EU governance. Whilst an ontological exploration of the nature of EU polity 
and the forces driving polity formation are not included in the scope of this study, we will 
draw on findings of the vast ‘new governance’ scholarship in order to explore the 
underpinning mechanisms that generate change which are specific to the different modes of 
governance.  
However, before addressing the impact of EU governance patterns on domestic adaptation, 
we need first to tackle the broader context of the new institutionalism and discuss both the 
theoretical core of the school and the epistemological and to some extent ontological 
differences between the rational choice, sociological and the historical approaches to 
institutionalism.  
The following theoretical analysis will start off by exploring the ambivalence of the 
Europeanisation process (downloading and uploading norms and procedures) and identify 
the level of analysis which this study will take. As the policy-analytical model which we will 
use to explain change at the domestic level as a result of EU influence is founded on a 
theoretical framework that borrows elements both from institution-based and agency-
based approaches in the new institutionalist agenda, we will explore the different 
assumptions put forward by each. We will then proceed by presenting three theoretical 
models of Europeanisation and finish by enriching their explanatory capacity with a 
                                                          
57 M. Bauer, C. Knill. D. Pitschel (2007): “Differential Europeanization in Eastern Europe: The Impact of Diverse 
EU Regulatory Governance Patterns”,  Journal of European Integration, Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 406, pp. 405-23. 
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discussion of potential mediating factors that would aid in explaining the expected degree of 
domestic change adjusting to Europeanization58 and the possible outcomes of this process.  
 
3.1. Dimensions of the Europeanisation process: location, nature and 
consequences of change  
 
National reforms and change resulting as a response to the pressure stemming from the 
European level has been explored by the academic relevant literature as a form of ‘top-
bottom’ Europeanisation. But it reflects not only a process, but an area of enquiry, with 
change being regarded as the inherent result and the intensity of change providing insight 
into the characteristics of the phenomena. The concept itself came under rigorous academic 
scrutiny, its necessity and utility being questioned as other terms such as the theory-laden 
‘European integration’ and ‘spillover’ or contiguous concepts such as ‘harmonisation’ or 
‘convergence’ seemed to already respond to some of the functions of the latter. Hence, we 
will start our analysis by gauging the relationship between these terms. As Radaelli 
observes, convergence represents a possible, but not implicit consequence of the process of 
Europeanisation59, divergence being a potential outcome as well. An illustration of the co-
existence of these consequences after the gradual ‘deepening’ of the EU’s influence over 
other policy areas and the ‘widening’ of the regional organisation is presented in Draxler 
and Van Vliet’s study of the European Social Model60. The authors argue that while social 
spending levels have converged across the old members states (a trend which has 
continued since the 1980s), social policy reforms in the new member states (of the 2004 
and 2007 accession waves) had a different trajectory being calibrated by the existent level 
of economic development and by the EU’s accent on promoting the common market and 
economic growth in the region.  
Harmonisation should not be regarded as an accurate equivalent of Europeanisation either. 
The former concept can be loosely defined as a voluntary shift towards adjusting the 
                                                          
58 Based on the framework proposed by T. Risse, M. Green Cowles, J. Caporaso (2001): “Europeanization and 
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regulatory requirements or governmental policies of different jurisdictions so that the 
problems arising as a result of the legislative and institutional variation would be alleviated.  
The areas subject to harmonisation vary from fairly specific rules that regulate the outcome, 
characteristics, or performance of goods, actors and institutions (e.g. the Product Liability 
Directive61), to more general governmental policy objectives (e.g. setting standards for the 
average workweek), agreed principles that limit the structure or implementation of policies 
(e.g. the “polluter pays” adopted both by the EU and the OECD), and finally institutional 
structures and procedures that would reinforce other types of harmonisation62 (e.g. the 
European Fiscal Compact that institutes a modus operandi for fiscal discipline63).  The 
outcome of normative attuning represents the point of departure between the two 
concepts. Harmonisation targets a level playing field, while the result of Europeanisation 
can take the form of regulatory diversity, intense competition and in some cases even 
distortions of competition64. A more in-depth exploration of the effects that the EU 
accession had on democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern European countries65 also 
draws attention to the heavy reliance of domestic political actors on a largely European-set 
policy agenda which could limit their accountability, lead to the attrition of the legislative 
power, distorted party competition and populist backlash. Moreover, as European 
integration has been regarded in the region first and foremost as an institution building 
process, the legitimacy of the ‘externally-imposed’ institutions could be contested66. The 
accession of Eastern and Central European countries presented greenfield investors with 
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Slavica Iaponica, Vol. 25, pp. 1-28.  
66 This was the case with the Romanian National Integrity Agency – institution established in 2007 as a result of 
numerous EU requests for the development of an efficient mechanism to tackle high-level corruption. In 2010 
the Romanian Constitutional Court severely diminished the Agency’s prerogatives after deeming as 
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the benefit of low production costs for the relocation of manufacturing and service 
activities. However this also triggered an incentive competition with Western Europe that 
led to subsequent policy deviation from European competition rules67.  
We also need to differentiate between Europeanisation and spillover, the former, in its most 
general formulation, referring to “a logic whereby initial steps toward integration trigger 
endogenous economic and political dynamics which provide an impetus for further 
integration”68. The concept can be broken into three types: functional – indicated when 
integration in one sector creates momentum and necessity for further integration both in 
the same and in other sectors69. Political spillover, by contrast, describes the accretion of 
new powers to a central supranational institution, based on the changing demands and 
expectations of actors such as interest groups and political parties who become aware that 
their objectives can no longer be adequately served at the national level.  Although the 
above outlined processes provide strong pressures for further integration, the cultivated 
spillover hypothesis assumes that central institutions such as the European Commission 
(which embodies the common interest of the member states) will advance the result of 
negotiations beyond a “minimum common denominator” leading to an expansion of the 
powers of the international agency70. Representing a fundamental explanatory factor 
deployed by neo-functionalist theoreticians to justify the extent and pace of European 
integration, the concept of spillover focuses more on a level of analysis specific to grand 
theories: the supranational one, the emphasis being placed on the factors that generate the 
dynamic for further integration (i.e. the role played by non-state actors). As we shall 
observe next in our attempt to conceptualise Europeanisation, the process is an integrative 
one that involves both projection and reception and that operates concurrently at the 
domestic and the EU levels of policy-making. Hence, loyalty transfer and expansive sector 
integration represent pre-requisite stages of the process of European-level 
institutionalisation. Subsequently, Europeanisation can be regarded as an effect of but at the 
same time a trigger for ‘deeper’ European integration. As Radaelli observes, the latter 
concept operates at the ontological stage of research – exploring a process in which 
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countries pool sovereignty, whereas the former is post-ontological, being concerned with 
aftermath of the creation of EU institutions and with the effects they produce71.  
3.1.1. Defining Europeanisation  
 
So what does Europeanisation mean? Any attempt to define the term would be dependent 
on the level of analysis adopted. As such, focusing on the supranational level, Lawton 
suggests that the concept represents the de jure transfer of sovereignty from national 
governments to supranational institutions72. In this case, Europeanisation is inherently 
connected to institution-building at the European level, while the national level is far from 
centre stage.  
In his study of the effects that the EU exerts upon France’s politics and institutions, Ladrech 
provides an interpretation of the concept that shifts the focus to the domestic sphere, 
distinguishing Europeanisation as an incremental process that internalises EU political and 
economic dynamics into the national politics and policy-making, inducing adaptive 
processes73. While the reorientation of domestic organisational logics triggered by 
Europeanisation is acknowledged, Laudrech also draws attention to the fact that pre-
existing national structures and internal developments are likely to play the role of 
mediating factors for ‘external’ pressures. The understanding of the concept in this case is a 
top-down one, but contrasted to the previous definitions it brings into focus the national-
specific adaptation strategies to external factors. Moreover, the terminology used 
sufficiently differentiates Europeanisation from neighbouring semantic terrains (European 
integration, harmonisation etc.). The downside however is represented by a narrowing of 
the components of domestic structures that can be under the pressure to adapt.  
Recognising the interconnectivity between different levels of governance (supra-national, 
national, and sub-national), Caporaso, Green-Cowles and Risse extend the definition to the 
emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance that 
formalise interactions among actors and of policy networks specialising in the creation of 
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authoritative European rules74. This perspective detaches itself from traditional uses of the 
term – connected as we have seen to the development of the EU institutional framework, 
and emphasises the development of new layers of politics that interact with older ones. 
While the authors go on explaining that the focus is on the impact that the European Union 
has upon domestic structures which entail both formal (political and social systems and 
their components) and informal institutions (policy networks, epistemic communities and 
cultures), the definition that they provide seems to offer more attention to the development 
and interaction of EU interest groups and their national counterparts which is not an ever-
present phenomenon in European governance75.   
In an endeavour to illustrate the complexity of the concept and the different processes it can 
be attached to, Olsen differentiates five phenomena that could bear the same label and 
assigns in each case subsequent mechanisms through which institutional change can 
occur76. The first implies the territorial expansion of a system of governance and the 
configuration of a single European political space through enlargement. A potential 
mechanism that fuels the dynamics of expansion is that of rule following which indicates a 
quasi-mechanical transformation. Institutional change is normatively driven, meaning that 
new states are being granted membership in a regional organisation such as the European 
Union as a consequence of a routine application of stable criteria for entry and the 
execution of standard operating procedures to pre-specified situations77. The second case 
revolves around the development of supranational institutions with the capacity of 
enforcing binding decisions and sanctioning non-compliance of member states. The frame 
used for understanding the dynamics of European-level institutional development is 
purposeful decision-making which regards institutional change as the outcome of voluntary 
agreements among the relevant actors. The third instance refers to the development of a 
multi-level governance system and the need for national adaptation and coordination with a 
European political centre. In this case, experiential learning and competitive selection are 
the two basic mechanisms through which European-level developments penetrate the 
domestic level and produce change78. Experiential learning suggests that institutional 
change is dependent upon the responses of relevant actors to alternative forms of domestic 
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organisation and governance. In models of competitive selection, environmental 
imperatives such as institutions’ own performance and their comparative advantages are 
drivers of change. The fourth interpretation emphasises the extension beyond the 
geographical borders of Europe of the political organisation and governance that is typical 
and distinct for the Union. The global extension of the European model can be based on a 
process of diffusion and institutional change in this case is dependent on the exposure and 
the attractiveness of the European forms of governance. The last conceptualisation connects 
the strengthening of the European political entity with some or all of the factors mentioned 
previously, deepened unification involving mutual adaptation among co-evolving 
institutions with the sub-national, national, European and even global levels interacting in 
intricate ways.  While this differentiation might at a first glance indicate separate 
interpretations of Europeanisation, the five conceptualisations are inclusive rather than 
exclusive. As Howell observes, European enlargement (prior to EU membership) implies 
exporting EU governance procedures beyond EU borders, but also implies policy change for 
existing members in order to take into account the extension79. However, by expanding the 
definition to all of these connected processes, we risk failing to abide by the external 
differentiation criteria (determining what are the semantic boundaries of a concept and 
thus distinguishing it from others) that Gerring identifies as being essential in the building 
and evaluation of a theoretically sound conceptualisation80.   
Featherstone and Kazamias propose a more internally dynamic view of the process which is 
regarded as being subject to change throughout time81. Moving away from a conception of 
the process as a passive response to external pressures, they argue that at the domestic 
level, Europeanisation is both a cause and an effect of action.  Hence, Europeanisation does 
not only indicate a process of ‘downloading’ of EU rules and norms into the national 
structures, but it also implies that member states compete for supranational policies that 
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conform to their interests thus ‘uploading’ their domestic preferences at the EU level82 in 
order to minimise the costs of adaptation. A third dimension of the process of 
Europeanization has been termed by Major and Pomorska as ‘cross-loading’ signifying the 
exchange of ideas, norms and best practices between member states and other entities for 
which the European Union sets the scene. This type of change occurs not only due to but 
most importantly within Europe83. Bulmer and Burch develop their study of central 
government in Britain by applying a similar understanding of Europeanisation as a two-way 
process. They maintain that domestic adjustment to EU pressure entails two institutional 
logics: ‘reception’ understood as the different manners of processing and implementing EU 
policy and ‘projection’ or the adjusting of processes by national institutions in order to 
make an effective contribution at the EU level84. In order to connect this dialectical 
relationship between ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’, Börzel explores the strategies pursued 
by member states to respond to Europeanisation pressures.  The responses are the devised 
on an axis of variance, with one end being occupied by pace-setting which supposes the 
active intervention at the European level in order to push for certain policies, followed by 
foot-dragging which implies the blocking or delaying of costly policies and at the opposite 
end of the axis being fence-setting which supposes the building of tactical coalitions without 
pursuing or preventing policies85. Were we to focus on an understanding of 
Europeanisation first and foremost as a process of uploading, an empirical use of this 
taxonomy would bring both Romania and Bulgaria closer to the fence-sitting strategy as a 
consequence of the asymmetrical power rapport that marked their relationship with the 
European Union during their accession which encouraged policy downloading and left 
fewer opportunities for uploading86.  
The transition from communism has meant for Central and Eastern Europe not only the 
construction of a functioning market economy, but also the building of a democratic 
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governing system capable of assimilating and implementing the EU’s complex acquis – a 
normative body which was internally accommodated by the EU-15 throughout half a 
century87. Moreover, the legacy of 40 years of socialism has contributed to the 
accommodation of a fluid political party culture (dominated by contextual and unstable 
coalitions formed by parties closely associated with their founders and leaders), to the 
absence of official forums for executive and interest groups interaction and nevertheless to 
the maintenance of a weak civil society88. Thus, the characteristics of the socialist regime 
and the nature of the post-1989 transition left a substantial mark upon the lobby market in 
both countries and its’ capacity to move beyond national borders. In Romania’s case social 
opposition emerged for the first time only after 1989 and remained weak even on the eve of 
accession due to the overdependence on donor funds, poor knowledge of Romanian public 
administration and inability to mobilise attention from the political opposition and the 
international community89. While in recent years Freedom House reports have shown a 
gradual diversification of the domains of activity of the non-governmental sector, there is 
still a tendency to focus on service provision with less attention being awarded to lobby and 
advocacy for more effective public policies90. In Bulgaria’s case the growth of civil society 
after 1989 has been a top-down process led mostly by donors signalling thus low levels of 
citizen involvement. While this trend has been gradually corrected, public consultancy in 
policy-making is still affected by the absence of specific regulations for lobbying activities 
which in turn creates “a space for dubious practices and hinders the ability of civil actors to 
effectively express and pursue the interests of various segments of society”91.  
The frequency of Romanian and Bulgarian lobby at the EU level remains low, shortcoming 
which can be causally connected, following Panke’s analysis of domestic engagement in 
lobbying activities, to member states’ level of governmental effectiveness and the 
transaction costs assumed. Governmental effectiveness is understood as the capacity of 
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receiving preferences put forward by interest groups and disseminating them (which 
requires domestic co-operation capacities, high quality of policy formulation and financial 
means to employ experts) and the latter are indirectly determined by the length of 
membership (which implicitly influences the number of contacts a state has to EU 
institutional actors) and the level of official and administrative representation within the 
EU’s institutional framework understood in terms of seats allocated to a country in the 
European Parliament92.  
According to the data presented in Panke’s study which projects an image for the year 2009, 
Romania and Bulgaria place themselves at the bottom end of table on the frequency of 
lobbying activities at the European level with policy preferences differing – more resources 
being allocated by Romania for interest representation in the agriculture sector, while the 
environment policy being Bulgaria’s focus93. However, intense public debate regarding the 
need for regulation of lobby practices in recent years in countries such as Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Romania and Ukraine94 indicates both an increased awareness and a 
nationally perceived necessity of a set of principles and standard procedures as to how 
public officials should be permitted to engage with lobbyists95.  
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Figure 1 Additive Frequency of Lobbying Institutional Actors (left) and Average Lobbying Frequency 
across Policy Areas (right) 
 Source: D. Panke (2011): “Lobbying Institutional Key Players: How States Seek to Influence the European 
Commission, the Council Presidency and the European Parliament”, pp. 132-33.  
 
 
This visible interest is embodied as well in the growing numbers of organisations (with 
head offices in Romania and Bulgaria) engaged in activities seeking to influence the EU 
policy and decision making process. As such the Transparency Register – a public platform 
jointly run by the European Parliament and the European Commission that provides 
information on the organisations engaged in EU policy-making – informs of 62 Romanian 
registrants (6 professional consultancies/law firms; 14 in-house lobbyists and 
trade/professional associations; 36 non-governmental organisations; 2 think tanks; an 
organisation representing a religious community and 3 organisations representing local 
authorities) and 35 Bulgarian registrants (a professional consultancy company; 6 in-house 
lobbyist associations; 24 non-governmental organisations and 4 think tanks)96.  
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We are witnessing thus a fertile niche of research which needs to be further explored 
especially in the light of both Bulgarian and Romanian officials having agreed at the 
beginning of the year 2013 upon a second attempt to put forward a unitary lobby strategy 
in order to strengthen their candidacy for the Schengen Area membership.  
While the circular dynamics of the Europeanisation process is being acknowledged and the 
tendency of member states to shape and influence the EU institutional framework and its 
trajectory is regarded as a part of the process (which has been emphasised above), our 
study will restrict itself to a ‘top-bottom’ approach in order to place a boundary around 
what is already a complex task of empirical research. This will also be visible in our decision 
over the definition used for the concept of Europeanisation which will be presented below. 
Moreover, as the range of studies devoted to the impact of European dynamics, decisions 
and institutions on domestic policies and polities in Romania and Bulgaria after their 
accession to the EU is fairly limited97, we consider this research objective as providing a 
pertinent starting point for further investigation.  
Based on this assumption, a number of implications arise. The first one concerns where the 
study of the domestic impact of the EU should begin and where it should zoom in. An 
alternative approach would be to examine the ex-ante domestic context (i.e. the situation 
before the supposed EU pressure emerges), then to track the participation of the country in 
the EU level negotiations, and finally study the implementation process of the EU act. Whilst 
this ‘bottom-up-down’ modus operandi enables the researcher to remain alert for the 
domestic level processes before and after the appearance of the EU act, and allows for a 
better observation of the country’s capacity to ‘upload’ preferences to Brussels, it is more 
suitable to explore the manner in which member states respond to adaptation pressures on 
a single policy area. In contrast, in spite of its limitations in tracking the full temporal 
dimension of European-lead domestic transformation (being thus less time-sensitive), the 
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top-bottom approach allows for a more extensive exploration of national responses across 
multiple policy areas and permits the plotting of the impact that the different EU modes of 
governance have upon national adjustment. The second note which must be made here 
involves concept formation. Europeanisation can be treated as an outcome, or as a 
process98. From the first approach we derive that Europeanisation is regarded as a quantity 
that can be ‘more’ or ‘less’ present. A study based on this conceptualisation would be 
interested in comparing the degree of Europeanisation of a policy area in two or more 
member states or candidate countries. The present study will be based on an understanding 
of Europeanisation as a process affecting domestic politics, public policy and institutions, 
and we expect adaptation to EU requirements to bear the mark of the national context and 
realities. Therefore, we will explore the changes within domestic institutions of governance 
and politics that occur as a response to the development of European-level institutions, 
identities, and policies. To this end we start off from the definition provided by Dyson and 
Goetz who distinguish between fundamental properties of the process and accompanying 
properties (i.e. ‘uploading’). In their view Europeanisation entails: 
 
“a complex interactive ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ process in which domestic polities, 
politics and public policies are shaped by European integration and  in which domestic 
actors use European integration to shape the domestic arena. It may produce either 
continuity or change and potentially variable and contingent outcomes.99” 
 
The authors deliberately exclude from the definition the phase of national projection or the 
export of ‘ways of doing things’100 at the European level as Radaelli explains it, particularly 
in order to distinguish Europeanisation from European integration. While domestic actors 
will inevitably attempt to shape the terms of European integration, and consequently the 
adaptational requirements, this process is not necessarily defining as it is dependent on 
power asymmetries (other variables including territory and temporality101) and is 
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unequally distributed across policies. Our approach to Europeanisation, broadly understood 
as the impact that European policy has within member states, differentiates between a pre-
accession phase in which EU directly influenced changes at the national level were 
dependent on conditionality or active leverage102 and a post-accession phase where 
domestic policy change would be expected to be a consequence of assumed responsibility of 
membership (i.e. passive leverage).  A number of pertinent studies have explored the pre-
accession Europeanisation phase103, underlining the openness of national political elites to 
EU influence, and the speed and breadth of measures required from candidate countries as 
factors that would influence the extent of institutional change. Our approach to the post-
accession Europeanisation phase will factor in along the mediating factors the weight of 
different EU modes of governance in triggering national institutional change.  
 
3.1.2. Europeanisation through hard and soft law 
 
One of the main contentions of this study is that the diversity of governance structures that 
coexist within the European Union can be expected to generate a variety of transfer types 
and adaptation models. But before moving on to considering some of the taxonomies 
introduced by the relevant literature and justifying our own selection for this study, we 
must first attempt to briefly define the concept of ‘governance’ which constitutes the subject 
of differentiation and classification. The concept has been defined both in an encompassing 
sense and a restricted one. A restricted view of governance will narrow down this process 
to a ‘soft’ type of political steering in which non-hierarchical means of guidance (such as 
socialisation, monitoring, and persuasion) are employed in policy formulation. A broader 
understanding of governance will cover all types of steering from hierarchical prescription 
to informative and steering instruments. Drawing from Kohler-Koch’s interpretation, 
governance is broadly regarded as: 
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“the ways and means in which the divergent preferences of citizens are translated into 
effective policy choices, (…) the plurality of societal interests are transformed into unitary 
action and the compliance of societal actors is achieved”104.    
 
The aim of governance is adjacent to that of government namely to establish a web of rules 
and procedures that would guide behaviour. However, while the latter indicates the 
organisation or agency appointed with explicit rights, subject to control according to 
established procedures, and invested with the authority to reach binding decisions, the 
former points to the process of shaping the economic, societal and political systems. Thus, 
governance is based on a system of rules that shape and coordinate actors’ behaviour. From 
this definition we can derive two dimensions of the concept: one referring to the process, 
the other to the regulatory structure. As a process, governance encompasses the various 
modes of coordinating actor behaviour. In its structural dimension, governance points to 
the actors involved and the institutional setting shaping its different instruments. Based on 
this dichotomy various modes have been distinguished in the literature, all bearing the 
caveat that they constitute ideal types which would facilitate academic exploration and 
analysis, while in practice at the EU level we would encounter more heterogeneity.  
In the context of EU studies, orthodox approaches largely distinguish between the 
Community method (the old governance) and soft governance (new modes of governance). 
In its 2001 White Paper on Governance, the Commission identified the Community method 
as an inter-institutional process of decision-making premised on its exclusive right of 
legislative initiative, the legislative and budgetary powers of the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice’s role in enhancing the Union’s 
law enforcement capacity105. The process thus involves the setting of rules by the legislative 
institutions, the monitoring by the Commission of member state implementation and the 
administrative and judicial infringement proceedings where transposition falls short of 
requirements. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
determined the transformation of the Community method, the inter-institutional balance of 
power changing in favour of the European Parliament while the Council of Ministers has 
moved towards majority voting. In this context, some authors argue that as the political and 
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legal implications of law-making through the Community method have intensified, political 
actors have continued the endeavour of injecting more flexibility into economic and social 
governance by the means of soft law – process which gain momentum with the Maastricht 
Treaty106. Whether contrasted with ‘hard law’ (legally binding) and presented as an 
alternative107 or considered to be operating in the ‘shadow’ of hierarchies and thus 
complementing legislation108, soft law is broadly understood as comprising “rules of 
conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding 
force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed 
at and may produce practical effects”109. However, this type of policy instrument is not a 
clear-cut and uncontested concept, at times being deemed as representing non-legal norms 
of a political nature especially as Art 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union does not mention soft law as part of the EU’s secondary legislation. Identifying 
obligation (injunction to act or restrain from acting in a specific manner), precision 
(unambiguous content of obligation) and delegation (granting of third parties the authority 
to implement and interpret norms and resolve disputes) as the three essential dimensions 
of law, Abbot et al. observe that a hard mode of governance will have all of these dimensions 
highly developed, while in the case of soft governance we would expect a dilution along one 
or more dimensions110.  Starting from this observation we argue that soft law benefits of an 
explicit obligation dimension which assures its legal effects. The source of legal obligation 
lies within art 4 of the Treaty on the European Union which specifies a general duty of 
member states to cooperate which assures that soft law will be considered in one manner 
or another111.  This offers it the status of a legal instrument and as variation can occur on 
each of the three dimensions (hard law knowing a process of ‘softening’ and vice versa) we 
can argue that any classification of governance should go beyond the classic hard/soft 
dichotomy and conceive modes of policy-making as a continuum. After having had 
discussed the nature of two of the most important elements that differentiate between 
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modes of governance, we now turn to some of the most discussed classifications discussed 
by the literature.  
Categorisations of EU policy-making vary substantially as a result of the multitude of 
locations for addressing policy issues, the different levels (from local to global) and the 
range of processes (from formal to informal) which form the platform for decision-making. 
Probably one of the most referenced categorisation is that put forward by Helen Wallace 
who proposes five variants of policy processes: the traditional Community method, the EU 
regulatory mode, the EU distributional mode; policy coordination and intensive 
transgovernmentalism112. However, the criteria used to devise this classification do not 
tailor in the analytical categories which target the research questions of Europeanisation 
studies. This taxonomy is based on a breakdown of which actors (be it the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, or the European Council) 
hold stronger roles in policy design and in setting political directions, the extent to which 
stakeholders, experts, and local or regional authorities are involved in the policy process, 
and whether or not the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance are 
involved in ensuring that non-application or discrimination occurs.    
However, this analysis will be based on a conceptualisation of governance patterns founded 
on an emphasis that is placed on different dimensions. As such our starting point is 
provided by the study of Trieb, Bӓhr and Falkner who distinguish three dimensions that 
differentiate between modes of governance: the politics, the polity and the policy one113. 
Along the politics dimension the authors use the predominance of certain actors – be they 
public or private – as a single criteria of differentiation, arguing that on one hand we would 
have a hierarchical state that would place the policy process solely in the hands of public 
actors, whereas on the other governance would entail the prevalence of policy communities, 
networks or bureaucracies. For the polity dimension we would operate with variation 
across several axes: hierarchy versus market (traits of the institutional structure 
responsible for decisions), central locus versus dispersed loci of authority, and 
institutionalised versus non- institutionalised interactions (i.e. the new modes of 
governance in the EU such as the open method of coordination). Finally, the third dimension 
adjoins the axis of legal compulsoriness versus soft law, rigidity versus flexibility in 
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implementation, presence versus absence of sanctions, material versus procedural 
regulation and finally fixed versus malleable norms. From this variety of criteria, the 
authors argue that in order to facilitate the establishment of a typology of modes of 
governance that would be both parsimonious and allow at the same time the largest degree 
of variation we would need to focus on the policy dimension and more specifically on the 
axis of legally binding versus soft law and that of rigid versus flexible approach to 
implementation as these two criteria grasp crucial dimensions of different policy 
instruments as they are currently discussed in EU research114.  As a result, four modes of 
governance could be put forward: coercion, voluntarism, targeting, and framework 
regulation. Within this typology, the most ‘intrusive’ mode in terms of EU intervention vis-à-
vis domestic societies is that of coercion which re-joins fully binding and highly prescriptive 
legal instruments. The mode of framework regulation accommodates legal instruments that 
are binding, but that offer member states more leeway in implementation either by defining 
only goals which need to be specified in national legislation or by presenting a range of 
policy options to choose from. The remaining two modes of governance provide member 
states with significantly more flexibility in norm application, covering more detailed 
recommendations that leave less room for manoeuvre at the implementation stage (as is the 
case for targeting) and broad and legally non-compulsory guidelines that typically define 
policy goals to be achieved rather than concrete reforms (as is the case for voluntarism).  
Developing a similar, but tri-partite taxonomy of EU modes of governance, Knill and 
Lenschow underline the existence of a relevant association between different EU 
governance patterns and the likelihood of far-reaching national change. The author 
proposes three types of EU governance patterns focusing solely on the legally binding 
versus soft law axis115. The first governance pattern is that of coercion implied in EU 
regulatory policy and imposed on national implementers. Notwithstanding the lack of an EU 
institutionalised government or dominant actor for decision-making, the EU is guided by 
three legal pillars (direct effect, supremacy and preliminary ruling) which allow for the 
exercise of power through legislation and rule-making and for the enforcement of 
compliance. Hence, coercive governance is defined as legally binding European legislation 
which leaves little or no discretion to the national implementer. As a rule, it is the 
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instrument of policy transfer especially at the level of the European single market, but it is 
not limited to it. Coercive regulatory policies are prone to have an institutional impact as in 
most frequent cases they suppose the creation of new organisations, the centralisation of 
regulatory processes, the demand for horizontal organisational change, and can even affect 
national administrative styles. The subsequent domestic reaction most prone to be 
triggered by this type of governance will be persistence-driven, actors attempting to meet 
the policy obligations while minimise the institutional adaptation costs116.  
The second pattern observed is that of governance by competition which implies only 
limited legally-binding requirements for domestic institutional change. The objective here is 
to promote the optimisation of certain institutional arrangements at the domestic level to 
the standards of a general framework put forward at the EU level. No distinctive 
institutional model is imposed, but member states need to comply with the legally-binding 
‘rules of the game’ that provide the general setting. The rationale for behaviour in this 
instance will be performance-driven and as the pattern involves competition, there will be 
winners and losers. Another important aspect here is the fact that the bureaucracy is no 
longer in an autonomous position when adapting to external pressure which leaves room 
for political actors to intervene more freely and increases the chances for potential path-
breaking reforms117.  
The final mechanism addresses the domestic level through communication and information 
exchange in transnational networks with the objective of developing and promoting ‘best 
practices’ to be applied by the member states. Hence the objective here is embodied in 
mutual learning between national policy makers and legally binding rules are replaced by 
regulatory models and objectives created to tackle policy problems118. The rationale 
followed in institutional change targets securing and increasing legitimacy of particular 
models within European discourse and the platform that assure the materialisation of 
change is that of European network structures through which guidelines, timetables for the 
achievement of common goals and the development of indicators and benchmarks assures a 
more uniform and continuous type of compliance119.  
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3.1.3. Hypotheses regarding Modes of Governance 
 
One of the main hypotheses of this study which will be reflected in the structuring of the 
thesis assumes that post-accession Europeanisation will be sensitive to variation of EU 
modes of governance. Whilst the taxonomy provided by Trieb, Bӓhr and Falkner120 allows 
for more variation along towards the soft law end of the governance axis, Knill and 
Lenschow121 contract it, summing it up under the banner of communication. For the 
purpose of this analysis we will use the former taxonomy, but we will formulate our 
hypotheses which are to be tested in the case of Romania and Bulgaria by adopting the 
latter categories of actor behaviour to explain output at the member state level. The starting 
hypotheses will be the following: 
 
H1: In the case of ‘hard’ adaptational pressure which is manifest in coercion and framework 
regulation modes of governance we would expect the rationale for domestic institutional 
change to range from persistence-driven (when the directives’ level of detail is high) to 
performance-driven (when directives would allow for more freedom); 
 
H2: In the case of ‘soft’ forms of governance (targeting and voluntarism) we would expect a 
more responsive mode of behaviour at the member state level, with exemplary performers 
in achieving the common benchmarks being identified as model-givers to be copied. 
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Figure 2 Modes of Governance 
Source: O. Trieb, H. Bӓhr, G. Falkner (2007): “Modes of Governance: Towards Conceptual Clarification”; C. Knill, 
A. Lenschow (2005): “Coercion, Competition and Communication: Different Approaches of European 
Governance and their Impact on National Institutions”. 
 
In order to test these presuppositions we will examine the extent of post-accession 
Europeanisation by observing compliance with EU directives, the degree to which the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism benchmarks have been achieved so far and the 
meeting of the targets set by Europe’s growth strategy – Europe 2020.   
 
3.1.4. ‘Mismatch’ as a trigger for Europeanisation 
 
Most orthodox approaches to Europeanisation are based on the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis. This 
rests upon the idea that the adaptation of the domestic policy-making process to the 
European-level policy requirements, guidelines and objectives depends on the degree of 
compatibility between the latter and existing domestic institutions. The fit thesis generates 
two suppositions. Firstly, that in order for domestic adaptation to occur there needs to be a 
certain degree of ‘misfit’ between the supranational and national policies, processes and 
institutions, the lack of incompatibility and thus of adaptation indicating that 
Europeanisation has not occurred122. The second supposition maintains that a substantial 
degree of ‘misfit’ will require harder and lengthier adaptation processes which in turn will 
make it less likely for the Europeanisation effect to take place. In other words smooth 
compliance is assumed to be dependent on the goodness of fit between internal and 
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external policies. Studies, however, indicate that these assumptions are not necessary and 
at times not sufficient conditions for successful domestic adaptation123.  Whilst we assume 
these findings, we also consider the fact that not analysing the impact of the goodness of fit 
might introduce an omitted variable bias in the analysis, especially as the literature argues 
that states that are unsuccessful or only partly successful in uploading national preferences 
to the EU level will be subject to significant domestic change as a consequence of 
downloading EU legislation and hence implementation will entail considerable 
challenges124.  
A series of variables – mostly pertaining to the domestic processes of political interaction – 
have been have been put forward by the different strands of the new institutionalist theory. 
In the next section we will start by discussing the ontological and epistemological 
differences that make up the three approaches to the new institutionalism - rational choice, 
historical and sociological institutionalism and discuss the different explanatory variables 
proposed by each approach and how these will substantiate the study.  
 
3.2. Institutions all the way down – Rational Choice, Historical and 
Sociological approaches 
 
For much of the post-World War II period political science, especially in the United States, 
had been marked by the “behavioural revolution” and rational choice approaches. In 
essence, both theoretical frameworks were based on a methodological individualism, 
assuming that actors behave autonomously which implied that in order to understand 
social phenomena one needs to focus either on socio-psychological characteristics or on 
rational calculations of personal utility. Thus both formal and informal institutions were not 
considered to exert serious constrains upon individuals, preferences were treated as 
exogenous and in the case of the behavioural revolution this individualism was reinforced 
by its focus of inquiry which sought to explain what do the actors involved in social 
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aggregates do and how can it be best explained125.  Institutions were perceived as material 
structures be they constitutions, cabinets, parliaments, courts, bureaucracies or even 
political parties, connected in the same explanatory category through their shared attribute 
of belonging to the state/government126.  
In contrast, a generation later, rational choice modellers sought to replace the “loose logic” 
borrowed by behaviouralists from psychology with mathematical and economic rigor, and 
in the name of theoretical integrity and parsimony, they strove (initially) to reduce politics 
to the interplay of material self-interest eliminating thus the normative elements of political 
science127. The focal point became individual action guided by a ‘logic of consequences’ 
(behaviour being driven by preferences and expectation about consequences and the 
ultimate goal being the maximisation of individual utility)128 and in this context institutions 
were conceived of as ‘rules of the game’ (decision-making rules and norms) and information 
structures that determine the amount of knowledge actors have at their disposal when 
making interest-led decisions129. While this conceptualisation represents a slight departure 
from the materialist approach mentioned above, the inherent individualism of rational 
choice is reiterated: institutions become the embodiment of equilibrium as rational 
individuals, interacting with other rational individuals, “continue to change their planned 
responses to the actions of others until no improvement can be obtained in their expected 
outcomes from independent action”130. And in order to understand why such patterns of 
interaction become visible, one needs to return to individual actors and ask what motivates 
them to produce such equilibrium.  
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3.2.1. Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
 
In spite of this individualistic underpinning, rational choice institutionalists have gradually 
turned their attention and understood that political life is deeply rooted in institutions – 
instance which led to the proliferation and growing dominance of rational choice theories 
and the development of the normative strand of the new institutionalism as a response. 
Fritz Scharpf’s actor-centred institutionalism reflects most accurately this shift as the main 
assumption of the author’s approach is that social phenomena can be best explained as the 
outcome of the interaction of actors (individual, collective or corporate), but these 
interactions are structured and their outcome is shaped by the characteristics of the 
institutional setting in which they occur131. The model is dependent on the concept of actor 
constellations which represents the sum of players involved, their strategy options, the 
outcomes associated with strategy combinations and the preferences of the players over the 
outcomes (concept similar to Tsebelis’s institutional design132). In contrast to the game-
theoretic literature, it is assumed that any such given constellation could be played out in a 
variety of modes of interaction (be it non-cooperative, cooperative, voting or hierarchical 
games) which are in the end shaped by institutional rules regulating their use and the larger 
institutional setting within which the interaction takes place133. The distinctiveness of this 
model lies in the fundamental concept of bounded rationality which assumes that due to the 
complexity and uncertainty of the environment in which they operate, rational actors are 
constrained and have to adopt satisfactory rather than optimal strategies134. While actors 
are expected to seek the maximisation of utilities, their decisions will be inherently limited 
as they are simultaneously operating within the normative setting of one or multiple 
institutions.  
Another significant and growing body of rational choice institutional theory is based on 
transaction costs economic theory developed by and Douglas North135 and Oliver 
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Williamson136. While the starting point in this approach is shared with that of actor-centred 
institutionalism, with institutions being defined as humanly devised formal (sanctions, 
codes of conduct etc.) and informal (constitutions, laws etc.) constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction137, the change lies in treating institutional 
arrangements as dependent variables. Here less emphasis is being placed on individual 
rational action and more on understanding the ways in which institutions can be structured 
so that transaction costs connected to decision-making could be lowered. Transaction costs 
are usually associated with asymmetric information which can take the form of policy 
uncertainty (actors not knowing precisely what outcomes will result from the adoption of 
specific policies)138. If institutions cannot provide benefits (in terms of lower costs) they 
become subject of change or replacement. However, within institutional design an essential 
premise revolves around enacting coalitions which use structures, procedures and 
processes to increase costs for policy opponents seeking to change the institution’s 
direction in the future, leading to a lock in of the designers’ preferences139. The usual 
stability of institutions is a hypothesis accepted by historical institutionalism as well, but as 
we will observe later on this characteristic is generated by path dependency, the notion that 
‘entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial 
choice’140. In contrast, the rational choice view on institutional change emphasises a change 
in the capacity of actors – the increased effectiveness of change-seeking individuals and the 
decreasing blocking power of status-quo protectors generating the context for modification 
in institutional arrangements. Applying these theoretical assumptions to the European 
context, Pollack identifies three instances which can generate ‘policy windows’ used by 
entrepreneurs to push for the modification of institutional arrangements: a change in the 
policy environment; in actors, or in the relative power of actors and lastly a change in the 
quality of information141. But as Moe observes, design efforts place agencies on a path that 
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hampers dramatic change as in time the new vested interests created as a result of power 
asymmetries become built-in forces that protect “the institutional system from large-scale 
organisational, policy, or program change”142.  
The fundamental distinctive element that separates these two approaches in rational choice 
theory is given by the manner in which institutions are understood and defined. As such 
while focusing on micro-analytical interpretations of institutions, Kenneth Shepsle argues 
that the different rational choice approaches to institutionalism can be subsumed under 
three conceptualisations of institutions: as game forms, as constraints and as equlibria143. 
The first definition regards institutions as humanly-devised exogenous constraints144 which 
include both formal rules such as law and constitutions and informal ones such as 
conventions and norms. They are humanly-devised as they result from the interaction 
between actors, but they are regarded as exogenous as they represent only a strategic 
environment in which actors pursue their interests. Analyses based on this 
conceptualisation of institutions, such as the ones based on transaction costs economics, 
model institutions through their effects upon the actors’ actions, their behavioural 
repertoires, the timing of strategy selection, and on the structure of information. Focusing 
on the effects that institutions have upon actors, the matter of compliance is also conceived 
as a set of games in which designers need to create a matrix of payoffs that would motivate 
the members of the institutional agreement to comply. In this context, Axelrod argues that a 
first condition for increased cooperation is that of repeated games meaning that players 
might meet again and the choices actors make in a first interaction will influence their later 
strategies. This condition is also reiterated by Peters when analysing decision-making 
within the European Union, arguing that the division of decisions into functional specialities 
and the continuing nature of the policy debates limits the capacity of ‘high politics’ to hinder 
decision making or to force it to sub-optimal levels145. A second important condition for 
cooperation is the development of “tit-for tat” strategies in repeated plays of Prisoners’ 
Dilemma games. As the “tit-for that” policy requires cooperation on the first move and then 
emulating the second player’s move, Axelrod argues that a player choosing to defect all the 
time, following this strategy will be tempted to defect on the first move and all subsequent 
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moves will represent punishment for constant mutual defection146. Thus actors are 
punished when they defect and rewarded when they cooperate, situation which will lead 
over time to the creation of equilibrium of mutual compliance.  
A second line of rational choice institutionalism depicts institutions as constraints or as 
Calvert observes as the cumulus of rules either taken as given, or treated as alternative sets 
of constraints to be imposed by the designers of constitutions, guided by the results these 
rules will yield once rational behaviour takes place under them147. This line of thought, to 
which the actor-centred institutionalism is attached as well, acknowledges the influence 
that institutional arrangements exert upon actors’ perception of reality, the structure that 
rules induce upon the interaction between individuals and nevertheless the impact on 
policy outputs. However, actor-related factors must be treated as explanatory variables in 
their own right when analysing political phenomena as actor behaviour is influenced, but 
not determined by the institutional structure. In his analysis of the process of progressive 
Europeanisation of governing functions, Scharpf identifies four modes of interaction – that 
of mutual adjustment, of hierarchical direction, of joint-decision and of intergovernmental 
agreement148 – which describe “at a highly abstract level the range of interrelationships 
likely among constellations of composite actors in institutional settings”149.  While the 
default mode of Europeanisation of “mutual adjustment” presupposes actor interaction in 
the absence of a structure or institutions (governments adopting their own policies but in 
response or anticipation to policy development in other states), all of the other three modes 
bring in the institutional structure that impacts upon actors’ strategies. Thus, in the 
intergovernmental mode, policies are coordinated through agreements at the European 
level which are achieved by rational actors only if the expected outcome of negotiation is 
more attractive than no agreements. The next step on this continuum of modes is that of 
hierarchical direction which places competencies exclusively at the EU level (exercised by 
the European Central Bank, the European Court of Justice and the European Commission in 
the infringement procedure). At this point the actor-centred framework approaches more 
the sociological branch of institutionalism as the legitimacy of supranational functions that 
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exclude the participation of member states depends on shared beliefs in the authority of law 
and in the capacity of technocrats to lead to the realisation of shared norms and values150. 
The joint-decision mode combines aspects of supranational centralisation and 
intergovernmental negotiations, but in this case, the presence of constellations where 
national interests are highly salient and strongly diverge will lead to the blocking of 
European solutions151.  
Finally the third rational choice strand that acknowledges the impact of institutions defines 
the game form as an endogenous equilibrium. The rules that were treated as fixed and 
exogenous parameters in the institutions-as game forms approach, become here variables 
that are the product of the larger game152. We have observed that in the institutions-as 
game forms approach exogenous parameters are assumed to be fixed in order for the game 
to be ‘playable’, and endogenous variables are also somewhat fixed as individual 
preferences are stable. In this context, change occurs as a result of exogenous shocks which 
in turn determine a modification of the parameters and eventually the selection of a new 
equilibrium. As Canales observes, change in this framework is represented by a 
modification of the exogenous parameters (while the endogenous preferences remain 
stable) and is hence marked by “punctuated equilibrium” (moves from one stable point to 
the next) implying long periods of stasis being interrupted by rare and large exogenous 
shocks153. In the institutions-as-equilibrium approach however the level of analysis shifts 
and the object of enquiry revolves around stability and change within institutions. Starting 
off by signalling the overly static view that identifies changes in self-enforcing institutions 
as always having an exogenous origin (no actor having thus the incentive to deviate from 
the behaviour associated with the institution), Grief and Laitin introduce the concept of 
‘quasi-parameters’ (aspects that are parametric in studying self-enforceability, but 
endogenous and hence variable on the long run) in order to address both institutional self-
reinforcing or self-undermining equilibrium154.  Quasi-parameters are not central to the 
rules of the game (hence not constitutive parameters) as they are not ex ante recognised or 
anticipated by actors, and they are not variables as they do not directly condition behaviour. 
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A sufficient condition for institutional endogenous change is that the institution’s 
implications constantly undermine the associated behaviour. In this context, an institution 
will reinforce itself when the changes in the quasi-parameters that it entails imply that the 
associated behaviour is self-enforcing in a larger set of situations, and it will undermine 
itself when the same conditions imply that the associated behaviour will be self-enforcing in 
a smaller set of situations155.  Thus, while initially actors might not be aware of their 
occurrence, in time quasi-parameters become more visible and lead actors to realise that 
their actions are no longer self-reinforcing in the institution. In terms of application of this 
theoretical framework within the field of European integration, Tatham detaches his study 
from the regular focus of the literature on dramatic evolutions and explores limited 
institutional change within the EU, accounting for the limitedness of the EU’s departure 
from its original “federal blindness” (low levels of regionalisation)156. In this particular case 
of limited endogenous change, factors such as the deepening process of integration and the 
regionalisation pressure faced by the EU member states have exerted initial low influence, 
which gradually increased, thus triggering pressure towards greater recognition and 
involvement of the sub-state level in EU decision-making. However, on the long run the 
pressure for change has proved limited, confirming the EU’s self-reinforcing capacity in 
terms of the regionalisation strategy.  
In essence, all of these variations of the rational choice approach to institutions present a 
set of common assumptions and starting points: individuals are in the end the central actors 
in political life and they act rationally in order to maximise their utility. As a consequence, 
institutions are collections of rules and required practices based not on values, but on the 
compliance mechanism inherent to the structure that affect individual action. Thus despite 
visible variation, rational choice institutionalists conceive the response triggered at the 
actor level as a rational reaction to contextual constraints based on a ‘logic of calculation’157. 
As we have discussed in the previous section, European hard law is sustained by monitoring 
and enforcement means, making an approach based on the logic of calculation on member 
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states’ side the natural theoretical framework to apply when assessing national 
transposition.  
When discussing non-compliance with European legislation, Börzel et al.158 group rational 
choice perspectives into the category of enforcement approaches putting forward the 
essential linking assumptions and a set of hypotheses which they draw from power-based 
theoretical claims. The leading premise of enforcement approaches is that states choose not 
to comply with international norms and rules because they are not willing to bear the costs 
of change. It follows that incentives for defection need to be offset by increasing external 
constraints in the form of institutionalised monitoring and sanctioning which will exert 
either material (economic sanctions or financial penalties) or immaterial costs upon states 
(loss of reputation and credibility)159. The response to these additional costs will be 
dependent either on the EU specific political power or the economic power of nation states, 
the expectation being that the less powerful EU member states are, the more sensitive they 
are to external enforcement constraints and the less likely they are to infringe EU 
legislation.  
3.2.1.1. Hypotheses grounded in RCI 
 
Our analysis will explore this hypothesis, but will focus only on member states’ direct EU 
specific political power, as Börzel et al. study shows that greater economic power did not 
substantially affect a country’s compliance record160. The proxy for the EU specific political 
power will be the proportion of votes under QMV (qualified majority voting) in the Council 
of Ministers and alternatively we will also consider the relative frequency with which a 
member state is in a pivotal position under QMV (i.e. in the position of turning a losing 
coalition into a winning one) or what is known in the literature as the Shapley-Shubik index. 
This later figure will be taken from Barr and Passarelli’s mathematical analysis of the 
distribution of power in the Council of Ministers under the voting rules established by the 
Treaty of Nice (50% of the member states vote in favour, at least 260 of the possible 352 
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votes are cast and the majority represents minimum 62% o the total population)161.  Hence, 
one of the hypotheses which will be tested in order to explore Romania and Bulgaria’s 
transposition record will be the following: 
 
Ha: The less powerful an EU member state is, the less likely it is to infringe EU legislation. 
Rational choice institutionalism assumes that strategic and rational of actors pursuing 
exogenous and fixed policy interests operate in an institutionalised environment which can 
either constrain them (e.g. through monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for free-riding) 
or enable them (e.g. minimise transaction costs for cooperation)162.  As mirrored by 
hypothesis Ha, domestic institutional change will vary across member states and this 
phenomenon can be accounted for by the degree of economic vulnerability and political 
capacity. However, there is a third factor identified by Schmidt in the form of misfit that 
represents an important part of the driving force for institutional change163.  Rational actors 
will attempt to upload their policies to the EU level with the aim of lowering the costs of 
adaptation which they will suffer when implementing (‘downloading’) norms and 
procedures established as mandatory by supranational structures. If member states are not 
successful in uploading their preferences, they will oppose the high costs of adaptation with 
both the correctness and timeliness of the transposition process being affected.  
A caveat must be introduced here, noting that not only rational choice institutionalism uses 
this variable, but the historical branch of institutionalism as well, the assumption 
substantiating the concept being that the ‘stickiness’ of deeply entrenched national policy 
tradition and administrative routines will impede reforms aiming to alter them164. The 
difference between the two perspectives on ‘misfit’ is also highlighted by the estimated 
probability for domestic change to occur, with the historical institutionalist 
conceptualisation focusing more on the limited capacity that the EU would have in breaking 
path dependent national structures. 
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In line with investigations of non-compliance that account for this factor165, we will thus test 
the goodness of fit variable, translated as a proxy that distinguishes between situations 
where transposition is realised through a completely new national implementing measure 
versus transposition through the modification of existing national legislation. The thought 
behind the addition of this variable is that amendments will display a higher fit between 
directives and national legislation.  
Hb: Evidence of a certain degree of fit will lower transposition delay.  
However, noting the previous studies that have underlined that the goodness of fit is not 
decisive (and thus not sufficient as a stand-alone variable) in explaining the implementation 
of individual directives166, we will refer to the realm of domestic politics and a number of 
national implementing measure specific variables will be used in order to explore the 
factors that have either a positive or negative impact upon the transposition process. The 
motivation behind this option is again theory-led, rationalist approaches to Europeanisation 
drawing attention to mediating institutional characteristics such as the number of veto 
points in a country’s institutional structure and the presence of supporting formal 
institutions as increasing, respectively decreasing national resistance to change.  
More concretely, it is expected that the presence at the national level of multiple veto points 
within the institutional structures and decision-making processes can empower actors with 
diverse interests to avoid constraints and adaptation costs leading to increased resistance 
to change. By way of alternative, the existence of formal institutions that would provide 
actors with the material and ideational resources to exploit new opportunities will increase 
the likelihood of change167. In order to translate these claims into variables, we consider the 
type and the number of the legal instruments that are used to implement European 
directives into national legislation as explanatory factors for variance as well as probability 
of compliance. The aim is to explore whether in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria we can 
identify major differences in compliance across different policy fields (whether we can 
observe that more cases of infringement are registered in a particular policy field and to 
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explore the reasons behind this phenomenon) and to compare the two countries’ track 
records with those of the other member states included in the study (the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Poland). This latter point will serve in order to identify whether 
any patterns in compliance across policy areas can be observed at the European level. This 
is especially interesting to test if we also consider that while legislative delegation to the 
government is constitutional in Romania (which could shorten the timing of transposition), 
but not in Bulgaria. 
Hc: Delay in transposition will decrease as the number of actors (veto points) involved in 
the making of the instrument of national implementation decreases;  
Hd: More implementing measures used to transpose EU directives will make delays in 
transposition larger.   
However, rational choice institutionalism is not without its critics, a number of drawbacks 
are frequently emphasised by the academic literature. Firstly, because of the over-reliance 
on a functionalist understanding of institutions – regarded as effective means for facilitating 
international cooperation (as actors rely on each other to achieve their goals) by preventing 
short-term defections that might jeopardise long-term interests (leading to suboptimal 
outcomes) – it is hard for the theoretical perspective to account for ‘dysfunctional 
institutions’168. Secondly, while the deductive nature of this approach makes it a useful 
framework for capturing the range of reasons individual actors would normally have for 
action in an institutional setting and the likely outcomes of these actions, it finds anomalies 
(instances when actors depart from an incentive-based logic) problematic to explain169. In 
this regard, placing itself in opposition to the methodological individualism and to the 
restricted understanding of institutions that create the fundament of rational choice 
analyses, sociological institutionalism – as well as the normative approach to the new 
institutionalism – have gradually provided an alternative theoretical account of the political 
and social world. In cases of national compliance with supranational norms in the absence 
of an external enforcement mechanism to prevent free-riding, sociological institutionalism 
assumes that individuals unconsciously enact cognitive templates as they are guided by a 
common understanding of what socially accepted behaviour is. Hence, for sociological 
institutionalists, compliance and enforcement appear to be nonissues. We emphasise 
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‘appear’ as recent rationalist contributions provide new avenues for theoretical explanation 
of incremental institutional change, Mahoney and Thelen arguing for a distributional 
approach that would envisage institutions as having built in the dynamic tensions and 
pressures for change170. The new modes of change proposed by the authors take the form of 
displacement (removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones), layering (new 
rules introduced alongside existing ones), drift (changed impact of existing rules due to 
shifts in the environment), and conversion (changed enactment of existing rules due to their 
strategic redeployment) and they allow for more flexibility in accounting for the differences 
in veto possibilities and the extent of discretion in institutional enforcement171. 
Nevertheless, it is the sociological branch that introduces complex explanatory variables 
such as coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism (with a specific interest in the latter 
mechanism of policy transfer)172 in order to explain the domestic effects associated with 
Europeanisation. We thus turn now to a brief discussion of the main theoretical claims of 
this perspective.  
3.2.2. Sociological Institutionalism (SI) 
 
Starting with the 1970s, contributions such as those of John Meyer173 opened the theoretical 
space for an alternative to the individual maximisation and utilitarian values inherent in 
actor-centred functionalist accounts of institutions. The tendency among the new 
approaches to institutionalism had been, as observed thus far, to incorporate a tension 
between structure and agency. While the old institutionalisms perceived actors as being 
embedded in the social and cultural environment, the new perspectives reconsidered this 
relationship, perceiving structure as a mere element affecting the behaviours, practices and 
ideas of individuals174. Taking into consideration this evolution, sociological institutionalism 
can be argued to have resonated more with the old approaches, the focal point to this 
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perspective, as Jepperson observes, being the embeddedness of social structures and actors 
in broad-scale contexts of meaning (i.e. initially the European and later the world culture for 
social organisation)175. 
A founding stone to sociological institutionalism has been the research initially conducted 
on the educational system, two important theoretical points which are now cornerstone for 
the school of thought being reflected in Meyer’s study on the positive and negative effects 
that high schools have on the students’ intentions to attend college. Firstly, institutions (in 
this case schools) play a fundamental role in bestowing an identity (“graduate”) onto actors 
(students), and secondly holding constant certain characteristics of these institutions (in 
this case the social status and the role of graduates in society), the effects on individuals 
would be largely similar, as actors are enacting a singular identity176. This latter observation 
served as the basis for the development of a theory of diffuse socialisation which assumes 
the acquisition by individuals within the organisation of values, needs and social roles (i.e. 
identities or self-conceptions) which will considerably guide them throughout a range of 
social contexts177. However, this socialisation will cover not only actors within institutions, 
but also outsiders (its diffuse nature) as for example universities not only create the 
identity of graduate, but they also legitimise the social rights and meanings attached to this 
identity which are transmitted within the larger environment178.  
The diffuse nature of socialisation can be connected to the concept of isomorphism that 
assumes a natural tendency of institutions within a field to converge on relatively similar 
forms. This latter concept extensively explored by DiMaggio and Powell is conceptualised 
both as a mechanism of change and of convergence. The fundament for isomorphism lays in 
the understanding of institutions. As such, within the sociological approach, institutions are 
portrayed as “frameworks of programs or rules establishing identities and activity scripts 
for such identities”179 – thus incorporating a set of common responses to situations and 
affecting actors’ expectations regarding the collective environment and collective activity. 
The totality of such organisations that constitutes a recognised area of institutional life 
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forms an organisational field which, as DiMaggio and Powell observe, has the tendency 
towards homogenisation180. This increasing convergence among institutions in particular 
fields is in fact the product of isomorphic change or the constraining process that forces one 
unit in a population to change its characteristics so that it would resemble to another unit 
that faces the same set of environmental conditions181. The mechanisms identified by 
DiMaggio and Powell by which convergence change occurs can be coercive, mimetic or 
normative. The triggers for coercive isomorphism are represented by formal or informal 
pressure being exerted on an organisation by another and by the cultural expectations of 
the society within which organisations function. Mimetic processes involve the modelling or 
borrowing of practices between institutions and are usually generated by the need to cope 
in an efficient manner with the uncertainties of the environment. However, this type of 
practices can be diffused unintentionally and indirectly as well through the transfer of 
employees. Finally the last source of isomorphic organisational change is normative and 
represents the tendency of professional networks to converge in terms of training and 
career progression. As such, individuals occupying similar positions across a range of 
organisations (and having similar professional backgrounds) will tend to respond in similar 
ways to policies, procedures and structures, this situation in turn leading to a diminished 
level of variation across organisations182.  
Normative isomorphism, as categorised by Peters183, starts with the assumption that 
individuals understand the political world on the basis of the values and principles that are 
embedded in their forma mentis through their membership in institutions. The definition of 
institutions that the normative strand puts forward is not fundamentally different to that of 
the sociological perspective discussed up until now, as both versions have been reactions to 
the overemphasis placed on utility maximisation and rationality within the discipline. 
Hence, an institution is understood as a “relatively enduring collection of rules and 
organised practices, embedded in structures of meaning (…) that are (…) relatively resilient 
to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external 
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circumstances”184. In this institutional context, actors are assumed to form their political 
values through their membership in formal and informal institutions185 and through 
continuous learning within this environment. The process of learning is not however, 
unidirectional. Organisational knowledge and beliefs are diffused to individuals through 
means such as instruction, indoctrination, and exemplification, but simultaneously, the 
institutional code of norms and practices is adapting to individual beliefs186. 
But the most important implication that is generated from this conceptualisation of 
institutional change is a very static or passive image of organisations which leaves variation 
unaccounted. As such, starting from the hypothesis that there is a tendency towards 
homogeneity, Powell argues that change understood as heterogeneity occurs in the 
organisational fields where the units are least subject to isomorphic pressures187. Thus 
episodes of change occur in instances where either mimetic or coercive isomorphism is 
partial. While in the case of unsuccessful modelling (mimesis) internal resistance to new 
practices represents the trigger for unintended modifications, in instances of weak external 
pressure (incomplete institutionalisation), due to the fact that the actor that is inducing the 
incentive for change does not have the power to insure its reproduction, the new practices 
introduced will be visible for a short term188.  
As we have observed thus far, while both institutional stability (understood in this case as 
convergence) and (episodic) change can be explored by using the theoretical assumption of 
sociological institutionalism, both the motivation for change and normative compliance 
with institutional practices cannot be explained with the same set of theoretical 
assumptions set forward so far. A more agency-centred variety of sociological 
institutionalism designed to counterbalance the rationalist perspectives reckoned as overly 
individualistic and characterised by largely utilitarian presuppositions and methodologies 
can be found in the works of James March and Johan Olsen189. The authors distinguish 
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between aggregative and integrative political processes190. The former structure is 
associated with institutions in which individual actors participate in order to materialise 
their own preferences (a view shared by rational choice institutionalism), while the latter 
attaches to the organisational environment the concept of “logic of appropriateness” which 
explains actors’ conformity with norms through their perceived legitimacy. The emphasis 
here is placed on a process of interaction between structure and agency (ontology of mutual 
constitution) in which neither unit of analysis (agency or structure) will reduce the other to 
a state of ontological primitiveness191. Actors are seen as embedded in these regulative and 
constitutive institutions and their interests are shaped by the institutional setting. 
Institutional constraints on actors in a normative perspective are thus mainly based on self-
policing, as individuals who become members of an organisation do so willingly and 
implicitly accept the set of rules and values attached to the institutional framework they opt 
for. On the long run however, compliance can also become a product of habitual action, 
conscious commitment to abiding rules being replaced with reflexive responses192. This 
more agency-centered version of sociological institutionalism (set in contrast to the more 
structuralist version of isomorphism) focuses on socialisation meaning the process through 
which actors learn or are persuaded to accommodate new norms and rules that redefine 
their interests and identities193.  
3.2.2.1. Hypothesis grounded in SI 
 
In this sociological reading, the EU is regarded as a platform for new ideas, meanings, rule 
and norms that member states are to absorb/internalise. To facilitate this process two 
mediating factors have the capacity to encourage change: norm entrepreneurs and co-
operative informal institutions. The former act as ‘change agents’ either lobbying for new 
ideas and norms deriving from the EU level (advocacy groups) or by developing and 
circulating causal ideas that help create state interests and preferences (epistemic 
communities). The latter are embodied by co-operative political cultures which ease 
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consensus-building in the decision-making process194. The impact of co-operative informal 
institutions will be tested in our analysis of the transposition record in Romania and 
Bulgaria by starting from the assumption that the degree of compliance correlates with the 
extent to which “rule addresses accept the legitimacy of the rule of law and consider 
compliance with legal norms as demanded by a logic of appropriateness”195. The hypothesis 
will thus be: 
He: The lower the support for the rule of law, the larger the delay in transposition will be. 
In order to operationalise this variable we will use the World Bank Rule of Law dimension 
of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The Rule of Law index captures “perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence”196.  We opt for this particular indicator as it 
assures inclusiveness by aggregating data collected from surveys of firms and households, 
as well as from assessments of a variety of commercial business information providers, 
non-governmental organisations and public-sector bodies.   
Sociological institutionalism is of course not without its drawbacks. While attempting to 
provide an alternative approach to the methodological individualism of rational choice, 
normative institutionalism faces the same difficulties as its nemesis in terms of potential for 
falsification. By conceptualising motivation for social behaviour as a consequence of pre-
fixed rational preferences, the rational choice framework puts forward an un-falsifiable 
tautology that “says little about human behaviour (save) that it is always and everywhere 
rational”197. To this extent, normative institutionalism is subject to the same pitfall, actor 
behaviour simply being perceived as a result of the “logic of appropriateness”. This 
emphasis on social appropriateness can also lead to the disregarding of actors that have 
competing stakes over certain institutional solutions. These competing stakes can be 
translated into the institutional genesis that will inherit these power struggles. As Hall and 
Taylor explain: 
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“After all, many actors, both inside and outside an organization, have deep stakes in 
whether that firm or government adopts new institutional practices, and reform initiatives 
often provoke power struggles among these actors, which an emphasis on processes of 
diffusion can neglect”198. 
Nevertheless, sociological institutionalism brings to the table an important set of 
mechanisms through which structures exert influence upon actors: normative, cognitive, 
and dependence mechanisms.  More specifically, institutional influence is exerted when  
actors seeking legitimacy among peer states opt to adopt forms of the parent policy in order 
to attain acknowledgement, when substantive policy concerns exist but the link between 
the available means and the desired ends is ambiguous and more viable alternative models 
are being emulated, and finally when technical authority is delegated to expert bodies (or 
‘epistemic communities’) to develop and demonstrate the cognitive and normative 
feasibility of policy rationales and prescriptions199. The fruitfulness of using heuristic 
learning forms200 such as persuasion and social interaction as explanatory variables for 
convergence has been particularly demonstrated in analyses of non-coercive modes of EU 
governance based on instruments and processes such as benchmarking, mainstreaming or 
coordination201. While we do not contest the perspective’s attributes and its suitability as a 
theoretical tool to account for deep compliance processes of elite socialisation or cognitive 
convergence, our analysis of the institutional influence exerted at the national level by new 
governance instruments such as the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism and the 
Europe 2020 Strategy will rely on rational choice and historical institutionalism as we are 
interested in exploring sequences of change across time and the influence that actors have 
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exercised during critical junctures. The fundamental premise is that actors might be in a 
strong initial position, seek to maximise their gains and nevertheless make policy decisions 
that would transform their positions in unanticipated ways.   
In what follows we will explore the themes and heuristics of historical institutionalism, 
theoretical strand that is distinguished from the frameworks discussed so far by the 
attention dedicated to empirical questions and by its orientation towards analysing macro 
contexts and hypothesising about the combined effects of institutions and processes. In 
order to corroborate the feasibility and value of our theoretical model that reunites both 
rational choice and historical institutionalist claims, we will present cases of theoretical 
juxtaposition in the relevant literature. Finally we will introduce a set of hypotheses that 
will guide our analysis of Europeanisation in the case of soft law and we will conclude the 
chapter after having presented the potential outcomes of Europeanisation.  
 
3.2.3. Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
 
In the general context of institutionalism, as we have observed so far, the principle that 
unites all theoretical strands is that institutions matter in the sense that they play the role of 
a variable in the outcome of decisions of actors. Historical institutionalism as developed by 
Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth represents “an attempt to illuminate how political struggles 
are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place”202 and in this context, 
institutions are catalytic variables that shape not only the strategies that actors put into 
play, but their goals as well203. Theoreticians within this framework distinguish themselves 
on the one hand from rational choice by emphasising the dependency of individual action 
and preferences on the social and historical institutional setting204, and from the 
sociological approach by the attention provided to the way in which institutions distribute 
power unevenly across societal groups. Hence the world that they portray is marked by 
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institutions understood not as means to an end, but as creators that give some groups or 
interests disproportionate access to the decision-making process205. Here the concept of 
veto player is introduced, understood as “an individual or collective actor whose agreement 
is required for a change in policy”206. Within political institutions, Kay differentiates 
between veto players arguing that they can be either institutional, meaning that they are 
built into the structure of the government, or partisan which identifies members within the 
governing coalition207. Focusing on the health care system, Immergut’s analysis of the 
potential for reform in this sector provides an empirical substantiation that can be attached 
to the general concept of veto player. The cross-national study explains why the structure of 
the Swiss federal health care system provides physicians with greater political influence 
compared to their peers in France and Sweden. The argument is that in spite of the same 
level of decentralisation, physicians in Switzerland benefit of greater opportunities to veto 
policies in this sector that they might perceive as harmful208. Hence, the institutional 
environment shapes actors’ power to engage in political conflict in order to protect their 
interests as different groups are provided with asymmetrical opportunities to veto policy 
(asymmetrical power).  
The conceptualisation of institutions reinforces the distinction from sociological 
institutionalism, as the research focus is on the impact and influence of “formal and 
informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions in the organisational structure of 
the polity or the political economy”, whereas the sociological approach deals with “cognitive 
scripts, moral templates and symbol systems”209 as well. With rational choice, historical 
institutionalism shares the fundamental assumption that institutions represent humanly 
devised constraints that shape behaviour. However, from this point on it places itself on a 
distinct research agenda. As such the focal point for historical institutionalism is centred on 
long-term evolution and on the outcome generated by the interactions between actors 
within a conjunction of institutions. Its research ‘agenda’ encompasses three key features: 
the examination of substantive questions (on the meso- to macro-level), the rigorous 
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analysis of processes of historical change, sequences and transformations, and finally the 
scrutiny of macroeconomic contexts combining the effects of institutions and processes210.  
At the actor level, preferences are understood as goals (in opposition to utility maximisation 
logic adopted by rational choice) which as Sanders observes, have a more public, less self-
interested dimension and are thus based on ideas that act as mobilising forces for collective 
action211. As such, Hall for example argues that within the economic sector an essential step 
to understanding decisions implies the initial exploration of the origin and the nature of 
policy paradigms. In his approach, Hall defines policy paradigms as “a framework of ideas 
and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can 
be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to 
address”212. In this sense, as Béland observes, by being both ideological and technical, 
paradigms constitute structured world views for politicians, policy-makers, social 
movements and representatives of the para-political sphere (located at the joining of the 
economic, governmental and academic environments and embodied by think tanks and 
research institutes)213.  
Goals as well as individual action are shaped to different extents by the environment in 
which they occur and hence must be pursued as part of the explanatory exercise. The 
institutional environment, once created and strengthened, becomes ‘sticky’ and choices 
made at a critical junctures (or choice points) become ‘locked in’ constraining future 
behaviour. This path dependent instance brings about institutions with mechanisms that 
provide increasing returns (meaning that where each increment added to a particular 
activity yields larger rather than smaller benefits) to action and self-reinforcing 
processes214. Hence, path dependency represents “the dynamics of self-reinforcing or 
positive feedback processes in the political system”215. The concept itself was initially 
borrowed from economics and technology literature where it sought to explain why certain 
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technologies gain advantage to the detriment of others and prevail on the long run, even if 
they might prove to be less efficient than their alternative. Once transferred to the realm of 
political science, path dependency was enriched with agency and choice and used to explain 
why path following becomes locked in. Connected to the concept path dependence is that of 
policy feedback effects which the literature classifies into two types: functional and 
distributional216.  Ikenberry explains functional feedback as the setting in which once a 
conglomeration of institutions is in place, actors adapt their strategies so that they reflect 
and also reinforce the “logic of the system”. The second feedback mechanism is connected to 
the distributional effects of institutions and presupposes that as institutions are not neutral 
coordination systems meaning that they reinforce within their structure a specific pattern 
of power distribution, they will reproduce the way in which power is spread and even 
magnify it217.  
Historical institutionalism is a school of thought characterised by great internal diversity, in 
the same line we would argue as the other new institutionalisms, and its critical version 
starts off with an initial assumption that Paul Pierson (one of the most prominent figures in 
historical institutionalism in political science) made in one of his earliest essays. The author 
argued that while the path dependence of politics via the mechanism of increasing returns 
is the most important concept of the theory, we need to take into consideration the 
hypothesis of previous interpretive arguments noting that negative learning is also a 
possible outcome of path dependency218. More clearly expressed, previous events in a 
sequence influence the outcomes, but not necessarily by inducing movement in the same 
direction. However, Pierson later reinforced a narrower conception of path dependence 
which assumes that “preceding steps in a particular direction influence further movement 
in the same direction”219, pattern captured by the idea of increasing returns. In turn this 
narrower conceptualisation brought criticism on historical institutionalism as it was 
consider falling in the same deterministic trap as the rational choice and sociologic 
alternatives. So if path-dependent processes preserve past decisions in their forms, how do 
actors ever break free from them? 
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Change in this context has been explained either in connection with punctuated equilibrium 
or critical junctures. The former represents a situation where institutions and processes 
remain stable until faced with exogenous shocks (such as crises and wars) that bring about 
relatively abrupt change followed by institutional stasis220. This model has been criticised 
however for its lack of agency and failure to account for the effects of political conflicts and 
the dynamic relation between institutions221. The concept of critical junctures remains 
firmly based on the premise that institutional development is marked by a high level of path 
dependency, but implies that historical moments create branching points at which new 
trajectories become followed instead up until a new critical moment arises222. These 
junctures close off alternative routes and lead to the establishment of institutions that 
generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes223. This approach includes two 
analytically separate claims – the first involves crucial founding moments of institutional 
formation which set developmental pathways, whilst the second involves the continuing 
evolution of institutions in response to changing political contexts, but in ways that are 
constrained by past trajectories224. For a critical juncture to lead to change, three 
parameters are expected to play an important role: forces external to institutions, internal 
factors or circumstances or the result of the intervention of a particular group or 
individual225.  Judging from these factors we can expect for the duration of a critical juncture 
to be short relative to the path-dependent process it initiates as what we are looking for in 
analyses based on the non-ergodicity of the institutional environment are phases of fluidity 
marked by uncertainty, distinctive decisions of influential actors or in the case of 
cumulative causes a tipping point (a threshold that once surpassed leads to rapid 
change)226.   
Change itself is differentiated, as Hall explains, the process being distinguished between 
simple change and radical transformation. Simple change entails policy settings (first order) 
and basic techniques used to attain policy goals (second order). Radical transformation 
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(third order) occurs rarely and involved a shift in the “framework of ideas and standards 
that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to 
attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing”227. 
While first and second order change is incremental, paradigm shift does not naturally follow 
from previous partial alterations. Historical institutionalism tends more often than not to be 
biased towards structure to the detriment of purposeful agency, institutional development 
being subject to a high level of path dependency. In this sense, it is closer to the sociological 
perspective rather than rational choice. However, change is generated during critical 
junctures “of relative structural indeterminism when wilful actors shape outcomes in a 
more voluntaristic fashion than normal circumstances permit”228. At this point historical 
institutionalism shares with the rational choice alternative the ontological premise that 
actors are rational, information is scarce and institutions shape outcomes, but are in turn 
themselves the results of the strategies and choices229.  
 
Table 1 The Three Institutionalisms 
 Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Object of Explanation  Rational behaviour 
and interests 
Historical 
regularities 
Cultural norms and 
frames 
Logic of Explanation Consequentiality 
(strategic 
calculation) 
Path dependence 
and contingency 
Appropriateness 
(socialisation) 
Problems of 
Explanation 
Economic 
determinism 
Historical 
determinism 
Cultural determinism 
Variables to Explain 
Change 
Fixed preferences 
and formal 
institutions 
Path dependence 
and critical 
junctures 
Cultural norms 
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Source: Adapted after V. Schmidt (2011): “Reconciling Ideas and Institutions through Discursive 
Institutionalism”, in D. Béland, R. Cox (eds.) Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) p. 67.   
 
In the context of Europeanisation, while focused mainly on the temporal dimension of 
domestic processes of adjustment to the EU, historical institutionalist studies have argued 
however for the need of a synthetic approach to structural, rationalist, and cultural 
variables and have factored in cognitive and cultural components as well as the influence of 
important veto players upon national adaptation to EU policy-making230. An example in this 
sense is the study of German and British reactions to EU integration designed by Bulmer 
and Burch who argue for an enriched historical approach to Europeanisation231. The 
authors start off by introducing and developing a series of theoretical propositions. Firstly, 
they hold that internal and/or external pressures for change in settled and stable societies 
usually lead to the adaptation of existing institutions rather than the creation of new ones. 
The assumption of incremental change is not however regarded as immutable, 
transformative change being also a potential outcome of accumulated and crystallised 
incremental change232. This ‘incremental-transformative change’ is generated when ‘critical 
moments’ (or moments when opportunity for change arises, but it is not capitalised) 
become critical junctures which create branching points where institutional development 
moves onto a new trajectory which will be path-dependent until the option for an 
alternative route is taken again by important actors. This theoretical model is then enriched 
with the motor that sociological institutionalism considers as influential in determining 
change: the institutional environment that creates a normative context to which actors 
adhere and through which they identify themselves. Hence, without pursuing the objective 
of theory-building, the authors deem that a historical institutionalist analysis of incremental 
and transformative changes must be supplemented by particular attention given to the 
culture and the belief-systems in order to offer deeper insight into the factors that 
contribute to institutional development.  
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The case for theoretical juxtaposition is also made by Jacoby who explores the proclivity of 
Central and Eastern European elites to emulate existing institutions from Western Europe 
on their way towards joining the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)233.  At the core of the theoretical model rests the proposition of 
‘embedded rationality’ shared to different extents by all strands of institutionalism which 
assumes that rationalism plays a central role in political life. Rather than downplaying the 
effects of this proposition, it is suggested that actors’ rationality is embedded within two 
contexts: norms and history. The research framework thus assumes that elite reason is on 
the one hand contingent upon normative models that specify much of the institutional 
design to be pursued and on the other that it is often constrained by historical factors that 
again limit the range of possible outcomes to be sought. Finally, each of the three theoretical 
perspectives holds in essence that institutional development and change is influenced by a 
series of motors and brakes which vary over time and across cases. Rational choice 
contends that the motor is constituted by the electoral support that elites would gain from 
voters (as a response to opting for a strategy) and in some cases the material resources 
forwarded by international organisations that actors can afterwards distribute. The brakes 
come in the form of veto points and their ability to significantly reshape preferences and to 
deflect plans for change. In the case of sociological institutionalism the motor is represented 
by a dense institutional environment, while the break is epitomised by low salience in some 
areas subjected to reform (some reform projects benefitting of less legitimacy). Lastly, the 
main motor driving change in a historical institutionalist view is embodied in the existing 
capacities of actors to push for institutional development, while the lock-in properties of 
existing practices constitute the breaks234. Hence, it is expected for emulation efforts to be 
more noticeable when the momentum generated by the sum of motors to be stronger than 
the hindrance exercised by the brakes. By contrast, elites emulate least when all three types 
of brakes exercise more influence than the motors.  
A third illustration of theoretical synthesis is reflected in Mahoney’s analysis of the political 
trajectories of liberal actors in pursuing the modernisation of the state and agrarian sectors 
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within countries in Central America during the nineteenth century235. In this case the first 
stage of analysis is based on a rational choice model of political preferences that aggregates 
behavioural options, potential outcomes, the utility of these outcomes, and the probability 
of occurrence of a given outcome as components shaping actor choice. Deriving from this 
assumption is a categorisation of actors into utility maximising seekers (who will pursue an 
option that would present the greatest sum of expected utilities) and risk adverse actors 
(whose preferred option is on with the best-worst outcome)236. The second phase of the 
analysis places preference formation in the context of history, the range of components of 
actor choice being shaped by historical circumstances. More clearly put, the options, 
outcomes, utility and probability that actors take into consideration before making a 
decision are factors which do not reflect the objective reality, but mirror former paths 
previously taken, ideologies, and past events. This inaccurate assessment of reality on 
actors’ behalf serves nevertheless as the basis for rational decision making237.  
 
3.2.3.1. Hypothesis grounded in HI 
 
This latter theoretical model will be emulated in our analysis of the extent of 
Europeanisation through two distinct soft law instruments – the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM) and the Europe 2020 Strategy (based on the Open Method of 
Coordination as policy instrument). Inherently, the concept of soft law seems to be tangled 
in a contradiction – “soft law without legal effects is not law and soft law with legal effects is 
hard law”238. However, starting from Snyder’s understanding of the concept as “rules of 
conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have 
practical effects”239, we look at the national impact exercised by two instruments of soft law 
which are differentiated through their legal basis, their instrumentation, policy 
objectives/material scope, and addressees. The motivation for the investigation of national 
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responses both under the CVM and the Open Method of Coordination is twofold. We are 
firstly interested in observing national responses in Romania and Bulgaria on the one hand 
in the case of a policy instrument that has all of the 28 Member States as addressees (the 
Europe 2020 Strategy) and that is based on intergovernmental co-ordination and on the 
other in the case of a largely monitoring instrument that has a driving institutional actor the 
European Commission and a limited number of addressees (the two countries under 
consideration in this thesis). The objective however is not to contrast the progress made by 
the two Member States under the different soft law instruments as we are dealing with 
distinct policy objectives, even if one might argue that the common denominator is the 
Community’s limited direct competence in the policy areas subject to soft law mechanisms. 
Secondly, we are interested in observing the degree of institutional change generated at the 
domestic level under the Community method and under instruments of the new mode of 
governance. Should we expect evidence of ‘thick’ institutional development when analysing 
the transposition of supranational legal acts which have monitoring and sanctioning 
elements attached? By contrast, will policy change taking place through voluntary learning 
be ‘thin’?  
As we have observed so far the components of the process of rational choice formation 
(options, outcomes, utility and probability of occurrence of a given outcome) are 
determined by historical circumstances (former taken paths, ideologies and past events). 
Hence, change will be essentially contingent on history. In largely stable societies we would 
expect internal and/or external pressure to lead to adaptation rather than transformation 
(i.e. incremental institutional change). However, when critical moments become critical 
junctures, in other words when the usual constraints on action are lifted and the weight of 
agency prevails over that of the structure, we can witness significant change at the level of 
domestic structures. The literature has tacitly assumed that the beginning of the accession 
negotiations coupled inherently with outset of the EU’s bargaining strategy of 
reinforcement through reward and penalty has been such a critical moment that has 
generated impetus for change in politics, policies, and polity240. Nevertheless, several 
scholars have predicted a significant backslide of reforms in candidate countries from 
                                                          
240 See F. Schimmelfennig, U. Sedelmeier (2004): “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 669-87; 
F. Schimmelfennig, S. Engert, H. Knobel (2005): “The Impact of EU Political Conditionality”, in F. Schimmelfennig, 
U. Sedelmeier (eds.) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (New York, Cornell University Press), pp. 
29-50.  
80 
 
Central and Eastern Europe as a response to the weakening of the EU’s conditionality in the 
post-accession period as the main incentive – membership – is reached and the extent and 
credibility of threats in case on non-compliance decreases. Post-accession centred studies 
have diverged in explaining the nature of change, on the one hand evidence being provided 
for incremental institutional development that was largely dependent on previous external 
incentives and sanctions/threats241, and on the other for institutional developments that led 
to the establishment of new and relatively stable trajectories242. Our analysis however will 
restrain its boundaries on the second and third part of the study to the extent of domestic 
change in Romania and Bulgaria determined by soft law mechanisms instrumented through 
monitoring, benchmarks, peer pressure and voluntary learning. Hence, in analysing the 
progress done meeting the targets and benchmarks of the CVM and the Europe 2020 
Strategy, we start off by articulating the following hypothesis based on the logic of historical 
institutionalism: 
Hf:  Transformative change that would break path dependent stasis is expected to occur 
when critical moments are capitalised by actors and become critical junctures.  
In the case of the CVM, the start of the accession negotiations with the EU (in February 
2000) following the decision of the European Council in Helsinki from 1999 marked a 
turning point in the pre-accession strategy that was built upon the preliminary phases 
encompassed by the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, the 1995 White Paper on the integration of 
the Central and Eastern European countries in the Single Market, and the series of 
proposals and opinions on reform published in 1997 under the Agenda 2000. While the 
momentum provided by the opening of the accession negotiations with Romania and 
Bulgaria might not have translated right away into the speed and breadth of national 
reforms, it was the pressure of the external and internal context that threatened the 
progress that the two countries had made up until then. Without a real prospect for EU 
membership, reform-minded governments were struggling to gain support in order to push 
                                                          
241 See among others V. Ganev (2013): “Post-Accession Hooliganism: Democratic Governance in Bulgaria and 
Romania after 2007”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 26-44; D. Dragoman (2013): “Post-
Accession Backsliding: Non-ideological Populism and Democratic Setbacks in Romania”, South-East European 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No.3, pp. 27-46.  
242 See P. Levitz, G. Pop-Eleches (2009): “Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact on Democracy and 
Governance Before and After Accession”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 20, no. 10, pp. 1-29; on the 
compliance pattern see D. Toshkov (2012): “The Disaster that Didn’t Happen: Compliance with EU Law in 
Central and Eastern Europe”, L’Europe en Formation. Revue d’Études Sur la Construction Européenne et de le 
Fédéralisme, Vol. 2(364), pp. 91-109.  
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for institutional change. In Bulgaria, the first government to remain in office for a full term 
since 1989 was formed by Ivan Kostov – the party leader of the Union of Democratic Forces 
(1997-2001). Repeated changes of government243 and deep political polarisation had 
prevented the parliamentary forces from establishing basic political dialogue244. In 
Romania, after the 1996 elections the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) which 
enjoyed the largest popular support (receiving 19.6% of the seats in city council elections) 
quickly found itself under attack for the revived pace of economic reform both from within 
the governing coalition, by its partner the Union of Social Democracy (USD), and by the 
opposition through the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR). This lack of support 
was translated in 1998 in the resignation of the Victor Ciorbea government and his 
replacement with the Radu Vasile government, who despite promising swift economic 
reform, failed to complete two years in office as well, being replaced in December 1999 by 
the technocrat Governor of Romania’s Central Bank, Mugur Isarescu. The internal context 
was coupled externally with the Kosovo crisis that saw both Romania and Bulgaria in a 
security gap generated by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the lack of a patron and the 
absence of a clear prospect of NATO membership (Bulgaria being especially affected as 
when having approached NATO in 1990 it had been told to secure better relations with 
Turkey as cooperation between the two states had been affected as a result of Bulgaria’s 
Regenerative Process245). A decision of the European Council to delay the start of the 
accession negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria – while potentially justified by the 
scarcity and sluggishness of national reforms – could have fostered the rise to power of 
anti-Western forces and the marginalisation of pro-Western political parties on the 
background of disappointment and discontent among the populations. While this 
alternative would have been possible, it would have come at the expense of the countries’ 
democratisation and regional security. Noting that this is a common critical juncture for 
both countries, in our analysis of the progress made in reforming the judicial sector we will 
                                                          
243 European Commission (1997): Commission Opinion on Bulgaria’ Application for Membership of the European 
Union (Brussels, Doc/97/11), p. 7, stated that: “Elections in June 1990 were won by the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP), successor of the Communist Party; but the BSP government was forced by economic crisis to resign in 
November 1990, to be replaced by a “programme” government. New elections in October 1991 resulted in a 
coalition government led by the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF); but that too was replaced by a non-party 
government the following year. Elections in 1994 gave a majority to a BSP government which, however, was 
forced by renewed economic troubles to resign in February 1997, to be replaced by an interim government.” 
244 S. Katsikas (2011): Negotiating Diplomacy in the New Europe: Foreign Policy in Post-Communist Bulgaria 
(London, I.B. Tauris), p. 92.  
245 In the 1980s Bulgaria’s government launched a campaign to assimilate the Turkish minority by forcing its 
members to adopt Slavic names.  
82 
 
also take into consideration critical moments that were specific for each of the two 
countries. This section will be based on a qualitative analysis developed through process-
tracing. Data will be collected from the Commission’s regular Reports on Progress under the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, the Freedom House “Nations in Transit” reports, 
BTI country reports, and from primary analyses developed by national and international 
think tanks such as Expert Forum, Transparency International, Center for the Study of 
Democracy, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Bulgarian Judges Association, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, Romanian Academic Society. The findings will be triangulated by integrating 
interviews with government representatives, national experts, and members of the 
European Parliament from the two countries.  
The main assumption regarding the behaviour of political actors is extracted from the 
rational choice literature (instrumental rationality drives political action). Thus we assume 
that while the perceived options, the outcomes, the utility and probability of occurrence of a 
given outcome are contingent on historical and nonetheless institutional circumstances, 
political actors will rank-order their goals and use the best available means for pursuing 
their ends, thus maximising their utility246. Hence, we will apply a deductive approach and 
focus on short-term goals that politicians tend to share, with one in particular recurring: re-
election. When adding the varying degree of pressure for compliance and adaptation 
brought about by the different EU governance modes (generally split along the lines of hard 
and soft law), we assume that, similar to the rationalist conjecture, states will favour a 
policy instrument over another depending on the level of commitment that they wish to 
take. The utility or advantage of the policy instrument is deemed in accordance to the set of 
circumstances, soft law being preferred to the detriment of hard law in situations of 
uncertainty where actors need to gain more information including about the other parties’ 
practices247.  In addition, soft law is related to the idea that “national policies should 
gradually become more alike through the voluntary exchange of information among officials 
on what has worked at the national level in order to achieve shared goals”248. Both in the 
case of the CVM, and in that of the Europe 2020 Strategy, the established benchmarks and 
                                                          
246 K. Weyland (2002): “Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin American Politics”, 
Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 37, No.1, pp. 57-85, p. 58.  
247 G. Shaffer, M. Pollack (2010): “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International 
Governance”, Minnesota Law Review, Vol.94, No.3, pp. 712-43, p. 715.  
248 A. Stubb, H. Wallace, J. Peterson (2003): “The Policy-Making Process”, in E. Bomberg, A. Stubb (eds.) The 
European Union: How Does It Work? (New York, Oxford University Press), p. 142.  
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targets regard policy areas that largely fall under the attributes of national policy-makers249 
where the Union’s competences are still weak, and nevertheless demand a substantial 
allocation of resources (active labour market policies particularly implying a strong national 
budgetary discipline).  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the case of ‘soft’ forms of governance (targeting and 
voluntarism) we would expect a more responsive mode of behaviour at the member state 
level, with exemplary performers in achieving the common benchmarks being identified as 
model-givers to be copied. However, this behaviour among actors will largely be dependent 
on the level of commitment, the governing architecture250 of the proposed system of 
coordination and ultimately the deeply rooted political and economic traditions and past 
trajectories. The analysis of the level of commitment will take into consideration the pre-
accession track-record of Bulgaria and Romania on meeting the Copenhagen criteria, as 
these initial conditions or obligations for membership generated the base for the process of 
guiding, supporting and monitoring of candidate countries’ road towards EU membership. 
Before concluding the chapter with a discussion of the diversity of potential outcomes of the 
Europeanisation process, we will turn to a brief review of the main institutional governance 
aspects of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism and the Europe 2020 Strategy that 
are deemed to be relevant in explaining the extent to which Bulgaria and Romania have 
sought to conduct reforms and design national policies while accommodating the objectives 
of these soft law instruments. These aspects will be discussed comprehensively in the 
following chapters, but due to their relevance in the construction of the research 
hypotheses, they will be included in a nutshell here.  
The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism constitutes a special instrument established 
by two European Commission decisions251 just before Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to 
the EU, having the explicit objective of monitoring and assessing the ongoing efforts of the 
new-comers to improve the accountability and efficiency of their judicial systems. The 
                                                          
249 An exception in the case of the Europe 2020 strategy is the overlap between the so called “20/20/20” energy 
targets and the legally binding commitments pursued through the community method that were agreed by the 
EU leaders in 2007 and enacted through legislation set out in the 2009 climate and energy package.  
250 The concept of governance architecture was defined by Borrás and Radaelli as an institutional arrangement 
that addresses complex problems in a strategic, holistic, long-term perspective by setting output-oriented goals 
and implementing them through combinations of old and new organisational structures. See S. Borrás, C. 
Radaelli (2011): “The Politics of Governance Architectures: Creation, Change and Effects of the EU Lisbon 
Strategy”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 463-84.  
251 European Commission (2006): Decision Establishing a Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification of Progress 
in Bulgaria (Brussels, 13 December), C(2006)6570 final; Decision Establishing a Mechanism for Cooperation and 
Verification of Progress in Romania (Brussels, 13 December), C(2006)6569 final.  
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context in which this mechanism was put forward however, goes back to 2002, when after 
concluding the negotiations for the 2004 big bang enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria’s EU 
accession was postponed due to doubts regarding the meeting of the second and third 
Copenhagen criteria (functioning market economy and the capacity to take on the 
obligations of membership). However, Sofia and Bucharest sought reassurance that the 
deferral would not throw their accession process into limbo and were successful in 
obtaining an official EU commitment to a precise accession timetable provided that 
improvement in the reforming of the justice sector would be reached in both countries252. In 
contrast to the member states that had joined the EU in 2004, Romania and Bulgaria had to 
accept an additional safeguard clause embodied by article 39 of the Treaty of Accession of 
the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union by which the Council would 
postpone accession by one year if the two states would be deemed, based on the 
Commission recommendations, manifestly unprepared to meet the requirements of 
membership253. In its 2006 Monitoring Report, the European Commission voiced concerns 
regarding the accountability and efficiency of the two countries’ judicial systems and law 
enforcement bodies254, but as fighting criminality and corruption and furthering the 
independence of the judiciary are large-scale and long-term objectives, tangible results 
would have required more than one year to be reached. Considering the time requirements 
for efficient and sustainable reform and the potential negative signal that postponement 
would relay among the Bulgarian and Romanian citizens, the clause was not activated, but a 
set of benchmarks and a monitoring mechanism were put forward serving a twofold 
purpose: on the one hand reassuring member states that the new-comers will fully comply 
with EU rules and standards, and on the other guiding and assisting Romania and Bulgaria 
on their course to fulfilling the EU requirements255.  
Six benchmarks were introduced for Bulgaria with reference to the independence, 
accountability, transparency and efficiency of the judicial system, the integrity and 
professionalism of the judiciary, the conduct of investigations into high-level and local 
government corruption and the strategy on the fight against organised crime and money 
                                                          
252 G. Noutcheva (2006): “Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the EU: Postponement, Safeguards and the Rule 
of Law”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 102/May (Sofia, Centre for European Policy Studies), p. 1.  
253 See the Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, 
(21.06.2005), OJ L 157/11, p. 41.  
254 See European Commission (2006): Communication from the Commission. Monitoring Report on the State of 
Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania (Brussels, 26 September), COM(2006) 549 final.  
255 Antoinette Primatarova (2010): “On High Stakes, Stakeholders and Bulgaria’s EU Membership”, Working 
Paper No. 27/April (Sofia, European Policy Institutes Network) 
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laundering and its application. For Romania, four benchmarks were established focusing on 
the transparency, efficiency, institutional structure and accountability of the judicial system, 
and on the fight against high-level and local government corruption and the legal and 
institutional framework governing it. In furtherance to the 27 June 2007 Progress Report, 
Romania and Bulgaria were invited to elaborate action plans that would substantiate the 
CVM benchmarks with concrete measures and timelines for implementation which were 
drafted in dialogue with representatives of professional associations and of the civil 
society256. The driving institutional actor of the CVM is mainly the European Commission 
that carries the evaluation through regular monitoring reports (issued biannually up to and 
including 2012, but have shifted to annual reports to allow more time for analysis). The 
reports are elaborated by the Secretary General with direct input from the Home Affairs 
Directorate General, the Justice Directorate General and the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF) on the basis of information provided from various sources (EC Representation 
Office, Member State diplomatic missions in Sofia and Bucharest, civil society organisations, 
associations and expert reports), including the governments of Bulgaria and Romania as 
part of their reporting obligation257.   
To this point the attributes of the CVM place the instrument within the sphere of soft law.  It 
has the objective of monitoring and guiding judicial reform and the fight against corruption 
– areas in which the European Union does not have competence258 – using an initial set of 
broad benchmarks and continuous assessment of progress, it encourages horizontal 
cooperation between judiciary representatives of Romania and Bulgaria and other Member 
States, it includes a wide range of actors in the information gathering phase that is essential 
                                                          
256 See Ministry of Interior (2007): Action Plan on the Implementation of the Benchmarks in the Areas of 
Judiciary Reform and the Fight Against Corruption and Organized Crime, available at 
https://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/A8FF1DB1-AE91-490F-84B2-
8CC1D4EA382F/0/ActionPlanBM16ENFinal.pdf, Ministry of Justice (2007): Action Plan for Meeting the 
Benchmarks Established within the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, available at 
http://www.just.ro/Portals/0/Right_Panel/Plan%20de%20actiune/plan_actiune_en_21122007%5B1%5D.pdf.  
257 European Parliament (2013): “The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and 
Rule of Law in the EU – Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism”, (Brussels, Policy Department Citizens’ Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET%282013%29493031_EN.pdf, p. 18.  
258 According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Title V. Area of freedom, security and 
justice, the European institutions can adopt measures with view to border control, asylum, and immigration 
matters and can assure judicial cooperation in civil (the implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions; effective access to justice; development of alternative methods of dispute settlements and 
training of the judiciary and judicial staff) and criminal matters (establishing minimum rules concerning the 
identification and sanctioning of the most serious criminal offences and requesting through Eurojust national 
authorities to initiate investigations or prosecutions for crimes affecting two or more Member States).  
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for the delivery of recommendations stage, its objectives are reinforced through EU funding 
opportunities, and finally the recommendations put forward in the progress reports are not 
legally binding. But beyond this point, the statute of the mechanism becomes more complex. 
Firstly, the CVM was established through European Commission decisions which are legal 
instruments binding in their entirety to their addressees. Moreover, the Commission 
referenced in its recitals articles 36, 37 and 38 of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of 
Bulgaria and Romania which provided the Commission the right to invoke safeguard 
measures up to three years after accession should serious shortcomings and breaches were 
observed in the case of the acquis (i.e. the economic sectors), the internal market and the 
justice and home affairs area. Particularly recital 7 in both decisions marks the failure to 
address the benchmarks adequately as a reason for the Commission to apply such safeguard 
measures. However, when distinguishing soft law instruments from binding legislation, 
sanctions are the missing element from the toolkit associated with the former. The 
effectiveness of soft law is rather explained by mechanisms such as naming and shaming, 
diffusion through mimesis or discourse, learning and sharing best practices and 
networking259.  Following the causal implications of the unfolding of these mechanisms, 
states would move from a single-loop or adaptive type of learning where the role of the EU 
is that of a source of information that modifies the range of alternatives available to national 
policy-makers to a double-loop or reflexive learning process where the EU generates 
change in instruments, practices and ultimately objectives through the transfer of ideas.  
Noting the impact that the introduction of hard law elements into soft law instruments has 
upon the nature and end result of learning and change at the national level, the analysis of 
the progress made under the CVM will be based on an initial discussion of the extent to 
which the perspective of sanction application has hastened or improved national policy 
change. But while the CVM has had a hard law element inbuilt, the Europe 2020 Strategy 
that aims to connect entrepreneurship with economic growth and social cohesion across 
Member States represents a soft law policy coordination cycle  (only for non-members of 
the Euro area, as for those countries within it, the Europe 2020 Strategy is built around the 
monitoring cycle of the European Semester which includes hard mechanisms of binding 
                                                          
259 D. Trubek, L. Trubek (2005): “The Open method of Co-ordination and the Debate over ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Law” 
in Zeitlin J., Pochet P., Magnussen L. (eds.) The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action. The European Employment 
and Social Inclusion Strategies (Brussels, P.I.E.-Peter Lang), p. 91.  
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budgetary and macroeconomic policy coordination and attached sanctions for non-
compliance) that was gradually synchronised with hybrid cycles such as the Stability and 
Growth Pact.  
The Europe 2020 Strategy, which succeeded the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010), was 
proposed by the European Commission in March 2010 as a means of enhancing growth 
potential, levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion across the EU on the 
background of the 2008 economic and financial crisis that had become by 2010 a sovereign 
debt crisis. The proposed vision of an efficient social market economy for Europe was built 
up on three mutually reinforcing priorities – smart growth based on knowledge and 
innovation, sustainable growth through ecological and competitive resource utilisation, and 
inclusive growth that would assure social and regional cohesion. The ten-year programme 
also incorporated a series of flagship initiatives (focusing on innovation, education, the 
digital society, climate and energy, mobility and competitiveness, job and skills and the fight 
against poverty) which act as umbrella vehicles for more specific initiatives thus being 
developed into coordinated roadmaps that identify medium and long-term objectives and 
the means of achieving them.  
The priorities and initiatives were set to commit both the EU and the Member States. At the 
EU level, policies and instruments, notably the single market, financial levers and external 
policy tools were to be reformed in order to tackle bottlenecks to the delivery of the Europe 
2020 goals260. At the national level, the European objectives for 2020 focusing on 
employment, research and development, climate change and energy, education and poverty 
were translated into domestic targets that would ensure the commitment of Member States 
to the strategy while also accommodating the uneven national circumstances. 
Implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy is based on the reporting mechanism 
developed under Lisbon II (the re-launched Lisbon Agenda from 2005) through which 
member states are requested to enter into dialogue with the European Commission by 
setting in their national reform programmes (NRPs) the specific domestic contributions to 
meeting EU-level targets.  
However, considering the fact that macro-economic stability and strong budgetary 
discipline across Member States are pre-requisites for the achievement of the Europe 2020 
targets for growth, starting with 2011 the European Commission decided the integration of 
                                                          
260 European Commission (2010): Communication from the Commission. Europe 2020 – A Strategy for Smart, 
Sustainable and Inclusive Growth (Brussels, March), COM (2010)2020 final, p. 7.  
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the 10 year programme in the economic governance architecture of the European 
Semester261. The semester represents a process of enhanced economic coordination and is 
initiated each year by the Commission after adopting the Annual Growth Survey through 
which it takes stock of the economic and social situation in Europe and sets out broad policy 
priorities for the EU as a whole for the coming year (and in so doing launching a new 
European Semester). In the annex of the survey the Commission presents its evaluation of 
the steps taken by the Member States in line with the Integrated Guidelines of the Europe 
2020 Strategy262. In April, Member States submit simultaneously their National Reform 
Programmes based on the Broad Guidelines of Economic Policy (Art. 121 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU) and the Employment Guidelines (Art. 148 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU) along with the Stability (euro area Member States) or Convergence 
Programmes (non euro area Member States) which represent the mandatory reporting 
under the Stability and Growth Pact. After the Commission’s assessments and based on its 
proposals, the Council concludes the Semester by the adoption of country-specific 
recommendations. The objective of the European Semester is to assure the premise for the 
achievement of the Europe 2020 headline targets by bringing closer an ex-ante economic 
policy coordination cycle that includes a corrective arm – the Excessive Deficit Procedure – 
based on hard fines for Eurozone countries that repeatedly fail to meet the criteria of a 
maximum deficit of 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although the Europe 2020 
Strategy is still a soft law policy coordination instrument, separate from the hybrid Stability 
and Growth Pact and its preventative and corrective arms, the coordination of governance 
mechanisms263 done under the European Semester has introduced elements of hard law 
among the toolkit through which the headline targets are to be reached. Our analysis of the 
impact of the Europe 2020 Strategy in Romania and Bulgaria (by considering the country-
                                                          
261 European Commission (2011): Progress Report on the Europe 2020 Strategy to the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions. Annex to the Annual Growth Survey 2012 (Brussels, 23 Nov), COM(2011) 815 final, p. 2.  
262 The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU provides that the Council is to adopt broad economic guidelines (Art. 
121) and employment guidelines (Art. 148). The first group of guidelines (1 to 6) address preoccupations with 
the sustainability of public finances, macro-economic imbalances, the stability of the euro area, the shift to an 
information society and to a competitive and low-carbon economy and are established by a Council 
Recommendation on broad guidelines for economic policies of the member states and of the Union. The second 
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states, and concern increasing labour force, improving human resources, matching the supply and demand over 
time, and bringing people back into the labour market. Together, these guidelines compose the integrated 
guidelines for implementing the Europe 2020 strategy.  
263 K. Armstrong (2012): “The Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020: From the Governance of Coordination to the 
Coordination of Governance”, in P. Copeland, D. Papadimitriou (eds), The EU’s Lisbon Strategy. Evaluating 
Success, Understanding Failure (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan), p. 208.  
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specific recommendations, the shifts in the National Reform Programmes and the European 
Commission evaluations) will however consider the strategy as a soft coordinative process, 
as the two countries are not Euro areas and the only available sanctioning means remains 
the ‘naming and shaming’ process.   
 
3.3. Potential outcomes of the Europeanisation process 
 
We have discussed so far in this chapter the dimensions, timing, boundaries and 
instruments of Europeanisation while providing the main assumptions regarding actor 
responses to institutional pressure and the extent to which change is expected according to 
the different variants of the new institutionalist theory. However, in order to be able to 
assess the effects of the Europeanisation process we would need an outcome scale that 
would accommodate the variation in intensity and depth of change. The first phase of 
Europeanisation studies have theorised the phenomenon as a set of conditions with 
convergence or transformation as its expected consequence. Authors as Kohler-Koch and 
her collaborators have argued that European integration had impacted not only the 
distribution of power between multiple levels of authority as member states are 
incorporated into a complex decision-making system, but has also changed the character of 
the state, as when national policies are partly supplemented and partly replaced by 
European policies the old actor constellations, instruments and structures were forced to 
adapt264. As we have mentioned in the beginning of the chapter Europeanisation is 
conceptualised as a process that may entail multiple effects ranging from continuity of 
status quo to fundamental change (or third order change were we to use the terminology 
put forward by Hall). Inherent to this conceptualisation is the increasingly shared 
conviction that Europeanisation is being ‘processed’ differently across policy sectors, modes 
of governance, institutions, and member states. While numerous authors have put forward 
classifications of the potential national outcomes of Europeanisation, they seem to converge 
                                                          
264 B. Kohler-Koch (1996): “Catching Up with Change: The Transformation of Governance in the European 
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towards Börzel’s heuristic summary of the scope and direction of the process265. The five 
discerned outcomes are: inertia, absorption, accommodation, transformation and 
retrenchment.  
The first denotes a lack of change and can occur if a country finds that the EU political 
architectures, objectives and/or policies are too dissimilar to the domestic practices. Inertia 
can take the form of lags, transposition delays or simply sheer resistance to EU-induced 
change266. Absorption indicates that policy requirements are accommodated without 
administrative structures being changed, as these new policies usually do not conflict with 
existing principles – loosely linking problems and solutions and thus allowing for the 
implementing organisations to decide over the instrumental aspects267. The next type on the 
axis of Europeanisation outcomes is accommodation, concept similar to what Thelen 
describes as “layering of new arrangements on top of pre-existing structures”. 
Transformation refers to a situation where policies, instruments and institutions are 
replaced with new ideational and organisational templates. This concept is similar to Hall’s 
third order change, entailing ‘paradigmatic’ shifts or profound changes in the logic of 
political, social and economic structures268. Finally, Europeanisation can produce the 
paradoxical effect which can be partly juxtaposed to Pierson’s concept of negative learning – 
where previous events in a sequence influence the outcomes, but not necessarily by 
inducing movement in the same direction. Hence, despite being subject to robust forces that 
would be expected to vector member states towards European policy goals, instruments, 
and institutions, in some cases we can encounter an antagonistic reaction where the 
national setting becomes less Europeanised than it was in a previous phase.  
Transformation and convergence are not however the dominant domestic consequences of 
Europeanisation. The extent of change will depend on the type of European policy 
instruments and governance modes that trigger different responses at the national and sub-
national level, the uneven development of EU institutions and policy-making (especially 
across policy areas) and finally the diversity of institutional traditions, historical 
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experiences and the interpretations and assessment of these experiences in the case of 
European Member States269. It is at the level of the direction (top-down or bottom-up) and 
the nature of the outcome of the Europeanisation process that the juxtaposition of rational 
choice and historical institutionalist traditions is mostly justified. Both institutionalist 
perspectives are top-down approaches, seeking to explain domestic reactions to pressures 
from outside, while the sociological branch expands toward the horizontal dimension of 
Europeanization considered to be influenced by the interaction between actors organised at 
similar levels, but across Member States. Placing greater emphasis on beliefs, values and 
ideas and thus on the political fit between actors reunited under the same supra-national 
institutional framework, a sociological perspective would expect an eventual level of 
congruence among actors. Rational choice and historical institutionalism bring back the 
focus upon actor preferences, institutions structuring the bargaining game and providing 
incentives for rational actors to rethink their strategies. But as calculations and national 
contexts influenced by past paths of development vary, so will the outcomes of the 
Europeanisation process. Thus, while it is generally agreed that EU institutions change 
domestic politics, in the absence of a uniform EU policy model and noting the need for 
national adjustment, we shouldn’t expect convergence270.   
After having explored the attributes of Europeanisation as a concept, the direction, 
mediating factors and outcomes of the process, and after having connected these with a 
theoretical framework that would substantiate the hypotheses that form the basis of the 
study, we now turn to a discussion over how the validity of our assumptions will be tested.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
269 See J. Olsen (2002): “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 5, 
pp. 921-52. 
270 T. Börzel, T. Risse (2007): “Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union Politics”, in K. 
Jørgensen, M. Pollack, B. Rosamond (eds.) Handbook of European Union Politics (London, SAGE Publications), p. 
496.  
92 
 
Chapter 4  
Securing the momentum for reforms beyond accession - 
An analysis of Romania and Bulgaria’s track record under 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
 
The current chapter will evaluate Romania and Bulgaria’s track records in meeting the post-
accession benchmarks established by the European Union in the field of justice. Being the 
only two member states that are subject to ongoing monitoring of their reforms in the 
justice sector (through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism), we will analyse the 
attained results and explain why the two countries have responded somewhat differently to 
similar soft law instruments and external formal and informal pressure. As we will argue in 
more detail in the chapter, the focus of our analysis will rest on judicial governance and 
anti-corruption policies in the two member states as these are commonly monitored under 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism and have been assessed as ancillary elements 
of the pre-accession political criteria. These outputs will be assessed by using 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier’s distinction between formal rule adoption, defined by the 
authors as transposition of norms and establishment of institutions, and behavioural 
adoption indicating the degree of rule conformation271. We will also be referring to 
historical institutionalist concepts such as critical junctures, path dependence, and lock-in 
effects in order to explain the current different results obtained by the two countries in 
tackling high level corruption and attaining European standards of judicial governance. As 
such, we will argue that despite witnessing in both countries great political instability and 
turmoil after their European accession, as well as comparable opposition from veto players 
that have sought to maintain the status quo of incomplete reforms, the lock-in of an 
institutional path opted for at EU demand during the pre-accession period has led to 
sustainable efforts in the fight against corruption in Romania.  
In terms of the impact of the post-accession system of conditionality and its efficiency in 
securing in Romania and Bulgaria the sustainability of specific EU-driven reforms, the 
tendency in the specialised literature has been to regard the Cooperation and Verification 
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Mechanism (CVM) as a weak incentive structure marked by toothless explicit threats272 or 
as a monitoring and assessment instrument marred by technical deficiencies which renders 
it not only inefficient, but detrimental273. It will be argued that comparative approaches that 
differentiate between pre- and post-accession conditionality mechanisms as a basis for the 
evaluation of the latter run into the risk of discounting the importance of continuous 
procedural guiding provided to Romania and Bulgaria through the recommendations 
sections of the progress reports, as well as the social pressure exercised during moments of 
political turmoil in the two countries. The end result would translate into an overlooking of 
a significant pressure factor that has had an impact upon the direction of reforms in the two 
member states despite strong domestic political opposition. Nonetheless, the CVM indeed 
has not been strong enough to ensure cumulative and irreversible progression in the two 
countries, however at this point we will question to what extent we could have realistically 
expected for such an outcome to be reached. This latter point will be subsumed in a 
discussion over the change in the Enlargement Strategy after the 2004 and 2007 waves 
which saw a reshuffle in the institutional ownership of the process that has led to the 
Council taking the lead in setting benchmarks and conditions for progress in accession 
negotiations, and a reconsideration of previously utilised instruments - the European 
Commission limiting the application of the CVM to Romania and Bulgaria and not extending 
it or reconfiguring it for Croatia when the country became in July 2013 the 28th member of 
the EU. The chapter will conclude that whilst the impact of EU conditionality has been 
dependent on the stage of the accession path – being higher during the transition from the 
negotiation to the accession phase – it is also influenced by previous institutional and/or 
policy decisions taken by domestic actors during this period of high propensity for EU 
leverage that have increased the costs of potential path switching at the national level after 
EU membership was granted. This latter point will also be considered in the context of 
recent political turmoil both in Bulgaria and Romania as well as in the larger region of 
Eastern Europe and we will analyse whether we are witnessing a post-accession backsliding 
phenomenon of a systemic nature.  
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4.1. Structure of the argument    
 
In a recent study that underlines the impact of merging the Europeanization and European 
integration research agendas, Coman and Crespy argue that by modelling Europeanization 
as a process whose dynamics and temporality is shaped by actors (bias towards agency), 
domestic change - understood to occur as a result of external European pressure - has been 
deemed as short-termed, piecemeal or incremental. While recognising the value of this 
approach, the authors argue that the transition from incremental to structural change can 
only be accommodated by a research design that would take into consideration not only the 
ability and intentionality of national actors to adapt to Europe, but also the potential of EU 
policy instruments to lead to a more profound transformation274. The study contends that 
the modalities of EU integration determine to a large extent the scale of Europeanization, 
while the degree and the form of Europeanization constrain, in turn, the possible scope for 
further integration (circular causality). Hence, structural change is considered to occur 
when the disparity between the expected effects of European integration and the real 
domestic outcomes reaches a critical level.  
Based on these observations, the current chapter will examine the post-accession record of 
judicial reforms in Romania and Bulgaria while also observing the idiosyncrasies of the 
main catalyst - the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) - through which the 
European Commission has sought to maintain momentum for change after EU membership 
(the most important incentive) had been granted to the two states. However, in order to 
reach a cogent evaluation of the extent to which we have witnessed an inculcation of EU 
values, norms and practices at the domestic level, or on the contrary whether domestic 
institutions have been resilient in resisting conditionality, we need to weight in three 
factors. Firstly, we need to consider the historical legacy of the Communist regime and its 
impact upon the pace of institutional reform in the pre-accession period. Thus, the chapter 
will initially look at the first phase of judicial reforms in Romania and Bulgaria, considering 
the solutions opted for domestically for institutional and legislative design. As the EU has 
been one of the most active and involved ‘donors’ or ‘providers’ of international technical 
judicial assistance, we will also consider how the approach to promoting European 
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standards of judicial governance has changed before and after granting the candidate states 
the status of members. Finally, we will analyse the response of domestic actors to the mix of 
‘hard’ external incentives/sanctions and normative elements reunited under the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.  
The main hypothesis upon which this chapter is constructed posits that critical junctures 
have occurred during the pre-accession period and in Romania’s case it led the country on a 
current positive trajectory in terms of the efforts made to tackle corruption275 despite the 
strong reaction of domestic veto players. The results that we are witnessing today are 
dependent not only on the power and nature of post-accession conditionality mechanisms, 
but more importantly on decisions made during the pre-accession period that have set the 
country on a specific institutional path that has been maintained  through lock-in effects 
despite veto players’ efforts to thwart them.  One explanation for institutional continuity in 
Romania rests on the premise assumed by Sedelmeier in his analysis of post-accession 
persistence of gender equality institutions in five new member states, namely that rules and 
institutions that were adopted during the pre-accession period and that comply with EU 
requirements are not cost-free to dismantle276. More specifically, national veto players need 
to weigh not only the costs of compliance against the threat of sanctions for rule violation, 
but also the costs and institutional obstacles that arise from changing previously 
established rules and institutions.  
But before explaining the lock in of the institutional path followed by the two member 
states, we will argue that European pressure exercised during the pre-accession period has 
created both for Romania and for Bulgaria what the literature on critical junctures refers to 
as permissive conditions for substantial change to occur277. The accession process has 
generated through the wide range of pressure mechanisms (increased monitoring, gate-
keeping and differentiation strategies, provision of institutional models, financial assistance 
and twinning) the necessary conditions for substantial reform to be reached. However, as 
this will be shown later in the chapter while the emergence of these causal conditions has 
been paramount, it has not been sufficient for divergence from a previously set path. When 
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domestic productive conditions have been present – in our case understood as the presence 
of individual change agents or collective ones embodied by reform-oriented governments – 
critical junctures have occurred triggering the formation of new institutional paths that 
became with time locked in. One such example that would help us explain the current 
progress made by Romania in the fight against high-level corruption revolves around the 
reorganisation in 2005 of the country’s specialised investigative and prosecution anti-
corruption service – the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. Whilst the institution was 
established in 2002 as the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (PNA), we contend 
that the moment of institutional genesis cannot be regarded as a critical juncture as the 
productive conditions for the setting into motion of such a juncture were largely absent.  
This initiative to create the specialised institution was based on the strong support of the 
European Commission and on EU twinning mainly with the Special Prosecutor’s Office 
against Corruption and Organised Crime of Spain. It was favoured as a response to an 
unsuccessful strategy of a decentralised system of national bodies responsible for 
coordinating the fight against corruption that had led to mediocre results278. However, 
whilst the setup per se of the institution can be considered as a reference point in the 
country’s quest to curb corruption, especially in the context of the external technical and 
financial aid provided, we will argue that this point in time did not render a break into the 
institutional path upon which the country had embarked – tactical reform. We consider that 
the initial prerogatives of the specialised institution made it more of a window-dressing 
than an outpost for investigating high-level cases of corruption as it was neither 
independent, nor powerful enough to improve de facto judicial quality279. By referring to the 
literature on critical junctures we will explore how the decision of the European 
Commission to opt for an enhanced conditionality by including in the 2005 Accession 
Treaty an unprecedented ‘postponement clause’ (through which perceived serious 
shortcomings regarding specific membership commitments and requirements could delay 
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the accession date by one year280) triggered in Romania’s case a puncture in the 
institutional equilibrium that facilitated the transition of the PNA to the National Anti-
Corruption Directorate (DNA) – Romania’s good practice story in the fight against 
corruption. This critical juncture created the context for increased causal power of agency, a 
series of reforms being promoted by change agents. In the context of the strong explicit 
threats of accession delay (constructive uncertainty), this punctuated equilibrium has 
echoed to today assuring a positive trend despite the continuous strong resistance of veto-
players in the post-accession period.  However, as it will become evident throughout the 
analysis, while this new institutional equilibrium that had been brought during the pre-
accession period and has been kept post-2007, it did not generate what Rothstein calls a 
‘big bang’ societal transformation, whereby the majority of political, social and economic 
institutions change during a relatively short period of time281. Lack of political will and 
strong political opposition towards the implementation of an effective anti-corruption 
policy have amounted to a current mix record in ensuring the efficient functioning of the 
judiciary and in the fight against malfeasance.  In this context, we understand the 
introduction of the CVM as a continuity-ensuring mechanism meant to supplement the 
transaction costs of a potential path change.  
When scrutinising the effectiveness of EU post-accession conditionality, it will be contended 
that while the CVM did not return a constant pace of national positive results and a cohesive 
trajectory for reform in the judiciary sector, the mechanism itself has provided 
technical/procedural guiding through the recommendations sections of the progress 
reports, it has been a means of social pressure – especially, but not limited to the political 
turmoil of 2012 – and it has been a tool for issue linkage, concerns over shortcomings in 
anti-corruption performance blocking  Romania’s accession to the Schengen area, despite 
provisions of the Schengen acquis not being technically tied to the CVM and having been 
largely  met in 2011282. Yet, while the absence of integration advancement rewards and the 
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use of flat threats for sanctioning non-compliance have limited the leverage to EU post-
accession conditionality, the early removal or the non-application all together of the CVM 
after 2007 has been deemed by some national  actors as having limited the amplitude of the 
achievements reached so far283. This hypothesis will be sustained through input collected 
through interviews with judicial reform specialists from Romania and Bulgaria, as well as 
an analysis of the internal and external factors that have contributed or on the contrary 
hampered reform sustainability.   
In Bulgaria’s case, despite being grouped together with Romania in 2001 when both 
countries were excluded by the European Union from the preparations for the ‘Big Bang’ 
wave of enlargement, a different institutional path followed during the pre-accession period 
has led the country to a more sluggish performance in the past few years. While pervaded 
by similar problems during the pre-accession stage that have extended beyond 2007, and 
despite being subject to comparable external pressure to maintain reform momentum after 
accession, in Romania’s case we have witnessed recent consistent improvement in 
addressing high-level corruption284, whilst Bulgaria lagged behind. The most recent 
available report of the Bulgarian General Prosecutor’s Office reveals that at the end of 2013 
out of the 21 opened investigations on corruption-related offences, only 6 were brought to 
court and no convictions had been reached285. For the same period, the Romanian National 
Anti-Corruption Directorate brought to court 270 cases with 1051 defendants being 
investigated and convicted286. In concordance with previous studies on post-accession 
compliance, we also contend that domestic institutional change is dependent on the 
interaction of EU pressure and domestic incentives287. However, our analysis also takes into 
consideration the impact of organisational path dependence when evaluating the post-
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accession reform track record in the two countries. The story of judicial reform during 
Bulgaria’s negotiation (2000 - 2004) and post-negotiation phases (2005 – 1st of January 
2007) has been somewhat different from that of Romania, being less about the initial 
improper influence of the Ministry of Justice, and more about the immunity of the members 
of the Parliament and of judges. The Bulgarian constitution adopted in 1991 had established 
a strong judiciary which had asserted itself as a quasi-constitutional constraint on political 
majorities288, both the Supreme Judicial Council and the Constitutional Court adopting a 
conservative stance towards the draft laws proposed by the government in order to 
respond to EU requirements. The scarcity of strong change agents, a traditionally 
conservative judiciary that has tended to respond with scepticism to endeavours to change 
the status quo289, and a political environment dominated by ideologically non-committed 
parties290  have weakened the extent to which the European Union has been able to secure 
momentum for continuous reform in Bulgaria after accession. This state of affairs has forced 
the European Commission to supplement continuous monitoring for both countries (CVM 
benchmarking) with other  instruments such as gate-keeping which materialised into 
several postponements of the accession to the Schengen area, the threat of activating 
safeguard clauses (a general economic clause, a specific market stipulation and a specific 
justice and home affairs clause which could be triggered in the first three years after 
accession) and in Bulgaria’s case the freezing of EU funds (in 2008, €500 million from farm 
aid were suspended due to fraud291 which were partially unblocked at the end of 2009292 
and fully in 2010, after two consecutive positive CVM reports293).  As it will be discussed in 
detail below, this strategy has fallen short of delivering transformative results. But this 
outcome can be better explained when factoring in the manner in which the two countries 
have responded to external incentives, threats and facilities throughout the pre-accession 
stage, as well as when observing the changes made to the principles governing the new 
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negotiations for the following EU enlargement waves.  Despite not managing to secure 
irreversible reform and the cementing of the principle of rule of law in these countries, the 
CVM has maintained national public awareness over the trajectory and pace of judicial 
reform; it has exerted pressure upon incumbent governments for targeted institutional and 
legislative changes and by virtue of the relatively flexible character of the benchmarks, it 
allowed for exceptional intervention. But as we will argue in this chapter, one reason for 
which we can observe divergence in terms of the results obtained in the fight against 
corruption despite comparable reform blocking factors and being submitted to the same 
soft and hard law pre- and post-accession mechanisms is because of the different forms of 
institutional change in the two countries. If in Romania’s case we will argue that a critical 
juncture occurred in 2005 creating a new equilibrium that has not been punctuated after 
accession, in Bulgaria’s case we will argue that institutional change has been incremental 
during the pre-accession period and has taken the form of displacement, reforms affecting 
mostly administrative graft, but not large-scale corruption. And while as in Romania’s case 
the permissive conditions have been present, in Bulgaria which has been subject to largely 
the same type of mechanisms (monitoring, financial and technical assistance, gate-keeping) 
we will argue that the necessary productive conditions have not been met.  
The governance strategy adopted by Bulgaria after its EU accession in pursuing anti-
corruption policies has been one based on legislative reform advanced in small instalments 
followed by amendments to improve the scope of the reform294. However, as the Group of 
States against Corruption (GRECO) observed in its 2015 report: 
“(...) the legal framework is complex, subject to frequent and often unpredictable changes 
and actual regulation, in some instances, tends to rely on secondary legislation which is not 
always congruent with the principles and objectives pursued by primary laws.”295 
In Romania, by means of comparison, in the same period of reference, projects of law 
adopted to meet EU standards have been “amended under pretext of improving efficiency 
while in fact restraining the scope and power of created bodies to tackle corruption”296. In 
this sense, one of the unequivocal cases has been the failed revision in 2010 of the law 
regulating the functioning of the National Integrity Agency (ANI) – institution created in 
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2007 to vet public officials’ asset declarations and identify potential conflicts of interest and 
suspicious income – that would have severely curtailed the institution’s powers297.  
The anti-corruption institutional framework established in Bulgaria has been shaped into a 
complex and decentralised system, with the legislative, executive and judicial branches 
having their own set of agencies mandated to assess corruption risks, propose preventive 
measures, ensure compliance with regulations and laws, propose disciplinary proceedings 
and coordinate with all of the other bodies that share similar responsibilities. Yet, as the 
latest GRECO Evaluation Report observes, most of these bodies have remained paper tigers, 
denied the power to conduct substantive checks298. Moreover, the same report argues that:  
“(...) the abundance of reporting instruments and oversight bodies has failed to bring in the 
desired cumulative effect or attain qualitative changes in corruption prevention efforts. 
Thus, the high degree of fragmentation and self-containment of relevant oversight bodies as 
well as their alleged susceptibility to undue influence have meant that a holistic vision of 
corruption-related risks and vulnerabilities in the relevant sectors cannot be formed”299.  
While some studies dealing with policy failure and success in public malfeasance control 
largely rule out the level of centralisation of “watchdog” institutions as a determining factor 
of their effectiveness300, the level of independence of these agencies, the specialisation of 
their expertise, integrity, material and coordination capacity, and political back-up are 
deemed as significant aspects that can influence institutional performance301.  In our 
attempt to understand the post-accession effects of the complex interaction between on the 
one hand EU legal mechanisms bearing on the fight against corruption and the 
sustainability of the rule of law and on the other hand national responses of domestic actors 
that have translated into the design of judicial policies we need to consider as well how this 
interaction has manifested itself before 2007 and what long term results it has generated.   
As such, we will contend that to the dyad of factors identified previously by the literature as 
determining the pace of domestic institutional change – namely the credibility and intensity 
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of EU pressure and the domestic political will to sustain the fight against corruption and 
improve the rule of law, generally tied to electoral gains302, one must also add what has 
been termed by historical institutionalist research as the structuring effect of existing 
arrangements303. This collocation simply translates into the assumption that policy choices 
made throughout different points in time such as institutional formation or policy initiation 
will carry a continuing and largely determining influence upon future institutional or policy 
change. This process of sequential contingency, where latter decisions are not independent 
of those that have been taken in the past, has been termed in the literature as path 
dependency or self-reinforcing dynamics. As Pierson and Skocpol explain: 
“Outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence 
of particular pattern into the future. Path dependent processes (...) can be highly influenced 
by relatively modest perturbations at early stages. Once actors have ventured far down a 
particular path, however, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course. Political 
alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost. Thus, events or 
processes occurring during and immediately following critical junctures emerge as 
crucial.”304 
4.2. At the crossroads between substantive and incremental change 
 
From the beginning of the analysis we assume that the concept of path dependence is not 
explanatory in the sense of revealing the inherent actor motivations for institutional genesis 
or change, and thus benefits of little predictive value, as it is difficult to identify ex ante what 
circumstances will trigger institutional transformation. However, it does provide us with a 
compelling toolkit of concepts that can help us pinpoint the link between initial institutional 
and/or policy decisions and the present outcome. As Mahoney argues, the notion of path 
dependence suggests “that crucial actor choices may establish certain directions of change 
and foreclose others in a way that shapes long-term trajectories of development”305. In this 
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conceptualisation, the relationship between structure (institutions) and agency 
(individuals) is portrayed as a complex duality – despite current studies that emphasise its 
tendency toward institutional determinism306. As Hay and Wincott explain, historical 
institutionalism puts forward a model where actors are rational, and seeking to realise 
complex, contingent goals in institutional contexts where initial pursued strategies 
constrain the trajectory of future change possibilities307. Yet while still dominated by utility-
maximising actors, institutions are understood less as functional means of reducing 
uncertainty and transaction costs (as are thought of through a rational choice lens) and 
more as structures “whose functionality or dysfunctionality is an open – empirical and 
historical – question”308.  
Starting from the premise of the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal 
sequence, historical institutionalist scholarship has enriched the concept of “path 
dependence” by borrowing from economics the notion of “increasing returns”. The guiding 
principle behind a process that manifests increasing returns can be summarised as 
following: the probability of taking further steps along the same path as followed in the past 
increases with each move down that path309. This logic is determined by exit or switching 
costs (to previous viable alternatives) which become higher as time passes. Turning again 
to economics, historical institutionalism refers to Brian Arthur’s set of four conditions that 
can give rise to increasing returns (or self-reinforcing mechanisms): large set-up costs; 
learning effects; coordination effects and adaptive expectations310. In the case of technology 
manufacturing, increased output (or continuation on a production path) entails the 
advantages of falling unit costs, improved specifications as other actors start developing 
new ways of production (learning effects), coordination with other agents following similar 
action over the existing solution and niche stability that is triggered by the belief that 
increased prevalence will lead to further path following311. Pierson translated this set of 
conditions from economics into political science by referring to the example of new social 
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initiatives – such as the creation of organisations and has argued that in a similar fashion to 
technology manufacturing, institutional genesis entails considerable start-up costs. Agents – 
defined either as individuals or collectives – learn by doing and results improve if they are 
coordinated or “fit” with the activities of other actors or organisations and if they are in 
concordance with expectations about the actions of others312. Associated to increasing 
returns is the idea of positive feedback mechanisms understood as an increase in the 
likelihood of an action happening at t1, if the same action has been conducted by the same 
actors at t0313.   Mechanisms of positive feedback are considered as a necessary condition for 
path dependence and lock-in to occur. When applied to policy analysis, positive feedback 
mechanisms have been distinguished in two categories. On the one hand, the literature 
points to functional mechanisms that imply that “once a set of institutions is in place, actors 
adapt their strategies in ways that reflect but also reinforce the ‘logic’ of the system”314. On 
the other hand, a second type of mechanism relates to the distributional effects of 
institutions and the central premise is that institutions are not neutral coordinating 
mechanisms, but in fact reflect, reproduce and magnify particular patterns of power 
distribution315.  
Hence, whilst stability is explained through the activation of positive feedback mechanisms 
that generate long-term entrenchment, institutional genesis and change are modelled 
around the linked notions of “critical junctures” and “punctuated equilibrium”316. The 
literature on critical junctures varies greatly, but the shared view is that institutional 
change occurs in a burst that is followed by a period of relative stability. Collier and Collier 
define the concept as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways 
in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce 
distinct legacies”317.  The authors put forward a critical juncture framework that reunites 
three essential elements: antecedent conditions, cleavage/crisis and legacy. They contend 
that antecedent conditions represent a “base line” against which critical junctures and 
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legacies can be assessed. While this concept is not theoretically explored in detail by Collier 
and Collier, we find a more recent equivalent in Slater and Simmons’s concept of critical 
antecedent, understood as “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine 
in a causal sequence with factors operating during that juncture to produce a divergent 
outcome”318.   The following two elements in the critical juncture model proposed by Collier 
and Collier are the cleavage or crisis understood as emerging out of the antecedent 
conditions and in turn triggering the window of opportunity and the legacy which is the 
final product of the critical juncture and represents the crystallisation of the new 
institutional configurations319.  
While this model brought further insight into the complex set of interconnected 
circumstances that complete a critical juncture, it still lacked the necessary theoretical tools 
that would help distinguish more clearly the factors that separate a juncture during which 
dramatic change is possible from historical moments in which continuity is favoured. To 
this end, Soifer extended this conceptual framework by identifying two types of causal 
conditions necessary for a critical juncture to be triggered: permissive and productive. 
Permissive conditions are understood as easing the constraints of structure (institutional 
stasis) and changing “the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or 
contingency and thus the prospects for divergence”320.  Productive conditions are aspects of 
a critical juncture that “shape the outcomes that emerge and are locked in when the window 
of opportunity marked by permissive conditions comes to a close”321. The example used by 
the author to add flesh to the conceptual framework provides a new reading to the dramatic 
shift in the 1940s observed in some Latin American countries from policies guided by the 
objective of export-led growth to the development of inward-looking industrialisation. As 
such, the author argues that in this case the permissive conditions were embodied by the 
Great Depression and the World War II that created the context in which the new economic 
paradigm could emerge. In this period, theoretical and institutional support for import 
substitution industrialization coming from the United Nations Economic Commission on 
Latin America (ECLA) acted as a productive condition that provided the context for the 
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critical juncture. As the trade recovered and the previously available option of export-led 
growth became viable again, the results of the critical juncture reached fruition: variation 
had been locked in322. As permissive and productive conditions are necessary, but 
insufficient if present individually, Soifer argues that for a critical juncture to be triggered, 
we need both conditions to be present, while the absence of both types will translate into 
status quo, any change in this case being precluded. The presence of permissive conditions 
and the absence of productive ones will create crisis without change, or a case of “missed 
opportunity”. Finally, he contends that the absence of permissive conditions, but the 
presence of productive ones will mark a phase of incremental change323. However, while a 
critical juncture is expected to produce consequences in the form of a legacy, the unit of 
analysis critically affected can differ from each case. Söyler argues that when focusing on 
turning points that establish particular sequences, variation can be observed as to the level 
where change occurs. Thus, during a critical juncture while the macro structure can be 
affected, many other institutions can remain unchanged, the duration of the conjuncture 
being part of the reason for which variation across the levels of analysis is determined. The 
causal force of critical junctures is determined by their duration, their prolongation bearing 
the possibility that political decisions will be hindered or forced in other directions by 
structural constraints324.   
The concept of punctuated equilibrium implies that institutions will function in accordance 
with the decisions made at their initiation, in an equilibrium state that gets punctuated by 
brief phases of institutional flux during which more dramatic change can occur. These 
moments of flux are abrupt, sudden, contingent, metamorphic developments and are 
expected to be in the majority of cases exogenous325. When applying the theoretical model 
of punctuated equilibrium to analyse policy changes, Baumgartner and Jones argue that 
institutional systems are characterised by positive as well as negative feedback processes. 
Stability in policymaking is secured when the general principle of policy action is accepted 
by stakeholders and when the institutional framework is dominated by negative feedback, 
meaning that shocks to the system are dampened and self-corrective mechanisms exert the 
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necessary counter-pressure for a rapid return to the status quo ante326. However, political 
actions can be subject to positive feedback, whereby small inputs can cascade into major 
effects that can lead to institutional redesign. As the saturation point is reached, negative 
feedback processes are re-established. The authors argue that a growing number of policy 
innovations follow the negative-positive-negative feedback pattern of change.  
The extent of change produced when equilibrium is punctuated can be determined either 
quantitatively, provided that numerical data are available, or qualitatively, this latter option 
of analysis being used more often in social sciences. However, critics have underlined the 
lack of a common set of a priori criteria necessary for determining when there is sufficient 
political or environmental “pressure” to generate change327. In a recent paper, Mahoney 
responds by clarifying that punctuated change can be deemed as having been met when the 
absolute size of change passes some minimal threshold – defined by the context of the 
research. In this context, he introduces the differentiation between punctuated changes, 
which are relatively bounded episodes with a clear beginning and end points and represent 
breakpoints within a historical sequence, and incremental change or gradual change328. As 
Thelen observes, the further exploration of incremental change is necessary as the 
punctuated equilibrium model tends to limit institutional dynamics to a zero-sum view of 
institutional evolution versus institutional reproduction329. As such, while conceiving 
institutions as “distributional instruments laden with power implications”330, and 
institutional outcomes as generated either by dominant actors, as unintended results of 
internal conflicts or even as the product of “ambiguous compromises” among actors331, the 
literature focusing on incremental change identifies four modal types depending on the 
locus of transformation: displacement, conversion, layering and drift332.  
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Displacement occurs when existing rules are replaced by new ones either through a radical 
shift or through slow-moving processes, with political entrepreneurs, understood as 
“individuals whose creative acts have transformative effects on politics, policies, or 
institutions”333, upsetting the status quo. Conversion implies the changed enactment of 
existing rules through their strategic redeployment. In this case, inherent ambiguities of 
rules are redeployed in a manner that leads to the conversion of the institution to new 
goals, functions and purposes.  However, both displacement and conversion are unlikely to 
reach fruition in the context of strong veto possibilities within the institution334.  Layering 
involves the “active sponsorship of amendments, additions, or revisions to an existing set of 
institutions”335, process that sets in motion path-altering dynamics. This mode of change is 
based on a mechanism of differential growth whereby actors exploit the degree of 
institutional flexibility and adaptability by promoting new regulatory additions that 
progressively gain more weight and eventually set in motion the dynamics for deep 
transformation. Finally, the last mode of gradual change represents the steadiest and most 
continuous pattern of transformation, occurring when core features of an entity remain in 
place, but cease to function in the same manner due to shifts in external conditions, thus 
drifting336. Out of all of the modes of gradual change presented so far, drift underlines the 
role that agency has within an institutional context even in the case of stasis, as Streeck and 
Thelen observe institutional reproduction is not always a matter of positive feedback, but it 
can require active maintenance and recalibration in response to changes in the political and 
economic environment337. Thus drift can be triggered when exogenous conditions shift and 
conservative policymakers deliberately decline to respond, their inaction changing the 
impact or the manner of enactment of old rules.  
So far we have explored the theoretical assumptions that substantiate historical 
institutionalism and have distinguished both mechanisms that causally determine 
institutional stability (path dependence resulting from self-reinforcing processes and 
maintained through positive feedback) and that explain institutional genesis and change – 
be it incremental or transformative (punctuated equilibrium, critical juncture, institutional 
displacement, conversion, layering and drift). These explanatory tools can be juxtaposed, as 
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Ebbinghaus observes, as two distinctive models: the ‘trodden trail’ that underlines the 
spontaneous evolution of institutions and their subsequent long-term entrenchment and 
the ‘road juncture’ that emphasises the interdependent sequence of events that structure 
the alternatives for future institutional changes338.  The key distinctive element between 
these models that share some key ontological assumptions (that history matters and 
previous taken produce increasing returns) resides in the nature attributed to change 
inducing factors. The first model sustains a view of institutional change determined by 
spontaneous exogenous intervening factors that induce change. The second model 
accommodates both endogenous (pertaining to the institutions that is the unit of analysis) 
and exogenous factors as determinants of change generating thus multiple scenarios for 
institutional transformation. Under this latter model an axis of change can be drawn with 
alterations of the status quo ranging from path stabilisation representing the marginal 
adaptation to structural constraints, to path departure or the gradual adaptation through 
partial renewal of institutional arrangements and limited redirection of core principles 
(displacement, conversion, layering and drift) and finally to path cessation or switching that 
ends the self-reinforcement of an established institution339.  
In this chapter, starting off from the theoretical premise that political and institutional 
outcomes are the result of self-reinforcing historical causation initiated during turning 
points, we will explore both exogenous and endogenous factors that have determined 
transformative or gradual change in the institutional makeup of the two countries during 
their pre- and post-accession period. We will contend that the presence of both permissive 
and productive conditions during the pre-accession period have generated a critical 
juncture in Romania’s case securing a good track record of corruption prosecution despite 
the veto power exercised by political actors and in the context of diminishing effectiveness 
of EU conditionality. Utilising Soifer’s framework of determining conditions, we identify the 
process of EU accession generally as having secured the necessary permissive conditions for 
transformative change to occur in both countries. Next, while considering Steunenberg and 
Dimitrova’s concept of compliance game340 as a time-sensitive indicator of EU’s leverage in 
determining domestic adaptation and rule downloading, we argue that the turn towards an 
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enhanced conditionality and the inclusion in the 2005 Accession Treaty of the 
‘postponement clause’, as well as the express provision for Romania that tied progress on 
meeting its anti-corruption commitments to accession, played the role of a critical juncture 
that closed with the confirmation of the accession date by the European Commission in its 
monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and 
Romania341. This period marked a visible break from what some Romanian judges had 
deemed as the dark chapter of the post-communist Romanian judiciary (2001 – beginning 
of 2004)342, as it brought much needed legislative modifications (the package of laws on the 
organisation of the judiciary, on the Superior Council of Magistracy and on the statute of 
magistrates) designed to improve judicial independence and effectiveness. While critical 
deficiencies in the judicial sector continued to hamper its efficiency ex post the critical 
juncture, mainly due to the virulent reactions of reform-adverse actors from the Romanian 
Constitutional Court, political veto players from various parties and even members of the 
judiciary, the legislative and institutional modifications produced at that point can be traced 
forward – at least at the level of organising principles – to today’s organisation of the 
judiciary343. In order to further sustain our argument that the identified period matches the 
criteria put forward by the literature, namely the presence of antecedent conditions, of 
permissive and productive conditions and finally the emergence of a legacy, our 
argumentation will define the interaction between the European Union and its then 
candidate states as guided by the principles of a compliance game. Thus, the accession talks 
between the EU and candidate countries will be understood as “a series of negotiations 
between the players over the extent to which the applicant at any given stage of its 
preparation satisfies the conditions set by the Union and the extent to which the Union is 
willing to continue supporting the applicant’s candidacy”344. In this model, acquiescing to 
the agreement and avoiding a strategy of deceptiveness by the applicant is profitable when 
the benefits of collaborating are greater than the payoffs of breaking the agreement. 
Deriving from this definition is the assumption that the conditions for the success of 
conditionality will be incentive dependent. As attainment of EU accession in 2007 had 
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become in both countries the benchmark against which the performance of state 
institutions and of the ruling coalition was evaluated, the system of enhanced conditionality 
had further tipped the scale towards the EU in an already asymmetric process, the costs of 
defection from a reform oriented path for the governing coalition increasing (in terms of 
future re-election prospects). Moreover, the calls for the freezing of the enlargement in the 
context of the French and Dutch no-votes on the European Constitutions project345 and the 
veiled threat of a potential decoupling the two countries’ accession bids346 impacted upon 
the pull of the EU’s leverage to determine willingness to meet demands and generated a 
sense of urgency among the national political elites347. Finally, we reinforce our assumption 
that EU accession has created the permissive conditions for transformative change brought 
through a critical juncture  by referring to the a series of existing studies that have 
underlined the EU’s impact upon the character of national political competition in the 
candidate countries348, the indirect domestic empowerment of the electorates by 
undermining authoritarian governments’ credential as reformers349, and the role in 
encouraging the involvement of civil society organisations in the implementation of the 
acquis and the meeting of the Copenhagen criteria (the political criteria in particular)350. 
The presence of change agents occupying top governmental positions (as was the case of 
Monica Macovei) and leading key institutions in the country’s anti-corruption framework 
such as the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (Laura Codruţa Kövesi and previously 
Daniel Morar) signalled a break from the ‘Potemkin’ type of harmonisation with EU 
requirements and standards. Important improvements in the legal framework (the Small 
Reform Law introduced in 2010, the New Civil Code in force since October 2011, the New 
Civil Procedure Code in force since February 2013, the New Criminal Code and Code of 
Criminal Procedure in force since February 2014), and a new generation of judges and 
prosecutors benefiting of training resources and expertise offered by a multitude of 
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international networks have further contributed to the sustainability of the efforts to curb 
corruption in Romania. However, as Hein observed, while formal factors such as 
institutional and policy adequacy are present, a wide ‘coalition of the unwilling’ among the 
Romanian political elite continues to fight by all available means to avoid being prosecuted 
and convicted351. Post-accession, the monitoring mechanism coupled with a naming and 
shaming strategy used by the EU contributed, despite its shortcomings, to the securing of 
the institutional autonomisation of the law enforcement agencies – which were able to 
intensively and successfully investigate corruption crimes352.  In contrast, we will argue that 
the same period of time identified as a critical juncture for Romania took the form of a 
missed window of opportunity for Bulgaria that embarked on a road of incremental change. 
A series of factors can be identified in order to justify our claim. Firstly, the system of 
specialised anti-corruption agencies present within each branch has encouraged the 
development of a culture of improved control, but the absence of a centralised structure to 
coordinate and to propose a common methodology and set of objectives has meant that the 
various units could avoid bearing the responsibility of poor results.  
In what follows, before starting the discussion over the impact of EU accession in the two 
countries, we will define the concepts of judicial independence and discuss the costs of 
high-level corruption and we will place them into context by exploring the EU’s strategy in 
assessing progress made by candidate states in meeting the Copenhagen political criteria 
(judicial independence and anti-corruption framework being included in the political 
benchmark) and the assistance provided by the European Union as a sui generis rule of law 
promoter to guide and support reforms.  We will then move to discussing the pre-accession 
track record of the two countries, their approach to transitional justice and finally the most 
important post-accession political developments as well as the dynamics of the reforms 
pursued by the two countries. Within this section we will also analyse the manner in which 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism has changed and whether this has been 
reflected at the national level in the pace and extent of reforms. The chapter will conclude 
with a discussion of recent events that have been considered to mark the installation of a 
post-accession backsliding phenomenon in Eastern Europe and ask whether an irregular 
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impact of EU conditionality (uneven Europeanisation across states and across time) has 
divided the region into successful versus laggard member states.  
 
4.3. Judicial independence and the fight against corruption – 
understanding the units of analysis, exploring the emergence of an 
EU rule of law framework 
 
In this section we introduce the concepts of judicial independence and accountability as 
well as that of corruption, and observe how different approaches to these notions have 
influenced various international donors in providing assistance for the reform of the judicial 
sectors in Bulgaria and Romania. These external contributions are considered to have 
formed collectively the permissive conditions for change to occur. We will then move to 
exploring how the EU has built its own rule of law framework and used its instruments to 
assess and assist reform in candidate countries during accession and beyond.  
The international dimension of democratisation, whilst initially downplayed by the early 
studies on regime transition, has now become an almost explanatory orthodoxy referred to 
when analysing the pace and trajectory of domestic transformation.  Collaborative 
relationships between national actors and international organisations have been 
established on the basis of the latter gradually increasing their role in guiding and 
sustaining the transition to democracy. However, the strategies for attaining this objective 
have differed substantially from one provider to another. One example of the earliest and 
most prominent assistance providers has been that of U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) which has opted for horizontal mechanisms of diffusion in order to 
administer assistance under its rule of law programme. More specifically, while 
complementing and not necessarily competing with European assistance, USAID has 
contracted the bulk of its rule of law work in Central and Eastern Europe to private actors 
(such as the American Bar Association or the East-West Management Institute) which in 
turn outsourced to local specialists, professional civil associations and NGOs. The concept of 
rule of law, understood as “a state in which citizens, corporations, and the state itself obey 
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the law, and the laws are derived from a democratic consensus”353 was acknowledged by 
USAID as providing the conditions upon which democracy depends: a legal framework 
rooted in the collective will, the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force, equality of 
rights and responsibilities and social order. Five elements were identified as necessary for 
the rule of law to prevail: order and security, legitimacy, checks and balances, and the equal 
and effective application of the law354. While depending heavily on the performance of the 
executive and legislative branches, the rule of law can be made operative in society largely 
through the activity of an independent and accountable judicial sector.  
Whilst two models defining the relationship between the judiciary to the rest of the 
government have been acknowledged by USAID – one where the judiciary is dependent on 
the executive for its administrative and budgetary functions, and a second where these 
management functions are exerted by the judiciary, the latter was promoted along with the 
establishment of judicial councils that would oversee the sector and assure some degree of 
independence from the interference of the judicial hierarchy itself355. A balance between 
judicial independence and accountability was emphasised, the two concepts being 
considered coterminous. Judicial independence was defined as the freedom from any 
outside pressures on the branch’s internal operations, while accountability was understood 
as a form of ex-post control through which the judiciary can relate and explain its 
administrative and functional operations and outputs356. Four mechanisms were privileged 
as necessary for the development of judicial accountability: transparent systems for the 
selection of magistrates, a system of internal operations that would be available for public 
review, transparent judicial decisions, and finally a functioning system for registering 
complaints on institutional operations or behaviour of individual members357.  
Judicial independence coupled with accountability and efficient institutional organisation 
were identified as the dimensions of change that would be needed in order to tackle 
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systemic problems such as endemic corruption. This latter concept, defined generally as the 
abuse of entrusted authority for private gain, was distinguished as a “tremendous obstacle 
to political, social, and economic development”358. USAID operated a distinction between 
administrative corruption, seen as including smaller transactions involving mid- and low-
level government officials, and grand corruption that included exchanges of resources, 
access to rents, or other competitive advantages for privileged firms and high-level officials 
in the executive, judiciary, legislature, or in political parties. The direction opted for by 
USAID to support national anti-corruption efforts largely focused on civil society programs 
that included endeavours to promote free and independent media (Professional Media 
Program in Romania and Bulgaria during 1996 until 2000), and to strengthen local NGOs 
and citizens' groups by empowering them to become critical constituencies for reform359. 
The general donor strategy for USAID intervention followed a scheme of three main 
priorities for the rule of law programmes: assisting the emergence of democratic legal 
authorities (objective especially followed in Latin America), encouraging the solidification 
of rights and democratic processes, and contributing to the bolstering of effectiveness and 
efficiency of the judicial system360.  
In Bulgaria, this type of “transformative diplomacy”361 took the form of framework projects 
such as the Judicial Development Project (1999-2004) and the Judicial Strengthening 
Initiative (2004-2007) implemented by the East-West Management Institute which targeted 
among others the improvement of court administration, the provision of general and 
specialised judicial training (through national organisations such as the Bulgarian Legal 
Initiative for Training and Development and the Magistrates Training Centre), and the 
development of a case management system that would facilitate the scheduling of hearings 
and the tracking of case files362. In Romania, USAID sponsored programs run by the 
American Bar Association designed to strengthen the National Institute of Magistracy (the 
judicial training school established in 1992), to develop, test and implement new streamline 
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court procedures and to assist the Ministry of Justice in the development of an ethics code 
for judges and prosecutors (which was adopted in 2001 and revised in 2005)363. However, 
as stated in the USAID commissioned reports, the sequential approach to the rule of law 
development programmes in Bulgaria, especially in the early stages (from 1990 to 1997), 
coupled with a hostile political environment and the lack of a broader context of reform 
commitment, of a clear strategy, and of sufficient resources in the judicial branch affected 
severely the long-term impact of the provided assistance364.  The strong attachment of high-
level magistrates to the preservation of national juridical traditions supported by a 
conservative constitutional court that would be far less perceptible to international 
pressure than the government or parliament further reinforced the relevance of the modes 
of intervention opted for by USAID: identifying and mobilising local actors likely to support 
its initiatives, both from the interior (professional organisations, bar associations) and from 
the exterior (NGOs, think tanks, the media) of the judicial sphere365. One of the most 
successful USAID-supported partnerships in Bulgaria has been Coalition 2000 – an initiative 
established in 1997 that brought together local non-governmental organisations, 
government institutions and media representatives with the aim of curbing corruption. The 
consortium contributed fundamentally to the improvement of the analytical rigour in 
diagnosing corruption by developing a Corruption Monitoring System that periodically 
measures administrative corruption (the incidence of corruption practices in interactions 
between citizens and businesses with the administration)366.  The initiative has also been 
involved in the drafting of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy adopted in 2001 that was 
the first comprehensive official document to outline the government’s future lines of action 
to tackle malfeasance within public institutions. While some results were achieved 
(institutional and legislative infrastructure, decrease of administrative corruption), the 
Anti-Corruption Coordination Commission, established by the government and chaired by 
the Minister of Justice to facilitate the implementation of the Strategy and coordinate with 
other relevant governmental agencies failed to fulfil its major tasks, focusing mostly on 
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general awareness-raising initiatives367. This aspect was also underlined by the European 
Commission in its 2004 Regular Report, observing that “the approach taken by the 
Bulgarian authorities in the fight against corruption has left aside the need to take specific 
measures in the fight against high level corruption, in the political, local and business 
circles”368. In an environment that offered little encouragement to foreign consultants, 
American expertise and aid was aligned with local actors who were, unfortunately, the 
weakest in the system. These measures and modes of application thus had an overall 
limited impact as underlined in the assessment of USAID funded rule of law initiatives: 
“USAID, faced with limited resources and, in Bulgaria, a time schedule for withdrawal, may 
be tempted to identify one or the other weaknesses as thee ‘key’ to reform. This is seldom 
the case. Information technology applied to improving efficiency of case management in the 
courts will not bring about a rule of law. Getting the government to prosecute a few high 
visibility corruption or narcotics running cases will not do so either. If there is political will, 
and commitment to making reforms happen, then donors can help governments understand 
that creating a rule of law requires a more comprehensive approach to the problem.”369   
The World Bank’s approach as a provider of justice sector assistance has been somewhat 
different to that of USAID, rule of law prevalence being considered dependent on the reform 
of laws and of institutions. This perspective has been reflected by the manner in which the 
Bank has used the rule of law concept throughout time. Thus, while initially a more formal 
understanding of the concept prevailed, governance based on the rule of law epitomising a 
“system, based on abstract rules which are actually applied, and on functioning institutions 
which ensure the appropriate applications of such rules”370, the approach soon changed 
towards a more substantial view that included the fight against corruption as a means to 
improve governance and sustain growth371. This change had its foundations laid in a 1990 
legal opinion of the General Counsel that concluded that the World Bank could favourably 
respond to a country’s request for assistance in the field of legal reform, including judicial 
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reform, if it finds it relevant to the country’s economic development372. In its documentation 
on legal and judicial reform, the World Bank observed that in order to prevail, the rule of 
law “requires transparent legislation, fair laws, predictable enforcement, and accountable 
governments to maintain order, promote private sector growth, fight poverty, and have 
legitimacy”373. An independent judiciary was considered essential to the rule of law and 
present if it “issues decisions and makes judgements that are respected and enforced by the 
legislative and executive branches; (...) receives and adequate appropriation from the 
legislature; and (...) is not comprised by political attempts to undermine its impartiality”374. 
Judicial independence was considered to operate when judges would be trained in the law 
and made decisions with integrity and impartiality, while judicial accountability could be 
maintained by enforcing judicial codes of conduct375. In terms of corruption curbing, the 
approach adopted by the World Bank has been to a certain extent rooted in a principal-
agent approach to corruption that connects the phenomenon to deficient accountability, 
wide political/state discretion for rent collecting and minimal transparency376. Thus, the 
operational definition of corruption used by the World Bank is the abuse of public office for 
private gain377. This general interpretation includes various forms of interaction between 
public sector officials and other agents, for the purpose of obtaining both monetary (graft 
especially for public procurement contracts) and non-monetary benefits (patronage and 
nepotism). Moreover, this approach focuses mainly on political corruption, which takes 
place at the highest levels of authority, involving politicians, dignitaries, and senior civil 
servants elected or appointed in leading roles, and bureaucratic corruption which takes 
place both at the implementation end of public policies, as well as in the planning and 
budgeting stages378. The implications of this approach have translated into the points of 
entry for governance reform that the World Bank has focused upon when providing 
financial assistance. Namely, it has concentrated its financial instruments towards 
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enhancing horizontal accountability379 or the intra-governmental control mechanisms 
within and between the three branches of power. Vertical accountability, both in its 
electoral form (through which citizens can hold dignitaries accountable by using electoral 
channels) and its social form (the civil society and the media that monitor and address 
actions of the state)380 has not been addressed to the same extent by the World Bank as the 
‘supply-side’ of good governance (individual state institutions/agencies for 
accountability)381.  
The financial instruments used by the World Bank to sustain legal and judicial reform 
efforts have varied from adjustment and investment loans to more recent instruments such 
as the Institutional Development Fund, designed to finance quick, action-oriented and 
capacity-building projects with operational emphasis on governance and anticorruption. 
Through adjustment lending, change would be induced by conditioning the financial 
support to a country’s budget to the adoption of certain reforms agreed in advance with the 
recipient governments. Two such examples were the Second Programmatic Adjustment 
Loan (PAL 2) to Bulgaria and the First Programmatic Adjustment Loan to Romania. PAL 2 
for Bulgaria was approved in 2004 and tied fiscal and balance of payment support to the 
undertaking of anticorruption actions for the judiciary and the submission of uniform 
criteria for the selection of magistrates. In line with this conditionality, Bulgaria adopted 
constitutional and legislative amendments that introduced functional immunity for 
magistrates382, performance appraisals, and solutions to modernise the administrative 
operation of courts (such as the random case assignment system, increased access to court 
documentation and public information, introducing the positions of court administrator and 
administrative secretary)383. PAL 1 for Romania was approved in 2004 and aimed at 
reforming core public sector institutions and processes, including the judiciary, in support 
of the overarching objective of joining the EU. Organic laws were adopted by the Romanian 
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Parliament redefining the appointment of judges, judicial career development, and court 
administration, eliminating the process of extraordinary appeal by the Prosecutor General 
against court decisions entered into force, and introducing the position of economic 
managers in the court in order to relieve judges from non-adjudicative tasks384.   
In 2005, under strong EU pressure to implement effectively the reform of the justice 
sector385 and facing a potential one year delay to its EU accession date, the Romanian 
government expressly requested a World Bank loan in order to address the areas that the 
European Commission had identified as of serious concern. Hence, under the Judicial 
Reform Project, the country reached an agreement for a Specific Investment Loan of $130 
million scheduled for the period 2005 – 2011 (revised to 2017) in order to enhance 
institutional capacity (for the Superior Council of Magistracy, the High Court of Cassation 
and Justice, the Ministry of Justice), improve the efficiency of courts and the transparency of 
court proceedings, advance court infrastructure, and enhance the degree of professionalism 
and integrity of judges and other personnel386. What distinguished this type of project from 
previous loans was the strict evaluation criteria used to assess the degree of independence 
of the judiciary from political authorities. Included in the Bank’s scrutiny are the procedures 
of judicial appointment, transfer, promotion or dismissal, the level of self-governance, and 
the level of budgetary autonomy387.   
In 2007, in the context of increased pressure exerted by the European Commission which 
had requested the preparation of an Action Plan with milestones for the meeting of the CVM 
benchmarks, the Bulgarian government received an Institutional Development Grant of 
$475.000 for the strengthening of the Office of the Prosecutor General’s capacities to 
prosecute corruption –both within its ranks and beyond. In terms of the results achieved, 
the Implementation report mentions that in the period of the project, the average length of 
pre-trial prosecutorial cases for corruption was reduced substantially, from approximately 
300-330 days to 150-180 days in the first half of 2010. The number of concluded 
disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors increased as well, from 14 in 2007 to 46 in 2009, 
while public confidence in the anti-corruption work of the prosecution increasing by 11.2 
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percentage points in a year’s time388. Whilst delays and modifications have occurred 
affecting the nature or the timing of expected outcomes (especially in the case of the 
Romania Judicial Reform Project), the World Bank has managed to assert itself as an 
important and competent actor in promoting and sustaining good governance and 
anticorruption actions at the national level. It reinforced the credibility of the EU 
conditionality by incorporating the EU accession criteria into its portfolio for the region and 
by reiterating in its documentation on the loans and grants offered to Romania and Bulgaria 
for judicial reform the commitments made and partially met by the countries during the 
pre-accession stage, the slow progress registered under the CVM, and the need for the 
priorities identified by the European Commission to be addressed.   
Another influential contribution to the promotion of the rule of law has been that of the 
Council of Europe which has used a triangular approach (standard-setting, monitoring, and 
technical assistance) and has encouraged the formation of a transnational network of legal 
experts, located at different levels of governance, which has created, diffused and enforced 
rules, procedures and policies in accordance with the rule of law principle389. Since its 
creation in 1949, the institution has set standards in the form of conventions and ‘soft law’ 
instruments in several policy fields such as penal justice (the Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime), civil justice (commercial law, family law, children’s rights), administrative law 
(Recommendation (2007)7 on Good Administration), and constitutional justice (European 
Convention on Human Rights, European Social Charter).  As membership in the Council of 
Europe was regarded almost as a ‘waiting room’ for EU accession390 and a hallmark of 
achieving political transformation, both Romania and Bulgaria submitted their applications 
early on during their transition towards democracy, with the Council responding promptly 
by providing them with a ‘special guest status’ (to Bulgaria in July 1990 and to Romania in 
February 1991), full membership perspective coming into sight once fully free elections had 
been held. Where the Council had previously expected democracy, rule of law and the 
protection of human rights to be established as givens within the states applying for its 
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membership, in the case of Central and Eastern European countries the entry criteria had 
been lowered to a demonstration of clear intentions of achieving  the provisions of article 3 
of the Statute which requires candidates to respect “the principles of the rule of law and of 
the enjoyment by all persons within [their] jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”391. Even so, in Romania’s case, the Council served as a gatekeeper to the EU, 
especially on human rights issues, providing the country with a list of requirements to be 
fulfilled in a short period of time (the signing of the European Charter of Local Self-
Government and of the European Charter for regional or Minority Languages, adopt 
education laws in agreement with the Council’s recommendations, and use constitutional 
means to fight racism, anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination)392, closely 
scrutinising its national minority policies, and eventually delaying the country’s admission 
until  October 1993. After admission, Romania kept being subject to a monitoring procedure 
until early 1997, when the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly observed that the country had 
made considerable progress towards the fulfilment of its obligations and commitments393.   
Input from the Council of Europe through its advisory board, the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law – better known as the Venice Commission – heavily influenced the 
process of nation and state-building through which the Central and Eastern European 
countries had to go after the collapse of the communist regime. An example in this sense 
was the Demosthenes programme. Launched by the Council of Europe in March 1990, it was 
designed to strengthen the reform movement in Central and Eastern European countries 
towards genuine democracy and facilitate their progressive integration in institutions of 
European cooperation. Technical and legal assistance was thus provided by the Venice 
Commission to Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Russia during the drafting of 
constitutions394.  
As the mandate of the Venice Commission was extended beyond constitutional justice to 
democratic institutions, fundamental rights, elections, referendums and political parties, the 
institution became a prestigious expert body elaborating, at the request of member states 
and with the involvement of stakeholders, opinions that aim to bring national legal and 
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institutional structures in line with European standards of rule of law and democracy. One 
relevant example occurred in 2012, when intense power struggles between the Romanian 
Prime Minister, Victor Ponta and the then President, Traian Băsescu culminated in an 
attempt to impeach the latter (by a simple majority vote of the electorate instead of an 
absolute majority), the dismissal of the country’s ombudsman and of the speakers of the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (both members of the opposition), and the passing by 
the government of an emergency decree that curbed the powers of the Constitutional Court. 
The Venice Commission was asked by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and 
later by the Romanian Prime Minister as well to elaborate an opinion regarding the 
compatibility of the actions taken with constitutional principles and the rule of law. The 
opinion criticised the controversial steps taken by the Romanian government, and 
expressed its concern over the lack of respect among representatives of State institutions 
for the status of other such institutions, including the Constitutional Court395. Despite a 
formal request for a response to the Venice Commission opinion sent by representatives of 
the Romanian mass media to the Government, the Parliament, the Ministry of Justice and 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry, no official responses were offered396. Representatives of 
national think tanks such as Expert Forum and Freedom House Romania however 
emphasised the importance of the opinion not least in confirming the role of rule of law 
promoter of the civil society: 
“The opinion put forward by the Venice Commission confirms the Government and the 
Parliament’s abuses, denounced by Freedom House Romania during the summer. Romania 
is a European Union member and the Romanian political elites need to respect the rule of 
law.”397 
“Expert Forum, together with other non-governmental organisations have criticised the 
unconstitutional and abusive actions of the Social and Liberal Union. (...) The Venice 
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Commission sanctions these abuses and ascertains that the attempt to impeach the 
President has been justified on political grounds rather than constitutional (...) 
acknowledging the NGOs and independent journalists who have denounced the abuses.”398 
Whilst not providing its own definition of the rule of law, the Venice Commission put 
forward in a 2011 report six elements necessary for its prevalence: the supremacy of law 
(legality), legal certainty (the law must be accessible and be foreseeable as to its effects), 
prohibition of arbitrariness, access to justice before independent and impartial courts, 
respect for human rights, and non-discrimination and equality before the law399. Judicial 
independence, understood as the ability of acting “without any restriction, improper 
influence, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any authority”400, was 
differentiated as both external – of the branch itself from the executive and legislative 
powers, and internal – of individual judges from the judicial hierarchy. Judicial 
independence would also need to be reinforced through the adequate allocation of 
resources, facilities and equipment that would enable the efficient delivery of decision 
within a reasonable time. With the aim of monitoring the functioning of judicial systems, of 
identifying their difficulties and defining concrete ways for improvement, the European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) was established in 2002, bringing together 
49 member states of the Council of Europe, two-thirds of them being representatives of the 
national ministries of justice401. CEPEJ launched in 2004 its first evaluation of judicial 
systems in Europe cycle (followed since then by biannual editions), collecting data covering 
a wide range of aspects (public access to justice, the management of courts systems, the 
recruitment and disciplinary matters, efficiency and quality of judicial services) and setting 
the basis for the analysis of trends cross Europe regarding the evolution of judicial systems 
and reform processes. The impact of the reports increased over time, the results of the 
latest evaluation report (2012/2014 cycle) being presented and discussed more extensively 
than in the past by the Romanian mass media402. In Bulgaria, the publication of the 
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402 The Press review prepared by the Secretariat of CEPEJ that summarises the media coverage of the Report 
“European Judicial System – 2014 Edition” mentioning 7 articles in the Romanian mass media. No articles were 
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European Commission Justice Scorecard, coupled with the data provided by CEPEJ on 
judicial efficiency induced public debate over the pace and trajectory of reforms in the 
sector403.    
Recognising corruption as a phenomenon that “threatens the rule of law, democracy and 
human rights, (...) good governance (...) and social justice”404, the Council of Europe adopted 
a comprehensive normative framework for the fight against corruption (among which the 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, and the 
Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption)405 which directed signatories 
on what acts needed to be criminalised under domestic legislation, included the premises 
for international cooperation in the process of evidence acquisition in cases of corruption, 
and drew attention to the measures that should be considered by member states to combat 
the phenomenon. Whilst later international law instruments on the fight against corruption 
had been adopted having a global scope of application and putting forward more 
comprehensive standards (such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption or 
UNCAC in 2003406), the early establishment of an effective monitoring network (the Group 
of States against Corruption or GRECO) that would observe national undertakings under the 
two Council of Europe conventions and facilitate the exchange of best practices has 
contributed substantially to the propagation of regulatory diffusion. The monitoring system 
is divided into two procedures: a horizontal stage in which all members are evaluated 
during a round and receive recommendations for legislative, institutional and practical 
reforms, and a second, compliance procedure where the measures taken at the national 
level in order to implement the recommendations made during the horizontal stage are 
assessed. Given the weakness of the EU’s anti-corruption acquis (which will be discussed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
mentioned for Bulgaria. See European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (2015): Press Review No. CEPEJ-
GT-EVAL(2015)2.  
403 In 2014, Open Society Institute – Bulgaria organised a wide event that brought together representatives of 
the government, the legislative, civil society organisations and journalists in order to discuss the results 
presented in the European Justice Scorecard on the quality, independence and efficiency of the Bulgarian judicial 
system. See http://www.osf.bg/?cy=10&lang=2&program=1&action=2&news_id=627.     
404 Council of Europe (1998): Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Strasbourg, Council of Europe), preamble.  
405 On the importance of the anti-corruption framework put forward by the Council of Europe, see N. Kofele-Kale 
(2006): The International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes (Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing), pp. 176-
183.  
406 A mechanism for review of the implementation of UNCAC was agreed upon in 2009, each state party being 
assessed by two other parties under the supervision of the intergovernmental Implementation Review Group. 
The system has inbuilt shortcomings however, civil society organisations not being included in the monitoring 
exercise, the country reports themselves being confidential and depending upon agreement with the state under 
review. See C. Rose (2015): International Anti-Corruption Norms. Their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal 
Systems (Oxford, Oxford University Press).  
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below), and considering the methodological approach opted by GRECO which ensures a 
transparent examination of member states’ laws and policies (written replies to 
questionnaires, on-site visits and meetings with public officials and representatives of the 
civil society), coupled with a consistent compliance surveillance (situation reports re-
examine outstanding recommendations within 18 months from the evaluation round) has 
paved the way for a lucrative partnership with the EU. As such, when elaborating its first 
Anti-Corruption Report, as an action line established by the Stockholm Programme, the 
European Commission relied strongly on data provided by international monitoring 
mechanisms such as those used by GRECO, OECD, and UNCAC, which was corroborated with 
input from the Member States’ public authorities, civil society and independent experts407.   
Cooperation between the European Commission and the Council of Europe institutions has 
been in fact characterised by some scholars as amounting to a ‘division of labour’, especially 
during the enlargement to the former communist countries, the Venice Commission, CEPEJ, 
and GRECO compensating for the ambiguous conditionality concerning the rule of law that 
the European Commission displayed408. The solidification of supranational institutional 
cooperation in the area of anti-corruption has been on the European Commission’s agenda 
since 2003, when the possibility of the European Community’s accession to GRECO was 
formally considered409. Given the pre-Lisbon Treaty limited competence of the European 
Community with regard to the Council of Europe’s Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on 
Corruption, the decision to actively pursue full GRECO membership was postponed until the 
transition to the single legal personality of the EU, which streamlined to a certain extent the 
EU competence on anti-corruption matters. The option of EU participation in GRECO that 
would go beyond the cooperation format laid in the 2007 Memorandum of 
Understanding410 was again explored in 2011, the Commission emphasising the benefits of 
the reinforced monitoring of Member States’ anti-corruption policies, as well as the 
                                                          
407 European Commission (2011): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Economic and Social Committee: Fighting Corruption in the EU (Brussels, European 
Commission), COM(2011)308 final, p. 6.  
408 R. Coman (2015): “Strengthening the Rule of Law at the Supranational Level: The Rise and Consolidation of a 
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409 European Commission (2003): Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
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410 Council of the European Union/Council of Europe (2007): Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Council of Europe and the European Union (Strasbourg, 23rd of May), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/international-relations/files/mou_2007_en.pdf.  
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possibility of extending this assessment to the EU own institutional framework411. While 
this option is presently blocked by a legal disagreement between the European Commission 
and the Council412, the steps so far taken have resulted in the establishment of a biennial 
monitoring instrument extended across all 28 EU member states that would more 
importantly set the stage for the promotion of EU anti-corruption standards, as one expert 
on anti-corruption policies consulted by the European Commission observed:  
“(...) the most important problem is that once a country becomes an EU member, no other 
standards can hold [it] in check, with the exception of provisions regarding the protection 
against the fraudulent administration of EU funds, and this is a limited approach in the 
broader context.”413 
So far, we have explored the different approaches that international donors have opted for 
when promoting the rule of law in Eastern and Central Europe during the region’s 
democratic transition. We now turn to the actor that has dominated this process, especially 
after 1993 when the premises for a complex system of monitoring, sanctioning and 
incentive provision was laid: the European Union.  
Starting with the fifth enlargement wave (2004), the European Union established a complex 
system of assessment of the level of preparedness of the candidate countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe to take on the responsibilities of membership, alongside to a series of 
mechanisms designed to promote democratic consolidation, human rights and the rule of 
law. With the sixth enlargement wave (2007) and in the context of a general hesitance and 
at times  open hostility of existing member states to grant EU membership to new candidate 
countries414, the stage-structured conditionality model415 has been modified to include along 
the pre-negotiation, negotiation and accession stages the phase of post-accession 
monitoring. The motivation behind this decision had been substantiated by Romania and 
Bulgaria’s track record before accession which had been plagued by a high level of 
corruption, opaque privatisation, unconvincing political will to pursue substantial reform, 
                                                          
411 European Commission (2011): Report from the Commission to the Council on Modalities of European Union 
Participation in the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (Brussels, European Commission), 
COM(2011)/0307 final.  
412 Expert Group on Corruption (2015): 13th Meeting of the Group of Experts on Corruption Report (Brussels, 
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413 Author’s interview with a member of the Expert Group on Corruption of the European Commission, 28th 
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Counter Enlargement Fatigue”, Contemporary European Research, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 5.   
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and insufficient transparency, efficiency and accountability of their justice systems. But 
before exploring the targeted conditionality applied by the EU in the post-accession period, 
we will briefly discuss the organisation’s approach to promoting democracy and the rule of 
law in candidate countries as membership criteria in a reward-and-sanction system of 
accession.  
As with the other international organisations, the EU played initially the role of an aid 
donor, imposing conditions on relations with third countries, conditions that would 
encourage post-communist transformation of economies and societies416. However, it did so 
initially perceiving association as an alternative to, rather than a preparation for accession, 
as the ongoing process of deepening brought by negotiations over the Maastricht Treaty 
raised the question of the organisation’s ability to extend. This stage was labelled as a 
period of passive leverage, when the EU’s role in motivating reform was minimal417. But 
even in this context, observance of democratic principles had been included as subject of 
scrutiny that determined the prospects of EU membership relatively early during the pre-
accession stage, the Association or ‘Europe’ agreements concluded with Bulgaria in March 
1993, and with Romania in February 1993 providing for political consultation through a 
tripartite institutional setup formed of an Association Council, an Association Committee 
and a Joint Parliamentary Committee. More importantly, the negotiation of the agreements 
provided the context for the EU to apply enhanced conditionalities and gate-keeping418 as 
instruments to incentivise progress, the European Parliament expressing its concerns 
regarding the fairness of the electoral process from June 1990 in Bulgaria and urging the 
European Council to make the strengthening of Bulgarian relations with the European 
Economic Community dependent on the promotion of reforms aimed at democratising the 
country’s political system and liberalisation of the economy419. In Romania’s case as well, 
the European Parliament qualified the negotiation of a European agreement on the 
backdrop of the discredited May 1990 elections and the government-sponsored violence 
against student demonstrations a month later as “inappropriate until such time as (...) 
                                                          
416 H. Grabbe (1999): “A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and 
East European Applicants”, Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper No. 12/99 (San Domenico di Fiesole, 
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developments in Romania with regard to democracy and a market economy finally follow a 
similarly positive path to those in other Central and Eastern European countries”420.  The 
extent to which gate-keeping was feasible in this case was influenced less by the legislative 
and institutional changes registered in the two countries and more by the political context 
in the region: the attempted coup d’état by a group of hard-line members of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union to take control of the country from president Mikhail Gorbachev. 
This change of heart was best reflected by the subsequent reaction of the European Council 
that decided to immediately suspend technical assistance aid of 400 million ECU pledged to 
the Soviet Union until the reestablishment of the constitutional order421. Yet, despite 
security concerns, the European Commission continued along the lines of extended 
conditionality, starting negotiation for the association agreements with Bulgaria and 
Romania in 1992, but introducing a suspension clause that linked economic cooperation to 
the achievement of democratic principles, human rights and a market economy. Despite 
concerns that any hasty enlargement could impede the effective implementation of the 
newly adopted Maastricht Treaty, in its report for the Lisbon European Council (June 1992), 
the European Commission laid the foundations for the transition to the second role 
assumed by the EU during the CEEs post-communist transformation: that of guiding these 
countries towards membership which implies the development of a system of incentives 
and monitoring instruments to assess progress. The European Commission argued that the 
Community “cannot now refuse the historic challenge to assume its continental 
responsibilities and contribute to the development of a political and economic order for the 
whole of Europe”422 and went on identifying the respect for democracy and fundamental 
rights, the obligation to adhere to the Community’s legal, economic, and political 
framework, and the ability to implement the common foreign and security policy as 
potential preconditions that candidate countries would need to meet in order to be granted 
membership. In the context of increasing pressure from the CEE countries for a clear 
membership prospect, and caught in the rhetorical trap created on the one hand by the pan-
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European foundations laid in the Treaty of Rome423 reiterated to a certain extent by the 
European Commission discourse, and on the other by the ‘return to Europe’ doctrine424 
adopted by CEE states425, the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 put forward a set 
of prerequisites for accession - deemed as of equal importance - that created the premises 
for a clearer and ‘depoliticised’ Eastern enlargement:  
1. The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and the protection of minorities (the political criteria); 
2. The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with 
the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (the economic 
criteria); 
3. The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union426 (the acquis criteria). 
In addition to the political, economic and acquis criteria, the Union’s capacity to “absorb 
new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration”427 was 
mentioned as a determinant factor to the timing and pace of enlargement.  While no 
definition of democracy, nor of the concept of rule of law were provided, external indicators 
used by the EU in its relations with the CEE countries such as the Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe which was mentioned in the Europe Association Agreement both with Romania and 
Bulgaria428 could be used as a point of reference to the dimensions of the political 
requirement:  
“Democracy has as its foundation respect for the human person and the rule of law. (...) 
Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character entails accountability to the 
                                                          
423 The preamble of the Treaty of Rome reads “determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe” and calls “upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts”. 
424 See F. Schimmelfennig (2003): The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (Cambridge, 
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131 
 
electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and justice 
administered impartially. No one will be above the law.”429 
The Essen European Council in December 1994 continued the path of fleshing out 
enlargement tools and formally launched the pre-accession strategy that was based on a 
structured dialogue/relationship and on the framework of the Europe Agreements. The 
structured dialogue represented a series of consultative, non-decision-making meetings 
held between the Council and all the Central and Eastern European countries on aspects 
concerning Community policy areas, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Home 
and Justice Affairs pillar, and were meant to familiarise the applicants with the decision-
making process as well as the institutional set-up of the Union. Along with the enhanced 
structured relationship, the EU leaders also included the White Paper drawn by the 
European Commission to provide a route plan for progressive integration of the candidates 
into the Single Market. Finally a pre-accession dimension was incorporated into the EU’s 
financial support, mainly by reorienting the PHARE programme (Pologne et Hongrie – Aide 
á Restructuration Economique) that had previously followed a demand-driven approach, to 
provide assistance in the process of legal approximation and the completion of market 
reforms430. 
The Luxembourg European Council of 1997 established a first understanding of the 
Copenhagen political criteria, in terms of their function in the accession process, 
determining them as “a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations”, while 
the economic criteria and the ability to fulfil the obligations arising from membership were 
to be assessed in a “forward-looking, dynamic way”431. The concept of the rule of law has 
been mentioned from the Maastricht Treaty onwards in the corpus of the Union’s primary 
law432 and has been interpreted as an umbrella concept by the European Court of Justice 
                                                          
429 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (1990): Charter of Paris for New Europe (Paris, OSCE), 
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common to the Member States” and introduced in article 7 the possibility of EU sanctions (suspension of certain 
rights deriving from the membership status) if Member States are found guilty of a “serious and persistent 
breach (...) of principles mentioned in Article 6(1)”; the Treaty of Nice (2001) additionally authorised preventive 
action in the form of appropriate recommendations where there is a clear danger of a Member State committing 
a serious breach of fundamental rights. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) lists in article 2 TEU the rule of law among the 
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case law433, but its substance in relation to the enlargement process has been gradually 
reflected in the framework of Copenhagen-related documents adopted by the European 
Commission and the Council.  The framework of Copenhagen-related documents comprised 
both targeted evaluations focusing on particular candidate countries as well as derivative 
analyses of a more general application establishing the principles of progress towards 
accession assessment. Included in the first category were the Commission’s Opinions on the 
Application for Membership of the EU by the CEECs (released in 1997), the Commission’s 
Regular Reports on the candidate countries’ progress towards accession (produced 
annually from 1998 to 2004), the Commission’s Comprehensive Country Monitoring 
Reports (produced in 2003 for the 2004 accession wave countries, and in 2005 for Bulgaria 
and Romania), two 2006 Monitoring Report on the state of preparedness of Bulgaria and 
Romania, and the Accession Partnerships434. The second group of acts comprised the 
European Commission’s Agenda 2000, and its Composite and Strategy Papers. Starting from 
the four element scheme (democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for and 
protection of minorities) produced by the Copenhagen political criteria, the monitoring, 
assessment and guidance documentation produced by the Commission and the Council 
initially emulated this structure. 
 As such, in its first official appraisal that responded to the EU membership application 
submitted by Romania in June 1995 and by Bulgaria six months later435, the Commission 
analysed democratic development and the rule of law as an ‘organic combination’436, 
including within this common heading a brief description of the structure and functioning of 
the parliament, the executive and of the judiciary. By fusing democracy and the rule of law 
under the same sub-criterion for candidate countries to meet and by avoiding pre-set clear 
definitions of these notions, the Commission allowed itself a good share of flexibility in 
assessing progress in CEECs, gradually formulating recommendations and developing a 
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conditionality system that left very few aspects of the functioning of the candidate countries 
outside the EU scrutiny437.   
Although the criteria did not originally specify reform of judicial systems as one of the 
requirements for EU accession, the interpretation given to the concept of rule of law in the 
evaluation documents has been largely built on two dimensions: judicial capacity 
(efficiency, resources, institutions) and judicial impartiality/independence. Thus the 
aspects observed under the democracy and the rule of law gauge in the first Opinions 
elaborated by the Commission were the character of elections (deemed free and fair in both 
countries), the exercise of local autonomy (perceived as hampered by the absence of a 
coherent legislative framework and limited because of financial dependency on the central 
authorities), the situation of the administrative sector (deemed deficient, exposed to 
political influence and prone to corruption), the power exercised by the secret services (in 
both cases perceived as extensive), and the process of dispensing justice (marked by 
shortcomings such as a large backlog of pending cases, deficiency of human resources, the 
complexity of new legislation)438. However, despite serious shortcomings, it seemed that the 
European Commission had set a low threshold for the meeting of the political criteria, 
concluding that Romania was on its way to satisfying the political criteria (which was 
considered to be met in 1999) and that developments in Bulgaria confirmed that the 
country was already meeting the requirements. This appraisal was interpreted by some 
authors as a move that deprived the Commission quite early on of the room for manoeuvre 
that it initially tried to construct by opting for the broad and over-encompassing criteria439. 
Moreover, whilst offering CEE countries a starting point towards reaching the opening of 
accession negotiations, Kochenov argues that the lack of a comprehensive set of principles 
for the assessment of the progress towards meeting these benchmarks, corroborated by a 
narrow approach to the notion of democracy and the rule of law, and a fragmented 
assessment that usually devoted insufficient attention to the political criteria (usually 2-4 
pages compared to a dozen of pages in the Regular Reports dealing with economic 
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conditions) led the Commission to fail the task of providing a clear image of the real 
progress made by candidate countries in meeting the political Copenhagen criteria440.  
The subsequent annual Regular Reports on the progress towards the accession of Romania 
and Bulgaria forwarded by the Commission (1998 - 2004) maintained the same format of 
analysis under the political criteria, but more attention was gradually allocated to the 
functioning of the national judicial systems and the development of the legislative and 
institutional anti-corruption frameworks. Below we provide a summary of the sections on 
judicial reform and fight against corruption in Bulgaria and Romania from the Commission’s 
Regular Reports.  
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Table 2 a. Bulgaria - Summary of observations on judicial reform and fight against corruption in 1999 – 
2004 European Commission Regular Reports 
Year Developments in the area of 
judicial reform and the fight 
against corruption 
Negative observations and Policy 
recommendations in Regular Reports 
 
 
1999 
- Amendments to the Law on the 
Judiciary (change composition of 
Judicial Council), and the Penal Code 
(regarding corruption); 
- Adoption of National Strategy for 
combating organised crime; 
- Ratification of major international 
anti-corruption conventions; 
- Absence of a strategy to increase 
effectiveness and transparency of the 
judicial system; 
- Vagueness of the legislative framework (on 
the liability of dignitaries, party funding and 
corruption); 
- Inefficient and unaligned to EU standards 
training of magistrates;   
 
 
2000 
 
- Introduction of three-instance 
proceedings; 
- Adoption of new legislation 
(officials being required to declare 
assets; criminalisation of actual and 
attempted bribery); 
- Ratification of Civil Law Convention 
on Corruption. 
 
- Lack of transparency in recruitment and 
promotion of judges; 
- Absence of a public judicial training 
institution; 
- Insufficient funding for judicial 
institutions; 
- Cumbersome procedures for caseload 
management. 
 
 
 
2001 
 
- Adoption of the Strategy for Reform 
of the Judicial System; 
- Obligation of newly appointed 
judges to be trained at the 
Magistrates Training Centre (NGO); 
- Adoption of the National Strategy 
for Combating Corruption and  of the  
a Code of ethics for Civil Servants;  
- Ratification of Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption;  
- Publishing of procurement tenders 
in the Public Procurement Register. 
 
- Provisions on immunity affecting the 
prosecution of corruption; 
- Unclear split of roles between the Supreme 
Judicial Council and the Ministry of Justice; 
- No substantial progress registered 
regarding recruitment, appointment and 
training of judges; 
- Little progress in the fight against 
organised crime; 
- Lack of transparent standards for case 
assignment.  
 
 
 
 
 
2002 
- Approval of Action Plans for the 
Strategy for Reform of the Judicial 
System and for the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy (2002-2003); 
- Amendments to the Law on the 
Judicial System (addition of 
prosecution offices and investigation 
services to the SJC, introduction of a 
competitive recruitment and 
promotion system); 
- Set up by the Parliament of a 24-
member permanent Commission to 
- Action Plans not covering the overall 
structure of the judicial system (judicial 
immunity not discussed); 
- High level of corruption attributable to low 
salaries, imperfect legislation, lack of 
transparent administration controls and 
poor functioning of judicial system; 
- lack of an efficient monitoring of asset 
declaration; 
- Lack of transparency of the case allocation 
system, very long proceedings and overall 
poor functioning of the judicial system; 
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fight corruption; 
- Addition of supplementary staff to 
the National Service for Combating 
Organised Crime. 
- Professional management of judges by the 
SJC hampered by the tripartite structure of 
the magistracy (judges, prosecutors and 
investigators); 
 
 
 
 
2003 
- Amendments to Constitution 
regarding magisterial immunity 
(functional penal immunity); 
- Transformation of the Magistrate 
Training Centre into the National 
Institute  for the Judiciary; 
- Amendments to the Civil and Penal 
Procedural Codes (mechanisms to 
reduce duration of procedures) and 
to the Law on Judicial System (asset 
declaration compulsory for 
magistrates as well); 
- Consolidation of the anti-corruption 
institutional set-up (special units 
within ministries, police and border 
guard).  
 
 
 
 
 
- Lack of comprehensive  statistics on court 
activity; 
- Further legislative steps required to 
introduce the concept of liability of legal 
persons and the definition of fraud; 
- Unreformed investigation service.  
 
 
 
2004 
- Amendments to the Law on the 
Judicial System (introducing fixed 
term tenures for leading positions, 
clarification of the process of 
appointment and promotion of 
magistrates); 
- 44% increase of judiciary budget, 
organisation of the National Institute 
for the Judiciary (mandatory 6 
months trainings), adoption by the 
SJC of own strategy to fight 
corruption in the judiciary; 
- Strengthening of anticorruption 
institutional set-up (collaboration 
between SJC, MoJ and the 
Prosecutor’s Office); 
- Increase in pre-trial proceedings on 
corruption charges (from 2253 cases 
in 2001 to 6785 in 2003, with 431 
persons convicted in 2003). 
- Political interference in new appointments 
for top positions in the judiciary; 
- Parliamentary quota of the SJC (11 
members) comprising only members from 
the ranks of the parliamentary majority;  
- Prosecution capacity affected by frequent 
referrals of cases back to the investigation 
stage; 
-  Need for revision of the legislative 
framework (including penal procedure 
code) in order to bring the functioning of 
pre-trial phase in line with EU standards 
- Deficient system of judgements’ 
enforcement (1/8 of fines being effectively 
collected); 
- The new Action Plan not covering high 
level corruption, or local corruption; 
- Little transparency regarding dignitaries’ 
personal interests and financing of political 
parties.  
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Table 2 b. Romania - Summary of observations on judicial reform and fights against corruption in 1999 – 
2004 European Commission Regular Reports 
 
Year Developments in the area of 
judicial reform and the fight 
against corruption 
Negative observations and Policy 
recommendations in Regular Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 
- Legislative modifications leading to 
reducing the case backlog and an 
improvement of the magistrates’ 
promotion system; 
- Setting up of the National Institute 
of the Magistracy; 
- Establishment of National Office for 
the Prevention of and Fight against 
Money Laundering and of anti-
corruption sections in ministries; 
- Entry into force of the Law on 
money laundering; 
- Concrete steps in tackling 
corruption in the judiciary (the 
Superior Council of Magistracy 
initiating 21 investigations against 
magistrates). 
 
 
 
- Lack of access to case studies and court 
decisions;  
- Low level of technical skills in EU law, 
financial, fiscal and commercial law among 
judges; 
- Weakness of the National Council for 
Action Against Corruption and Organised 
Crime – institution established in 1997; 
- fight against corruption not addressed 
with sufficient determination and 
institutional set-up is fragmented. 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 
- Amendments to the Code of Civil 
Procedure introducing measures to 
speed up court procedures; 
- Decrease of pending cases and 
progress registered in the 
computerisation of courts; 
- Adoption of new legislation on the 
prevention and punishment of acts of 
corruption, penalising private sector 
corruption, and permitting the 
tackling of high level corruption in 
the public sector; 
- Establishment of Anti-corruption 
and Organised Crime Unit within the 
Prosecutor’s Office.  
 
- The significant influence of the Ministry of 
Justice over judicial appointments;  
- Low technical skills in many areas of law; 
- Unclear division of tasks among bodies 
involved in the fight against corruption; 
- Non-ratification of important international 
conventions concerning the fight against 
corruption (such as the Civil and Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption; Convention 
on Laundering Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime). 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
- Entry into force of the revised 
version of the Civil Procedure Code 
(speeding up court procedures; 
improving enforcement of judicial 
decisions); 
- Introduction of mandatory 
publication of reasoning for all 
decisions; 
- Adoption of ordinance introducing 
- Extended influence of the Ministry of 
Justice over the Superior Council of the 
Magistracy (SCM), appointing 1/3 of its 
members and chairing its meetings; 
- Lack of transparency in the demotion of 
court presidents and vice-presidents; 
- Inactivity of the Anti-corruption and 
Organised Crime Unit within the 
Prosecutor’s Office not functional due to 
lack of staff and equipment; 
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public procurement procedures and 
establishing right to appeal against 
the award of public contracts.   
- Non-ratification of the Council of Europe 
conventions on corruption;  
- No noticeable reduction in levels of 
corruption.  
 
 
 
 
2002 
- Adoption of the National Plan and 
Programme for the Prevention of 
Corruption; 
- Setting up of the National Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor’s Office 
(NAPO) replacing the existing anti-
corruption section that investigates 
cases involving sums over €100.000 
and relating to high-ranking officials; 
- The establishment of 15 regional 
branches of NAPO to Courts of 
Appeal; ratification of Civil and 
Criminal Law Conventions on 
Corruption.   
- Previous concerns not addressed 
(involvement of executive in judicial affairs; 
the extensive right of appeal of the General 
Prosecutor; inadequate human resources 
policy; possibility of doctors in law, general 
inspectors or legal counsellors within MoJ to 
be appointed as judges/prosecutors without 
competitive examination); 
- Considerable role of the MoJ in the 
appointment of prosecutors to NAPO;  
- Weakness of NAPO and overlapping 
institutional tasks (with the Control Office of 
the Prime Minister); 
- Excessive court workload and limited legal 
aid.  
2003 - New selection procedure for the 
SCM (budges selected by the 
judiciary and proposed to 
parliament); 
- Repealing of discretionary power of 
the General Prosecutor; 
- Adoption of a Judicial System 
reform Strategy to enhance judicial 
independence; 
- Revision of Constitution 
(enshrining principles of judicial 
independence and right to fair trial); 
- Extension of mandate for SCM 
members to reduce effect of political 
patronage and inclusion of 
representatives of civil society in the 
SCM; 
- Adoption of new anti-corruption 
legislation (extended requirements 
for public disclosure of assets by 
officials; concept of conflict of 
interests was introduced, expansion 
of types of interests considered 
incompatible with public positions).  
 
- Maintaining of power to directly appoint 
judges (from other legal professions) by 
MoJ; 
- Limited investigation power of NAPO due 
to understaffing and limited operational 
independence due to MoJ’s responsibility 
for anti-corruption enforcement; 
- Adoption of new anti-corruption 
legislation through the legislative 
mechanism of vote of confidence restricting 
possibility of consultation;  
- Weak provisions on conflict of interest, 
potential loopholes such as asset transfer to 
relatives in order to bypass asset 
declaration; 
- Maintenance of the General Prosecutor’s 
discretionary power to bring extraordinary 
appeals in criminal cases; 
- Absence of clear rules on distribution of 
cases;  
- Need for strategic assessment of the 
nature and scale of corruption. 
 
 
 
- Requirement for courts of appeal to 
publish annual jurisprudence 
bulletins; 
- Adoption of the three-law package: 
on the SCM (full responsibility for 
- Continued political pressure exerted on 
judges while exercising official duties; 
- Limited access to case law, lack of 
information about new legislation and lack 
of specialised training for judges; 
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2004 the recruitment, career development 
and sanctioning system), on the 
Organisation of the Judiciary 
(establishing random allocation of 
cases based on IT system) and on the 
Statute of Magistrates; 
- Adoption of New Criminal Code, of 
legislation decreasing threshold for 
wealth declarations;  
- Removal of obligation for NAPO to 
report to Parliament.  
- Limited impact of the National Corruption 
Strategy and Action Plan; 
- Low number of convictions stemming from 
NAPO investigations (out of the 2300 
registered cases investigated by NAPO 
between 2003 and 2004 only for 160 cases 
prosecutions were launched in court); 
- Unprecedented backlog of appeals (from 
over 3.000 in 2002 to over 35.000 in 2004) 
by giving responsibility for ruling on all 
second appeals to the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice.  
 
But if so far the Union brought together countries under the umbrella of eligibility for EU 
membership based on their association status, the Florence European Council in June 1996 
introduced the mechanism of differentiation – based on the regatta principle – whereby 
each state which had signed an Association Agreement with the EU was to be individually 
judged in relation to whether or not having met the criteria. Furthermore, in an effort to 
strike the right balance between the speed and depth of the accession process, the 
Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 introduced a hierarchic differentiation, 
conditioning the opening of negotiations with candidate states to compliance with the 
political requirements, the economic criteria and the ability to fulfil the obligations arising 
from membership being assessed in a forward-looking, dynamic way441. Hence, while 
aspiring to maintain all countries targeting membership in a single accession process but 
making use of the input provided through monitoring instruments and encouraging 
momentum for reform, the Council invited six of the CEE countries to start negotiations in 
March 1998 (the Luxembourg Six or ‘ins’), while from the remaining five countries 
(Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) further results were expected.  
The broad framework of membership conditions which needed to be satisfied before 
accession was supplemented by the Accession Partnerships442, which formed the basis of 
the enhanced pre-accession strategy. The new instruments provided inter alia for a 
comprehensive articulation of policy priorities agreed upon between the Commission and 
the candidate countries that needed to be implemented within the year or in the medium 
                                                          
441 European Council (1997): Conclusions of the Presidency (12-13 December, Luxembourg), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/43332/1/LUXEMBOURG_EUROPEAN_COUNCIL.pdf, paragraph 25.  
442 Council of the European Union (1998): Council Regulation No. 622/98 on Assistance to the Applicant States in 
the Framework of the Pre-Accession Strategy, and in Particular on the Establishment of Accession Partnerships (16 
March).  
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term (defined as a period of five years). The European Commission reported on applicants’ 
progress in meeting each priority (based on the countries’ national policy programmes) 
while making financial aid conditional upon states satisfying the Copenhagen criteria and 
meeting the specific priorities set up in the Accession Partnership443. This new instrument 
covered a wide range of policy areas, setting a timeframe for the achievement of acquis-
related issues of concern as well as priorities included under the political and economic 
Copenhagen criteria. But it also consolidated the EU’s incentive structure, setting explicit 
financial threats to penalise non-compliance with EU rules and including financial and 
accession advancement rewards. While the Commission monitored implementation, the 
Council ultimately applied conditionality, being able at any time to take appropriate steps 
with regard to any pre-accession assistance (PHARE - Pologne et Hongrie – Aide á 
Restructuration Economique; SAPARD – Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and 
Rural Development; ISPA – Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), acting by 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission where commitments contained in the 
Agreements were not respected. In terms of the priorities set by the Accession Partnerships 
that touched upon judicial reform and the fight against corruption, in Romania’s case 
improving the functioning of the judiciary through the adoption of new penal and penal 
procedure codes, the passing of suitable legislation on corruption prevention, the 
establishment of an independent anti-corruption department, and ratification of the 
European conventions on corruption and money laundering were identified as short-term 
objectives to be achieved by the end of 2000444.  Similarly, in Bulgaria’s case strengthening 
the independence of magistrates, the efficiency of the court system and the enforcement of 
civil and penal judgements were identified as key priorities to be achieved in the short 
term445. In its 2000 Regular Reports, the European Commission noted that Romania had 
only partially met the Justice and Home Affairs priorities that had been agreed446 and that in 
Bulgaria “[w]hilst progress has been made to meet some of the JHA (Justice and Home 
Affairs) priorities, those on strengthening the judiciary and developing a national strategy 
                                                          
443 H. Grabbe (2003): “Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process”, in J. 
Featherstone, C. Radaelli (eds.) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 313.   
444 European Commission (1999): Romania: 1999 Accession Partnership (Brussels, European Commission). 
445 European Commision (1999): Bulgaria: 1999 Accession Partnership (Brussels, European Commission).   
446 European Commission (2000): Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards Accession 
(Brussels, European Commission), p. 92.  
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to combat corruption have not been met”447. However, despite the rather critical 
assessment of the countries’ progress in fulfilling the short-term priorities of the Accession 
Partnership448, and an unsatisfactory advancement in the area of political reforms 
underlined by the regular reports, negative conditionality in the form of cutting of pre-
accession financial assistance was avoided, while the official reprimanding of the two 
countries by the Commission and the European Parliament based on the system of 
benchmarking prevailed449. Thus, the EU manifested its preference for exercising implicit 
threats that usually translated into delaying accession advancement rewards450, one early 
instance being the Luxembourg European Council’s decision to include Romania and 
Bulgaria into the ‘pre-ins’ group and open accession negotiations in February 2000, instead 
of March 1998.  
A second essential component of the EU’s enhanced pre-accession strategy has been the 
financial aid made available by the EU in order to enable the alignment with the Union 
acquis prior to accession. The PHARE programme (Pologne et Hongrie – Aide á 
Restructuration Economique) – one of the three pre-accession financial instruments 
designed to assist candidate countries in their preparation for joining the EU – had been 
opened for Romania and Bulgaria through Regulation 2698/90. In Romania’s case, however, 
the Council suspended the effective implementation of economic aid until January 1991, 
largely due to the violent suppression of student demonstrations in June 1990 by the 
National Salvation Front dominated government451.  Whilst the main focus of the funding 
line was to be restricted to the private sector, with an emphasis on certain areas of 
economic activity such as the industry, investment, transport, environment protection, 
trade and services, in 1992 the European Parliament insisted on creating a PHARE 
Democracy Programme that would focus on politics and civil society. A further extension 
was made in 1998 when PHARE funding was allocated for projects pertaining to the Justice 
                                                          
447 European Commission (2000): Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession 
(Brussels, European Commission), p. 93.   
448 D. Papadimitrious, D. Phinnemore (2008): Romania and the European Union. From Marginalisation to 
Membership (Oxon, Routledge), p. 42.  
449 T. Börzel, T. Risse (2009): “Venus Approaching Mars? The European Union’s Approaches to Democracy 
Promotion in Comparative Perspective”, in A. Magen, T. Risse, M. McFaul (eds.) Promoting Democracy and the 
Rule of Law. American and European Strategies (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan), p. 41.  
450 E. Gateva (2013): “Post-Accession Conditionality – Translating Benchmarks into Political Pressure?”, East 
European Politics, Vol. 29, No.4, pp. 420-42.  
451 European Commission (1993): Second Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the Implementation of Community Assistance to the Countries of East and Central Europe (PHARE) 
in 1991, (Brussels, European Commission), COM(93) 172 final, p. 4.  
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and Home Affairs area and 30% of the total PHARE funding was devoted to institution 
building. Moreover, from this point onwards PHARE monies were disbursed in the frame of 
annual national programmes drafted by candidate countries on the basis of the Accession 
Partnership priorities and the weaknesses identified by the Commission in its Regular 
Reports. PHARE national allocation was decided by the Commission on the basis of GDP and 
population, but also taking into account past performance, needs, absorption capacities and 
progress in implementing individual Accession Partnerships452. An evaluation of the 
European Commission of the total allocation for Justice and Home Affairs projects funded 
through PHARE estimated that between 1998 and 2003 €57million had been accorded to 
Bulgaria, while for Romania the sum amounted to €102million453. Launched in 1998 as an 
initiative of the European Commission to address the issue of deficient administrative and 
judicial capacities in the candidate countries, the twinning instrument was designed to 
assist candidate countries in strengthening their administrative and judicial capacities to 
implement EU legislation as future member states. The format for its implementation rested 
on a secondment of civil servants from EU member states to work as advisers to beneficiary 
institutions from candidate states for periods longer than one year.  The ‘twinning 
exercise454’ was structured as a two stage programme whereby beneficiary candidate 
countries issued calls for tenders addressed to any potential administrative partner in EU 
member states, and administrators from EU member states submitted in response 
proposals to the European Commission which ensured that the selection of the partner and 
the implementation of the project were procedurally correct and substantially coherent 
with the National Plan that each candidate country had previously agreed with the 
European Commission455. The key objective was that of knowledge and competencies 
transfer from old member states to prospective ones. In Bulgaria, for the period 1998-2007, 
141 twinning projects for a total amount of €138 million had been implemented, and 42 
                                                          
452 P. Nikolova (2008): “The Implementation of PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD in Bulgaria”, in Centre for EU 
Enlargement Studies, Using IPA and Other EU Funds to Accelerate Convergence and Integration in the Western-
Balkans (Budapest, Center for EU Enlargement Studies), p. 91.  
453 European Commission (2006): Support to the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis. Thematic Evaluation Report of 
the European Phare Programme (Brussels, European Commission), Annex 5.   
454 D. Phinnemore, D. Papadimitriou (2003): “Exporting Europeanisation to the Wider Europe: the Twinning 
Exercise and Administrative Reform in the Candidate Countries and Beyond”, Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 1-22.   
455 D. Piana (2010): Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe. From Rule of Law to Quality of Justice (Surrey, 
Ashgate Publishing), p. 65.  
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had been designed to deliver specific results in the area of justice and home affairs456. 
Similarly, in Romania between 1998 and 2006, out of 207 initiatives launched, 50 projects 
had been in the area of justice and home affairs457. While the Justice and Home Affairs 
acquis did not cover aspects that would fall under the realm of the rule of law and generally 
under the Copenhagen political criteria such as judicial independence and efficiency and the 
fight against corruption458, a significant percentage of EU funded projects implemented 
under the label of Justice and Home Affairs embedded elements of the Copenhagen political 
criteria (in Romania’s case 55% of projects involving JHA and Political criteria, and 17% in 
Bulgaria’s case459).  
However, in the absence of a unitary model of rule of law and facing a variety of 
administrative and judicial practices across the EU, clashes between experts on the ground 
over effective solutions460, concerns regarding the capacity both in terms of human 
resources and financial constraints of candidate countries to absorb the knowledge 
accumulated, and the question of sustainability of intervention after the programme ended 
hindered the effectiveness of the instrument461.  
 
 
Table 3 PHARE-funded projects in Bulgaria in the area of judicial reform - 1997-2007 
 PHARE 1999 – Strengthening the Independence of the Judiciary and Building the 
Capacity of the Ministry of Justice  (budget: €2 million - twinning) 
 PHARE 2000 – Strengthening the Public Prosecutor’s Office (€3 million - 
investment) 
                                                          
456 D. Markov (2013): “The Role of International Assistance for Building the Capacity of National Law 
Enforcement Institutions: Lessons Learned from the Bulgarian Experience”, in G. Andreopoulos (ed.) Policing 
Across Borders. Law Enforcement Networks and the Challenges of Crime Control (New York, Springer), p. 61.  
457 European Commission (2007): Twinning: Key facts and Figures, 2006 (Brussels, European Commission).  
458 Starting with the 2005 negotiation frameworks for Croatia and Turkey the acquis in the area of Justice, 
Freedom and Security has been widened by the introduction of Chapter 23 “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” 
that focuses on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Chapter 23 
includes four main headings:  judiciary, fight against corruption, fundamental rights and EU citizens’ rights. 
Chapter 24 entitled “Justice, Freedom and Security” covers the fight against all types of organised crime and 
terrorism, the Schengen rules, border control and visas, as well as migration, asylum, judicial cooperation in 
criminal and civil matters and police and customs cooperation.   
459 European Commission (2006): Support to the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis. Thematic Evaluation Report of 
the European Union Phare Programme (London, ECOTEC Research and Consulting), p. 16.  
460 A. Mungiu-Pippidi (2009): “A House of Cards? Building the Rule of Law in East Central Europe”, Paper 
presented at the ECPR General Conference (Potsdam, European Consortium for Political Research).  
461 D. Bailey, L. De Propris (2004): “A Bridge too Phare? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity-Building in the 
Candidate Countries”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 77-98.  
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 PHARE 2001 – Recruitment and Training Strategy for the Judiciary (€2 million - 
technical assistance) 
 PHARE 2002 – Implementation of the Judicial Reform Strategy (€10.8 million – 
twinning and investment) 
 PHARE 2003 – Support of the Implementation of the Strategy for Reform of the 
Judiciary through Introduction of Information technologies (€27.2 million - 
twinning, technical assistance, investment) 
 PHARE 2004 – Strengthening of the Bulgarian Judiciary – Implementation of new 
penal procedures code; strengthening interagency cooperation between Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and other concerned bodies in the fight against corruption 
(€878.600 – technical assistance; twinning) 
 PHARE 2004 – Judicial Cooperation in Penal and Civil Matters (€1 million – 
technical assistance) 
 PHARE 2005 – Strengthening Capacity of Anti-Corruption Commission to 
Counteract Corruption in Public Administration and Judiciary (€4.7 million – 
technical assistance) 
 PHARE 2006 – Strengthening public management of the judiciary and court 
administration (€1.8 million twinning, technical assistance) 
 PHARE 2006 – A Further Step towards a Higher Quality of Training of Bulgarian 
Judiciary (€800.00 - twinning, technical assistance) 
  Source: Author’s consultation of European Commission: PHARE Financing Memoranda and Project Fiches 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/former-assistance/phare/index_en.htm).  
 
Table 4 PHARE-funded projects in Romania in the area of judicial reform - 1997-2007 
 PHARE 1999 – Consolidating Support for the National Institute of the Magistracy 
(€1 million – technical assistance; investment) 
 PHARE 1999 – Inter-Institutional Programme on Anti-corruption – establishment of 
anti-corruption structure within the Prosecutor’s Office (€2 million - twinning); 
investment in IT and Technical Assistance to National Anti-Corruption Prosecution 
Office (€2 million - investment) 
 PHARE 2000 – Continuation of the Development of the Case and Document 
Management System (€8.75 million - investment)  
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 PHARE 2001 – Continuation of assistance in strengthening the anti-corruption 
structures in the Romanian judicial system (€0.5 million - twinning) 
 PHARE 2002 – Modernisation and reform of law enforcement agencies and 
strengthening of anti-corruption structures (€4.3 million - investment) 
 PHARE 2002 – Assistance in strengthening the independence and functioning of the 
judiciary system (€1.8 million - twinning) 
 PHARE 2003 – Further strengthening the institutional capacity to fight against 
corruption (€2 million - twinning) 
 PHARE 2004 - 2006 – Assistance to enhance the independence, professionalism and 
management capacity of the Romanian judiciary (€ 56 million - twinning, 
investment, technical assistance) 
Source: Author’s consultation of European Commission: PHARE Financing Memoranda and Project Fiches 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/former-assistance/phare/index_en.htm). 
 
What also needs to be emphasised here is that post-communist Central and East European 
countries became the first target of a very demanding political, economic and institutional 
conditionality, closely linked with the process of transition towards democracy and market 
economy. Hence, accession paved the way not only for a Europeanisation process 
understood as domestic adaptation prompted through conditionality462, but also involved 
the EU in a more structural process, that of institution-building which implied the reform of 
the judiciary, administration and policymaking structures. However, not having a uniform 
matrix of institutional design with regard to the implementation of structural reforms 
required prior to accession, as well as an unclear methodology created the image of the EU 
leading a fleet of “ships built at sea” that would retain important elements of the initial 
structure463. Due to protracted legacies which were reflected on the one hand in the absence 
of strategies for institutional development, and on the other on the presence of reluctant 
Europeanizers both from the political sphere and the judiciary, the impact and 
sustainability of EU funded projects were at times threatened, as the commissioned 2006 
Thematic Evaluation of the PHARE support in the area of Justice and Home Affairs in 
Romania and Bulgaria noted: 
                                                          
462 T. Börzel, T. Risse (2003): “Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in K. Featherstone, C. Radaelli 
(eds.) The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford, Oxford University Press).  
463 A. Mungiu-Pippidi (2008): “The EU as a Transformation Agent. Lessons Learnt from Governance Reforms in 
East Central Europe”, Hertie School of Governance Papers, No. 33, p. 11.  
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“There is evidence of programmes which are at risk of poor impact or sustainability because 
of the lack of strategic framework, particularly with regard to overlapping and duplication, 
or inadequately planned and prioritised resources.”464  
“Commission officials and twinning experts raised doubts regarding the institutional ability 
of beneficiaries to implement the acquis to the point at which it can deliver freedom, 
security and justice to citizens, particularly with regard to: (...) fraud and corruption, and 
money laundering. (...) [M]any Justice and Home Affairs projects targeted subordinate 
bodies and agencies which generally lacked the necessary ministerial authority to enforce 
policy and procedures.”465 
Other studies have questioned the very design of the twinning projects arguing that the EU’s 
instrumental approach to enlargement that materialised into setting fixed universal goals, 
and devising country-specific road-maps for those goals to be achieved with the help of 
various instruments, incentives and penalties led to an overestimation of the role of 
external incentives/carrots/the prize of EU membership, and to the implicit presumption 
that  national institutions will be willing to implement/assimilate466. This vertical approach 
has hampered the effectiveness of some projects such as the twinning initiative for the 
strengthening of the Romanian National Institute of Magistrates (NIM) where due to lack of 
cooperation between external experts and the management of NIM, both project leaders 
needed to be changed, delaying the start of activities467. On a similar note, Bozhilova’s study 
of Bulgaria’s quest for EU membership substantiated the hypothesis that this Money & Men 
solution followed by the EU when extending membership to CEECs created a catch 22 
situation for Bulgaria468. As conditionality surpassed the area of the acquis, and as 
unsatisfactory responses to benchmarks and criteria were penalised with further delays to 
integration, candidate countries such as Bulgaria and Romania faced the risk of veering off 
the democratic path of reform (retrenchment). Bozhilova argues that while the EU offered 
money and personnel (expertise) openly to all candidate states, this offer was essentially a 
                                                          
464 European Commission (2006): Support to the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis. Thematic Evaluation Report of 
the European Union Phare Programme, p. 12.  
465 European Commission (2006): Support to the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis. Thematic Evaluation Report of 
the European Union Phare Programme, p. II.  
466 D. Rem, D. Gasper (2008): “Romania’s Accession Process into the European Union: Discourses at Policy-, 
Program-, and Project-Levels in the Justice Sector”, Institute of Social Studies Working Paper No. 463 (The Hague, 
Institute of Social Studies).  
467 D. Rem, D. Gasper (2008): “Romania’s Accession Process into the European Union: Discourses at Policy-, 
Program-, and Project-Levels in the Justice Sector”, p. 22.  
468 D. Bozhilova (2008): Bulgaria’s Quest for EU Membership. The Europeanization of Policies in Transition 
(Bloomington, AuthorHouse), pp. 47-77.  
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matter of the latter being able to import the resources and make use of them in order to 
sustain progress (absorption capacity)469. Thus, this approach took away the focus from the 
problem of institutional capacity-building, despite the fact that CEECs needed to dismantle 
communist-style governance and implementation structures, so to build new ones 
compatible with liberal democratic principles.  
Yet, despite concerns regarding the impact and sustainability of projects funded through 
PHARE, with a particular emphasis on twinning exercises, probably one of the most 
important projects in Romania’s case has been the PHARE programme RO9910.05 that 
supported the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (NAPO) – a 
specialised body with the task of carrying out the criminal pursuit activity in cases 
regarding corruption crimes. The programme had an investment component which 
facilitated a better cooperation between the anti-corruption investigation unit and the 
Ministry of Administration and Interior and the General Customs Authority and assured an 
effective information flow between the entities. Through the twinning component, over 80 
seminars were held on topics ranging from the protection of the financial interests of the 
European Union to the concept of corruption, money laundering, tax evasion and inquiry 
techniques470.  Further PHARE technical and investment assistance was provided for the 
development of NAPO in 2003 and in 2004, in order to develop the institution’s territorial 
services and improve its capacities for retrieving, inspecting, analysing, investigating and 
storing digital evidence within corruption cases471. Yet, while several independent reviews, 
including peer reviews by the European Commission and the non-governmental 
organisation Freedom House acknowledged the establishment of NAPO as an important 
step in the right direction, especially compared to the results recorded up until 2002, when 
the Unit against Corruption and Organised Crime within the National Public Ministry acted 
as the specialised body in fighting corruption, the still present reluctance of NAPO to take 
action against high level political corruption cases was raised once again472.  The state of 
affairs shifted only in the context of increased pressure from the EU for results in the fight 
against corruption that culminated during 2004-2005 when the European Commission 
                                                          
469 D. Bozhilova (2008): Bulgaria’s Quest for EU Membership. The Europeanization of Policies in Transition, p. 49.  
470 Government of Romania (2003): Report on the Progress in Preparing the Accession to the European Union – 
September 2002 – June 2003 (Bucharest), p. 51.  
471 Ministry of Justice (2005): Conclusions regarding the 2005 Audit of the National Anti-corruption Directorate 
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highlighted the need to include within the Accession Treaty with Romania a safeguard 
clause that would postpone the envisaged date of accession by one year if there was clear 
evidence of serious risk that the country would be manifestly unprepared to meet the 
requirements of membership473.  However, we will focus more in the following sections on 
the EU’s strategy of gate-keeping and its effectiveness in creating momentum for the 
speeding of reform in Romania and Bulgaria. After having built a clearer and hopefully 
comprehensive image of the external permissive conditions – necessary, but insufficient on 
their own – for a critical juncture to occur at a national level, we turn to the domestic realm 
and trace back the conditions that set the stage for critical junctures to occur.  
 
4.4. Understanding the past, anticipating the future? 
 
This section will review the political and economic transition of the two countries and their 
course towards EU integration as it swayed between exclusion, differentiation and 
inclusion. The discussion will begin by briefly introducing the historical context and the 
enabling factors for the development and diffusion of cronyism during the early stages of 
democratic transition. This will provide us with a basis for understanding the 
inconsistencies of the early judicial reform and the hindrances that have delayed or even 
diluted the fight against corruption. In consonance with the theoretical framework 
discussed at the outset of this chapter we will outline the permissive and productive 
conditions for political change and argue that the manifestation of both types of conditions 
in 2005 in Romania’s case had generated a critical juncture of which effects we can identify 
at present. A contrario, the same critical moment was translated in Bulgaria’s case as a 
missed window of opportunity, the country continuing on a path of incremental 
institutional change in reforming its judiciary and controlling malfeasance.  
Democratic transition is considered by the transitologist literature as having been 
completed when a new government that is the result of free and popular vote conducted on 
the basis of commonly agreed political procedures comes to power and benefits of de facto 
authority to generate new policies, and when the legislative, executive and judicial branches 
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created by the new democracy do not have to share power with other bodies de jure474. As 
well as accommodating initiation by opposition groups (from below), democratic transition 
can also be facilitated by the authoritarian political elite in power (from above), or occur to 
that matter as a result of actions of both government and opposition groups475.  In the face 
of a larger wave of change in Central and Eastern Europe and a sense that the repression 
policies of the Communist regime would no longer work, in certain instances, the younger, 
less implicated leaders of what was to become the former regime became the first 
democrats, opening up to political competition early on in order to pre-empt the 
mobilisation and consolidation of opposition forces that could attenuate their dominance. 
Using the “palace coup”476 (more the case of Bulgaria as the political elites initiated and 
guided a peaceful transition, while in Romania events took a regretful violent turn) to their 
advantage, the new governing elites anticipated the potential challenge coming from the 
streets and shifted their policy objectives both externally, by adopting the ‘return to Europe’ 
discourse meant to secure them some international legitimacy and internally, by evoking 
feelings of nationalism in the public in order to gain the electoral support. However, the 
ramifications of this antagonistic strategy of seeking simultaneously European 
legitimization and domestic support whilst nurturing nationalistic tendencies translated 
into the pace and depth of the Europeanization process within the two countries. The costs 
of fostering the institutions pertaining to liberal democracies and the requirements of 
comprehensive economic reform were too high to bear as they ultimately converted into 
the context of political and market competition, privatization and liberalization, rule of law 
and freedom which would have severely constrained their rent-seeking practices and grasp 
of power. Hence, despite their democratic rhetoric, the non-opposition governments started 
crafting what Milada Vachudova called illiberal patterns of political change, wrapping 
democratic institutions, sabotaging economic reform and fostering intolerance in their 
efforts to concentrate and prolong their access to power477. 
The complex transition to democracy and to market economy in Central and Eastern 
Europe countries has generated favourable conditions for contradictions and setbacks such 
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as political, judicial and administrative corruption to cohabit along with political pluralism, 
institutional reform, the rule of law, privatisation, and the formation of a free civil society. 
Daniel Kaufmann and Paul Siegelbaum explain this paradox as “transition from the 
exploitation of power and access to goods and special perks, to the unchecked 
appropriation of wealth for private use”478. Whilst under the communist regime corruption 
in its different forms was “somewhat held in check by the discipline of the Communist Party, 
draconian anti-bribery laws and the rigidity of the overall system of itself”479, after the 
breakdown of the socialist system a normative, institutional and political vacuum was 
created which provided a fertile soil for a “general deterioration of values”, the 
establishment of a “moral wasteland”480 and the proliferation of clientelistic structures. In 
both countries, corruption under the communist regimes was largely shaped by the rigidity 
of the systems that encouraged the flourishing of nepotism as well as a series of cast 
privileges of which the top nomenklatura benefited. Along with the regime leaders and their 
families, the members of the highest echelons would gain substantially higher incomes (5-6 
times larger than the highest salary allowed by the official remuneration structure), reside 
in luxurious residences and have access to goods that were absent from the national 
markets481. Submitted to severe privations generated by an increasing inefficient command 
and planned economy, the majority of population in both countries started to engage in the 
bribery of the local nomenklatura and other state officials. The remarkable changes in the 
Soviet Union from the mid-1980s onwards embodied by Mikhail Gorbachev’s objective to 
humanise the communist system were met with strong opposition by both the Ceauşescu 
and the Zhivkov regime, as both dictators feared the unforeseen consequences upon the 
status quo of such “unrestrained openness of speech in the Soviet Union”482.  
However, this episode generated slightly distinct trajectories. In Bulgaria, behind the 
appearance of inertia, changes had been underway for several years, the most important 
being the regulations governing economic liberalisation promoted in the late 1980s that 
had planted the seeds both for the regime change and for the ‘smash and grab’ capitalism of 
                                                          
478 D. Kaufmann, P. Siegelbaum (1996): “Privatization and Corruption in Transition Economies”, Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 2, p. 424, pp. 419-58.  
479 Ibid., p. 423.  
480 See T. Verheijen, A. Dimitrova (1996): “Private Interests and Public Administration: the Central and East 
European Experience”, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 197-218.  
481 G. Boldur-Lăţescu (2004): The Communist Genocide in Romania (New York, Nova Science Publishers), p. 56.  
482 G. Fotev (1996): “Total Crisis and the Reorganization of Society”, in J. Coenen-Huther (ed.) Bulgaria at the 
Crossroads (New York, Nova Science Publishers), p. 17.  
151 
 
the post-communist transition in the 1990s483. Among the key officials involved in the 
preparation of these regulations was Andrei Lukanov, minister for foreign economic affairs 
from 1987 until 1989 and the country’s prime minister between February and December 
1990. Andrei Lukanov and the foreign minister (since 1972), Petur Mladenov were the most 
prominent members of the top nomenklatura who, realising that the communist system was 
dying, understood that through economic reform the communists could retain power484. 
The set of new rules was designed as a limited albeit reluctant Bulgarian version of the 
Soviet Perestroika485, and authorised the restructuring of state firms as anonymously 
owned and limited liability companies (decree no. 56/January 1989). Among the 
beneficiaries of this new legislative context that had enabled by September 1989 the 
establishment of nearly 5,520 private firms486 were numerous state officials and members 
of the economic intelligence services. Unfortunately, this move towards further relaxation of 
state authority also opened a window for fuzzy institutionalisation487 – where the 
boundaries between the state and economy, and the public and private spheres became 
unclear after the regime transition. Multigroup – Bulgaria’s largest business conglomerate 
up until the early 2000s – is one such case in point. Being established in Bulgaria in 1992 by 
Multigroup International Holding – the parent company set up in 1990 in Lichtenstein, the 
entity has developed throughout the country’s transition period through political and 
informal power wielding. In the years after 1989, it saw a steady flow of personnel from the 
state administration (the Bulgarian National Bank, the Privatisation Agency, and the 
National Electric Company among others) to its managerial positions, it quickly obtained 
the status of preferred business associate of various state-owned enterprises, and even 
gained control of their majority during the early phases of privatisation, including in its 
portfolio 120 Bulgarian companies from sectors such as metallurgy, mining, engineering, 
petrochemicals, and distribution of natural gas. However, as Ganev’s detailed analysis of 
Multigroup’s rise observes “the profits of the private conglomerate [have been] inevitably 
                                                          
483 B. Quirke (2015): “EU Fraud and New Member States – A Success Story? The Case of Bulgaria”, in J. Van Erp, 
W. Huisman, G. Vande Walle (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime in Europe 
(Oxon, Routledge), p. 233.  
484 R. Kaplan (1998): “Hoods against Democrats”, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 282, No. 6, pp. 32-36.   
485 For a more extensive discussion of the set of policies see V. Paraskevov (2012): “The Decline of Socialism in 
Bulgaria: Mikhail Gorbachev, Todor Zhivkov and Soviet Peretroika, 1985-1989”, Socialist History, Vol. 42, pp. 25-
42.  
486 N. Ragaru (2010): “Forging Capitalism: A Bulgarian Case-Study”, in J-L. Briquet, G. Favarel-Garrigues (eds.) 
Organized Crime and States. The Hidden Face of Politics (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan), p. 121.  
487 W. Outhwaite, L. Ray (2005): Social Theory and Postcommunism (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing), p. 80.  
152 
 
accompanied by loses for its state-owned partners”488. Described as having a “Mafia 
structure”, Multigroup’s activity has been criticised throughout time by the national media 
as ranging from contraband to rent-extracting schemes such as the Topenergy affair in 1995 
which resulted in Bulgaria finding itself buying the most expensive natural gas in Europe 
after the highly disadvantageous governmental decision of granting Multigroup almost 
exclusivity in the distribution of natural gas on the domestic market489. Thus privatisation, 
whose foundations had been laid earlier than in Romania’s case, had been quickly 
transformed into a mechanism through which the threatened apparatchiks could lock in 
power by organising themselves into oligarchical groupings.   
The strategy followed by Romania in the last decade of communism was somewhat 
different. In the context of totalitarian decay, Bulgaria experienced what Linz and Stepan 
identify as post-totalitarianism or the phase where the official ideology becomes more 
isolated from society, while ideological commitment of the party officials weakens490.  
Ceauşescu’s regime hindered the installation of this phase as it turned to a sultanistic 
complement in order to preserve the authoritarian backbone of the regime. This translated 
into dynastic socialism and a policy of elite rotation, whereby members from the higher 
echelons would be periodically reassigned to new state or party positions in order to 
prevent any potential rise of dissidents. These two traits of the Romanian communist 
regime thwarted the development of individual expertise and severely impacted upon the 
economic policy of the 1980s491.  The characteristics of the regime also had overwhelming 
effects on the emergence of the opposition: within the party, it remained clandestine and 
concentrated on toppling the Secretary General, rather than on reforming the system492. The 
severity of the regime, the pauperisation and shortages created by economic 
mismanagement and the drive to rapidly reimburse a foreign debt that amounted to $ 11.4 
billion at the end of 1981 created a fertile ground for the proliferation of corruption. 
Members of the state apparatus, especially officials from the Department of State Security – 
either being affected by the harsh economic situation of the late 1980s or looking to secure 
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the accumulated wealth started to secretly amass hard currency in foreign bank accounts493. 
As they transitioned to the new governance system and market economy, the former 
communist elite made use of “insider knowledge, political power, and control over state 
resources (...) to privatize their personal control over the economy, and, increasingly, over 
the polity by bankrolling a variety of political parties of all ideologies”494.  
Whilst corruption cannot be regarded as being the attribute of a certain political system or 
development stage, the first half of the 1990s displayed a variety of forms of cronyism 
expanding to multiple governance levels. In the case of Bulgaria, the first phase of 
democratic transition, which entailed the dismantling of communist structures, was marked 
by a deep enculturation of corruption that undermined the people’s trust in public 
institutions. A series of practices such as the draining and subsequent collapse of state and 
commercial banks with the tacit participation of officials, the lucrative takeovers of 
profitable activities from state-owned enterprises by private companies followed by the 
accumulation of losses for the state, the non-transparent privatization deals marked by 
opaque methods of divestiture, the participation of public officials in smuggling schemes 
(trafficking of drugs and weapons and the smuggling of commercial goods) and the 
questionable public procurements inhibited the pace and depth of the transition process 
towards a market economy in Bulgaria495. In Romania, the option for a non-standard means 
of privatization, which in a first phase took the form of manager employee buyout schemes 
meant to give citizen part of the ownership and control of firms (70% of any commercial 
firm was initially owned by the State Ownership Agency and 30% by the Private Ownership 
Agency which was designed to administrate private owned vouchers distributed by the 
state to the population) resulted in paving the way for a number of controversial political 
figures and mafia-type individuals for managerial roles in the still few business firms that 
were being privatised. This state of affairs developed on the background of a slow pace of 
privatisation that was not generated by an overall political unwillingness towards the 
process itself, but by a reluctance to undertake such changes that wouldn’t bring benefits to 
various politically affiliated interest groups.   
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In the following sections we will look at the pre-accession reform track-records of the 
Romanian and Bulgarian administrations in order to sustain our hypothesis that the EU’s 
decision to introduce a postponement clause in the Accession Treaty, coupled with the 
presence of national change entrepreneurs set the stage for a critical juncture in Romania’s 
case. The absence of productive conditions in Bulgaria during this timeframe – understood 
in this study case as domestic reformers – meant that the conditions for a critical juncture to 
occur were insufficient, Bulgaria experiencing a missed opportunity for substantial change.  
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter the presence of permissive conditions, while 
necessary, they are insufficient for the emergence of a critical juncture.  
4.5. The Transition to Democracy. The Long Road Back to Europe.    
4.5.1. Bulgaria’s pre-accession story 
 
Both in the case of Romania and of Bulgaria the path for transition towards democracy and 
political, institutional and economic consolidation was marked by the control of the 
reformist sector of the Communist power establishment496. By agreeing to give up their 
monopoly on power, the ex-communist parties in both countries targeted the securing of 
the first free elections, aim which was reachable as a result of a clear resource asymmetry 
that was to the detriment of the opposition, as well as a more stable structure as political 
organisations. In Bulgaria, opposition groups were slow to emerge during the communist 
regime, with the environmental Ekoglasnost and the Club in Support of Glasnost and 
Perestroika in Bulgaria being the most prominent movements. However, the biggest 
challenge came from the Turkish minority which, after being subject to a gradual 
assimilation campaign that culminated in 1985 with the imposition of Bulgarian equivalent 
names and surnames (the policy of Regenerative Process), coagulated under the Turkish 
National Liberation Movement that responded to discrimination by staging public protests. 
As a consequence of the sometimes violent stifling and the “encouragement” by the state of 
the ethnic group to “choose their homeland”, over 300,000 ethnic Turks left the country. 
This episode coupled with the intra-party opposition that had been brewing since the mid-
1980s as a result of the hardliner Todor Zhivkov’s conservative stance towards perestroika 
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provided the context for his engineered resignation in November 1989497. The party 
leadership went to Petur Mladenov – former foreign minister who was elected by the 
parliament in March 1990 as president of the republic, while Andrei Lukanov, his partner in 
the reformist wing of the BCP, was appointed as prime minister in February 1990498. 
In early December 1989, an umbrella organization reuniting most opposition groups 
emerged under the name of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) being led by Zheliu 
Zhelev, an academic philosopher who had incurred the displeasure of the old regime. 
Despite the ideological diversity, the different factions shared a common principle: they 
weren’t prepared to play the role of satellites to the Communist Party, even in its reformed 
version. As such, the UDF was able to marshal substantial public support which translated 
into the 14 December 1989 protest in Sofia that called for the abolition of article one of the 
Constitution that guaranteed the Communist Party a leading role in the state and society. In 
the face of popular discontent, national Round Table Talks with the official authorities were 
held in January-May 1990 and fourteen of the groups that came under the UDF became part 
of the delegation representing opposition forces. In terms of the strategies pursued and the 
long-term goals of the main two political structures, Kolarova and Dimitrov observe that the 
Bulgarian Communist Party that became at the beginning of 1990 the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) sought to preserve as many financial and organizational resources as possible 
by preventing the expropriation of party property and by continuing to exert some control 
over the local government and the state enterprises499.  Being a temporary coalition that 
reunited parties with political platforms ranging from social democratic to conservative, the 
UDF had essentially a single common goal:  to consolidate and oust the Communist Party 
from its dominant position in order for all parties to compete on an equal basis. 
The purpose of Round Table Talks that were thus designed as a two-sided forum between 
the UDF and the BSP was to lay the foundation for the development of a democratic regime. 
As such, it targeted agreement over the date of the first elections, the elimination of 
communist organizations in the workplace, the de-politicisation of the army, police, courts 
and state administration, the amending of the constitution and introduction of a new 
electoral law (the former two points being negotiated at the second round that began in 
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March). The main document of the Round Table, which established the principles guiding 
the future political system was agreed upon in March 1990 and represented the first 
expression of national consensus. It called for the establishment of a political system based 
on the enforcement and protection of all internationally recognised human rights and 
freedoms, the separation of powers, and the rule by the majority with guaranteed rights of 
political expression and accountability of all public officials to the people. It included 
concrete provisions regarding the Constitution of 1971, outlined the organisation of 
competitive elections in a framework of a multiparty system and it set the mandate of a 
Constitutional Grand National Assembly composed of 400 members and with an 18 months 
tenure that was to redesign the country’s political system500. Elections were held in June 
1990 and due to the fractious nature of opposition, the BSP secured a slim majority of 211 
seats, the rest being split between the UDF who received 144 mandates, the Turkish 
Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) with 23, and the Bulgarian Agrarian National 
Union (BANU) with 16. Andrei Lukanov was reconfirmed as prime minister and after 
Mladenov’s resignation amidst continuous protests, the Grand National Assembly selected 
Zheliu Zhelev as president in accordance with the pre-Constitution electoral rule501.  
However, in the context of a political impasse generated by disagreement over economic 
reforms, Lukanov was forced to resign following mass protests in November 1990, and a 
caretaker government comprising BSP, UDF and BANU ministers was agreed upon and was 
led by Dimitar Iliev Popov, a politically independent judge.  But political instability 
continued to plague the country, the period between November 1989 and the end of 1997 
seeing four parliamentary elections and eight changes of government, the BSP and UDF 
alternating at power. The first elections for the National Assembly under the new political 
system were held in October 1991, with the UDF winning 110 seats, the BSP – running 
together with four other parties – taking 106 mandates, and the MRF, the other party to 
meet the 4 percent vote threshold, gaining 24 seats. The Assembly named Filip Dimitrov, 
UDF’s leader as Prime Minister, but as MRF, the party on whom he relied for parliamentary 
majority declined to enter a governing coalition and with incessant hostility between him 
and re-elected President Zhelev producing hiatus, his government was to stay in office for 
just under a year. The Dimitrov government also faced internal splits over the pace of 
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economic reform (especially over privatisation of state enterprises and farms and 
restitution of properties)502, and as inflation and unemployment rose, affecting especially 
the Turkish rural population, the MRF lead by leader Ahmed Dogan joined the BSP in a vote 
of no confidence that subsequently lead to the fall of the government. If at the national level, 
the UDF government had alienated popular support pursuing a crash programme of 
economic reform, externally it managed to mark a turning point: it engaged in intense 
diplomatic activity, securing in May 1992 Bulgaria’s entry into the Council of Europe and 
undertaking negotiations for the European Association Agreement in December 1992503.  As 
attempts to build a new government failed, the MRF proposed the option of an 
‘administration of experts’ (implying a non-partisan, technocratic approach to governing) 
led by President Zhelev’s economic adviser, Lyuben Berov504. A loose alliance between MRF 
and BSP was formed, gaining the approval of the National Assembly and surviving until 
September 1994. 
Despite initial delays of the constitutional committee proceedings, either encouraged by the 
BSP in order to postpone the following round of elections505, or triggered by the UDF 
hardliners (‘Dark Blues’ or the right wing of the heterogeneous coalition) who opposed a 
constitutional draft largely proposed by the Socialists, the new fundamental law was 
adopted on the 12th of July 1991, after effectively four months of debate. The 1991 
Constitution started off with its share of ambiguities and deficiencies that were epitomised 
by virulent clashes between the three branches of power, the institutional balances between 
the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers (embodying Bulgaria’s government) 
and the judicial branch (with its self-administration organ embodied by the Supreme 
Judicial Council) being early matters of contention506. However, it incorporated the 
principles of popular sovereignty (article 1), rule of law (article 4 providing an extensive 
understanding of the concept that reflects not only the formal, but also the material 
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substance of the principle507), separation of state powers (article 8), political pluralism 
(article 11), and fundamental rights and freedoms in accordance with internationally 
recognised standards (Chapter II). As the neo-communist dominated National Assembly 
was primarily concerned by potential attempts of future opposition governments at the 
exploitation of the judicial system as a tool for ‘de-Communisation’ of the state, the 
constitutional design of the judiciary was aimed at theoretically insulating it from political 
influence.  
As such, the 1991 Constitution provided for a tripartite judiciary comprising judges, state 
prosecutors, and state investigators (charged with the preliminary investigation of penal 
matters) that benefits of financial, organisational, personal, and regulatory independence 
from the other two branches of power. The inclusion of the pre-trial investigation and the 
prosecution in the judiciary were preferred in order to assure a high degree of insulation of 
the Bulgarian judiciary from the other branches of the government. Among European 
countries, only Italy and Croatia displayed similar unified institutional setups. The 
Constitution established the institutional foundation for judicial review as well, basing it on 
Western European models, with a Constitutional Court not incorporated by the judicial 
branch, consisting of twelve justices (with a nine year term with no removal), elected in a 
modified French fashion: one-third by the national assembly, one-third by the president, 
and one-third by the Supreme Court, changing after 1997 to a joint appointment by the 
justices of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court508. The 
functions with which the Court was vested were established as two-fold: firstly, to offer 
authoritative and binding interpretations of the Constitution, and secondly to evaluate post-
promulgation the consistency with the Constitution of laws passed by the Parliament and 
Presidential decrees. With no historical experience with constitutional adjudication, the 
establishment of the Court (only months after the Great National Assembly adopted the 
Constitution) was a radical innovation in Bulgaria’s case, even if when considering the 
potential measures that would ensure the independence of the judiciary in the state, some 
academics consider a priori judicial review, whereby parties are allowed to challenge the 
                                                          
507 Article 4 emphasises a democratic construction based on legitimacy, popular sovereignty, institutional 
predictability, equality, justice and human dignity and its functioning is secured through political responsibility 
and civic culture.  
508 R. Ludwikowski (1996): Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance (Durham, Duke 
University Press), p. 116.   
159 
 
constitutionality of statutes and decrees prior to their application, as offering courts real 
power in affecting policy509.  
Life tenure was awarded to all members of the judiciary upon completing a third year in 
office, the possibility of being relieved of one’s duties before the end of one’s term being 
made possible only for a limited number of situations: retirement, the enforcement of a 
prison sentence, or as a result of a disability lasting more than a year. The same type of 
immunity that Members of the Parliament benefited from was extended to judges, 
prosecutors and investigative magistrates who were immune from detention or criminal 
prosecution except perpetration of grave crimes. Moreover, the administrative control of 
the justice apparatus was not entrusted with the Ministry of Justice - restricted to 
elaborating the law, but rather to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), institution inspired by 
the 1958 French Constitution and the Spanish and Italian models510, but with a historical 
precedent in 1910 in the consultative body for personnel policy of the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Justice. After a long political struggle between the BSP and UDF for domination in this 
governing body with a wide scope of authority, the Supreme Judicial Council Act was 
adopted in 1991. In order to ensure the organisational independence of the judiciary, the 
SJC was thus entrusted with the governance and management of the judicial branch, having 
as responsibilities the promotion, demotion, reassignment and dismissal of judges, 
prosecutors and investigative magistrates. With the judicial reform of 1994 the SJC was also 
conferred the responsibility of preparing and submitting for approval to the National 
Assembly the annual budget for the judicial branch and the appointment.  
The configuration of the SJC included 25 members, legal practitioners with at least 15 years 
of judicial experience. The presidents of the two Supreme Courts – Administrative and 
Cassation – as well as the Prosecutor General are appointed to the SJC ex officio. Eleven 
members were elected through simple majority by the National Assembly (the so-called 
Parliament College/quota), and the remaining 11 members were elected from the judiciary: 
five by judges, three by prosecutors, and three by investigative magistrates. The elected 
members of the SJC were assigned 5 years terms, not being eligible for immediate re-
election. The latter professional quota which was fixed through law in 1991 became a point 
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of dissention for the magistracy, being modified several times, firstly in 1998, when the 
representation for judges increased to six and that of the investigative magistrates lowered 
to two (6-3-2), and finally being established in 2007 to six representatives of judges, four 
prosecutors and one investigative magistrate. The Minister of Justice was designated to 
chair the meetings of the SJC, but without voting rights. But, while the SJC was given 
considerable governance powers over the judicial system, having authority not only over 
professional development matters, but also over a broad range of administrative 
determinations (such as fixing the number of judges and supporting personnel in courts, 
setting judges’ remuneration), the technical and material capabilities of the body were still 
limited and the degree of insulation from the other state powers was to a certain extent 
questionable. As the SJC’s membership included among representatives of judges, 
prosecutors, and investigators, elected out of their own ranks, it also comprised members 
elected by the Parliament, which have regularly reflected the political majority. Moreover, 
as observed by an Open Society report, the conflicting interests of judges, prosecutors and 
investigators have often limited the ability of the SJC to provide consistent management, 
over the years a clear voting pattern emerging with judges and prosecutors opposing each 
other (especially on distribution of funds) and investigators changing sides depending on 
the political context511. In addition, the report questioned the extent of internal 
independence of the judiciary in Bulgaria when prosecutors, who are members of the 
magistracy according to the Constitution, would have the right to decide on issues of 
appointment, promotion and disciplining of judges through their representatives on the 
Supreme Judicial Council. Also, as the government was held politically responsible for 
successfully tackling crime and has thus had a clear interest in establishing some control 
over investigation and prosecution in order to carry out consistent policies, it has passed 
legislation replacing the SJC before its constitutionally mandated five-year term had expired 
(in 1992, 1996 and 1998). This direct political intervention was deemed by the report as 
creating disincentives for the SJC members to take principled positions at odds with the 
interests of the Government in power, even if those interests were detrimental to the 
professional development of the judiciary512.    
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While the Constitution and the Judicial System Act of 1994 provided for an impressive 
accumulation of institutional safeguards protecting the independence of the judicial system, 
international evaluations revealed a different situation in situ.  A World Bank report513 
noted that while the SJC had a broad-base administrative mandate, it lacked the resources 
and capacities to execute its functions. As such, while determination of staffing levels within 
the judiciary ultimately rested with the SJC, the institution could not produce any systematic 
assessment of the existent needs as it was dependent on input from presiding judges, the 
Chief Prosecutor and the National Investigative Service. This in turn meant that staffing 
requests largely depended on the personal assessment of presiding judges or other 
supervisors and inevitably on their local connections. Moreover, the SJC had not set a 
cohesive policy for the promotion of judges, prosecutors and investigators was set, relying 
again on court presidents to report disciplinary matters. While an inspectorate function was 
carried out by the Ministry of Justice, this function was not directly connected to the review 
of disciplinary matters. The result translated into the absence of referrals to the SJC and 
overall a judiciary deprived of any form of review for internal corruption matters.  
In the absence of a strong political backing, the Berov government failed to implement 
structural reform, following a mix of successive indexations of pensions and wages based on 
the rate of inflation (that had reached 64% in 1993)514, sluggish privatisation515, and more 
dramatically what Dimitrov termed as a process of mafiotisation of the economy, whereby 
the government allowed itself “to be taken over by shadowy conglomerates which operated 
on the unclear boundary between the state and the private sector and combined the 
interests of state enterprise directors, private commercial firms, criminal bosses and 
corrupt state officials”516. Criminal activity surged, especially in the form of racketeering 
and illegal trafficking (notably during the years of the embargo on Yugoslavia in connection 
with the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina), while the Berov government failed to take the 
necessary measures to curb the phenomenon and a weak judiciary, facing substantial 
problems related to large caseloads, inadequate training possibilities and lacking an 
internal professional assessment system, failed to prosecute and try crime.  Some reports 
had pointed to the implication of state agencies in illegal fuel trafficking, arguing that the 
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high number of illegal large transactions destined for Yugoslavia and the soaring losses 
made to the state treasury (an official estimation of $ 250 million loss in revenues during 
the first embargo) would have otherwise been impossible without the involvement of state 
institutions and people from the highest ranks of power517. However, no substantial 
investigations were ever launched.  
Moreover, serious threats to the constitutional order occurred within this period, 
culminating with the passage of the Law on Judicial Power in 1994 that introduced new 
eligibility standards (requirement of five years of legal experience) for the country’s top 
judgeships. As Ganev observes, the new standards “which were crafted so as to eliminate all 
jurists appointed after 1989, were to result in the immediate dismissal of any judge who did 
not qualify”518.  Among the targets of this proposal were the Chief Prosecutor, Ivan 
Tatarchev, and chairman of the Supreme Court, Ivan Grigorov, both open UDF supporters519.  
The Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional all the provisions that gave retroactive 
force of the law and stroked down a section that was authorising the parliament to dismiss 
judges if they undermined the prestige of the judicial power520.  In the context of economic 
stagnation and rising crime, the Berov government eventually fell in September 1994, being 
replaced by a caretaker administration under Reneta Indzhova.  
The December 1994 elections confirmed BSP to power, the party securing 52 percent of the 
popular vote and 125 parliamentary seats, while the UDF gaining only 28.6 percent and 69 
mandates. Together with the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union and the Political Club 
Ecogalsnost, the BSP formed the new government under the leadership of hard-liner Zhan 
Videnov, BSP leader between 1991 and 1996521. While Videnov announced in his inaugural 
speech that his administration would follow a governing program designed to revive the 
economy, curb crime and pursue integration into the EU, during his mandate Bulgaria faced 
one of the harshest economic crises fuelled by the snail’s pace in restructuring the still 
state-dominated economy and even attempts to reverse the effects of the 1991 land 
legislation and reintroduce collectivisation for farmers522. In this latter case, at the referral 
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of President Zhelev, the Constitutional Court struck down the collectivisation amendments 
as they infringed private-property rights. The government’s foreign affairs agenda looked 
different from the initial plans, Videnov having no intention for Bulgaria to join NATO and 
pursuing instead a reconsolidation of the country’s relations with Russia.  Although Videnov 
was not directly involved in corruption scandals, the entire government was accused not 
only of tolerating corruption, but taking part: 
“Despite warnings from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that the 
economy was collapsing, the Videnov Government sat by as state industries were stripped 
of their assets by economic groups allied to the Socialist Party.”523 
“The Bulgarian Socialist Party (...) has balked at undertaking market reforms, and many of 
its leaders have been under fire from a parliamentary corruption commission for allowing 
politically connected banks to drain the country’s hard currency reserves.”524 
The Vitosha affair during Videnov’s administration highlighted best the nexus between 
corruption, the political system and the economy: state banks such as the Bank for 
Agricultural Credit ‘Vitosha’ became vulnerable to collapse due to the numerous non-
performing loans given preferentially to economic groups – made up of members of the 
former nomenklatura and security officers with close links to the government. Organised 
crime and contract killings surged, one of the most resonating cases being the assassination 
of former Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov in October 1996. His death was veiled in 
controversy as Lukanov was allegedly preparing to disclose proof of large-scale 
misappropriation of public funds, especially through Topenergy – a lucrative Bulgarian-
Russian joint venture that supplied Russian gas to the Balkan Peninsula through Bulgaria525 
and from which Lukanov was removed as chair a few months before his death526. As the 
crisis deepened and more banks were placed under the supervision of the Bulgarian 
National Bank due to the pressure of credits given to insolvent enterprises, the IMF 
announced the freezing of a $582 million loan that Bulgaria desperately needed as its 
inflation spiralled in 1996 to circa 500 percent527. The failure to pursue reform measures 
soon led to a rapid downturn of living standards, and public reaction to the growing crisis 
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did not fail to manifest itself, large demonstrations being organised in Sofia in June 1996. 
Public anger was also expressed during the November 1996 presidential elections, with the 
BSP candidate losing the race to the UDF supported Petur Stoyanov. Soon after, following 
BSP internal disputes over the formation of a new administration under a new leader, 
Videnov stepped down as Prime Minister and as leader of the party. Meanwhile, despite 
several internal splits, the UDF regained its popular support by promoting a pro-reform 
agenda and differentiating itself as the most credible centre-right force. The newly sworn-in 
president called for early parliamentary elections to be organised in April 1997 and, after 
reaching an agreement with the BSP not to form a new government under the Socialist’s 
mandate, appointed in February Stefan Sofianski – popular and charismatic UDF mayor of 
Sofia – as caretaker Prime Minister. The UDF, participating at the 1997 parliamentary 
elections as part of a broad coalition that included the right-of-centre People’s Union (an 
alliance between the Democratic Party and the Agrarian Party), won 137 of the 240 
parliamentary seats, securing an absolute majority of 52.3 percent of the vote. The BSP 
secured only 58 seats and MRF 19 mandates. The new appointed government that became 
the first post-communist administration to run its full constitutional term of four years, was 
headed by UDF chairman Ivan Kostov, who put forward a governing programme targeting 
the stabilisation of the economy, combating corruption and crime, and pursuing Euro-
Atlantic integration. On this latter priority, one of the most notable successes was achieved 
during the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, when the EU extended the 
invitation to Bulgaria and Romania to open negotiations for membership in March 2000. 
This achievement came at a cost, as the European Commission conditioned the start of the 
accession negotiations to the government’ agreement to decommission two of the 
environmentally hazardous Kozloduy nuclear plant by 2002 and the following two by 
2006528. It is also during this period that we witness a differentiation of the pace of reform 
between Romania and Bulgaria which translated both in better quality of governance and 
better control of corruption in the latter’s case. To a certain extent, the severe economic 
crisis in Bulgaria, coupled with the consolidation of the UDF – which had become a strongly 
programmatic party headed by a competent leadership529, and the clarification of the EU’s 
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accession strategy towards candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe created a 
critical juncture that generated the premises for reform. The gap created between Romania 
and Bulgaria was to be closed in the period 2005-2006, when as we will argue Romania 
found itself at a critical juncture, with effects that have reverberated to the present.  
 
 
Figure 3 Government Effectiveness 1996 – 2006 
Source: World Bank - Worlwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The Governance Effectiveness indicator captures 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its degree of independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. The indicator is measured on a scale of -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (better governance).  
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Figure 4 Control of Corruption 1996 – 2006 
Source: World Bank - Worlwide Governance Indicators (WGI). WGI reports aggregate and individual indicators 
for 215 economies for six dimensions of governance. The Control of Corruption indicator captures perceptions 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as capture of the state by elutes and private interests. The indicator is measured on a scale of      -2.5 (worst) to 
+2.5 (better control).   
 
The first steps taken to reverse the effects of the crisis came after consultations with the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the government launching a stabilisation 
programme that lifted price controls, introduced a currency board in June 1997, and pegged 
the national currency (the Lev) to the German mark and after 1999 to the Euro. A new wave 
of privatisations was launched in January 1999, this time Bulgaria seeking to sell large loss-
making state enterprises, as recommended by the IMF. However, studies conducted by 
national think tanks such as the Centre for the Study of Democracy underlined that 
throughout the period between 1997 and 2004 privatisation was still conducted in a non-
transparent manner, with numerous and frequent changes to the legislation and 
negotiations with potential buyers remaining the preferred method of selling, while more 
transparent mechanisms such as competitive auctions and stock exchange were largely 
ignored530.  This in turn opened the door to subjective criteria and corrupt practices to 
proliferate.  
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Nonetheless, as Rose-Ackerman observes, “in countries where the public fiscal system and 
the profitability of business have been undermined by corruption (...) economic crises can 
provide a catalyst for anti-corruption policies as well as economic adjustment”531. In 
Bulgaria’s case the alarming high inflation and its effects upon the population prompted the 
new government to pursue not only an economic stabilisation programme, but also 
initiatives at curbing corruption. In its “Bulgaria 2001” governing programme, the 
administration reiterated its commitment to preparing Bulgaria’s membership in the EU by 
bringing the country’s laws and institutions in line with European standards, strengthening 
public institutions and developing appropriate mechanisms for combating and eliminating 
opportunities for corruption and crime. Initial concrete steps to tackle corruption were 
made in the context of public-private partnerships between national NGOs such as 
Transparency International and Coalition 2000 and the government, the former developing 
studies on the phenomenon of corruption and forwarding recommendations for the latter 
to improve its transparency and reduce malfeasance. A strategy for combating organised 
crime was adopted in 1998, the Public Register Law was passed in 2000 introducing the 
requirement for officials to declare their assets, incomes and expenses to the National Audit 
Office, the Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption were signed and by 1999 the 
country was part of the Council of Europe’s GRECO initiative. Substantial modifications to 
the civil and penal procedural codes were made in order to increase the speed of court 
proceedings, and progress was achieved in the area of legal training with the creation in 
1999 of the Magistrate Training Centre (although the MTC was an association and not a 
public institution).  Moreover, the new cooperative relationship between the government 
and President Stoyanov encouraged a more meritocratic approach to governance that 
transpired in the context of a series of corruption scandals involving members of the 
government.  As such, at the request of the President, Kostov dismissed half of his cabinet 
after allegations of corruption arose. The government also sought the assistance of the 
World Bank and USAID in designing and implementing policies for the judicial branch and 
benefited in October 1998 of a joint mission of the two international donors that diagnosed 
the deficiencies, dysfunctions and needs of the justice system532. The report recommended 
increasing the SJC’s financial, material and human resources to enable it to exercise its 
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authority as provided by the Constitution and the Judicial System Act, and pointed out 
several problems in the recruitment and professional advancement of magistrates, as well 
as the reduced opportunities for general and specialised training. The introduction of a 
computerised system of managing court files was seen as mandatory to limit the backlog 
and improve transparency, instituting statistical evaluation of individual and collective 
activity. The document highlighted the need to change the immunity law applying to 
magistrates, to substantially increase their remuneration and create a mechanism of 
verification of assets and incomes. The extent to which the government responded to these 
issues was however quite limited, the European Commission observing in its Regular 
Report in 2000 that while the budget for operating expenditure was raised for most 
government branches, the budget for the judiciary received a relatively minor increase, 
judges continued to be appointed to particular courts by the SJC upon suggestion of the 
presidents of courts, and no progress was registered in developing a compulsory training 
system for magistrates (neither upon entry into the profession, nor whilst holding office). 
533. In response to the European Commission’s observations regarding the lack of efficiency 
and transparency in the handling of cases by magistrates, a series of amendments to the 
Criminal Procedure Code were introduced in 2000 in order to remove unnecessary 
formalities during the preliminary investigation (such as passing this stage to the police for 
all cases of minor importance) and the three-instance judicial proceedings system (first 
instance, second instance and cassation) as provided by the Constitution was introduced in 
1999.  
But the credibility of the government was profoundly affected by the alarmingly large 
number of malfeasance accusations, as well as the subjects of the claims. Cases such as that 
of Alexnader Bozhkov, the country’s Chief Negotiator with the EU, who was forced to leave 
office after a judicial inquiry into his activities pointed to financial irregularities and false 
documents534 cast a shadow over the government’s adherence to the fight against 
corruption. Even the Prime Minister’s wife, Elena Kostova, did not escape corruption 
accusations, a Bulgarian socialist newspaper, Trud (Labour) pointing to a donation of 
$80.000 made to her charity by Russian businessmen with reported ties to organised 
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crime535. Following this allegation, the Russian donors stated that their political 
involvement did not stop there, confessing to transferring substantial sums on a monthly 
basis to the ruling party536. If corrupt practices before 1997 bore the mark of cronyism – a 
mode of distribution of favours based on clientelism and/or personal relationships with 
regime officials –, after this point a shift could be observed towards competitive rent-
seeking, “whereby market opportunities are allocated to the highest bidders and thus 
ultimately benefit a wide spectrum of interest groups”537.  Thus, as the government was in 
essence dependent on the support of powerful economic networks, and despite the 
legislative changes put in place to limit the opportunities for malfeasance (for example the 
Law on Administration – 1998; the Law on Civil Servants – 1999; the Law on Property 
Disclosure by Persons Occupying Senior Positions in the State – 2000; the Code of Tax 
Procedure – 2000; Law on Public procurement - 1999), high-level corruption in politics and 
administration was tolerated, and the often illegal connections between politics and 
economics, while changing form from cronyism to competitive rent-seeking, remained in 
place. But what the UDF had proven during 1997-2001 was best summed up by Ganev:  
“The fact that some UDF officials were corrupt should not obscure an even more central 
fact: While corruption was not eliminated under the UDF, it was ‘sublimated’ into a state-
building effort.”538 
But, in the context of stagnant living standards and offering no strategic approach to 
curbing corruption (although the need for an anti-corruption national strategy had been 
expressed both by national think tanks and in the European Commission’s Regular 
Reports539), shortcoming which also impeded progress in the accession negotiations with 
Brussels, support for the Kostov government withered away and left widespread public 
disillusionment which was capitalised unapologetically by a new challenger to both the UDF 
and the BSP: the former monarch Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha II, who had been exiled by the 
Communist regime and had returned to Bulgaria in April the same year to form his National 
Movement Simeon II (NMS II).  
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The June 2001 elections thus brought to power the new political formation that managed to 
gain 43.4 percent of votes and 120 seats, the UDF securing 51 mandates, the BSP 84 and the 
MRF 21 seats. With the support of the MRF, Simeon II was appointed at Prime Minister by 
the National Assembly, leading a cabinet formed in majority of members with no previous 
political experience. The NMS II’s proposed platform had three main objectives to be 
achieved in 800 days: to end political partisanship and bring more ethics into politics, to 
eliminate corruption, and to pursue immediate and qualitative reform in order to bring 
Bulgaria’s economy in line with EU standards540.  But while the initial platform was 
dominated by populist promises and vague objectives, the actual governing programme 
benefitted of the expertise of Western-trained economists and bankers who intended to 
follow a similar neo-liberal reform programme to that pursued by the UDF (including tax-
cuts on businesses, increase privatisation, target public-spending cuts and substantially 
lowering public borrowing), but at a faster pace and in a more transparent manner. 
Likewise, achieving substantial progress towards EU integration, obtaining membership of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), decreasing crime rates and eliminating 
corruption were also put forward as priorities to be fulfilled within the 800 days of 
governance. NATO membership proved to be a slightly easier task to achieve compared to 
EU membership and the extensive requirements attached to it. The country’s conduct 
during the Kosovo crisis (granting NATO use of its air space) and its participation in the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, corroborated by the government’s effort to modernise its 
military forces paved the way for its invitation to join NATO ranks during the Prague 
Conference in 2002. The road to EU accession required sustained efforts to reach the 
standards of a functioning market economy, and in its 2001 Regular Report the European 
Commission deemed Bulgaria as “close to being a functioning market economy”541 despite 
the previous government’s efforts, with the high inflation rate, insufficient investment, 
deficiencies in the land market, administrative obstacles to private sector development and 
a problematic judicial system being identified as the shortcomings that needed to be 
tackled. If in the case of the Copenhagen economic criteria, the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 
government managed to achieve successes quite early on (the criteria being considered as 
met in 2002), by largely continuing the same policy lines as his predecessor and securing 
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real progress in term of substantial increase in state and custom revenues, lower 
unemployment rates, declining inflation, sustained GDP growth, meeting the political 
Copenhagen criteria was not as in sight as the Prime Minister initially declared it. While 
substantial normative and institutional changes had been introduced (the adoption of the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy, the introduction of the Standing Anti-Corruption 
Committee within the National Assembly with the task of preparing reasoned opinions to 
suggest amendments to anti-corruption legislation in order to improve its effectiveness; and 
the setting up of the Anti-Corruption Coordination Commission within the Council of 
Ministers with the task of coordinating the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy), a protracted confrontation between the government and the judiciary over 
amendments to the Judiciary System Act (and hence the organisation of the branch) 
hampered the pace of reforms that the European Commission required. A 2005 evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption bodies created during the NMS II administration 
revealed that while the Standing Anti-Corruption Committee of the National Assembly made 
efforts to establish cooperation with NGOs and various anti-corruption initiatives, it fell 
short of realising its stated intention of analysing corrupt practices and the legal or factual 
grounds from which they emerge, and initiate the legislative measures required in 
response542. Moreover, interim fact-finding committees set up by the National Assembly to 
explore existing suspicions of corruption and abuse by government officials were primarily 
used for political attacks, thus failing to hit their targets and fulfil their tasks, a relevant 
example provided here being the committee set up to check the distribution of PHARE and 
ISPA instruments by the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works. The lack of 
efficiency in dealing with suspicions over mismanagement of funds reached its pinnacle in 
2008, when an investigation carried out by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) showing 
a worrisome mishandling of EU funds led the European Commission to withhold €220 
million of pre-accession funding (PHARE), freeze €300 million of post-accession funding in 
November 2008543, and withdraw the accreditation of two government agencies charged 
with disbursing EU money for failing to guarantee sound and transparent management of 
funds (the Central Finance and Contracting Unit and the Implementing Agency at the 
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Work).  The Anti-Corruption Coordination 
Commission created within the executive branch and chaired by the Minister of Justice in 
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order to collect, analyse and summarise information about anti-corruption measures and to 
supervise efforts in combating corruption provided a similar reading of its activity as the 
Anti-Corruption Committee in the National Assembly. The institution issued reports on the 
anti-corruption operations of ministries, agencies and of municipal administrations, but 
failed to provide an in-depth analysis of the underlining factors that hampered the fight 
against malfeasance at the highest levels of the government544. In fact, this approach of 
focusing on administrative corruption was reflected in the results recorded by indigenous 
indicators such as the Center for the Study of Democracy’s Corruption Monitoring System, 
which pointed for the period between 2001 and 2005 a clear decreasing trend in the 
prevalence of corrupt transactions between citizens and the public administration. 
However, despite a still strong corruption pressure indicated by the business sector in 
Bulgaria545, the number of convictions for crimes related to corruption remained low for the 
entire accession period (the average number of convictions for the period between 1997 to 
2006 being of 36 per year).  
 
 
Figure 5 Dynamics of Involvement in Corruption Transactions and Corruption Pressure among the 
Bulgarian population (1998-2013) 
Source: Center for the Study of Democracy (2013): Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bulgaria (2012-2013). 
Policy Brief No. 43. 
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As the judiciary was still being perceived by the Bulgarian people as one of the most corrupt 
powers in the state, and in the context of consecutive European Commission reports that 
underlined the fact that the inefficient, corrupt, and underfinanced judiciary was a hurdle to 
the country’s EU accession, the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha administration put forward in 2001 the 
first major legislative initiative that would attempt at addressing these issues: the Strategy 
for Reforming the Judiciary. The document was drafted by the Ministry of Justice sought to 
deal with the unclear split of roles between the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Judicial 
Council – the body designed to insulate the functions of appointment, promotion, and 
discipline of judges from partisan political processes. A list of serious shortcomings in the 
functioning of the judiciary were identified: inefficient court administration and case 
management; substantial delays in hearings and in delivering judgement; poor 
enforcement; a poor level of selection and training of the judges and insufficient financial 
and technical resources that would assure the continuous tracking of cases546. In order to 
reach the document’s objectives, amendments to the Judiciary System Act, the law voted in 
1994 that laid down the institutional structure of the judiciary, were submitted to the 
parliament in March 2002, stipulating fix mandates for court presidents and their 
administrative counterparts among the prosecution and the investigation, tests and 
competitions for hiring and promotion, reducing magistrates immunity to their professional 
actions, and increasing the Ministry of Justice prerogative of submitting proposals to hire, 
promote, demote or transfer magistrates. The judiciary reacted by forwarding a resolution 
that called on the contrary for an even further insulation of the branch vis-á-vis  the other 
powers by fixing financing of the judiciary to a certain percentage of the GDP547. The 
executive did not accept this proposal, and used its majority in the National Assembly to 
adopt the revised Judicial System Act in July 2002, which in turn caused further escalation 
of the conflict, the judiciary invalidating all three major privatisation deals for the tobacco 
company (Bulgartabak), the telecommunications monopoly (BTK) and the electric utility 
monopoly for which the government had found investors and upon which the EU had 
insisted. The new law envisaged the creation of a professional assessment system based on 
competitions organised around transparent and objective criteria, the setting up of a public 
Institute of Justice responsible for the training, it provided for the Supreme Judicial Council 
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(SJC) to have the power to supervise court and prosecutors, and introduced monitoring 
mechanisms meant to prevent and combat corruption within the justice service based on 
the declaration of assets and incomes, and the adoption by the SJC of codes of conduct for 
judges and administrative staff548.  
The Constitutional Court decided in December 2002 that nearly every article of the revised 
Judicial System Act submitted for its review was unconstitutional. The next blow to the 
government’s plan of reducing the judiciary’s insulation from the other powers in the state 
came from the Supreme Cassation Court, which, after having filed the appeal against the 
2002 law to the Constitutional Court, moved to challenge the constitutionality of the 2003 
judiciary budget for reflecting the Ministry of Finance’s estimations and not so much those 
of the Supreme Judicial Council. The Constitutional Court sided with the Supreme Cassation 
Court, striking down part of the budget. Finally, probably the most important move of the 
Constitutional Court against the government’s attempt to modify the balance of power this 
time by complying with the request made by the European Union during accession 
negotiations to transfer the Investigation Service from the judiciary to the executive, came 
in April 2003, when the Court decided that such a transformation would constitute a change 
in the form of governance and would thus require a Grand National Assembly rather than 
an ordinary parliament. Pursuant to article 158 of the Constitution, an ordinary National 
Assembly could not resolve on the form of state structure and the form of government, 
which were the attributes of a Grand National Assembly. The Constitutional Court assumed 
a very broad interpretation of these concepts, with the latter  especially being understood 
as comprising any modification to the system of all basic constitutional institutions, their 
existence, their place in the relevant branch of power, their structure and mode of 
formation, and their remit549. The interpretation resulted in the narrowing of the scope of 
possible constitutional and legislative reform in respect to the judiciary. What remained 
feasible was to focus on measures for institutional strengthening. Thus the Constitutional 
Court reacted as a veto player, essentially signalling to the executive that any dilution of the 
judiciary’s independence or in fact any structural change (such as excluding the prosecution 
from the judicial branch and including it together with the investigation in the executive 
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power) would require a constitutional amendment and implicitly elections. However, in the 
context of weakened public support for the NMS II government, already visible since the 
November 2001 presidential elections that resulted in the victory of the BSP leader, Georgi 
Purvanov, such a move of calling new elections was a political suicide. By the spring of 
2003, this war of institutions translated into the state’s failure to implement the judicial 
reform strategy, and a severe delay in the government’s privatisation programme.  Under 
increased pressure from the European Commission, a decision was reached and in April 
2003, all parliamentary factions agreeing to detach from patchwork legislative revisions 
and support reform through a constitutional amendment, setting up a parliamentary 
Temporary Commission for Constitutional Amendments that was to vote the replacement of 
the absolute immunity of magistrates with a functional alternative. This prompted the 
European Union Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunther Verheugen to explicitly condition 
the closing of negotiations on the Justice and Home Affairs Chapter to further progress 
being registered in reforming the justice sector. Negotiations on the justice chapter were 
concluded however in October 2003, prior to any radical change, demonstrating and 
reiterating the European Commission’s preference towards tactics of supportive 
intervention, rather than coercive reinforcement of the obligations that the country had 
taken on under the Copenhagen criteria550. Constitutional modifications were eventually 
adopted in March 2004, leading to a replacement of the magistrates’ civil and penal 
immunity with functional immunity that could be invoked solely in respect of acts 
committed in the exercise of duties and that could be suspended by the Supreme Judicial 
Council and after the Chief Prosecutor would submit the request to the institution, an 
increase from three to five years of the probationary period before tenure would be 
awarded to magistrates, and instituted positive evaluation of magistrates’ professional 
performance and a limitation of a five-year mandate for judges holding managerial posts 
(with the exception of the President of the Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme 
Administrative Court and the Chief Prosecutor)551. With the relaxing of the Constitutional 
Court’s position starting with September 2005 on constitutional modifications regarding 
the structure of the judicial branch, the foundation for a new cycle of transformation was 
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laid. Thus, in December 2005, under intense pressure from the EU and after protracted 
political consultations, the new governing coalition comprising the BSP, NMS II and MRF 
and led by Sergei Stanishev, chairman of the BSP since 2001, made a series of proposals to 
amend the Constitution in order to introduce more accountability in the judiciary. Yet, some 
of the proposed modifications in the course of 2006 only raised further concerns, 
envisaging annual hearings in the Parliament of the Supreme Administrative Court and the 
Supreme Court of Cassation and the possibility of the Parliament to impeach these 
magistrates under certain specific circumstances. However, this latter provision was 
immediately declared un-constitutional, while the provision regarding the reporting 
obligation of the Chief Prosecutor and the chairpersons of the Supreme Administrative 
Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation produced little effects in terms of accountability, 
the first hearing in the parliament in 2008 of the ‘big three’ retrieving little interest among 
the members of the National Assembly552.   In February 2007 the National Assembly 
addressed the European Commission’s concerns regarding the independence of the 
judiciary by introducing new amendments that mandated the creation of an independent 
judicial inspectorate in the Supreme Judicial Council to monitor the integrity of the 
branch553. The new Judicial System Act reflecting the modifications was adopted in July 
2007 and the necessary measures were taken to make the new inspectorate operational.  
Thus, when political willingness for judicial reform was displayed by the Kostov and the 
Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha administrations, the pace in pushing for institutional and 
legislative change has been slowed down by veto players in an insulated but not fully 
independent judiciary. While the Constitution and subsequent secondary legislation have 
laid the basis for an independent judiciary, where the Supreme Judicial Council was granted 
wide formal governance powers, especially as we will observe in comparison to the 
situation in Romania, indicators such as that of judicial independence monitored by the 
World Economic Forum and presented in the table below have shown a lower rating for 
Bulgaria despite an early legislative framework that provided a noteworthy accumulation of 
institutional safeguards protecting the judicial system554.  
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Figure 6 Judicial Independence 2001-2014 
Source: World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey (data from 2001 up until 2014) – Judicial 
Independence is rated on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the lowest level of progress, and 7 the highest.   
 
As the judiciary and the constitutional court have gradually expanded their powers while 
reducing the political scope of the parliament and government, the European Commission 
began emphasising the need to pursue reform that would consolidate the accountability of 
the judiciary as well. But any substantial change has usually been dependent on the 
establishment of a wide political consensus between parties. In turn this consensus was 
achieved usually only under strong EU pressure, in Bulgaria’s case especially between 1998 
and up until the 2005 elections when the prospect of European integration was not 
vulnerable to internal political cleavages in Bulgaria, the political elite displaying consensus 
over EU accession as this reflected the wide popular support for the objective of integration. 
In this context, conditionality proved to be more effective when the EU coerced the 
governments reluctant to change with the threat of postponing the country’s accession.  As 
we have explored so far in the previous sections of this chapter, the influence and 
involvement of key international donors such as the World Bank, USAID, the Council of 
Europe and the European Union (through its complex system of monitoring instruments, 
gate-keeping actions, funding programmes and technical guidance) have created the 
permissive conditions for critical junctures determining substantial institutional, 
behavioural and legislative change to occur in Bulgaria. The presence of strong veto players, 
178 
 
be they political, within the judicial branch or even within the Constitutional Court in the 
latter stage of accession, led the country down the path of partial reform, with agents of 
partial change having to balance two contradictory objectives: on the one hand, supporting 
the country’s preparations for EU membership which in turn opened a window of 
opportunity for new profits, and, on the other hand, guarding their privileged positions by 
not allowing a loss of control of rent-seeking opportunities in their specific sector555. 
Previous studies on the effects that early rule of law reforms in transitions countries have 
upon future similar efforts, such as Mota Prado’s study on the case of Brazil, observe that 
states pursuing piecemeal and sequenced rule of law reforms can run into reform traps 
whereby the practices, values and attitudes laid during the early stages of institutional 
transformation are given the time and context to become entrenched while interest groups 
who wish to maintain the status quo become stronger in pursuing this objective556. To a 
certain extent, this was the case of Bulgaria as well and the absence during the pre-
accession stage of change agents that would be able to capitalise the external pressure 
exercised by the European Union in order to secure the necessary political consensus to 
push for the consolidation of judicial effectiveness and the materialisation of anti-
corruption efforts meant that in the post-accession stage new obstacles in achieving 
institutional change occurred.  
4.5.2. Romania’s pre-accession story 
 
Starting from Munk and Leff’s thesis that transition affects the form of subsequent political 
developments through its influence on the pattern of elite competition, on the institutional 
rules crafted during transition, and on key actors’ acceptance or rejection of the new rules 
of the game557, we now turn to Romania’s post-communist past in order to understand the 
member state’s track record in upholding the rule of law and combating corruption.  
If the end of the communist regime in Bulgaria came as a result of a palace coup, in Romania, 
the change came about in a less peaceful manner, being initiated by a violent street 
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revolution that produced more than 1,000 casualties, killed by the army in the days prior to 
22 December, and afterwards by unidentified snipers. This difference in the mode of 
transition present in Romania’s case has been interpreted by some authors as necessary 
due to the sultanistic nature of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s regime, arguing that a coup alone would 
not have been enough for an overthrown of the authoritarian leader558. With party elites 
being highly dependent on Ceaușescu for their position and priviledges that led to their 
alienation, and in the misdt of the chaotic series of events, a swift trial against the 
communist leader and his wife was organised before a military tribunal culminating in the 
execution of the defendants on the charges of genocide, undermining of the power of the 
state by organising armed actions, and undermining of the national economy559.  Within 
four days, a provisional government was formed by the National Salvation Front (FSN), an 
initial grassroots movement comprising communist cadres, student and human rights 
activists, with Ion Iliescu, a prominent member of the Communist Romanian Party before 
his demotion in 1971, acting as interim president of the country, and Petre Roman as 
caretaker prime minister from December 1989 to June 1990. The FSN initially described 
itself as ‚the emanation of the revolution’, denying any intentions to transform itself into a 
political party. However, by January 1990, the FSN had announced its decision to compete 
in the first post-communist elections, despite protests from civil society groups and 
opposition parties. The unparalleled penetration of former Communist state officials into 
the FSN, who unproblematically had switched allegiance to the new central authorities, 
meant that despite the instability brought by the revolution, the „operating power structure 
was never truly affected”560. In this sense, Mihăilescu observes that as the FSN took over 
immediately the administration of central economic resources, supplying cities and the 
population, preserving the administrative network and maintaining trade and the overall 
cohesion of the state apparatus, it gained a head start that provided it with increased 
authority and popular sympathy561.   
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The street confrontations that marked the years 1990-1991 (the so-called “mineriade”)562 
reflected the turbulent reconfiguration of the political system as well. Despite the discursive 
commitments made by the new government, old practices and political barriers to the rule 
of law were preserved. In this sense, the 1991 Romanian Constitution has been considered 
as a mechanism of securing power and institutional control, as it placed judicial courts and 
the Public Ministry under the same banner of “judiciary authority”, provision which 
annulled the effective distinction between the judicial and executive branches563. Moreover, 
while the promotion, transfer and sanctioning of judges was provisioned in the Constitution 
to rest upon only the Superior Council of the Magistracy (CSM), the institution meant to 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary, the actual organisation of the CSM was 
postponed due to heated political debates between the governing party that strived to 
maintain control of the Public Ministry over the administration of the judicial system and 
the opposition which argued that  the independence of the judiciary could not be secured 
under this solution. De facto, all of these attributes were carried out by the Ministry of 
Justice, the head of the institution deciding whether a disciplinary measure against a 
magistrate was to be imposed or not. Before becoming officially independent from the 
executive in 2005, the CSM was comprised of 10 judges and 5 prosecutors appointed by the 
Parliament for a mandate of four years, and was headed by the Ministry of Justice who 
appointed a third of its members. The composition of the first CSM was decided in 1993 
through a series of decisions of the Parliament564. Appointments to higher courts were 
made by presidents of courts in charge of selecting judges through the Ministry of Justice, 
mechanism which further exacerbated the dependency upon the executive branch. In 1992 
the first post-communist law on the organisation of the judiciary was passed (in force up 
until 2005), establishing a four-tier hierarchical structure of the legal system, establishing 
the Supreme Court (as the highest judicial authority with general national competencies, 
now named the High Court of Cassation and Justice), courts of appeal provided with 
extensive territorial competence (over two to four districts), country courts (one for each 
county), and first instance courts or lower courts. This hierarchical structure determined 
some authors to note that as neither the leading structures of the courts of appeal, courts of 
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justice, and first instance courts depended strictly on the interests of local political power, 
this led to a change in the ratio of forces that secured the obedience of court presidents to 
the central political power that was ruling565.  Moreover, the 1992 Law on the Organisation 
of the Judiciary also offered the Justice Ministry the right to set the organisation and 
jurisdiction of courts, as well as the right to be informed of the activity of each court through 
its inspectors566.  
After the nearly seven-year reign of Ion Iliescu, the victory of the Romanian Democratic 
Convention (CDR) (and the appointment of the Victor Ciorbea Government), a right-wing 
alliance of seven small political parties, in the November 1996 elections and the election of 
Emil Constantinescu as president of the country spurred hopes both among external and 
internal actors regarding the pace of reforms. The most important changes in the judicial 
sector brought by during the CDR government and supported by president Constantinescu 
were the enhancement of the training of magistrates (judges and prosecutors) which was 
linked to the National Institute of Magistrates (NIM), and the enactment of two laws against 
corruption such as the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (June 1999) and the Civil 
Law Convention on Corruption (November 1999). President Constantinescu also sought to 
reform the judiciary by modifying the Constitution and improving the functioning of the 
Constitutional Court (with the two-fold jurisdiction of examining laws before their 
promulgation by the President and the examination of laws in force when their 
constitutionality is challenged), but the lack of support and authority within the 
institutional structures and the CDR itself hindered a straightforward approach to pushing 
for reforms. The results achieved in prosecuting corruption for example between 1996 and 
2000 reflected some of the inefficiencies of the judiciary: out of more than 35.000 
investigated during this time, only 617 were convicted567.  
The fourth presidential and parliamentary elections in November 2000 were marked by the 
victory of Ion Iliescu and of the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PDSR later becoming 
PSD). The Adrian Nastase government (2000-2004), having as assumed as milestones EU 
and NATO membership put forward initially ambitious plans to reduce bureaucracy , curb 
corruption, privatise state-owned companies and increase foreign direct investment. One 
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important step was the adoption of Law no. 78/2000 on the prevention, investigation and 
combat of corruption acts, that differentiated between corruption-related offences and 
contained provisions regarding the incompatibilities between the public office and other 
activities568. While some steps were made in creating and improving legislation, at the 
institutional level, the 2002 GRECO Report revealed that the two institutions involved in the 
fight against corruption – the policy and the judiciary – were subjects as well to the 
phenomenon569. In the context of harsh criticism coming from the European Commission as 
well that deplored among others the inefficiency of the anti-corruption section within the 
General Prosecutor’s Office that a year since its establishment had only 17 prosecutors and 
38 open positions570, the government elaborated its first anticorruption strategy and action 
plan for 2001-2004, and established the National Committee for Crime Prevention, an inter-
ministerial body without legal status, directly subordinated to Prime-minister and 
coordinated by the Ministry of Justice that had as responsibility the implementation and 
monitoring of reforms aimed at preventing corruption. But the most important decision in 
the anti-corruption policy was the adoption of Emergency Ordinance no. 43/2002, later 
approved through organic law571 that transformed the Section against Corruption and 
Organised Criminality within the Prosecutor’ s Office into an independent structure, with its 
own investigative staff – the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (NAPO). The 
institution was responsible for the prosecution of grand corruption offences under the Law 
no. 78/2000 that produced prejudices of over Euro 200.000 to the public authority, 
involved a good or a service subject to the offence with a value exceeding Euro 10.000, and 
the authors of the offence were high officials. Its Chief Prosecutor was appointed by the 
President of the country, following an evaluation by the Superior Council of Magistracy of 
the candidates proposed by the Ministry of Justice. While the institution was relatively well 
staffed, including 150 police officers and 75 prosecutors, the extent of its independence was 
questioned, as by law the Chief Prosecutor was subordinated to the Prosecutor-General, and 
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the Minister of Justice had the power to reshuffle his office at any point in time572. A 2005 
Freedom House assessment of the country’s anti-corruption policy highlighted that the lack 
of transparency and objectivity of the institution’s human resources practices, the absence 
of coordination with agencies responsible for corruption prevention, and the lack of an 
evaluation system of the institution’s performance meant that NAPO “was neither 
autonomous, neither efficient”573.  
This period in fact was marked by strong contrasts, situation which substantiates the 
hypothesis according to which the external pressure exerted from this point onwards has 
created permissive conditions for change to occur. More specifically, important formal steps 
were made such as the voting of further anti-corruption legislative package in 2003 which 
required public officials to fill out income and asset declarations, and the most important 
political development in 2003, the revision of the Constitution, which by new provisions 
granted the Superior Council of Magistracy the exclusive competence to appoint, promote, 
transfer and sanction the magistrates. At the same time, we consider these shifts as ‘formal’ 
as when focusing on their implementation, as Gallagher observed the asset declaration 
forms omitted properties owned abroad, art collections and jewellery, while in the case of 
the Prime Minister’s wealth, no public agency has the authority to carry out an 
investigation574. In the case of judicial independence guaranteed by the revised Constitution, 
still existent intrusion mechanisms such as control over budget, nomination attributions of 
the Ministry of Justice, and the presence of the Minister of Justice at the CSM meetings 
raised question marks as regards to the substantial transposition of the principle575. 
Moreover, national resistance to substantial change was particularly observed as regards to 
the struggle over the competences of NAPO, making its legislative framework one of the 
most amended and changed pieces of legislation in post-Communist Romania576. Overall, 
the progress made towards improving judicial independence and the fight against 
corruption during the mandate of PSD-appointed Rodica Stanoiu (2000-2004) was 
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interpreted by some authors as “the darkest period for the Romanian legal system from the 
standpoint of the independence of post-communist justice”577. Transcripts of party 
meetings published in the national media in 2004 only came to reinforce suspicions of 
political implication in the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption cases, 
with the Minister herself reassuring other PSD members of the possibility of delaying high-
profile cases involving members of the government578.  Under intense criticism by both the 
Commission and the European Parliament and fearing a delay in the conclusion of EU 
membership negotiations, Prime-minister Nastase responded with a cabinet reshuffling 
that led to the removal, among other of Justice Minister Stanoiu. A ‘To Do’ list comprising 
some 30 items that had to be addressed by July 2004 was also signed under the 
encouragement of Commissioner Verheugen579. As a result, an Emergency Ordinance was 
passed in 2004 amending and updating the existing laws on ministerial liability, on the 
functioning of the NAPO and on the control of dignitaries and the public servants’ wealth. A 
three-law package on the Superior Council of Magistracy, on the Organisation of the 
Judiciary and on the Statute of Magistrates580 was also enacted in June 2004. The rules 
amending the Law on the Organisation of the Judiciary (Law no. 92/1992) aimed at 
transferring to the Superior Council of Magistracy most of the competences previously 
exercised by the Ministry of Justice581. However, while applauded as a genuine and 
ambitious attempt to adopt and implement the EU conditionality to guarantee the 
separation of powers, resistance from the Constitutional Court translated into 4 articles that 
were related to the status of members of the SCM being declared unconstitutional, the final 
three-law package being enacted at the end of 2005 without these provisions.  
The Parliamentarian and presidential elections of 2005 shifted power from PSD to the 
Justice and Truth Alliance, comprising the centre-right National Liberal Party (PNL) and the 
Democratic Party (PD – later turned PDL). The new government headed by Prime Minister 
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Calin Popescu Tariceanu together with the newly-elected President Traian Basescu came to 
power in a new context both internally and externally, with the revised Constitution and 
adopted legislation providing a clearer separation of competences, and the EU on the other 
hand using gatekeeping mechanisms in order to secure the sustainability of reforms. The 
appointing of Monica Macovei, former prosecutor, international anti-corruption activist and 
legal expert for the Council of Europe, as Minister of Justice signalled a change of approach 
to reform which did not take long to materialise. Soon after taking office, Macovei submitted 
a draft law to CSM to analyse that included several amendments to the 2004 law package 
which proposed among others the introduction of mandatory competitions for acquiring a 
position in CSM, and the incompatibility of CSM membership with any other position of 
authority582. After the enactment of the new reform law, two attacks were triggered on the 
one hand by PSD submitting an unsuccessful no-confidence motion against the new 
government and on the other by the Constitutional Court that declared articles of the law as 
unconstitutional583. While the law was eventually re-drafted and reintroduced in the 
Parliament, in its new form it was substantially adjusted. As NAPO’s track record in 
prosecuting high-level corruption cases was not satisfactory (in 2005 for example the 
institution having  2314 cases out of which only 744 were sent to trial584), the institution’s 
budget was increased. Very shortly afterwards, the Constitutional Court ruled out the 
institution’s competence to investigate Members of the Parliament, which was passed to the 
General Prosecutor of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. Through Emergency 
Ordinance no. 134/2005 however, the Justice Ministry managed to open the door for the 
reorganisation of NAPO in 2005 into the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA), an 
independent body operating within the High Court of Cassation and Justice and led by a 
Chief Prosecutor seconding the General Prosecutor, in this way re-securing the competence 
to investigate deputies and senators. Despite strong opposition in the Senate towards this 
solution, the ordinance was eventually approved, setting the scene for the gradual 
optimisation of the institution. Lacking political support and being accused of undue 
interference in the judiciary, Macovei was eventually ousted in April 2007. During the first 
                                                          
582 C. Dallara (2014): Democracy and Judicial Reforms in South-East Europe. Between the EU and the Legacies of 
the Past (Heidelberg, Springer), p. 65.  
583 R. Carp (2007): A Constitutional Principle under debate: Immovability of Judges in the Romanian and 
Comparative Law context, in R. Coman, J. De Waele (eds.), Judicial Reforms in Central and Eastern European 
Countries (Brugge, Editions Vanden Broele), pp. 11-23.  
584 NAPO (2005): Annex no. 1 – Statistical Data regarding the Prosecution Activity undertaken during 2005 
(Bucharest, NAPO), available at www.pna.ro/obiect2.jsp?id=11.  
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post-accession year, the attempt of the government to issue a decree suspending the activity 
of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate after the newly appointed Justice Ministry, 
Tudor Chiuariu became the subject of a DNA investigation induced the view that Romania 
was set on a backsliding path585.  
4.6. Post-Accession Europeanisation? Impact of the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism in Bulgaria and Romania  
 
As both Romania and Bulgaria still had to demonstrate that the rule of law was fully 
observed in their domestic systems, even after the main incentive of EU membership was 
granted, on December 2006, the European Commission adopted two decisions586 on the 
basis of Articles 37 and 38 of the Treaty of Accession, thereby establishing a Cooperation 
and Verification Mechanism. The material scope of the mechanism covers judicial reform 
and the fight against corruption for both members, as well as the fight against organised 
crime for Bulgaria only. The leading role in the monitoring of the two countries is taken by 
the European Commission that carries out the assessment based on input from 
governmental, civic, and administrative sources. Specific benchmarks were put forward 
initially such as in the case of Bulgaria the adoption of Constitutional amendments 
removing ambiguities regarding the independence and accountability of the judicial system 
or for Romania enhancing the capacity and accountability of the CSM. If in the technical 
reports these benchmarks are reiterated, in the monitoring reports they have been 
integrated in the assessment itself under general headings. The reporting was done up until 
2012 bi-annually and up until 2010 safeguard clauses, included in the Accession Treaty of 
Bulgaria and Romania at articles 36-38, were available as means to redress  backsliding and 
severe shortcomings. The general economic clause, the internal market specific one, and the 
justice and home affairs safeguard clause could take the form of temporary suspension of 
specific rights under the EU acquis directly related to the area where shortcomings were 
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586 European Commission (2006): Decision establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of 
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identified587. Other potential sanctions included the suspension of Member States’ 
obligation to recognise and execute judgements and judicial decisions from Bulgaria and 
Romania. However, throughout the period of reference (2007-2015), the safeguard clauses 
were never invoked. Yet some authors go beyond the three clauses and consider that the 
Commission’s decision to freeze Euro 400 million in pre-accession funding in the case of 
Bulgaria in 2008 constituted a sanction deployed under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism588. The author’s own interviews with experts from the Bulgarian think tank 
Centre for Liberal Strategies and the Romanian think tank Expert Forum589 have revealed 
however, that this decision was regarded as separate from the CVM, the mechanism being 
considered as designed for supportive reinforcement rather than sanctioning.  
The decision to maintain the CVM after 2010, the end date for the availability of the ‘stick’ 
attached to the mechanism which has been wrongly equated by the Bulgarian government 
with the overall duration of the CVM590, has triggered a wide variety of reactions at the 
national level. As such, in Romania’s case, representatives of the Romanian government591 
emphasised the expandable nature of the CVM, arguing that if with the first monitoring 
reports, the Commission limited itself to evaluating progress across the 4 benchmarks 
initially set, by 2013 the issues monitored by the Commission would have equated with 30 
new benchmarks. Benchmark 4 that regarded the fight against corruption, in particular 
within the local government was identified as the evaluation indicator that had expanded 
the most, including after 2012 a rule of law component as well. The evaluation methodology 
attached to the benchmarks was also criticised as lacking precision that allowed the 
mechanism to extend in time and in scope. The Romanian government also addressed these 
perceived issues to the European Commission, elaborating in March 2013 a detailed 
analysis of the progress made under each benchmark and sub-indicator and requiring the 
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Liberal Strategies in Sofia, conducted in February 2014.  
591 Interview conducted by the author in November 2013 with expert within the European Affairs and Human 
Rights Department, Romanian Ministry of Justice.  
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establishment of a new evaluation methodology on the Commission’s part that would 
secure an endpoint to monitoring592. Thus, were we to compare the CVM with policy 
coordination under the Europe 2020 Strategy, because of the restricted character of the 
mechanism which was interpreted as a sort of ‘punishment’ directed solely to the two 
Member States, the Romanian authorities, especially members of the Ponta cabinet, have 
actively sought to set a ‘completion’ timetable. In fact the continuous monitoring applied to 
Romania and Bulgaria has been identified as hindering the countries’ negotiation positions 
at the EU-level. In the context of the introduction in 2013 of the EU Justice Scoreboard, a 
comparative tool monitoring the quality, independence and efficiency of justice systems 
across Member States, and the introduction in 2014 of the EU Anti-Corruption Report593, 
representatives of the Romanian Justice Ministry considered that the country was 
submitted to triple monitoring and argued that one of the two instruments could have been 
used as an alternative to the CVM.  
Interviews conducted with Romanian Members of the European Parliament594 have also 
revealed a diversity of interpretations regarding the efficiency of the CVM in triggering 
sustainable change at the national level. While all interviewees agreed upon the benefits of 
monitoring, the extended use of the CVM by the Commission has been however deemed by 
some as having generated adverse effects, as the overuse of the theme of the fight against 
corruption in political rhetoric has led to an erosion of the concept. Moreover, Commission 
observations regarding the progress achieved under each benchmark have been used at 
times as ‘fuel’ for internal political conflicts which determined some of the interviewees to 
again underline the potential hidden adverse effects. Overall, the mechanism has been 
deemed to be fundamentally political in nature and not technical, as its assessment arm falls 
largely with the Secretariat General and not so much the niche Commissioner. Bulgarian 
MEPs have regarded the CVM as a useful instrument that has run its course, a former driver 
for change and a good starting point for guidance for legislation to be adopted, but a clear 
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exit strategy was deemed necessary in order to avoid the rooting of a double standard when 
submitting the country to further monitoring595.  
At the grass-roots level, the efficiency of the CVM has been evaluated very differently in 
Romania. On the one hand, it has been viewed as an initial constraining/pressuring 
instrument for the period during which the safeguard clauses were available sanctioning 
options, securing in this sense certain changes that previously had been rejected. As such, 
the Deputy Director of Transparency International Romania596 argued that while previous 
advocacy attempts to determine the establishment of a national agency for integrity, the 
Parliament passed the law regarding the formal establishment of the National Integrity 
Agency (ANI)597 only days from the publication of the first Monitoring Report. However, 
when turning to the procedure of adoption of the new Civil (in force since October 2011), 
Penal (in force since February 2014) Civil Procedure (in force since February 2013) and 
Penal Procedure Codes (in force since July 2013), the haste with which these essential 
instruments have been adopted and the manner itself – with the government assuming 
responsibility (a practice whereby legislative proposals made by the executive do not need 
to be voted by the parliament and are considered adopted unless censure motions are 
forwarded within three days), have been judged as negative effects of CVM benchmarking. 
The complexity of such legal instruments and the necessity of considering potential effects 
at the wider level of society did not take precedence in this sense over the ticking of 
requirements.  
Alternatively, the CVM has been considered as a support mechanism, especially in cases 
where the political sphere has tried to by-pass the principles of accountability and the rule 
of law598. In this sense, the representative of national think tank Expert Forum argued that 
during what came to be known as “the Black Tuesday” in 2013 when the Romanian 
Parliament attempted to pass through secret ballot a series of contested draft laws – one 
that under the pretext of overcrowded prisons would have pardoned those convicted for 
minor offenses (postponed) and two modifications brought to the New Penal Code that have 
changed the definition of ‘conflict of interests’, and have excluded the Members of the 
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Parliament and the President from the category of public servants (voted)599.  Such 
instances have been neither singular nor infrequent, in 2012 the Social Liberal Union 
between PSD, PNL and the Conservative Party (PC) have trigger a political and institutional 
crisis in their endeavour to impeach the president and topple the PDL-led government 
through a no-confidence vote in the Parliament, dismissing afterwards the speakers of the 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies (both PDL members) and the country’s Ombudsman, and 
curbing the powers of the Constitutional Court600. In this instance, Prime Minister Victor 
Ponta was invited for an emergency meeting at Brussels by both the European Commission 
President José Barroso and the Council President Herman Van Rompuy and was presented 
with an 11-point list of measures that were deemed necessary to restore the rule of law. 
The requirements referred to the respect for the powers and decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, the transparency of appointment procedures in the case of the heads of the General 
Prosecutor’s Office, the National Anti-Corruption Directorate, and of the Ombudsperson 
(appointment which needed to benefit of cross-party support), and the imperative of a clean 
criminal record (with emphasis on the absence upon appointment or at the beginning of the 
mandate of any final convictions ) for members of the Parliament and Ministers.  Thus in 
such cases, where the political class did not demonstrate enough ‘maturity’, the CVM with 
its flexible character was used by the European Commission as a checks and balances 
security measure.  
In contrast to Romania, in Bulgaria the CVM was regarded at times by representatives of the 
civil society with more scepticism as regards to its capacity to produce change. In this sense, 
a representative of the Bulgarian think tank Centre for the Study of Democracy601 argued 
that in a context where a political class has direct interest in exercising influence over the 
judiciary and where the judiciary is marred with political appointees, it would be difficult 
for the CVM to generate change when the only two sources of change have vested interests 
in maintaining the status quo.  Moreover, in the absence of a European model of structuring 
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the judicial system, the CVM is considered to become a moving target, here again the 
necessity of devising an exit strategy for Bulgaria being put forward as a next step.  
The political instability of the post-accession years in both countries that saw Bulgaria 
having changed 5 governments602 from 2007 to present and Romania 7 governments603 has 
translated into fractioned institutional and legislative reforms. However, even in this 
context successive Monitoring Reports of the Commission for Romania604 have underlined a 
good reform trajectory and note-worthy results that throughout this chapter have been 
explained as the products of a pre-accession critical juncture that has triggered a new 
equilibrium. In fact the strategies pursued by the two countries in curbing corruption and 
improving their judicial systems have differed substantially. Bulgaria has opted for a 
decentralised institutional framework, having on the investigative and prosecution side, the 
State Agency for National Security, the Internal Security Directorate within the Ministry of 
Interior and the Prosecutor’s Office all collaborating for the investigation of corruption 
crimes committed by senior public officials. However, as two of these institutions are 
subordinated to the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, the extent to which these can be 
detached from the political realm remains problematic. The Centre for Prevention and 
Countering Corruption and Organised Crime established in 2011 by the Council of Ministers 
represents a separate body that is responsible for collecting and registering information 
from all domains sensitive to corruption, and to produce complex analyses and methods 
tailored to each field to curb corruption. The results however, have not been proportionate 
to the funding redirected towards the institution605.  The Commission for Combating Crime 
and Corruption within the Council of Ministers was created in 2006 with the purpose of 
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605 European Commission (2015): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
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establishing objectives of state anti-corruption policies, provide decisions in this sense. 
Recent evaluations have shown unfortunately that the institution lacks the necessary 
capacity to effectively perform its functions, especially implementing a synergetic approach 
to corruption606.  
Romania has opted for a more centralised approach to anti-corruption with the National 
Anti-Corruption Directorate and the National Integrity Agency being the main specialised 
bodies that on the one hand conduct, supervise and control all criminal investigations on 
corruption crimes and send cases to court for trial and on the other hand combat corruption 
through administrative means such as control of assets. While both institutions have been 
the direct targets of successive political attempts to restrain their powers, budgets, or 
structures, both the European Union and the national public have been active in demanding 
a return to the status quo and the well functioning of these institutions. Overall, this 
protective double monitoring coupled with the institution’s highly trained and specialised 
prosecutors, the available means for conducting investigations and the legislative 
instruments in force have led to impressive results, DNA for example contributing to the 
prosecution by 2015 of over 1250 persons for cases of high-level corruption, and identifying 
overall prejudices from corruption of Euro 431 million607.  Yet, the sheer number of cases to 
be investigated, which in 2015 rose to 10.974, and their severity demonstrated in the same 
year by the staggering number of dignitaries under investigation (1 Prime-minister, 5 
ministers, 16 deputies and 5 senators) indicates a highly embedded phenomenon. It is our 
contention however, that on the basis of a consistent legislative framework, maintenance of 
DNA’s standard of activity and the strengthening of the capacity to recuperate prejudices of 
the National Fiscal Administration Agency, the price of engaging in corruption activities will 
substantially increase.  
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4.7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have strived to demonstrate that the difference in performance that we 
now observe between Romania and Bulgaria in terms of their efforts towards curbing 
corruption and addressing the weaknesses of their judicial systems can be explained 
through a historical institutionalist lens. In this sense, we consider that governmental 
decisions (such as opting for a particular institutional framework for fighting corruption, 
requesting international loans and directing funds where the European Commission usually 
pointed at the debilitating effects of insufficient funding etc) made during the pre-accession 
period, as well as the ‘transformative diplomacy ’ conducted not only by the European 
Union, but by a myriad of international organisations have created what the historical 
institutionalist literature calls permissive conditions for a critical juncture to occur and 
create a new equilibrium in the case of Romania. The same factors, but in the absence of 
productive conditions at the national level have translated in Bulgaria’s case in a missed 
opportunity. In the case of Romania, the productive conditions included the presence of 
strong change agents (occupying either top governmental positions or leading key 
institutions) pushing for real reform and important improvements in the legal framework 
(such as the legislation amending in 2004 the functioning of NAPO or the three-law package 
on the Superior Council of Magistracy, on the organisation of the Judiciary and on the 
Statute of Magistrates) that have generated an institutional path that has secured progress 
being reached in prosecuting high level corruption. The impact of the threat to delay 
accession put forward by the European Union played an essential role as well, providing the 
context for empowerment of change agents and for the adoption of essential legislation.    
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Chapter 5 
Laying the path for European prosperity and social 
cohesion? Analysing Romania and Bulgaria’s performance 
under the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy 
 
 
One of our starting hypotheses extracted from the rational choice literature connected the 
propensity of state compliance with supra-national law with either the political clout at the 
EU level of Member States, or their economic power. The premise of this hypothesis 
identified actors as rational self-interested agents that calculate the costs and benefits of 
non-compliance. Incentives and disincentives in this scenario play a role in tipping the 
balance in favour of the transposition at the national level of external norms. Thus, when 
employing this reasoning to the European level, Member States are expected to avoid 
complying with EU norms due to the associated costs of the targeted change to be achieved. 
In order to counterbalance the incentive for defection, external constraints in the form of 
institutionalised monitoring and sanctioning of Member States need to be established or 
increased. However, in the case of certain policy areas which do not fall in the sphere of the 
Community method, such as Research and Development, Education, or the Information 
Society, both the level of obligation to comply and the level of enforcement attached to 
norms are largely soft. These types of norms have been bracketed under the umbrella term 
of ‘soft law’, and their effectiveness in generating change has been connected by ‘optimist’ 
perspectives608 to the room that they provide to implementers for policy experimentation, 
to the wide range of actors that become involved in the process of policy-making609, and to 
the long-lasting learning effects that they induce through voluntary and rational assessment 
of past experience and new information610. The most emblematic mode of governance 
falling in this category has been the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), a mechanism 
described as ‘softer’ than the EU regulatory mode but more inclusive in terms of the 
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involvement of EU institutions than intensive transgovernmentalism611. The OMC originated 
with the European Employment Strategy (EES) that was launched at the Essen European 
Council in 1994 a set of recommendations that were to be translated by Member States into 
long-term programmes, annually assessed at the Community level612. The mode itself which 
now stands at the basis of the Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 Strategy which will be 
presented in this chapter, “employs non-binding objectives and guidelines to bring about 
change in social policy and other areas”613.  Thus, in the absence of “hard” sanctions when 
Member States fail to adopt or achieve OMC objectives, the subsequent natural question is: 
why would these governments assume the inherent costs of implementing 
recommendations when they are not legally obliged to do so and the only threat for non-
compliance is naming and shaming by the European Commission? Moreover,  a “sceptical” 
view over the extent to which Member States would strive to meet the Europe 2020 
Strategy targets would also question whether the relatively open-ended nature of the policy 
substance promoted (in this case the lax understanding of competitiveness which has been 
corroborated with social cohesion614) would affect the extent of “soft Europeanization” at 
the domestic level.  In the context of voices that identify a potential inherent tension 
between negative and positive European integration on the one hand and the social 
component of soft law instruments such as the Lisbon strategy and its 2010 relaunch, the 
Europe 2020 Strategy, should we simply consider these governance modes as very 
ambitious programmes with very limited instruments, and inevitably insufficient results? In 
what follows we will explore the characteristics and differences between soft law initiatives 
employed by the European Union, and we will proceed to follow their impact at the national 
level, more specifically in the two countries under analysis. As the 20-20-20 climate targets 
contained by the Europe 2020 Strategy are also part of binding legislation, namely the 
Climate and Energy Package for 2020 and the Energy Efficiency Plan of 2011615, the focus of 
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the analysis will be placed on the social policy targets, namely employment, poverty 
reduction, education and innovation.  
 
5.1. Mapping distinctions between EU modes of governance  
 
In this section, we will introduce and clarify the concepts of soft law, mode of governance 
and governance architecture with which we will operate in the following sections in order 
to understand better the nature of enforcement and obligation attached to norms, as well as 
to be able to distinguish the plethora of various instruments applied in the same policy. This 
clarification will aid in identifying the distinctions between the EU’s high-profile initiatives, 
the Lisbon Strategy and its 2010 relaunch, the Europe 2020 Strategy, and implicitly their 
domestic impact.  
However, a first step that must be taken when proceeding to understand a contested 
concept such as “soft law”616, which stands at the basis of the related terms of mode of 
governance and governance architecture, would be to go back to the definition of hard law 
and its essential elements. In their study on the increasing legalisation of international 
governance, Abbott and Snidal define hard law as “legally binding obligations that are 
precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed 
regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law”617. 
Three dimensions are thus identified – obligation, precision, and delegation, the authors 
arguing that a harder or softer legal character of a norm would depend on variation across 
one or more of the legalisation dimensions. The authors contend that the realm of soft law 
‘begins’ where legal arrangements are characterised by moderate/low levels of 
obligation/precision/delegation. This perspective places international law on a wide 
continuum running from non-legal positions to legally binding and judicially controlled 
commitments, each of the ends having their own merits and shortcomings. Starting from the 
three dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation, hard law can be defined as “legally 
binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the 
issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and 
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implementing the law”618. Critics of the efficiency of hard law argue that the uniformity of 
treatment supposed by such legal commitments is bound to limit compliance in the context 
of significant diversity among Member States. Moreover, hard law also presupposes a set of 
fixed conditions based on prior knowledge, while situations of uncertainty may demand 
constant experimentation and adjustment619. On a more targeted note, in the context of the 
so-called “paradox of a popular Europe”, where popular expectations are high (regarding to 
take an example the reducing of unemployment) but political unwillingness to expand 
formal legislative and budgetary competences to the EU is low620, the need for 
diversification of legal instruments increases.  
Recent studies have altered the three dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation in 
favour of an approach based on obligation and enforcement as essential traits that would 
facilitate the identification of the rich range of instruments that would qualify as soft. In this 
sense, Terpan argues that a more accurate understanding of EU soft law would require 
covering both legally binding norms that do not necessarily reach the level of legality that is 
required to be seen as hard law and non-legally binding norms that despite their voluntary 
character still have legal relevance621. Understanding obligation as the injunction to act or 
restrain to act in a specific manner, and enforcement as the range of mechanisms that can 
be used to ensure that obligation is being fulfilled, the author argues that in the new model 
of classification of norms, obligation needs to be regarded as taking precedence over 
precision (which in essence is the content of the obligation and hence can be regarded as a 
secondary feature of norms) and enforcement (which goes from monitoring to coercive 
mechanisms, including judicial control and sanctions) needs to take precedence over 
delegation (which focuses more on the authorities designed to implement agreements)622. 
Based on variation across the these dimensions, Terpan considers soft law all norms 
imposing hard obligations, but soft or no enforcement mechanisms attached, and all norms 
putting forward soft obligations (loose provisions) and having attached soft and in some 
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cases hard enforcement instruments (in this latter case directives dealing with social 
standards applying to pregnant or young workers being identified as a case in point). 
However, opinions remain divided in this sense, with earlier studies focusing mostly on the 
flexible, non-binding quality of soft law which in turn provides for a more restricted 
plethora of instruments including communications, declarations, resolutions, frameworks, 
guidance notes, circulars and codes of conduct623. Moreover, when contrasting the 
advantages and costs of opting for soft law in various policy fields, earlier studies tended to 
cast a more sceptical view over the efficiency of such instruments in assuring compliance. In 
this sense, authors pertaining to the so-called ‘anti-soft camp’ have argued that in the social 
policy field, the absence of enforcement mechanisms could lead to potentially denying 
citizens fundamental rights624. In other cases, ‘a third way in European soft law’ is suggested 
in order to ensure a minimal enforcement of European-level policy objectives. The solutions 
put forward by this third way would largely take the form of policy duplication, scholars 
either suggesting framework directives that would enable the EU to draw broad legal 
commitments, but still provide member states enough leeway to suit local conditions, or a 
mix and match of hard and soft law that would enable innovation in policy areas as well as 
an expansion of the EU’s remit625.   
Overall, while sovereignty costs – understood as ranging from simple differences in 
outcomes on particular issues to more fundamental encroachments on state sovereignty – 
would be lowered by soft law, objections have been formulated. More specifically, a lower 
level of clarity and precision translates into diminished predictability and a less reliable 
framework of action. Clear effects are difficult to be traced back directly to the soft law 
instruments themselves, in the context of laxer time constraints and usually no enforcement 
mechanisms626. Change at the domestic level is thus usually attributed to the Member States 
themselves (as a case of political appropriation whereby countries complying with 
criteria/guidelines/goals might not want to express overtly that changes have been induced 
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by EU policy, but rather present them as their own policy)627, and when considering the 
case of the European Union, the questionable efficiency of deployed soft instruments would 
only support declining public confidence in the European project, which the European 
Commission observed that can be reversed should people “feel that Europe provides an 
added value”628. Finally, soft law has been criticised as being a device used to produce 
effects while bypassing normal systems of accountability629. The literature630 shows 
however that the involvement of national parliaments in soft law processes depends more 
on the constitutional structure of each Member State, with federal and regionalised 
countries having higher levels of regional authorities’ involvement631, as well as national 
governance practices, with countries having a tradition of including civil society in policy-
making, tending more to follow the EU request to involve and mobilise NGOs in social policy 
issues632. A similar situation has been observed in terms of national stakeholder 
involvement in soft law processes at the national level in the Research and Development 
policy and the employment policy. In this case, the low political saliency of the former, more 
technocratic policy area, in contrast to the latter, translated into a larger stakeholder 
support and a higher degree of consensus633.   
Yet, soft law instruments offer significant offsetting advantages over hard law, which in the 
context of the EU have been considered to have triggered a shift in governance. This 
transition has been more visible in terms of a steadily decline in the volume of EU legislative 
output since the mid-1990s (the last peak year being 1991 when a total of 6.711 directives, 
regulations and decisions were adopted) and a particularly sharp drop in 2009634 (to a total 
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of 2.475 directives, regulations and decisions635). The so called governance shift in turn 
triggered a wide range of extensive academic work exploring both the diversity of policy 
tools and instruments which became to different extents politically, socially and morally 
binding for actors involved636, as well as the more extensive forces that could explain the 
new approach to policy-making. In this sense, some authors have argued that the period 
marked by a drop in the volume of EU hard law can be superimposed over the 
intergovernmental movement that reached its apex between 2009 and mid-2012637, with 
soft law in this case being understood as norms not entailing judicial control. More 
theoretical approaches seeking to explain the governance shift have suggested that the 
emergence of ‘softer’ modes of operation in fields such as the social policy could be better 
understood under a neo-functionalist approach as the result of a ‘spillover’ effect from the 
development of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)638. Rational-choice 
institutionalist analyses on the other hand put forward the hypothesis that Member States 
opt for alternatives to the conventional Community Method of legislation for ‘sovereignty-
protecting’ reasons, as the these policy instruments have “low degree of legalisations and 
limited potential for unintended consequences”639. Finally, constructivist approaches 
underlined that coordinative mechanisms such as peer-reviewing, mutual monitoring and 
benchmarking could change – depending on the capacity of expert discourse – the cognitive 
and normative beliefs and preferences of political actors640 and based on this premise the 
flourishing of various soft law mechanisms was explained.  
But regardless of the approach opted for in explaining the decline in the volume of EU 
legislative output, a first step taken by studies focusing on this shift from hard law is to 
define the concepts of governance and mode of governance in the context of the EU. Thus, in 
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broader terms, in contrast to governing, governance has been defined as the provision of 
“common goods or the establishment of public order resulting from the interaction between 
various categories of actors and from forms of coordination of their behaviour”641. We 
contrast the two concepts as in the case of the former, common goods and public order are 
the result of hierarchical coordination between public actors, while the latter implies non-
hierarchical coordination between both public and private actors and can be further 
clarified as a concept based on two dimensions: structure and process. Governance 
structures emerge from the actors involved and their relationships, while as a process, 
governance encompasses various modes of coordinating between actors642. The specialised 
literature has presented a wide variety of modes of governance and defining criteria 
according to which a categorisation could be done.  The most comprehensive to date 
however has differentiated between modes of governance along the politics, polity and 
policy dimensions643. On the polity dimension, modes of governance run on various 
contrasting axes, from legal bindingness to soft law, rigid versus flexible approaches to 
implementation,  presence versus absence of sanctions, material versus procedural 
regulation (setting specific material standards versus codes of conduct), to fixed versus 
malleable norms (revisable and integrated with other norms and policies). On the politics 
dimension, modes of governance can be distinguished in terms of the actors involves – 
solely public or private. Finally, on the polity dimension, modes of governance vary 
according to the nature of the institutional structure of the actors’ interactions (be it 
hierarchical or non-hierarchical), the locus of authority (central or dispersed among 
territorial units or boundaries of states), and the degree of formal institutionalisation of 
decision-making and implementation processes. Focusing on the policy dimension, Trieb et 
al proposed four main modes of governance at the EU level, namely coercion (characterised 
by binding legal instruments prescribing detailed and fixed standards that leave little 
leeway in implementation), voluntarism (non-binding instruments setting broad goals), 
targeting (non-binding recommendations to member states), and framework regulation 
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(binding law offering more leeway in implementation)644. The starting point of this section, 
the concept of soft law can thus be placed on an axis that would run from voluntarism to 
framework regulation as demonstrated by Peters and Pagotto’s analysis based on a working 
definition of soft law as reuniting norms that are not legally binding in an ordinary sense, 
but that are not completely devoid of legal effects which range from normative guidance 
and hard law complementarity to creating political obligation645. In fact, some authors have 
taken a step further and expanded the functions of European soft law to a soft form of legal 
obligation, derived from Art.4(3) of the Lisbon Treaty which sets the basis for a general duty 
of Member States to cooperate and facilitate the achievement of the EU’s tasks and 
objectives646.    
While focusing on identifying and differentiating soft modes of governance, Héritier argued 
that in practice two basic new modes of governance could be distinguished. On the one 
hand, we would have a type that develops substantive targets to be reached either by using 
reputation mechanisms and mutual learning or by using voluntary accords, and on the 
other we would have a type that defines procedural norms without setting specific 
substantive outcomes647. Codes of conduct and guides for best practices are included in this 
latter category, while the former referred to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
formally launched during the Lisbon European Council in March 2000. Although envisaged 
among others in the procedures for coordinating national economic policies under the 
Economic and Monetary Union established in the Maastricht Treaty (through the main 
instrument of the Stability and Growth Pact) and in the employment chapter of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (through the European Employment Strategy), the OMC was ‘launched’ 
in 2000 as a politically coherent governance method supported by a legitimising 
discourse648. The Lisbon summit thus defined the OMC as facilitating policy convergence 
(and not harmonisation as Member States are encouraged to develop their own policies in 
order to achieve coordination) and identified the following instruments within its toolkit: 
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- EU level guidelines combined with specific timetables for achieving short, medium 
and long term goals; 
- Quantitative and qualitative indicators as well as benchmarks tailored to the context 
of each Member State and as a means of assessing national performances; 
- National and regional-specific targets designed to encourage policy changes; 
- Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer reviews organised as mutual learning 
processes649.  
 
In terms of the general procedural steps behind the OMC, the need for this soft mode of 
governance has been observed to arise once the European Council decides that areas of 
problem-interdependence necessitate policy coordination, but authority cannot be 
delegated to the EU. The next step is made by the Commission which proposes, after a series 
of consultations on the matter between the Council of Ministers and public and private 
actors, a common strategy for dealing with the identified problems as well as a series of 
general guidelines or objectives under overarching strategic pillars. Quantifiable targets and 
timetables are also put forward and are regularly reaffirmed and in certain cases updated. 
Finally, in order to monitor national policy measures adopted to meet benchmarks and 
targets, Member States are expected to produce reports (in the form of national action plans 
or national reform programmes) which are in turn assessed by the European 
Commission650. Specific recommendations to Member States are made based on national 
reporting, and the process is completed with mutual evaluation and peer-review between 
Member States (occasionally coupled with a system of naming and shaming/faming), at the 
Council level. But despite these general steps, as the OMC has not been limited to one 
specific policy area, variation in terms of duration of the cycle of coordination, the type of 
outcomes, degree of compliance pressure imposed, stakeholders involved, and the role of 
the participating institutions has been observed. As such, by 2007, 13 different OMCs were 
considered to be in place in areas that possessed a legal basis within the Treaty (the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines and the European Employment Strategy), adjunct areas (social 
protection and inclusion, pensions and healthcare), nascent areas (innovation and research, 
education, information society, environment and immigration policy) and unacknowledged 
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tax651.  However, whilst acknowledging the differences that occur when applying the OMC to 
various policy areas, both legal scholars and political scientists alike have come to consider 
this new mode of governance as a fully-fledged alternative to the Community Method652.  
In terms of the context that enabled the emergence of co-ordination as a policy tool, starting 
with the 1990s and especially after the Maastricht Treaty, alternative modes of governance 
have been gradually explored at the EU level, the European Commission itself funding 
research to explore a new approach to policy-making and announcing its readiness to turn 
to new ways of governing in its 2001 White Paper on governance653. This change of heart 
came on the background of a perceived weakened European Commission after the forced 
resignation of the Santer administration due to repeated allegations of mismanagement654 
in conjunction with fading public enthusiasm and growing resistance from Member States 
to the transfer of powers towards Brussels655. The Maastricht Treaty itself has been 
considered by some researchers as an expression of this transition towards new modes of 
governance, as it led to the establishment of the European Union as a legal entity based on a 
three-pillar structure, guided by different types of policy-making656. As such, the first ‘pillar’ 
or the supranational pillar essentially comprised all areas of competences that the Member 
States had previously agreed to pool at the European level (economic and social affairs) and 
had the European Community as its operative entity. The second and third pillars, 
comprising the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs 
domain, were left to intergovernmental co-operation, Member States dominating the 
decision-making process to the detriment of the Commission and the European Parliament, 
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and the European Court of Justice being excluded from the second Pillar and given only a 
limited role under the Third Pillar657.  
But the building block for the OMC was represented by the Essen summit in 1994 when a 
number of objectives to fight increasing unemployment (such as investing in human capital 
and reducing non-wage labour costs) were agreed upon, with Member States being urged to 
transpose recommendations, being monitored by the European Commission (together with 
the Economic and Financial Affairs Council) and expected to report annually to the 
European Council about their progress. As such, the core elements of the OMC – common 
objectives, national implementation and surveillance by the Commission and Member 
States (peer review) – were in place starting with 1994658. But the biggest inspiration for 
the OMC has been embodied by the European Employment Strategy (EES), the EU’s main 
instrument for coordinating Member States’ reform efforts in the area of labour market and 
social policies. Launched in 1997 during the Luxembourg European Council (and since also 
labelled the ‘Luxembourg process’), the EES included key instruments passed onwards to 
the OMC: guidelines, best practices, and objectives adapted to national specificities659. Thus, 
the policy coordination process attached to the EES would start with the Council’s adoption 
through a qualified majority vote, and following the Commission’s proposals, of a set of 
common European employment guidelines660 which were to be translated into national 
employment policies which would be communicated to the Commission and the Council 
annually via ‘National Action Plans’. To the elaboration and implementation of the National 
Action Plans, subsequent EU summits also insisted on the engagement and input of national 
trade unions and employer associations. An annual joint evaluation by both the Commission 
and the Council would next take place, on the basis of which the Council would issue 
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individual recommendations to Member States. As Goetschy observed, in cases where the 
guidelines were deemed not to have been followed by individual states, no legal effects 
could be triggered but the political costs of naming and shaming were still powerful enough 
to trigger some reactions661.  
However, the EES was subsequently modified starting with the launch of the Lisbon 
Strategy during the March 2000 European Council and the 2002 European Commission 
review that observed a perceived a cumbersome guideline structure of the process, as well 
as a need for better synchronisation and complementarity of economic and employment 
objectives662. In terms of the results achieved, successive EU Joint Employment Reports 
presented an overall lukewarm performance at the EU level, emphasising a series of 
shortcomings such as an uneven implementation at the national level of the four pillars’ 
provisions (employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities), discrete 
policy initiatives that Member States had in stock regardless of the EES, the absence of 
quantified EU-level objectives which made national policy progress assessment under the 
EES difficult, and a lack of coordination between national institutional structures normally 
involved in the EES663.  
In an effort to break from economic growth stagnation and to provide more effective policy 
instruments, the March 2000 Lisbon European Council put forward an ambitious ten-year 
reform programme designed to make the Europe more dynamic and competitive in a 
sustainable manner while also enhancing social inclusion. The Lisbon Strategy thus 
developed promoted the integration of social and economic policies while focusing in 
particular on strengthening the EU’s research capacity, completing the Single Market, 
encouraging entrepreneurship, promoting fiscal consolidation and sustainability of national 
public finances, boosting progress within information society technologies, developing 
active employment policies and modernising social protection systems664. In the field of 
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economic performance the strategy did not comprise specific targets, but implied that 
Member States needed to lessen tax pressures on labour, maintain budgets close to balance 
and redirect public expenditure to focus more on human capital accumulation665. In the 
policy field of employment, Lisbon aimed at attracting more people in employment via 
pension reforms, active-aging strategies, reducing the informal economy and undeclared 
work and minimising gender gaps in payment. A strong emphasis was also placed on 
research and innovation, one of the goals being that of establishing a European Area of 
Research and Innovation that would assure a good coordination of national research 
activities. Europe needed to maintain its leadership role in key technology areas, and the 
level and quality of training and skills development activities needed as well to be 
increased.  
To achieve these numerous strategic goals, the OMC was launched following a template that 
did not differ fundamentally from the EES receipt: identification and setting of common 
goals for the EU with specific timetables, establishment of indicators and benchmarks for 
assessing progress, translation of common objectives into national and regional policies, 
and engaging in periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual 
learning processes. For the four main deficits identified as essential to be addressed by 
2010, namely the standard of living, the productivity, the labour and the environmental 
deficits, the strategy comprised initially 28 main objectives and 120 secondary objectives 
for a total of 117 indicators666. The large number of objectives and indicators translated into 
confusion about the aims of different coordination processes, and in time this led to a lack of 
engagement by Member States, harshly emphasised in the 2004 “mid-term review” of the 
High Level Group headed by former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok667. In response to 
criticism regarding the inadequate progress, lack of commitment and incoherence and 
inconsistency between means and ends, the Barroso Commission relaunched the Lisbon 
Strategy in 2005, reorganising the process into three major steps: defining European 
Integrated Guidelines, their implementation through three-year national reform 
programmes and monitoring of progress on a country by country basis and collectively. 
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Moreover, the number of goals was narrowed down and focused on boosting jobs and 
growth (an employment rate of 70% and Research and Development investment to 3% of 
GDP by 2010), and two other surveillance and coordination instruments, namely the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)668 and the European Employment Guidelines were 
assembled into a single set of 24 Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs, divided into 
separate macroeconomic, microeconomic, and employment chapters. In line with this 
architectural shift, the National Actions Plan for Employment became a section within the 
Member States’ National Reform Programmes, shift which has been argued by scholars to 
have reduced the visibility of employment policy coordination and greater unevenness in 
national employment policy reporting669. Another newly introduced element was the 
Community Lisbon Programme which complemented the National Reform Programmes by 
comprising measures foreseen in the regulatory domain, financial instruments and 
proposals for policy development to be launched at the European level. A new general 
three-year timeframe was established that provisioned for priorities to be defined during 
the first year of the policy cycle, programmes to be delivered in the second year, and stock-
taking and revision of priorities for the following period during the third year. But in 
practice the renewed strategy continued to follow the pre-2005 practice of evaluating 
national achievements on an annual basis. Moreover, the Commission made no country-
specific recommendations for 2005 and 2006 and significantly played down the practice of 
ranking Member States in relation to EU targets and benchmarks not attempting to group 
them according to the progress made. This in turn led the Commission itself to report in its 
2010 evaluation of the strategy that despite some positive effects (such as building more 
consensus over the necessary pace and direction of reforms), the policy instrument was 
substantially weakened in assuring the meeting of its main targets by a lack of focus on 
critical elements such as macro-economic imbalances and competitiveness problems, the 
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absence of internal prioritisation with regards to the guidelines put forward, the lack of 
agreed commitments and an inconsistent impact of country-specific recommendations670.   
Independent evaluations of the influence of the Lisbon Strategy have been even more 
critical, revealing that the gap between the best and worst performing countries in 2010 
was wider than in 2000, policy convergence within the EU not differing substantially to that 
of the rest of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)671. 
Furthermore, when analysing these disparities, in the case of better performing countries 
such as the Nordic Member States, Austria and the Netherlands, the main reform triggers 
have been connected more often to domestic political dynamics than to policy coordination 
under the Lisbon Strategy672.  Various academic assessments of the impact of the Lisbon 
Strategy have associated the lukewarm results with collective action problems. In this 
sense, Collignon argued that the most important intrinsic issue attached to the OMC has 
been the underestimation of the importance of vested interests articulated in national 
politics. Along this line of thought, as political leaders seek to get (re-)elected, they 
formulate policies constrained by national debates and interests articulated within their 
home constituencies. Thus, factional interests of national constituencies would inevitably 
prevent the realisation of a collective utility optimum, and in the case of governance with 
many governments the tendency of individual Member States will be to free-ride on 
others673.   
On the background of the widely acknowledged failure of the Lisbon agenda, as well as 
under the financial pressure of the economic crisis, a prominent debate was sparked over 
the nature of the ‘beast’ that would follow after 2010. Concurrent proposals were put 
forward by some Member States, EU institutions, local and regional authorities and 
academics focusing largely around four core demands aimed at redressing key perceived 
defects of the Lisbon Strategy, especially in its relaunched version. Firstly, requests 
regarding the parity of economic and employment goals were formulated, followed by the 
demand for a more visible social character of Europe embodied in specific quantifiable 
commitments towards reducing poverty and promoting social inclusion. A third demand 
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was for more effective mainstreaming of social cohesion and inclusion objectives into EU 
and Member State policy-making, while the forth demand was for greater stakeholder 
participation674. The response came in March 2010, the European Commission proposing a 
new ten-year strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth675 which was approved in 
amended form by the June European Council.  
More recent studies, when exploring the Lisbon Strategy and its 2010 relaunch, have 
transitioned from the theoretical concept of mode of governance to that of governance 
architecture. As such, governance architectures have been differentiated as “strategic and 
long-term institutional arrangements of international organisations exhibiting three 
features; namely, they address strategic and long-term problems in a holistic manner, they 
set substantive output-oriented goals, and they are implemented through combinations of 
old and new organisational structures within the international organisation in question”676.  
In contrast to the notion of mode of governance Borrás and Radaelli argue that governance 
architectures refer to patterning processes which include ideational and organisational 
dimensions that on the one hand lead to the socialisation of actors to new frames of 
reference and on the other constrain or enable different governmental levels involved in the 
political and administrative processes. Along the ideational dimension, institutional 
arrangements such as the Lisbon Strategy are differentiated through an ideational 
repertoire (concepts which are essential to the strategy and need to have widely accepted 
meanings) and a discourse (the means that uses the ideational repertoire in order to 
legitimise the relationship between goals and policy instruments) constructed around them. 
Along the organisational dimension, complex policy initiatives are characterised by various 
formal and informal organisational arrangements, policy instruments and procedural 
requirements that represent the basis for engagement and implementation. The concept of 
governance architecture has been particularly useful in facilitating a deeper understanding 
of the creation, evolution and impact of EU strategies. In the following section we will 
explore the Europe 2020 Strategy whilst keeping in mind the two dimensions mentioned 
here.   
                                                          
674 J. Zeitlin (2010): “Towards a Stronger OMC in a More Social Europe 2020: A New Governance Architecture for 
EU Policy Coordination”, in E. Marlier, D. Natali (eds.) with R. Van Dam, Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU? 
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5.2. Shifts in softer modes of governance – the transition from Lisbon 
to the Europe 2020 Strategy  
 
The Commission’s Europe 2020 Strategy differed from its predecessor first of all in terms of 
its focus. A limited number of goals were proposed, namely five aggregate EU-level targets 
to be achieved by 2020: concerning employment (to reach 75%), research and innovation 
(of 3% of GDP), climate change and energy (the 20/20/20 targets on caps emissions, 
indicators for energy efficiency, and the share of consumption of renewable energy), 
education (share of early school leavers below 10% and at least 40% of people in the 
tertiary education) and poverty reduction (20 million less people at risk of poverty). The 
targets were also translated at the national level encouraging countries to set the long-term 
trajectories towards meeting them. The new strategy seeks thus to lead towards a European 
economy based on knowledge and innovation that would be resource efficient and greener 
and foster high employment and social and territorial cohesion. In addition to the five 
targets, seven flagship initiatives (Digital for Europe; Innovation Union; Youth on the Move; 
Resource-Efficient Europe; Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era; Agenda for New Skills 
and Jobs; European Platform against Poverty) were also created as the main tool regarding 
the implementation of the three priorities of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Each 
of the flagship initiative “acts as an umbrella vehicle for more specific initiatives, consistent 
with the intentions of the original Lisbon agenda”677, deploying a plethora of instruments 
such as legislation, non-binding recommendations, EU funds, and policy coordination 
processes (periodic monitoring, evaluation, peer reviews etc.). In terms of the focus of the 
strategy, some authors have argued that in the case of Europe 2020 one could identify 
growth as the only goal, dividing the concept in a linguistic sleight into three distinctive 
types678. In this sense, smart growth is considered dependent on improvements in 
educational attainment, investment in research and innovation and harnessing information 
and communication technologies. Sustainable growth is conceived largely as environmental 
efficiency corroborated with a strong business environment and informed consumers. 
Finally, inclusive growth entails raising the employment rate by investing in skills and 
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training, modernising welfare systems and ensuring that the benefits of growth reach all 
parts of Europe.  
Again, in distinction to the Lisbon agenda, Europe 2020 offered prominence to poverty 
reduction, making it one of its headline initiatives, and setting an ambitious target in this 
sense despite the very limited legal and political mandate for EU action in this field. 
However, as poverty has been a highly contested concept and a contentious problem, the 
Europe 2020 target concerning it and social exclusion has been interpreted by the academic 
literature as an example of EU compromise. The motivation behind this assertion rests on 
the fact that Member States are given a choice regarding the indicator against which they 
would be monitored in their progress on meeting the limitation of poverty and social 
exclusion target. This is possible as the target itself represents an amalgam of three 
measures of the phenomenon: disposable income from whatever source, access to the 
customary standard and style of living, and joblessness in households. Even though each 
measurement is given equal weight, the underlining phenomena have been different both in 
terms of intensity and scale across Member States679. Another shift brought by the new 
strategy has been visible in terms of a certain synchronisation of its financial framework. 
More specifically, different funding instruments such as structural funds, agricultural and 
rural development funding, the Research Framework Programme and the Competitiveness 
and Innovation Framework Programme have all accommodated to varying degrees or have 
been aligned with the key thematic areas of the Europe 2020 strategy so that the 
achievement of the targets would be facilitated.   
Relating to governance, the strategy also tried to remedy the rather weak architecture 
exhibited by its ancestor, imposing on Member States the obligation to present two reports 
every year, the Stability and Convergence Programme and the National Reform Programme, 
which are forwarded every April and are fully integrated in the European Semester, the EU’s 
annual cycle of economic policy guidance and surveillance. This latter exercise is initiated 
by the European Commission through its annual Growth Survey that sets out priority 
actions to be taken by Member States. Annexed to this document is a progress report in 
which the European Commission evaluates the steps taken by Member States – in line with 
the Europe 2020 guidelines – to implement the strategy’s initiatives and to improve 
progress towards achieving of the targets. The Commission also publishes the Alert 
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Mechanism report680 which identifies Member States at risk of macro-economic imbalances 
(signalling which states will subsequently be subject to in-depth reviews) and proposes 
draft Council recommendations on the economic policy of the Euro area. The European 
Parliament and the Council also express their opinions on the Annual Growth Survey. The 
next step in the monitoring and evaluation cycle belongs to the Commission which 
publishes country reports, providing Member States with assessments of the 
implementation of Country Specific Recommendations. The Spring European Council, the 
annual meeting dedicated to economic stocktaking, provides strategic guidance over the 
priorities to be pursued during the Semester cycle and invites Member States to take 
account of those priorities in their Stability or Convergence Programmes and National 
Reform Programmes. The Stability and Convergence Programmes are part of the exercise 
being based on the economic governance rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, agreement 
adopted in 1997 and reformed in 2005, 20011 and 2013 having as main objective the 
enforcement of fiscal responsibility among Member States. Thus, countries sharing the Euro 
currency lay out their fiscal plans over a period of three years in Stability programmes, 
while non-Euro states submit Convergence Programmes that also contain monetary 
strategies as well as outlines of medium-term budget plans. The European Commission and 
the Council assess the National Reform and the Stability or Convergence Programmes, as 
well as the progress made by Member States towards the Europe 2020 targets and on the 
basis of this documentation, the Commission proposes updates Country Specific 
Recommendations, which are discussed (by employment, economic and finance and 
competitiveness Councils), endorsed and finally adopted by the Council, bringing the cycle 
to a close.  
The Stability and Convergence Programmes setting Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives 
(MTOs) - a budgetary target defined in structural terms - represent the basis for the two 
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‘arms’ of the Stability and Growth Pact, namely the preventive arm (through which Member 
States are guided to address temporary deviations from their MTO) and the corrective one 
governing the Excessive Deficit Procedure whereby non-compliance with recommendations 
can trigger sanctions for Euro area Member States681. The National Reform Programmes, 
initially developed under the Lisbon agenda, remained the central mechanism for national 
reporting on domestic policy measures to achieve the Europe 2020 targets. In order to 
avoid the risk of poor performing states’ free-riding on the better performance of others, 
when requesting Member States to set their specific national contributions towards meeting 
the EU-level targets, the Commission encouraged countries to enter into dialogue682. 
However, even so, a 2011 assessment of the Commission revealed that in the case of full 
compliance with national targets, these results would not secure the meeting of the EU-level 
targets683.  While concerns have been voiced that the new policy coordination framework 
embodied in the European Semester with its focus predominantly on economic and fiscal 
policy monitoring could create the risk of marginalisation of whatever social policy 
messages might emerge through the reporting and monitoring of Member States’ National 
Reform Programmes684, it certainly provided for the co-ordination of co-ordination 
processes across economic governance and Europe 2020. Mid-term reviews of the Strategy 
show however, that the disparity in the attention provided by the Commission to issues of 
financial stability to the detriment of structural reforms (micro-economic issues) has placed 
the employment and poverty targets at the largest distance from being reached in the 
present than they were in 2010685. However, even in this case the opinions are divided, 
more recent studies showing that starting with 2011 a progressive ‘socialisation’ of the 
European Semester has taken place, a shift visible through the expansion in scope (range of 
‘social’ topics covered) and the ambition (asking for the recalibration of social policies) of 
the Country-Specific Recommendations from year to year, and the enhanced role of social 
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and employment policy actors (such as the Directorate General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion, the Social Protection Committee and the Employment, Social Policy, 
Health and Consumer Affairs Council) in the monitoring, reviewing and amending of 
Country-Specific Recommendations686. Yet in terms of compliance and sanctioning 
possibilities attached to the Europe 2020 Strategy, some authors have argued that the very 
weak option of the Commission to issue a warning in accordance with art. 121 paragraph 4 
TFEU in cases where Member States fail to adequately respond to policy recommendations 
further reinforces the risk of free-riding687.  However, under the new Structural Funds 
Regulation covering the 2014-2020 programming period the Commission benefits of three 
levers through which it can exert pressure on Member States to implement Country-Specific 
Recommendations688. The ex-ante conditionality presupposes that the Commission can 
refuse to approve Member States’ Operational Programmes if they do not target 
expenditure on the priorities set in the Country-Specific Recommendations. The 
reprogramming conditionality implies the Commission’s possibility to request Member 
States to redirect a portion of their structural funding to meeting newly arisen priorities. 
And finally, through the suspension conditionality, the Commission is obliged to bring 
forward a proposal for the progressive suspension of structural funding for Member States 
failing to comply with recommendations under the corrective arm of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure and of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. While limitations to these types 
of conditionality exist and no proposals for suspensions have been so far tabled, the 
presence of these options for the Commission to encourage compliance does indicate a 
tendency towards ‘hardening’ the Europe 2020 Strategy. In what follows we will explore the 
impact of the strategy in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria.  
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5.3. Evaluating Romania and Bulgaria’s progress towards “smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth” – focus on social policies 
5.3.1. Bulgaria 
In the period marked by the introduction and the implementation of the governance 
architecture of the Europe 2020 Strategy, both Romania and Bulgaria were marked by 
severe political struggles and reverberations of the global economic crisis, despite relatively 
prudent macroeconomic management.  
In Bulgaria’s case, the three-party coalition government (June 2005 – July 2009) - 
comprising the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the centre-right National Movement Simeon II 
(NMSII) and the right-wing nationalist Movement for Rights and Freedom pursued a 
reasonable fiscal policy which earned it high marks from the International Monetary Fund. 
In its 2009 Country Report, the IMF was observing that as the country was entering 
economic slowdown due to drops in the capital inflows, the previous strategy of running 
large fiscal surpluses in previous years was placing the country on a strong position689.  
Moreover, the structural reforms implemented before 2007 coupled with EU accession 
support translated in Bulgaria’s case to a rate of real economic growth at 5.5% in 2005, 
6.2% in 2006 and 6.3% in 2007690. One concern underlined in this period however was the 
fact that the Bulgarian economy distinguished itself as one of the most heavily reliant on 
foreign direct investments capital inflows in the Central and Eastern Europe, in 2005 
reaching 9.9% of GDP per annum – compared to 5.6% in Romania, 2.2% in Poland, 4.1% in 
Slovakia, 3.1% in Hungary and 4.4% in the Czech Republic691. Moreover, these capital 
inflows also fuelled and financed a credit boom, with private sector credit rising from 26% 
of GDP in 2003 to 66.7% of GDP in 2008692. The danger in this sense was that as the global 
economy contracted and confidence of investors decreased, because the majority of 
investments in Bulgaria went to the service and property sectors instead of developing 
production capacity in the industrial sector, accelerated withdrawals from the national 
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economy were imminent. In this sense, between 2005 and 2008, the percentage of inward 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in manufacturing and construction sectors decreased from 
30.3% to 25.8%. In the same period, foreign investments in the wholesale, retail trade and 
real estate sectors grew from 25.1% to 37.1%693. In 2009, FDI withdrawals continued to 
decrease in the manufacturing and construction sectors reaching 25.2%. This trend began 
to be observed in the case of services as well, in 2009 FDI investments in the wholesale, 
retail trade and real estate sectors reaching 36.2%694.   
Bulgaria had embraced financial reforms in this time in order to sustain macroeconomic 
stability and damped somewhat the effect of shocks. As such, it built between 2004 and 
2008 fiscal buffers by accumulating fiscal surpluses, the foreign exchange reserves 
amounting to approximately 41% of annual GDP, while the cash fiscal reserves 
(accumulated over the years from the budgetary surplus) standing at around 17% of the 
annual GDP695. Public debt was also reduced in 2008 to 13.3% from over 70% of the GDP in 
2000696. However, while the macroeconomic policies pursued by Bulgaria were generally 
effective, the country managing low and controlled deficits and relatively low levels of 
public debt, the microeconomic policies have not been successful. Lukewarm achievements 
in curbing unemployment, a deficient regulatory and administrative system that could not 
adequately support the private sector, and little progress in increasing the level of skills of 
its active population, in fostering innovation and raising productivity have been recurrent 
issues identified by the European Commission both in its Annual Country Assessments 
under the Lisbon Strategy and in its regular assessments of Bulgaria’s national reform 
programme under the Europe 2020 Strategy.  The unemployment rate in Bulgaria, while 
initially below the average registered in the Euro area which for 2008 was calculated at 
7.6%, doubled in 2011 reaching 11.3%. This upsurge in unemployment is partly explained 
through its cyclical nature. Growth in sectors that had been the engine of job creation up 
until 2008, namely the construction, industry, real estate, and trade sectors, had started to 
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decline. Exports, which within the Balkan region accounted for approximately one-fifth of 
employment, declined in 2009 in Bulgaria by 22% (10% in volumes)697 which translated in 
large layoffs and prolonged unemployment in the trade industries. Construction, tourism, 
the metallurgy and textile sectors were particularly hard-hit with worker layoffs and 
subsequent protests and labour unrest698. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Unemployment rates Bulgaria 2008-2014 
Source: Republic of Bulgaria National Statistical Institute, Labour Time series, available at : 
http://www.nsi.bg/en/content/6503/unemployed-and-unemployment-rates-national-level-statistical-regions-
districts. 
 
Planned commercial and residential real estate developments were also either scaled back 
or postponed as the credit policies of commercial banks became restrictive and no new 
governmental policies towards residential construction were included in the anti-crisis 
package. In contrast, in Romania’s case the government launched in May 2009 the “Prima 
Casa” (First Home) programme designed to boost the residential constructions sector which 
had also been seriously affected by the economic and financial crisis. Through this 
programme, the state was offering support to citizens wishing to purchase a home for the 
first time and who had not contracted a mortgage loan previous to the date when the 
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programme became effective (June 2009).  The programme, which to the time of writing 
still continues, is based on securities provided by the state, through the National Loan 
Guarantee fund for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises for loans of up to Euro 60.000 (in 
the case of old apartments) or Euro 70.000 (for new apartments), thus allowing access to 
mortgage loans to many who otherwise could not qualify. Beneficiaries were able to buy an 
apartment or house by making an advance payment of 5% compared to 20-25% in the case 
of regular mortgages. Between the launching of the programme and the beginning of 2015, 
approximately 130.000 loan guarantees were provided for funding totalling Euro 2.525 
billion, of which 31% represented the value of guarantees for the purchasing of 
apartments/houses constructed between 2008 and 2014699. In Bulgaria, as the purchasing 
power of the population decreased by 4.29% in 2009 compared to the previous year700, the 
decreasing demand in the residential constructions sector translated into a contraction of 
transactions of approximately 35%. Over the 2008-2011 period, employment in this sector 
declined by more than 30%701.  
However, the overall situation in the labour market was also marked by a series of factors of 
a fundamental nature. Firstly, the demographic crisis manifested in sharply increased 
emigration flows, mainly of young, educated and highly skilled people and in decreasing 
birth rates especially sustained by low living standards affected both the size and the 
quality of the labour force. Moreover, Bulgaria faced relatively high drop-out rates in 
secondary education, only in the 2004/2005 school year, approximately 21,000 students 
leaving general schools for different reasons702. And while PISA (Program for International 
Student Assessment) scores for Bulgaria improved by 27 points from the 2006 survey to the 
2009 one (thus reflecting improved learning achievements among Bulgarian students)703, 
the latter still revealed that 41% of surveyed students had the lowest score for reading 
proficiency, having serious difficulties in evaluating, understanding, using and reflecting on 
written texts, and almost 50% of students receiving a similar low score for mathematical 
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proficiency, not being able to use and engage with mathematics and make well-founded 
judgements. A similar situation was also recorded in Romania’s case, the mean score 
achieved not revealing statistically significant differences between the two countries704. 
Thus, at the onset of the financial crisis, both countries faced the same dilemma: the 
learning content of their vocational and training systems lagged in terms of fostering 
generic, transferable skills, increasingly needed in an era of fast technological advance. For 
the labour markets this meant that the young staying in education did not necessarily 
acquire the skills and competences essential in order to compete in a high innovation 
economy. As regards to early school leavers, their opportunities to be (re)integrated on the 
labour market and to benefit of labour mobility were severely lowered. It is within this 
context that the European Commission recommended Bulgaria at the beginning of 2009, 
within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy, to focus on: 
 
“(…) increasing the quality of labour supply and the employment rate by improving the 
efficiency, effectiveness and targeting of active labour market policies and by further 
modernising and adapting the way education is governed to raise skills to levels that better 
match labour market needs, and reducing early school leaving.”705  
 
The initial response of the Stanishev government was synchronised with the situation on 
the labour market, which was marked by an activity rate of the Bulgarian population of 
66.3% in 2007706 and boosted by three consecutive years (2006-08) of high economic 
growth of more than 6%. As part of the 2007 state budget, the government allocated 
approximately Euro 90 million for active labour market policies, 80% of the sum being 
oriented towards the creation of subsidised employment, 11% subsidising measures related 
to the Employment Promotion Act (adopted in 2001, the institution regulates the promotion 
and support of employment, vocational information, consultation and training), and 9% 
being allocated to vocational training707. Moreover, under the 2007 National Action Plan for 
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Employment, the government put forward measures aimed to encourage employers to hire 
new workers by providing for subsidised wages and tax relief, and to promote 
entrepreneurship among unemployed citizens. Among the active measures applied in this 
sense were the National Programmes “From Social Aid to Employment”, “Assistants to 
people with disabilities”, “Assistance for Retirement”, and “Career Start”. The most 
important programme - “From Social Aid to Employment” had as main aim the employment 
and social integration of long-term unemployed persons benefiting of monthly social 
assistance for whom the programme would assure participation in community activities 
implemented by municipalities, non-governmental organisations or businesses. In 2008 the 
programme included 52.586 individuals representing 60.3% of the total number of citizens 
included in all of the programmes run by the Employment Agency708. By 2009, 76.751 
persons were benefitting of short-term subsidised employment709. However, the extent to 
which these active measures have been successful over the long-term has been debated, as 
these programmes were mainly targeting individuals with low qualifications and were not 
able to address the problem of long-term unemployment. A recent assessment of the 
efficiency of the programme “From Social Aid to Employment” emphasised that the 
drawbacks of the scheme, namely the temporary nature of employment provided under the 
programme, the low-skilled jobs offered (cleaning, planting, local infrastructure sustenance 
etc.) that did not translate into the development of new abilities, and the discriminatory 
attitudes among some private employers attracted into the programme towards 
beneficiaries led to a dependency relationship between the activity status of beneficiaries to 
state subsidies. Otherwise said, the programme “would not offer hired persons some 
different life perspective besides their turning back to the registration as unemployed or 
participation in some other project of the programme”710.  
In April 2008 the Bulgarian government adopted a renewed strategy for employment for 
the 2008-2015 period which targeted the increase of the employment rate to 72% by 2015, 
an increased participation of elder workers on the labour market (up to an average 
retirement age of 68), a 3% decrease of the unemployment rate, a decrease of the early 
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222 
 
school-leaving rate from 16.6% to 10% and increased labour productivity. The strategy, 
which was aligned to the updated Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs711, benefited of input 
from social partners, being developed within the National Council for Tripartite 
Cooperation - the main body for social dialogue in Bulgaria (established in 1993) 
comprising representatives of the government (the deputy Prime Minister and one minister 
depending on the issues discussed), of the trade unions (the largest being the Confederation 
of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria and the Confederation of Labour “Podkrepa”) and 
of the employers’ organisations. The overall new focus of labour policies was on activating 
vulnerable groups and increasing literacy among low-skilled persons, while in terms of 
improving education performance, Bulgaria implemented quality assurance mechanisms 
and general performance evaluations, school funding was decentralised and linked to 
performance and a system of differentiated pay and teacher training was set up.  The wage 
differentiation scheme was based on three payment pillars which granted a monthly pay 
increase equivalent to 20% of the gross monthly wage in the education sector to 10% of the 
best teachers in the country, an equivalent of 10% raise to the remaining 10%, and a 5% 
salary increase to another 40% of teachers712.    
As the first signals of the onset of the crisis began to crystallise in Bulgaria the government 
made a first step to introducing a set of anti-crisis measures. As such, the government 
presented at a meeting held in December 2008 with representatives of social partners such 
as the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB) and the 
Confederation of Employers and Industrialists in Bulgaria (CEIBG) a package of anti-crisis 
measures that aimed primarily at the prevention of the further growth of the 
unemployment rate.  In terms of social security, the governmental proposals aligned around 
three main courses of action: 
- Training and retraining 150.000 individuals, of whom 64.000 would be hired and 
over 10.000 would start their own businesses, using resources provided through the 
“Human Resources Development” programme; 
- Implementing measures for the protection of existing employment, such as the 
recognition of up to 160 days of unpaid leave per year as part of seniority and length 
of service in insurance;  
                                                          
711 And taking into consideration the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2008-2010) proposed by the 
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712 E. Skarby (2007):”Wage Differentiation Scheme for teachers Gets Go-Ahead”, European Observatory of 
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- Guaranteeing part-time employment for periods longer than three months, and 
providing public subsidies to companies for the payment of salaries (the state 
covering up to a half of the minimum salary per month)713.  
Together with these measures which were accepted by social partners, the government also 
established, at the request of the Bulgarian Industrial Association, an Anti-crisis Council 
under the authority of the Prime Minister, and supplemented funding to support increased 
competitiveness of local businesses and of regions. In this sense, after the Bulgarian 
Parliament changed in April 2008 the mandate of the Development Bank, constituting it as 
the country’s specialised vehicle for financing small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), 
the government began the gradual capitalisation of the institution by a total of BGN 500 
million. By February 2009, the Bulgarian Development Bank had provided BGN 250 million 
to 13 commercial banks for medium and long-term investments loans and pre-export 
financing provided to businesses. In the first month of the implementation of this measure, 
the Development Bank had already given out loans totalling BGN 43 million714.  A similar 
facility was also provided for agricultural producers, in April 2009 the Development Bank 
granting 100 BGN million in credit funding715.  
In terms of fiscal policy, for 2008 the government continued to aim for tight aggregate 
spending and managed to reach a surplus of 1.6% of the GDP. Fiscal discipline came not 
only as a political decision, but was also strongly connected to the Currency Board 
Arrangement (CBA) that was introduced in Bulgaria in 1997, in the context of a severe 
exchange-rate and a banking crisis that had led the country to default on its international 
debt and battle hyperinflation (soaring to 500%) that sent the economy into a free fall716. 
The benefits of such arrangements are many: a fixed exchange rate regime can be an 
effective anti-inflation tool as it provides transparency and raises the costs of politically 
geared (loose) monetary and fiscal policies (governments are prevented from financing 
budget deficits by printing money as the local currency can only be issued in exchange for 
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714 Bulgarian Development Bank (2009): “Bulgarian Development Bank provided BGN 230 million to 12 
Commercial Banks for loans to local Small and Medium-Sized Firms”, (Sofia, Bulgarian Development Bank), 9th 
February Press Release.  
715 Bulgarian Development Bank (2009): “Bulgarian Development Bank Gives the Banks a Hundred Millions Leva 
to Fund Farmers” (Sofia, Bulgarian Development Bank), Press Release 22nd April Press Release.  
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reserve assets and the reserve currency), and as it anchors inflationary expectations it also 
encourages foreign investors to negotiate long-term trade and investment contracts (the 
national authorities not being able to be inconsistent with previous arrangements)717. Thus, 
through this arrangement, the national currency (BGN) was pegged to the Euro and the 
monetary policy attributes of the Bulgarian National Bank were restricted to influencing 
credit expansion to a limited extent, by putting a regulatory ceiling on lending or increasing 
the reserves required by commercial banks. The results of the CBA introduction were 
immediate, inflation being lowered to single-digit values after just two years. In the 
following years the inflation rate remained within single-digit values, although significantly 
larger than the EU average (in 2004 for example being at 6.1% compared to 2.0%), a 
situation reflecting the higher risks in the domestic economy718. And as the economy began 
to overheat with the labour market tightening, wage growth accelerating to a peak of 25% 
in June 2008, and food and oil prices rising, inflation reached 12.3% at the end of 2008.  
Starting with 2009, as the domestic demand began to slow down and the international 
prices for raw material and fuel started to decrease compared to the past year, the inflation 
rate was moderated to 2.5%.  
In terms of budgetary allocations, as commitments began to materialise and budget 
allocations for social spending increased, the overall government spending in the last two 
months of 2008 had reached 10.8% of the GDP719. Furthermore, despite the implemented 
measures to curb expenditures and improve tax compliance (between 2008 and 2009 the 
government intensifying onsite controls particularly in the case of large taxpayers, 
restructuring the National Revenue Agency and the customs agency and linking together 
their information systems720) the government was not able to offset the significant revenue 
shortfall. Hence, for 2009 the general government deficit reached 4.1%721, yet this still 
placed Bulgaria both below the EU and the Euro area averages (-6.7% and -6.3% 
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respectively).  During its mandate, the coalition government came under increased 
pressure, the parliamentary opposition calling for three votes of no confidence during 2008 
that mirrored concerns emanating from Brussels: the high level of corruption, the 
government’s links to organised crime and its inability to manage EU funds and the material 
and non-material damages caused as a consequence. The governing coalition survived all 
three votes, benefiting of an oversized majority in the Parliament. Governmental reshuffling 
was however done, the ministers of internal affairs, defence, agriculture and healthcare 
being replaced, and a new Deputy Prime Minister and minister responsible for the 
management of EU funds were appointed722. But this was not enough, and the July 2009 
parliamentary elections brought forward the Citizens for the European Development of 
Bulgaria Party (GERB) that formed a minority government, headed by Boyko Borrisov. 
Following a series of protests organised in June 2009 by the Confederation of Independent 
Trade Unions that called for urgent measures to deal with the effects of the financial and 
economic crisis723, social partners were invited by the new government to the negotiations 
table in order to agree over a much-needed anti-crisis pact. Initial policy proposals were 
drafted by the social partners and negotiated in March 2010 in the National Council for 
Tripartite Cooperation. The resulting anti-crisis package containing 59+1 measures was 
announced on the 31st of March 2010. The first group of measures were aimed at fighting 
budgetary deficit through accelerated privatisation of minority residual shareholding in 
companies through the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, the reduction of administrative spending 
by 10% and the sale of CO₂ emission quotas, and was expected to generate BGN 1.6 billion 
in savings. The second set of measures targeted private enterprises and included increasing 
the capital of the Bulgarian Development Bank for investment funding, repayment of all 
state debts resulting from public procurement contracts with private firms by the first half 
of 2010, and improvement of the system of payment of sums from European funds due to 
beneficiaries. In the social sphere, the pact provided for a new mechanism for increasing the 
minimum wage, the removal of an upper limit on unemployment benefits (setting the level 
of benefits as 60% of the contributory income before the loss of job), a temporary freeze of 
state-regulated utility prices, the provision of additional funds for subsidised employment, 
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the application of a mechanism guaranteeing the funds of insured persons with additional 
capital held in deposits at Bulgarian commercial banks, and the introduction of a set of 
measures for preserving employment at enterprises experiencing difficulties in the 
production and sale of their outputs (such as the introduction of flexible hours, specific 
leave for economic reasons, state guaranteeing compensations to dismissed workers 
etc.)724. In the case of the measures concerning privatisations and the selling of carbon 
emission quotas, the GERB government did not reach its proposed targets, but the socially-
oriented and labour market measures were largely implemented, although some analysts 
have argued that the active measures taken by both the BSP and the GERB governments, 
namely subsidised employment and the training and retraining of unemployed persons, 
have come at large public costs while not producing lasting results and economic growth 
due to their mechanic nature725.  
In terms of the fiscal policy pursued by the new government, what was clear was that it 
aimed for balanced budgets through expenditure reductions across the board. As such, for 
both 2009 and 2010 most end-year and other bonus payments in the public sector were 
scrapped, especially as the authorities hoped that by pursuing fiscal stringency the 
country’s case for its application to enter the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, which 
was going to be submitted in early 2010, would be improved. However, by both curbing 
public investment and withholding of payments due from the budget especially to firms 
involved in public procurement trapped the economy “in a largely self-inflicted vicious cycle 
of an economic downswing and a swelling fiscal imbalance”726. In 2010, after the deficit 
from the previous year was revised, increasing from 1.9% to 4.9% of the GDP (large arrears 
primarily in the construction and defence sectors being discovered), the government saw 
itself forced to drop its application for the European exchange rate Mechanism II, while the 
European Commission initiated an Excessive Deficit Procedure727.  
The procedure was first introduced by the European Union through its Stability and Growth 
Pact (1997), the cornerstone of the European Union’s macroeconomic architecture which 
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was based on two Council regulations728 that urged Member States to maintain their 
budgets in surplus or close to balance (budget deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP) and to 
restrict their public debt to no more than 60% of GDP.  At its core, the Pact which was 
revised in both 2005 and 2011729, has both a preventive and a corrective mechanism, the 
first focusing on detailed monitoring by the Commission of Member States’ fiscal positions 
based on annual convergence (in the case of non-euro members) or stability programmes 
(members of the Euro zone). The preventive arm includes two policy instruments: an early 
warning addressed by the Council on the basis of a proposal by the European Commission 
and policy recommendations which the European Commission directly addresses to a 
Member State as regards the broad implications of its fiscal policies730. The core 
requirement in this case is that Member States reach and maintain a Medium Term 
Objective (MTO) – a country-specific budgetary reference value defined in structural terms 
(cyclically adjusted and net of one-off and temporary measures) that is to be set within a 
safety margin in view of the 3% deficit limit. The yearly stability and convergence 
programmes must contain a formulation of an adjustment path towards meeting the 
specific Medium Term Objective, and in the case Euro zone members if significant and 
repeated deviations from the adjustment path are observed, financial sanctions (interest-
bearing deposits of up to 0.2% of the GDP) are foreseen731. The corrective or dissuasive part 
of the Pact governs the Excessive Deficit Procedure through which countries are given a 
deadline of six months (or three in the case of a serious breach) to comply with 
recommendations that provide it with concrete steps to correcting its deficit within a set 
timeframe. The European Commission together with the Council assess the progress done 
by the country in question, and if effective action is deemed, but public finances are affected 
by exceptional events, an extension or revision of recommendations is considered. Where 
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countries fail to take effective action to correct the excessive deficit in due time, revised 
recommendations and new timelines are issued, but in the case of Euro zone members the 
stepping up of the procedure may result in the imposition or strengthening of sanctions in 
the form of a fine of 0.2% of GDP (on a recommendation by the European Commission for a 
Council decision which is taken semi-automatically unless a qualified majority of Member 
States votes against it). Moreover, all countries in receipt of assistance from the Cohesion 
Fund may face a temporary suspension of this financing (under the 2014-2020 budgetary 
exercise, the Cohesion Fund concerns Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia)732.  
As for the 2007-2013 European budgetary exercise, Bulgaria had been allocated 
approximately Euro 6.9 billion representing EU structural and cohesion funds (Romania 
was allocated Euro 19.7 billion), and as in 2008 the country had had the experience of the 
EU freezing Euro 500 million due to funds mismanagement, the GERB government pursued 
a strict fiscal policy: it froze pensions and wages, streamlined public administration 
(including by reducing the civil service by some 9.000 workers), increased excise duties 
(cigarettes and electricity), and hiked taxes on gambling and real estate733. While the 
adopted economic austerity measures were successful in improving the budget position 
(the deficit being cut from almost 4% of the GDP in 2010 to 1% in 2012), they came at the 
cost of increasing social unrest. In 2013, expenditures on dwellings, water, electricity and 
fuels increased by 1.8%, reaching a share of 18% of the household expenditures734. In the 
context of a material deprivation rate that reached 43 points in Bulgaria in 2013, which 
reflected the inability of close to a half of the country’s population to afford among others 
unexpected financial expenses and adequate heating, the steadily increase since 2004 of 
electricity prices coupled with a slow increase of household incomes (the National 
Statistical Institute of Bulgaria reporting an increase of household income between 2008 to 
2012 of just 13%) led at the beginning of 2013 to wide-spread protests against the GERB-
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led government and public anger over the economy. The government resigned in February, 
and a caretaker government was appointed by the President of the country, Rosen 
Plevneliev.  
During Borrisov’s mandate the new Europe 2020 Strategy was adopted in June 2010, and 
the country was subsequently invited to adopt its own national targets on employment, 
innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy and to submit its national reform 
programme. Social participation within this process was also secured. The process of 
preparation of the National Reform Programme which sets the country’s policies and 
measures to sustain growth and jobs and to reach the Europe 2020 targets included the 
involvement of the Bulgarian Economic and Social Council (ESC) – the permanent 
institutionalised form of social dialogue between the state – The Council of Ministers and 
the parliament – and organised civil society in the area of social policy735. By law, the 
Council which was formed in 2003 and reunites nationally representative organisations of 
employers, employees and of various interests (agricultural producers, cooperatives, 
craftsmen, professional branches etc.), is required to develop opinions on draft laws, 
national programmes, and plans regarding the economic and social development of the 
country. Based on this provision, the Bulgarian Economic and Social Council was invited to 
take part within the interdepartmental working group on Europe 2020 which drafted the 
National Reform Programme. The ESC has also forwarded observations and 
recommendations regarding the quality of education and drop-out rates which were 
incorporated into the updated 2012 National Reform Programme736.  
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Europe 2020 targets Situation in Bulgaria 
in 2009 
Bulgarian Europe 
2020 targets 
3% of EU GDP invested in R&D  0.5% 1.5% 
75% of 20-65 year-old to be employed  65.4% 76% 
Reducing early school leaving to below 
10% 
14.7% 11% 
At least 40% of 30-34 year-old 
population completing tertiary 
education  
27.9% 36% 
At least 20 million fewer people in/at 
risk of poverty/exclusion 
3.5 million people at-
risk-of poverty or 
exclusion 
Reduction by 260,000 
persons 
20% increase in energy efficiency  Reduction of 3.20 Mtoe 
20% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions (from sources not covered 
by Emissions Trading System) 
0% +20% 
20% of Energy from renewable 
sources (share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption) 
9.4%(Eurostat 2008) 16% 
Figure 8 Europe 2020 & Bulgaria targets 
Source: Government of Republic of Bulgaria (2011): National Reform Programme (2011-2015). Implementation 
of “Europe 2020 Strategy” (Sofia, 13 April), p. 16. 
 
For its national employment rate, despite low levels of population optimism regarding the 
economic situation of the country revealed by a 2010 Eurobaromoter737, the GERB 
government set out a target slightly higher that the EU one, the then Deputy Minister of 
Labour and Social Policy, Krasimir Popov, arguing that the goal while ambitious was not 
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impossible to be reached738. In reality, throughout 2010 up until 2014, the employment rate 
remained well below the European average and the Euro area, reflecting a weak labour 
market as well as skills mismatch between demand and supploy. In order to advance in 
approaching this goal, on the short term, the National Reform Programme for 2011-2015 
proposed a series of active measures in the form of subsidised employment (the National 
Programme “Assistants to People with Disabilities”, “Employment and Professional Training 
of People with Permanent Disabilities”, “New Chance for Employment”, “Career Start”, and 
encouragement measures for subsidising employment in the private sector), and the 
training and retraining of unemployed (such as the “Development” Scheme or the “I can” 
and “I can more” schemes). Overall, based on the implementation of these measures, the 
National Reform Programme targeted the employment of at least 10.497 people and the 
subsidising of 11.180 employees 739.  However, while funding for the active measures 
increased, totalling BGN 127 million (a raise by 30% in comparison to 2010, largely based 
on supplementary funding available under the Human Resources Development Operational 
Programme), the results achieved were lukewarm, the total number of persons working 
under programme measures for employment and training in 2011 being of 23.908, lower by 
12% compared to the previous year740.  
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August), available at http://www.euractiv.com/priorities/bulgaria-sets-employment-target-higher-than-eu-
average-news-497282.  
739 Figures based on the calculation of all of the targets attached to each National Programme presented as an 
active measure on the labour market in the National Reform Programme (2011-2015). Implementation of 
“Europe 2020 Strategy”.  
740 Government of Republic of Bulgaria (2012): Yearbook 2011 (Sofia, Ministry of labor and Social Policy – 
Employment Agency), p. 26.  
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Figure 9 Employment rate (% of population aged 20-64) 
Source: European Statistical Office, 2007-2014, data available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Employment_rate,_age_group_15%E2%80%9364,_2004%E2%80%9314_(%25)_YB1
6.png 
 
On the medium term, the country targeted a 27% increase by 2015 in participation of young 
people in the labour market through internship schemes (paid traineeship of up to 6 
months organised for people aged up to 29 years), activate by 2015 35% of the long-term 
unemployed and integrate vulnerable groups on the labour market through various 
schemes (such as “Back to work” whereby long-term unemployed persons would be hired 
to look after children of 1 up to 3 years of age), improve employment services by 
introducing a general information system in all labour offices, improve matching between 
labour demand and supply by connecting forecasting of labour demands with the 
educational curricula and programmes in the secondary level of education, and increase 
skills and knowledge of the work force through life-long learning programmes.  
An analysis of the 2012-2015 Country reports, European Commission proposals and 
Council recommendations for Bulgaria on the trajectory towards meeting its national 
employment target reveals that the active labour market policies pursued by the Bulgarian 
government have been deemed as insufficiently developed both in terms of coverage and of 
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targeting, the fragmentation of agencies being a major challenge in the delivery of benefits 
and services to the unemployed and the inactive. In its Recommendation to the Council 
regarding the 2015 National reform Programme of Bulgaria, the European Commission 
observed that a high proportion of young people in the country are neither employed, nor in 
education or vocational training and are not in touch with the employment services. In this 
way this category is virtually outside the scope of any standard labour market activation 
policy741. Moreover, a recent assessment of the impact of active social programmes on the 
labour market observed that in situ, social workers assuring the operationalisation of the 
policies expressed their preference to advising and orienting individuals with better 
prospects of obtaining full time employment offers, in contradiction to the objectives of 
some of the programmes that targeted the integration and motivation of the poorest 
marginalised persons742. This situation was also reflected in the 2013 European 
Commission recommendation towards Bulgaria which encouraged the country to reform its 
National Employment Agency so that the counselling services provided to jobseekers would 
become effective and the capacities of the institution for forecasting and matching skill 
needs on the labour market would be developed743. The latter issue of ineffective matching 
of demand and supply on the labour market is best reflected when considering employment 
among young graduates. In this sense, in 2013 the employment rate of graduates was of 
67.3% and data from the Bulgarian university ranking system revealed that approximately 
half of the tertiary students are concentrated in 6 (economics, administration, law, 
computer technology, pedagogy, tourism) out of 52 professional fields, while severe 
shortages of specialists were present in key sectors744.  
In order to address the ever larger rates of youth unemployment across Europe, the 
European Council agreed to create in 2013 a Youth Employment Initiative which is a 
financial instrument concentrating on young people not in employment, education or 
training (the so-called NEETs) to support their access to the labour market and upgrade 
their skills. In the case of Bulgaria, the specific allocation for the 2014-2015 period was of 
Euro 55 million and by 2014 a Youth Guarantee was put in place, the government 
                                                          
741 European Commission (2015): Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2015 National Reform 
Progamme of Bulgaria (Brussels, European Commission), COM(2015)253 final, p. 4.  
742 T. Venelin, D. Sevdalina, E. Arabska (2015): “Assessing Impacts of Active Social Programs on the Labor 
Market in the Republic of Bulgaria”, Procedia Economics and Finance, Vol. 30, pp. 890-902.  
743 European Commission (2013): Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on Bulgaria’s 2013 National 
Reform Programme (Brussels, European Commission), COM(2013) 352final, p. 6.   
744 European Commission (2015): Country Report Bulgaria Including an In-Depth Review on the Prevention and 
Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances (Brussels, European Commission), SWD(2015) 22final, p. 49.  
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estimating that through this facility 154.000 young people would be provided with 
subsidised employment and 60.000 with jobs within the primary sector of the labour 
market745. While a strong and direct causal effect is difficult to be established, it is 
noteworthy here to mention that with 2014 and throughout the rest of the year, as well as 
in 2015 the youth unemployment rate in Bulgaria decreased from 26.40% in January 2014 
to 21.00% in August 2015746. In view of responding to a recurring Council recommendation 
of addressing the increasing skills and geographical mismatches, Bulgaria has also made 
steps to establish a National System for Forecasting the Development of the Labour Market, 
steps that have materialised into the application of a pilot Survey of the employers’ labour 
needs in 2012, replicated afterwards on an annual basis. At present, the Bulgarian 
government thus plans to use results of the surveys as well as a model of forecasting 
qualification needs on the labour market and develop an enrolment plan in the secondary 
and higher education system747. While it is too early to be able to assess the impact of these 
measures, what should be emphasised here is the willingness of the government to move 
beyond the option of creating subsidised employment in order to address the structural 
problems of unemployment.  
Intimately connected to the sensitive matter of equilibrating the qualified supply of 
workforce to the skills demand on the labour market are the targets relating to early school 
leavers and people aged 30-34 attending a form of higher education. For these targets, 
namely reducing school dropout to 11% by 2020 and increasing to 36% the share of people 
aged 30-34 within higher education, the 2011-2015 National Reform Programme set 
forward very few measures and largely general in nature and lacking a strong connection to 
the labour market requirements. The introduction of compulsory pre-school education for 
children aged 5 years together with the implementation of a system of consultations and 
additional activities for pupils with learning difficulties registered in primary and lower 
secondary education were envisaged for 2011, while for the medium-term the only 
proposed policy measure was the implementation of full-day schooling programmes for 
                                                          
745 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria (2013): “Bulgaria is among the first countries to already have 
a plan for the European Youth Guarantee”, (Sofia, Council of Ministers), Press Release 18th December, available 
at http://www.government.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0137&n=112&g=.  
746 European Statistical Office (2015): Youth Unemployment 2014-2015, data available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Youth_unemployment.  
747 European Parliament (2013): Youth Unemployment. Interparliamentary Meeting (Brussels, Committee of 
Employment and Social Affairs), Committee of Employment and Social Affairs Interparliamentary Meeting 29th 
January.  
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children in primary education by 2013748. The 2012 update of the National Reform 
Programme provisioned the development of a National Strategy for Reducing the Number 
of Early School Leavers by 2020 which would focus on developing long-term policies for 
school dropout prevention, intervention and compensation based on more efficient systems 
of monitoring749. In terms of the measures initiated by the Bulgarian authorities as a 
response to the Council recommendations, in 2012 a series of programmes were 
implemented towards improving the general educational content and curricula, setting a 
system of career orientation in schools, and a programme designed for pedagogical 
specialists to raise their professional competences in scientific, methodological and 
managerial training750. However, subsequent county assessments delivered by the 
European Commission have emphasised that despite these measures funded under the 
European Social Fund, no substantial steps have been taken to reform the educational 
system. The new School Education Act which is expected to introduce among others new 
national educational standards, provide schools with more freedom in curriculum 
development and teaching methods and improve the system of professional development 
and evaluation of teaching staff has been postponed numerous times since 2012 – when it 
was initially planned to be adopted.  The Law on National Education, adopted in 1991 and 
amended over 20 times in the past years has been supplemented by secondary legislation 
which has not always been coordinated.  The postponement of the new law on education 
was partly the result of political instability, as well as of a lack of public consensus which 
was also visible during the preparation and adoption in 2012-2013 of the Law on Pre-
school and School Education (which introduces among others obligatory pre-school training 
from the age of 4)751. In terms of political instability, from 2009 to 2015, the country was 
governed by two caretaker governments (March-May 2013 and August-November 2014) 
and three elected cabinets (GERB-led between July 2009 and March 2013; BSP-led coalition 
between May 2013 and August 2014; and the incumbent GERB-led government). This 
translated into a lack of continuity between different cabinets in approaching education 
                                                          
748 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria (2011): National Reform Programme (2011-2015). 
Implementation of “Europe 2020” Strategy (Sofia, Council of Ministers), 13th of April, p. 76.  
749 Ministry of Finance (2012): Europe 2020: National Reform Programme 2012 Update (Sofia, Ministry of 
Finance), p. 43.  
750 Ministry of Finance (2012): Europe 2020: National Reform Programme 2012 Update (Sofia, Ministry of 
Finance), p. 44.  
751 See Y. Totseva (2014): “The Education Reforms, Public Discussions and Social Changes in Bulgaria”, 
International Journal of Cross-Cultural Studies and Environmental Communication, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 124-34.  
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reform as well as lagging in adopting essential legislative frameworks that would lead to the 
implementation of necessary comprehensive reforms of the school system.  
As a result, the 2015 European Commission assessment of the education system in Bulgaria 
observed that while the 2012 PISA results have shown improvements, the country 
remained the worst performer in reading and mathematics and the third-worst performer 
in science, with students from non-profiled general education and vocational education and 
training schools (VET) doing particularly poorly. The Commission argued that this outcome 
needed to be considered against the backdrop of a very low level of annual expenditure per 
pupil, estimated at around 40% of the EU average when measured in Purchasing Power 
Standards752.  PISA evaluations have also revealed that differences in mathematics scores 
between students in the highest and lowest quintiles of socio-economic status in Bulgaria 
were among the highest in the region753, making opportunities for obtaining a good 
education in the country highly unequal and dependent on students’ background 
characteristics. In this sense, comparative data on the educational status of the three main 
ethnic groups in the country (Bulgarians, Turks, and Roma) derived from the 2011 National 
Census, has shown significant disparities in the educational integration of Roma children754.  
As a result, starting with 2012, the Council has expressly reiterated the need for Bulgaria to 
actively improve access to education for disadvantaged children, in particular of Romani 
ethnicity. Steps towards addressing this problem have been made, two of the most 
important strategic documents in this sense being the National Roma Integration Strategy 
(2012-2020) adopted in 2011 and the Strategy for Reducing the Share of Early School 
Leavers (2013-2020) adopted in 2013 which has identified Roma children as one of the 
groups at risk of dropout and put forward a series of additional measures. Amendments 
made to the Education Act have made enrolment in pre-school education of children aged 5 
compulsory, introducing as well financial sanctions for parents who failed to ensure the 
presence of their children in class. While the effectiveness of this decision has been debated, 
an increase of the percentage of Roma children aged 3-6 enrolled in kindergartens 
                                                          
752 European Commission (2015): Country Report Bulgaria 2015 Including an In-Depth Review on the Prevention 
and Correction of Imbalances (Brussels, European Commission), SWD(2015) 22final, p. 49.  
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increased from 73% in 2007 to 84% in 2014755 - Bulgarian authorities choosing to focus 
their attention on pre-school integration of children as an active measure of preventing 
primary and secondary dropout. This approach has seen some success, as Eurostat data 
shows that the rate of early leavers from education and training has decreased from 13.9% 
in 2010 to 12.9% in 2014756.  
5.3.2. Romania 
When turning to Romania, the pre-crisis period was marked by strong progress towards the 
country’s convergence with other EU Member States in terms of income and living 
standards, the economy expanding during 2001-2008 by an average of 5-6% per year, thus 
benefitting of one of the fastest growth rates in the EU. The prospects of the country gaining 
EU membership and the subsequent adoption of the acquis communautaire encouraged, as 
in the case of Bulgaria, large Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows and in turn growth. 
The foreign investment inflow translated into capital and access to markets, but also 
contributed substantially to the transfer of technology and knowledge, with a beneficial 
impact on productivity757.  However, similar to the case of Bulgaria, growth was uneven 
across different sectors such that between 2000 and 2008, average annual growth for the 
construction sector was reported around 15% and for services 6% - both sectors which 
tend to be non-tradable in Romania, while industry grew at 5% per year – below the 
average for the economy, and the agriculture sector registered a negative growth of 3.3%758. 
In contrast to Bulgaria though, where the currency board and prudent fiscal policies had 
kept the budget balanced, the Romanian authorities followed in this period pro-cyclical 
policies, increasing public-sector salaries at a pace that surpassed those in the private 
sector and witnessed an acceleration of domestic demand (understood as aggregate 
spending in an economy that includes imports). Real private credit expanded by some 50% 
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and Correction of Imbalances (Brussels, European Commission), SWD(2015)22 final, p. 50.   
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in 2007759, newly privatised banks being keen to boost profitability and market share while 
the population and economic operators nurtured optimistic expectations on the financial 
situation. High consumption was stimulated by a flat tax of 16% introduced in 2005 which 
increased the household disposable income, as well as by increasing remittances (money 
sent in the country by Romanians working abroad) that peaked to Euro 6.5 billion in 
2007760. This in turn fuelled an excessive demand for imports, putting trading balances at a 
deficit. In this context that was deemed by some analysts as unsustainable economic 
growth761, the expansionary budgetary policy pursued by the Romanian government 
further fuelled macroeconomic imbalances. As such, an increase in government spending 
from 31% of GDP in 2004 to 37% of GDP in 2008, a stagnation of revenues at around 31% 
of GDP in this period, and a hike in public employment, which expanded by 15% between 
2005 and 2008762 lead to an escalation of the government budget deficit from -1.2% in 2004 
to -5.7% of GDP in 2008763.  The general elections of November 2008 further encouraged 
increases in public spending, as the reshuffled centre-right coalition in power (formed of 
the National Liberal Party, and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) led by 
Călin Popescu Tăriceanu attempted to gain popularity by raising voters’ salaries and 
pensions. In this sense, two consecutive increases in public pensions brought the pension 
fund from surplus into deficit, undermining its long term financial sustainability. By the end 
of 2008, the public debt was of 13.4% of GDP, the unemployment rate was at 5.8% and the 
current account deficit was of -11.4%. At the same time, the country began to be directly 
affected by the economic crisis in the last quarter of 2008, industrial production and 
domestic consumption accelerating their declining tendency and budget revenues 
shrinking. In December 2008, a new government formed of a grand coalition between the 
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) and their erstwhile rivals, the Social Democratic Party 
(PSD) and led by Emil Boc (PDL) received the vote of confidence from the Parliament and 
was sworn in by the President. However, the collaboration protocol did not show much on 
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the side of policy strategies to comply with EU requirements, address political corruption or 
protect the country against the effects of the international economic crisis. In fact, it detailed 
the allocation of over 3.000 posts in the national and local administration, suggesting a 
tendency towards a position-seeking strategy instead of a policy-seeking one. As an 
example, at the national level, the administration comprised 20 minister portfolios, 80 
deputy minister posts, and hundreds of councillors, directors and deputy-directors, each 
with their own advisors764. Moreover, given that the budget for 2009 was calculated on a 
presumed economic growth of at least 3%, the sharp economic contraction of 6.6% led to a 
deficit of 9%. In the spring of 2009, pressed by the rapid deterioration of the country’s 
economy and the fragility of the national currency, the Boc government requested a loan of 
Euro 19.95 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the EU, the World Bank and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The loan, which was the 
largest the country had ever contracted, was to be disbursed in six instalments within two 
years, conditional on the country scaling down of public spending, reducing the budget 
deficit to 5.9% of GDP, the number of public servants, and of the debt to private firms. The 
support was meant to be given to the banking system in order to prevent high inflation and 
a dramatic drop in the exchange rate. However, in September 2009, contrary to the 
commitments taken by the country, the government used Euro 1 billion in order to cover 
public servants’ wages, pensions and benefits, most of which had been raised in view of the 
November 2009 presidential elections. In response, the IMF delayed the third instalment 
and warned that in future all money should go to the National Bank765. By October, the 
political situation in the country worsened as well, with the Social Democrats ministers 
resigning – partly as a strategy to force the cabinet to fall and the Democrat-Liberals to take 
the full blame for the financial instability. In response, the remaining Democrat-Liberal 
ministers assumed all portfolios for 45 days, as stipulated in the country’s Constitution, in 
the hope that during this period they would be able to bring in another party to govern766. 
However, a motion of no-confidence was introduced by the opposition (the National Liberal 
Party, the Democratic Union of Magyars and the Social Democrat Party), criticising the 
government for its lack of legitimacy and representativeness, as well as for the economic 
hardship that had led to 700.000 people losing their jobs, and over 100.000 SMEs closing 
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down767. As a result, the Boc cabinet lost the Parliament’s confidence and support, however, 
in a defying move, President Băsescu re-appointed in December 2009 a PDL-supported 
government led again by Emil Boc. By 2010, the unemployment rate had reached 7.3%768, 
while the public debt had soared to 30.5% of the GDP. While the IMF had preferred for the 
government to respond to the deteriorating financial context through a mixture of tax 
increases and expenditure cuts, the Boc government was reluctant to raise the income tax, 
and instead opted in June 2010 for a package of particularly severe austerity measures. The 
public servants’ wages were cut by 25%, social security benefits were lowered by 15% (a 
provision for a 15% reduction of pensions was included, but the measure was ruled as 
unconstitutional), entitlements due to teachers, the army, police and intelligence service 
personnel, monthly food allowances, subsidies for rent and other benefits granted to 
scientists and artists were cut, and compensations for retirement or decommissioning from 
active military service were abolished. VAT was also increased from 19% to 25%. 
But while the government declared that in the absence of these harsh measures Romania 
could not have met the budget deficit ceiling of 6.8% of GDP, it refused in first instance to 
cut hundreds of unneeded public administration posts, fuelling public dissatisfaction769. In 
August 2010, the government announced plans to cut 54.000 posts in local public 
administration and 20.000 posts in central administration, in addition to the 30.000 posts 
that had been cut during the first half of the year770. In reality, in many cases mayors and 
country council presidents opted to cut positions that were included in the structural 
organisation of institutions, but that were not filled at the time when the governmental 
decision was made. As a result, operating costs for the public administration did not go 
down and in the context of manifest public dissatisfaction, the opposition introduced in the 
Parliament four different no-confidence motions against the government (in June, October, 
and December).  The motions did not unseat the government, but led to cabinet reshuffling 
and finally to contestation of its working style, which was revealed after an audit in 2010 by 
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the Court of Auditors to have led to the squandering of over Euro 750 million on unjustified 
purchases and spending771. Moreover, the Boc government assumed responsibility (a 
practice whereby legislative proposals made by the executive do not need to be voted by the 
parliament and are considered adopted unless censure motions are forwarded within three 
days) on multiple occasions and have heavily relied on emergency ordinances (normative 
act issued by the government which comes into force after being debated by the parliament 
and once published in the Official Gazette or within thirty days from its submission). Among 
the most important issues for which the government assumed responsibility was to amend 
the Labour Code. The amendments introduced longer probation periods for employees, 
extending them from 30 to 90 days for workers and from 90 to 120 days for managers. The 
maximum length of fixed-term employment contracts was modified, being extended from 
24 to 36 months, thus making it easier for employers to use non-standard contracts and 
utilise temporary agency workers. Employers were also allowed to unilaterally reduce the 
working week, and to demand employees to work overtime. Furthermore, the influence of 
trade unions was diminished through the adoption in the summer of 2010 of a new Social 
Dialogue Code that imposed certain legal obstacles in the sphere of collective labour 
relations by introducing new minimum membership thresholds for forming trade unions, 
making it very difficult for unions to be formed at company level in the vast majority of 
employing enterprises. Also, trade unions were no longer allowed to associate on the base 
of sharing a “branch of activity”, but had instead to fall within the same “sector of activity”. 
At the beginning of 2011, the government further amended the Law on Social Dialogue by 
eliminating national collective agreements, meaning that for this point onwards collective 
bargaining was only to take place at the company level, groups of companies, or the sector 
of activity. Combined with the new minimum membership thresholds, and changes to the 
criterion of trade union “representativeness” (a provision stating that multiple trade unions 
could not be accredited as representative in a company) resulted in an exclusion of an 
estimated 1.2 million employees from collective bargaining772.  
On the short term, the changes did not manage to set in action positive effects on the labour 
market. In fact, a study conducted by the National Trade Union Block concluded that after 
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the entering into force of the amendments, the rate of long-time unemployment rose to 58% 
in 2011, compared to 50% in the previous year, meaning that by 2011 6 out of 10 
unemployed citizens could not become active on the labour market. Moreover, the report 
showed that the probability of a person active on the labour market to become unemployed 
or inactive rose to 7.7% in 2011, compared to 3.3% in 2010773. In their attempt at fiscal 
consolidation, Romanian policy-makers “failed to implement measures that would have 
required sophisticated administrative and political skills”774. While the measures reduced 
the budget deficit from 9% of GDP in 2009 to 3% of GDP in 2012, they came at the expense 
of living standards: by 2010, the share of people at risk of poverty was of 45.4% for the 
unemployed and 29.8% for inactive persons, compared to the national average of 21.4%775. 
While the unemployment rate decreased from 7.8% in 2009 to 5.6% in 2012, the high 
number of Romanian emigrants which according to official figures reached 2.5 million 
between 2002 and 2012776, as well as a high number of unregistered workers, defined as 
working without legal forms, an individual labour contract or being paid without a payroll, 
which in 2015 was estimated at 1.5 million777 are two aspects which need to be considered 
when evaluating the effects of austerity measures upon the Romanian labour market.  
When turning to the Europe 2020 Strategy, the Romanian government committed in its 
National Reform Programme 2011-2013 to a 70% employment rate among the age group 
20-64, while in terms of education, the country assumed to reduce early school leaving by 
11.3% and to increase participation in tertiary education by 26.7%.  
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Europe 2020 targets Situation in Romania 
in 2009 
Romanian Europe 
2020 targets 
3% of EU GDP invested in R&D  0.48% 2% 
75% of 20-65 year-old to be employed  63.5% 70% 
Reducing early school leaving to below 
10% 
16.3% 11.3% 
At least 40% of 30-34 year-old 
population completing tertiary 
education  
16% 26.7% 
At least 20 million fewer people in/at 
risk of poverty/exclusion 
9.1 million people at-
risk-of poverty or 
exclusion 
3.9 million at risk of 
poverty 
Reduction by 580.000 
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20% of Energy from renewable 
sources (share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption) 
20%(Eurostat 2008) 24% 
Figure 10 Europe 2020 & Romania targets 
Source: Government of Romania (2011): National Reform Programme - 2011-2013, (Bucharest, April).  
 
In order to reach the employment target, besides introducing the Social Dialogue Law and 
amending its Labour Code in order to “promote the flexibility on the labour market”778, 
Romania put forward a wide variety of short and medium term measures. At the 
institutional level, the government committed to improving the professional and 
administrative capacity of the National Agency for Employment (ANOFM) responsible for 
implementing the state’s labour policies and strategies (vocational counselling, professional 
training, provision of unemployment benefits, entrepreneurship advisement etc.). Thus, 
                                                          
778 Government of Romania (2011): National Reform Programme 2011-2013, (Bucharest, April), p. 66.  
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programmes budgeted with a total of RON 47.8 million for the training of the institution’s 
staff were devised either to familiarise them with new legislative provisions in the field or 
simply to adapt their vocational services to labour market requirements. Infrastructure 
projects were also put forward with a total value of RON 50.5 million. Through these, new 
self-service centres for public employment services were to be established throughout the 
country, and modernisation works would be made for 8 regional vocational training 
structures. Studies, analyses and forecasts of the labour market tendencies were also to be 
funded by an estimated RON 22.5 million.  
In terms of active employment measures, the National Reform Programme pointed to a total 
allocation over the period 2011-2013 of RON 793 million under the Unemployment 
Insurance Budget. While no details as to the nature of these active measures were provided 
in the Reform Programme besides employment targets for elder and young workers as well 
as women, the majority of spending under the Employment Programme was concentrated 
on various forms of employment subsidies. The implementation report of 2012 showed that 
during the course of 2011 over 981.000 persons had benefitted of active measures, but that 
the rate of beneficiaries that were employed as a result hovered at 39%779. Moreover, while 
50.000 jobseekers were trained by means of continuous vocational training (services for 
which investments had been made in order to increase their efficiency), again the rate of 
beneficiaries employed was of only 35%. The same situation was recorded for 2012, out of 
over 1.700.000 persons benefitting of some form of aid funded through the Unemployment 
Insurance Budget, 689.000 were recorded as employed, while for 2013 the number falling 
to 380.000. While the country’s unemployment rate (6.8%) stood fairly at an acceptable 
level – below in fact the EU average in 2012 (at 10.5% according to Eurostat figures), the 
European Commission commented however, that certain problems such as youth (20-29 
years) employment and activity rates remained among the lowest in the EU (of 60.2% 
compared to 66.5% in the Czech Republic or 67.1% in Estonia), had the highest share of 
employment in low productive subsistence or semi-subsistence farming (28.6% in 2011), 
and that difficulties for certain disadvantaged minorities such as Roma ethnics to access the 
formal labour market was still a concerning issue780. These comments came despite some 
steps taken by the Romanian authorities to address these problems, such as funding 
                                                          
779 Government of Romania (2012): National Reform Programme 2011-2013. Implementation Report, (Bucharest, 
15th of March), p. 8.  
780 European Commission (2013): Assessment of the 2013 National Reform Programme and Convergence 
Programme for Romania (Brussels, European Commission), SWD(2013)373 final, p. 16.  
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through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EARDF) the setting-up and 
development of businesses in non-agricultural sectors which resulted in 2012 in 2.168 new 
SMEs and 4.260 new jobs781. Through emergency ordinance no. 6/2011 the Romanian 
government also put forward a financial instrument to encourage young citizens (up to 35 
years) to establish their own small businesses by co-financing up to 50% (maximum Euro 
10.000) of the costs for starting-up and an exemption from paying social security 
contribution for 4 employees782. A closer look at the results registered under this particular 
programme managed by the Agency for the Implementation of Projects and Programmes 
for Small and Medium Enterprises (AIPPIMM) shows that between 2011 and 2014 an 
average of 35.5% of the total received dossiers have obtained funding (representing a total 
of 1806 beneficiaries), while the total number of new jobs created in this period was of 
8.817783. When comparing the outcomes with the allocated funds for the programme, which 
for the reference period reached RON 94 million, the national impact can only be deemed as 
lukewarm. The same institution has been attributed with the administration of the National 
Programme for the development of entrepreneurship among female managers in the SME 
sector. Through this line of action, the state funded in 2014 business plans put forward by 
women, but the results again were quite weak: out of 105 applicants, only 44 were 
accepted, 12 were funded and a total of 24 positions were created at the national level. 
Finally, the START Programme designed to encourage the establishment of new SMEs and 
to sustain the improvement of economic performances of existent ones through financing 
the acquisition of equipment, reached a similar conclusion: between 2012 and 2014, 1.953 
applications had been registered, 519 were funded, and 1.618 positions were created, while 
the total funding for the period was of approximately RON 55 million784.  
Whilst below European average, the unemployment rate in Romania continued to hover at 
7% between 2012 and 2014. The European Commission observed that despite the above 
                                                          
781 Government of Romania (2012): National Reform Programme 2011-2013. Implementation Report, (Bucharest, 
15th of March), p. 9.  
782 Government of Romania (2011): Emergency Ordinance No. 6/2011 - “Stimulating the Establishment and 
development of Micro-Entities by Apprentice Entrepreneurs”, Official Gazette no. 103/09.02.2011.  
783 Ministerul Energiei, Întreprinderilor Mici și Mijlocii și Mediului de Afaceri / The Ministry of Energy, SMEs and 
the Business Environment (2015): Situația Implementării Programelor Naționale în Perioada 2009-2014/The 
Situation regarding the Implementation of National Programmes between 2009-2014, (Bucharest, MEIMMMA), p. 
6.  
784 Ministerul Energiei, Întreprinderilor Mici și Mijlocii și Mediului de Afaceri / The Ministry of Energy, SMEs and 
the Business Environment (2015): Situația Implementării Programelor Naționale în Perioada 2009-2014/The 
Situation regarding the Implementation of National Programmes between 2009-2014, (Bucharest, MEIMMMA), p. 
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mentioned programmes, spending on active labour market policies as a share of GDP in 
Romania (at 0.02% in 2012) remained very low compared to the EU 27 average (0.54% in 
2009). Most of the spending went, as we have seen, on various forms of employment 
subsidies, while training, guidance, job counselling remained underdeveloped.  In this sense, 
national experts have deemed the activity of the National Agency for Employment (ANOFM) 
as weak, the institution focusing more on its role as administrator of unemployment 
benefits, while its overly centralised vocational training policies remained unsynchronised 
with market requirements785. This situation is emphasised in ANOFM’s Strategy for 2014-
2020 as well, where a SWOT analysis revealed deficient personnel and administrative 
capacity for assuring vocational counselling for target groups comprising long-term 
unemployed and members of vulnerable groups (with disabilities, elderly, Roma ethnics 
etc.), very limited capacity of medium and long-term forecasting of trends on the labour 
market and of developing analyses which in turn translates into programmes and measures 
uncoordinated with the market, having limited efficiency, and no preventive lines of 
action786. All of these problems have translated from 2010 onwards into a hovering of the 
unemployment rate at around 7%, despite an expansion of the economy that picked up in 
2011 and that reached 3.5% in 2013 in the context of a strong export performance on the 
back of robust industrial output and an abundant harvest.  
 
                                                          
785 HotNews (2012): Interview with Suzana Dobre, expert in social policies (HotNews, 23rd of May), available at 
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-12329454-politicile-salariale-fantome-sau-realitate-suzana-dobre-
expert-politici-sociale-expert-forum-discuta-online-joi-ora-13-30.htm.  
786 Ministrul Muncii, Familiei, Protecției Sociale și Persoanelor Vârstnice/Ministry of Labour, Family, Social 
Protection and Elderly (2015): Strategia Agenției Naționale pentru Ocuparea Forței de Muncă 2014-2020/The 
Strategy of the National Agency for Employment 2014-2020 (Bucharest, MMFPSPV), approved through 
Administration Council Decision No. 11/17.06.2015, pp. 11-13.  
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Figure 11 Unemployment rate Romania 2008-2014 
Source: National Statistics Institute, Labour Time series, available at http://statistici.insse.ro/shop/.  
 
In its most recent assessment, the European Commission acknowledged that the Romanian 
authorities have achieved progress in revising active labour-market policies, albeit 
modest787. The regulative regime was modified, a new law on unemployment insurance and 
employment stimulation788 being passed in 2013 introducing free non-formal competences 
evaluations, access to mobility aid for the long-term unemployed, and new facilities for 
companies hiring from vulnerable groups or inactive youth. The country had also launched 
two Youth Guarantee pilot schemes supported through the European Social Fund leading to 
the creation of 27 youth centres (aimed at identifying young people not in education, 
employment or training or NEETs and providing them with packages of personalised 
services) which have facilitated employment for over 59.000 NEETs. The country’s 
involvement in an European network of Public Employment Services benchmarking and 
mutual learning exercise was also appreciated as another step forward in terms of 
improving job search and retraining services. Even so, the Romanian labour market was 
deemed as “characterised by persistently low employment and high inactivity rates coupled 
with a shrinking working-age population due to population ageing and outward migration”, 
                                                          
787 European Commission (2015): Country Report Romania 2015 including In-depth Review on the Prevention and 
Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances (Brussels, European Commission), SWD(2015)42 final, p. 58.  
788 Romanian Parliament (2013): Law no. 250/2013 for modifying and completing Law no. 76/2002 regarding 
the unemployment insurance system and the stimulation of employment and modifying Law no. 116/2002 
regarding the prevention and the fight against social marginalization, Official Gazette no. 457/24.07.2013.  
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public spending on labour-market policies was criticised as insufficient, with passive 
measures absorbing the highest share and vocational education and training not being well 
aligned with market needs789.  
In terms of the targets relating to smart growth, Romania committed in 2010 to lowering 
the dropout rate from 18.4% in 2010 to 11.3% in 2020, and to increase the share of people 
aged 30 to 34 in tertiary education from 18.1% in 2010 to 26.7% in 2020790. The main 
legislative step towards these targets was the adoption in January 2011 of a new National 
Law on Education791. However, the law profoundly stirred spirits in the Parliament and was 
not in the end adopted through ordinary procedure, but by the Emil Boc government 
assuming responsibility for the framework regulation in October 2010792. In turn, the 
opposition led by PSD and PNL have contested the constitutionality of the law by requesting 
in this sense for a decision from the Romanian Constitutional Court. Among its provisions, 
the law increased the duration on the one hand of the primary cycle to 5 years by 
introducing a preparatory grade, and on the other of the lower secondary education (grades 
V-IX) in order to synchronise and streamline education cycles with similar practices in the 
EU. In reality, this process revealed a fundamental flaw in the implementation of public 
policies in the country: namely legislative modifications seldom reach their end objective as 
they do not take into account a clear situation in the territory. For the 2012-2013 school 
year, when the preparatory grade was introduced, authorities struggled to accommodate 
into an already overcrowded public education infrastructure over 127.000 children793. The 
law also provided for a more decongested school curriculum, based on the development of 
eight key competences: communication in the mother tongue and foreign languages, 
mathematical skills and basic competences in science and technology, digital abilities, social 
and civic competences, sense of initiative and entrepreneurship, cultural awareness and 
“learning to learn” competences. However, implementation was again slow, one such 
                                                          
789 European Commission (2013): Country Report Romania 2015 Including an In-Depth Review on the Prevention 
and Correction of Imbalances (Brussels, European Commission), SWD(2015)42 final, pp. 57-59.  
790 Government of Romania (2011): National Reform Programme 2011-2013, (Bucharest, April), p. 115. 
791 Romanian Parliament (2011): Law no. 1/2011 on National Education, Official Gazette no. 18/10.01.2011.  
792 L. Pârvu (2010): “Guvernul și-a Asumat Răspunderea în Parlamnet pe Legea Educației. Emil Boc: Această 
Lege Schimbă din Temelii Educația Românească”/ “The Government has Assumed Responsibility in Parliament 
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793 E. Gheorghiță (2012): “Clasa Pregătitoare – Un Experiment pentru Copii, Părinți și Dascăli, din 10 
Septembrie”/ “The Preparatoy Grade – An Experiment for Children, Parents and Teachers from the 10th of 
September”, Mediafax (Mediafax, 29th of August), available at http://www.mediafax.ro/social/analiza-clasa-
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example being the delays in providing students with textbooks in the 2014-2015 school 
year when new digitalised 1st and 2nd grades were meant to be introduced794. After 
organising the public tenure process in order to establish which publishing houses will be 
responsible for the printing of the textbooks and of their digital versions, contestations 
regarding the transparency and fairness of process were put forward and in one case, the 
Court of Appeal in Bucharest decided the annulling of one contract in the case of a 1st grade 
digital textbook which meant that schools opting for it would not benefit of state 
deduction795. The need to improve vocational education and training (VET) was also 
addressed by providing for the gradual re-founding of state training schools and by offering 
low-secondary education graduates who had previously left school the possibility to 
complete free of charge at least one training programme. Social programmes such as 
“School after school” (providing support teachers, education counselling and remedial 
training) and “Second chance” (supporting the return to school of early school leavers) 
were also devised as means to limit the dropout rate. Annually based social support 
programmes such as School supplies (over 700.000 pupils and students benefiting in 2015 
of a RON 30 package), Money for high-school (over 60.000 students receiving in 2014 social 
bursaries of RON 180/month) and Euro 200 (over 17.000 pupils and students receiving in 
2015 Euro 200 in order to purchase a computer) were also implemented to facilitate 
primary and lower-secondary education attainment. These social programmes have been to 
a certain extent restricting, conditioning support to a somewhat prohibitive number of 
documents regarding the economic status of potential beneficiaries (only in the case of the 
School Supplies programme, 6 to 7 different categories of official documents being required 
for the support package). Some results were visible though, in 2013 the indicator for early 
dropout from school registering relative improvement to 17.3%, thus continuing a gradual 
downward trend796. Three other countries, namely Spain, Portugal and Italy have registered 
higher early school leaving rates.  
                                                          
794 E. Gheorghiță (2014):”Anul Școlar Începe Fără Manuale la Clasael Mici, dar cu Mai multe Obligații pentru 
Profesori și Elevi”, Mediafax (Mediafax, 15 September), available at http://www.mediafax.ro/social/analiza-
anul-scolar-incepe-fara-manuale-la-clasele-mici-dar-cu-mai-multe-obligatii-pentru-profesori-si-elevi-13264864.  
795 A. Ofițeru (2015): “3 Ani cu Ponta. Cum Arată Imaginea Sistemului de Învățământ din România după Patru 
Schimbări ale Legii Educației”/”Three years with Ponta. How the Educational System in Romania Looks like after 
Four Modifications of the National Education Law”, Gândul.info (Gândul.info, 6th of March), available at 
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796 Romanian Ministry for National Education (2014): Romanian Education for All. Review Report (Bucharest, 
MEN), p. 13.  
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Yet, when looking at Romania’s level of expenditure on education and training, measured 
through the indicator of public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP, the 
country’s spending is neither consistent with the EU benchmark, nor with other Eastern 
European countries’ trends. The latest Eurostat comparative data registered for 2011 for 
example shows that if in the case of Romania the percentage of spending on education was 
of 3.1% of GDP (decreasing from 2006), in the case of Bulgaria it was situated at 3.8%, the 
Czech Republic at 4.5%, Estonia at 5.2%, Latvia at 5%, Lithuania at 5.2%, Hungary at 4.7%, 
Slovenia at 5.7%, and Slovakia at 4.1%797. In 2014, public expenditure on education in 
Romania was further reduced to 2.8% of GDP, compared to 5% the EU average798. This in 
turn is detrimental to participation in education, the reduction of disparities, to the quality 
of education and to potential economic growth799. Starting from the premise that education 
has become a decisive factor in the future of European economic progress in the context of 
fiscal constraints, challenging demographic developments and alarming high levels of youth 
unemployment, a recent study undertaken by the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre using a new econometric model revealed that Romania’s probability of reaching its 
national target for early school leaving given the policy measures implemented and their 
continuity was quite low (between 20% and 35%)800. Comparatively, in the case of Bulgaria 
the model revealed that based on the country has a quite high probability (between 65% 
and 80%) to meet its national target regarding early school leaving by 2020. The low 
expenditure on education and training, the incoherent policy shifts, outdated teaching 
methodology801 and unmotivated teachers are some of the reasons that led to concerning 
results in international testing. The PISA 2012 tests revealed that in the case of Romania, 
40.8% of pupils encountered difficulties in using basic algorithms, formulae, procedures or 
                                                          
797 Statistical Office of the European Union (2011): Educational Expenditure Indicator (Brussels, Eurostat), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Expenditure_on_educational_institutions,_2006_and_2011_%28%C2%B9%29_YB15.p
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798 European Commission (2015): Education and Training Monitor 2015. Romania Report (Brussels, European 
Commission), SWD(2015)199, p. 2.  
799 P. Varly, C. Iosifescu, C. Fartușnic, T. Andrei, C. Herțeliu (2014): Cost of Non-Investment in Education in 
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800 C. Dragomirescu-Găina, A. Weber (2013): Forecasting the Europe 2020 Headline Target on Education and 
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801 I. Albulescu, M. Albulescu (2012): “Romanian Education System Syncope’s Revealed by PISA Tests. Causes of 
School Failure and Possible Ameliorative Interventions”, Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Psychologia-
Paedagogia Journal, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 3-15 consider that the educational framework used in Romania which is 
based to a large extent on theoretical contents, the assessment methods that emphasizes the quantity of 
acquired information, and a curricula that is overlooking the importance of interdisciplinarity are important 
contributing factors to disappointing results.  
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conventions to solve problems involving numbers802. Moreover, 73% of participating 
students responded to questionnaires regarding the sense of belonging that they felt lonely 
at school.  In terms of national-level assessments, the year 2012 saw the worst deterioration 
of Baccalaureate results (the comprehensive examination at the end of the secondary 
education cycle, mandatory to be passed in order to transition to higher education), with 
one in every two students taking the examination not being able to pass it. The graduation 
rate for the secondary education cycle thus was of only 44.3% in 2012, compared to 81.4% 
in 2009. While the graduation rate has in recent years started to increase, reaching 56.4% in 
2013, 60.6% in 2014 and 66.4% in 2015, circumspect views questioning the extent and 
nature of the measures implemented by the Education Ministry in order to correct this 
trend have come to light803.  
As regards to the higher education system, the National Education Law introduced for the 
first time a two-tier classification mechanism based on an identification stage and a 
consolidation one whereby universities would assume their own missions, provide 
supporting data and information and be included in an institutional evaluation that 
differentiated between advanced research universities, teaching and research universities 
and teaching oriented universities. A first classification was done in 2012 undertaken by the 
European University Association in collaboration with the Romanian Executive Agency for 
Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding. The results of the 
classification exercise showed that Romania had only 12 research-intensive universities, 30 
teaching and research universities and 48 teaching oriented higher education 
institutions804.  The effect of this classification meant that universities in the first category 
would benefit of a 20% budget raise in order to fund more available places for Masters of 
Arts and doctoral degrees. But as this process was highly contested by stakeholders, mainly 
due to the methodology of data processing not being made public, the link between such 
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instruments and the funding methodology was abandoned. Moreover, its credibility was 
further eroded by a decision805 of the Victor Ponta government two weeks after its 
instatement to make funding independent of the evaluations. Yet the need for an objective 
assessment of state and private universities remained an issue, albeit on the background, as 
starting with 2012 accusations of plagiarised doctoral works occurred, among them even 
Prime Minister Ponta being subject of such claims806.  
A further blow to the higher education system came in 2013, when the Romanian 
government decided to cut between 40% and 55% of the funds for over 300 ongoing 
research projects which in 2012 had been evaluated and selected for funding provided 
through various national research and innovation programmes807. While government 
funding for research for 2014 and 2015 was frozen to 0.31% of GDP, several ongoing 
projects saw their budgets arbitrarily cut, decision which triggered protests in March 2015. 
The 2015 Innovation Union Scoreboard in fact revealed that the relative performance of 
Romania on this sector has significantly declined from 46% in 2007 to 37% in 2014808.  
While tertiary education attainment rate has been steadily increasing over the past years, 
reaching 25% in 2014 (placing the country on track to meeting the Europe 2020 national 
target of 26.7%), the 2015 Education and Training Monitor observed that the employment 
rate of recent tertiary graduates (74.2% in 2014) has been decreasing since 2009, revealing 
mismatches between university curricula and labour market requirements809. In fact, skills 
shortages remain acute in sectors such as healthcare, the construction sector and 
information and communications technologies (ICT), despite promised policy developments 
concerning career guidance810.  
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Overall, in the area of education, whilst acknowledging the efforts made by Romania so far, 
the Council expressed serious concerns in its most recent recommendation regarding a 
continuously high early school leaving rate, limited access for children in rural areas and 
from the Roma community to early childhood education and care services, and inadequate 
relevance of higher education training in regards to the labour market. Despite the adoption 
of several national strategies, the most recent ones concerning lifelong learning, early 
school leaving and on tertiary education, the Council observed that “little visible end-
effects” have so far been observed and emphasised the need to efficiently implement the 
objectives set in strategic documents811. Comparatively, in the case of Bulgaria the Council 
observed that delays in reforming the School Education Act have affected the formal 
training system’s ability to generate skills and competences relevant to the labour 
market812.  
 
5.4. Conclusions 
 
Bulgaria and Romania’s performance in progressing towards their national targets set 
under the Europe 2020 Strategy has been rather limited, the policy analysis done in this 
chapter showing that in both countries there are no clear long-term strategies that would be 
accepted and followed by different governments (irrespective of the political parties in 
power) in order to successfully coordinate the employment and education lines of action. 
Bulgaria faces today the highest percentage of population at-risk-of-poverty or social 
exclusion out of the country’s total population (48% according to Eurostat), an employment 
rate below the EU average (at 61% in 2014 according to Eurostat compared to the EU 
average of 64.9%), and a very low expenditure on research and development of 0.6% of the 
GDP. Romania is in a very similar situation, with public spending on research and 
development hovering at 0.3% of the GDP, 40.4% population at-risk-of-poverty or social 
exclusion and the employment rate as well below the EU average in the context of an 
emigration wave that saw to the total population count fall from 21.700.000 in 2002 to 
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19.900.000 in 2014813. In both countries active employment policies have not been 
adequately constructed so that they would efficiently address the effects of the economic 
crisis, professional training and education opportunities have not been coordinated with 
labour market needs and so far steps taken to correct these shortcomings have not 
produced substantial effects. While the monitoring and evaluation undertaken under the 
Europe 2020 Strategy has been beneficial, country-specific recommendations providing the 
stage for naming and shaming, the visibility of these recommendation as well as of concerns 
has been limited at the national level. Moreover, policy coordination triggered by the Lisbon 
Strategy and continued by Europe 2020 has not been proven to have created permissive 
conditions for critical junctures to be facilitated. As mentioned in this chapter the possibility 
of using reprogramming conditionality on a continuous basis could give the strategy 
substantially more clout over Member States, and an overview of the Interreg Romania-
Bulgaria funding lines as well as Romania’s Operational Programme Human Capital for the 
2014-2020 budgetary period has revealed a move towards funding projects that would 
contribute to the national Europe 2020 targets814. However, we contend that the Europe 
2020 Strategy and its governance architecture could prove more efficient towards pushing 
Member States to effectively address development issues if its main evaluation means – the 
country-specific recommendations put forward by the Council would place a greater 
emphasis on the pace and trajectory of employment and educational policies. Moreover, 
greater visibility of these recommendations is necessary at the national level in order for 
naming and shaming to generate policy and political change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
813 Institutul Naţional de Statistică (2014): Anuarul Statistic al României/ Romanian Statistical Yearbook 
(Bucharest, INSSE).  
814 Ministry of European Funds (2014): The Strategy for the Contribution of the Operational Programme 
towards the EU’s Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth and towards Economic, Social and 
Territorial Cohesion, (Bucharest, MFE), available at http://www.fonduri-
ue.ro/images/files/programe/CU/POCU-2014/POCU.pdf.  
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Chapter 6  
From soft law to hard law – evaluating Romania and 
Bulgaria’s compliance track records 
 
Yet, despite increasing statements on its alleged obsolescence, hard law – embodied by 
regulations, directives and decisions - has remained the main legal instrument at the EU 
level, being generated through decision-making procedures such as the “Community 
Method” (the ordinary legislative procedure as it is referred to in art 294 in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union815 or TFEU) or in some cases special legislative 
procedures (such as the consent or the consultation procedure). The Community method 
has been described by the European Commission as: 
“(…) a means to arbitrate between different interests by passing them through two 
successive filters: The general interest at the level of the Commission, and democratic 
representation, European and national, at the level of the Council and European Parliament, 
together the Union’s legislature. 
- The European Commission alone makes legislative and policy proposals. Its independence 
strengthens its ability to execute policy, act as the guardian of the Treaty and represent the 
Community in international negotiations. 
- Legislative and budgetary acts are adopted by the Council of Ministers (representing 
Member States) and the European Parliament (representing citizens). The use of qualified 
majority voting in the Council is an essential element in ensuring the effectiveness of this 
method. Execution of policy is entrusted to the Commission and national authorities. 
- The European Court of Justice guarantees respect for the rule of law”.816  
 The earliest Community method was based on a compromise solution between 
supranational and intergovernmental decision-making, with the Commission (the High 
Authority in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community) having right of initiative, 
the Parliament having advisory capacity (meaning it had the capacity to scrutinise, but not 
to determine proposals), the Council which was formed of representatives of Member State 
                                                          
815 European Union (2012): Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Official Journal of the European Union No. C326/26/10/2012, pp. 173-75.  
816 European Commission (2001): European Governance: A White Paper, (Brussels, European Commission), COM 
(2001)428 final, pp. 9-10.  
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governments, deciding (usually acting by unanimity) and the European Court of Justice 
adjudicating any disputes arising in relation to community law. After seven rounds of treaty 
reform and growing pressure to democratise policy processes in response to the EU’s ever-
growing policy responsibilities, the European Parliament (for which the first direct 
elections were organised in 1979) was given the role of co-decision maker with the Council, 
and the latter’s usual voting rule changed from unanimity to qualified majority in the case of 
more than 90% of legislative proposals817. In its current form, the ordinary legislative 
procedure (formerly known as the codecision procedure) begins with the adoption by the 
College of Commissioners of a legislative proposal which is sent to the European Parliament 
and the Council. During its first reading, the European Parliament may adopt or amend the 
proposal by a simple majority vote. On its turn, the Council can either approve the European 
Parliament’s wording or adopt its own position which is passed to the European Parliament 
along with explanations and the Commission’s position on the matter. If the Council and the 
European Parliament are still at odds after a second reading, the proposal falls if the latter 
rejects it (by an absolute majority), and a conciliation committee composed of Council and 
an equal number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) has the task of reaching 
an agreement on a joint text, by a qualified majority of members representing the Council 
and by a majority of the MEPs within six weeks of its being convened. If the Conciliation 
Committee approves a joint text, both the European Parliament (acting by a majority of 
votes cast) and the Council (acting by qualified majority) have a period of six weeks to 
adopt the act in accordance with the joint text. On the contrary, if an agreement is not 
reached within the given timeframe, the act is deemed not to have been adopted818. 
Alongside the ordinary legislative procedure, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union also provides for special procedures such as the consent and the consultation (art. 
289 paragraph 2). In essence, this presupposes that a regulation/directive/decision is 
usually adopted by the Council unanimously, combined with the requirement of the consent 
of the European Parliament (which in this case has the power to accept or reject the 
legislative proposal by an absolute majority vote, but it cannot amend it) or of consultation 
                                                          
817 L. Buonanno, N. Nugent (2013): Policies and Policy Processes of the European Union (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan), p. 122.  
818 European Union (2012): Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Official Journal of the European Union No. C326/26/10/2012, p. 175.  
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with it (the Parliament submits an opinion regarding the proposal and it may approve, 
reject or propose amendments to it)819.   
Taken together, these procedures emphasise the original nature of the European 
construction in regards to more traditional forms of international cooperation, not only in 
terms of the scope of the competences transferred to supranational institutions, but also in 
the manner in which powers are being exercised. In this sense, the European Commission’s 
right of initiative has been equated by some with the institution itself being de facto, if not 
de jure a third branch of European legislative power820. More specifically, unlike in national 
democracies, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, where representatives 
of the Member States sit, cannot in principle, take any initiative at this level – if European 
law is deemed necessary, the two institutions must refer to the Commission to put forward 
a proposal in due form821. The Commission is formally responsible for overseeing the 
application and the enforcement of EU law as well, having the right to start the infringement 
procedure upon receiving information of non-compliance in a Member State’s case. Recent 
practice dictates however, that before launching the formal infringement procedure, the 
Commission uses the EU pilot mechanism, a system launched in 2008. The EU pilot allows 
the Commission to refer correspondence and complaints it receives directly to the Member 
State for comment, giving governments a chance to remedy any breaches through voluntary 
compliance. Complainants who agree to make their identity known are placed in the loop 
with the Member State in question that in turn send them their observations directly. If the 
matter is not resolved at this stage, the Commission retains the power to take further action 
by launching the infringement process.  
We must mention here, that together with the Pilot system, the Commission benefits of an 
additional source of information. This is the case of the implementation reports that the 
body receives from Member States, as most directives contain reporting obligations which 
examine the practical application together with the national legislative integration of the 
directive’s aims822. Where early investigations thus show that a breach of EU law exists and 
                                                          
819 For an in-depth presentation see P. Craig, G. de Búrca (2015): EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press), Sixth Edition, pp. 133-34.  
820 R. Dehousse (2008): “The ‘Community Method’: Chronicle of a Death too Early Foretold”, in B. Kohler-Koch, F. 
Larat (eds.) Efficient and Democratic Governance in the European Union, CONNEX Report, Vol. IX (Mannheim, 
CONNEX), pp. 79-107. 
821 R. Dehousse (2008): “The ‘Community Method’: Chronicle of a Death too Early Foretold”, p. 84.  
822 S. Grohs (2012): “Article 258/260 TFEU Infringement Procedures: The Commission Perspective in 
Environmental Cases”, in M. Cremona (ed.) Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) pp. 57-73.  
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has not been resolved, the Commission may decide to launch formal infringement 
procedures. The Commission operates with three main categories of infringement: non-
communication, non-conformity, and bad application. Non-communication concerns a 
Member State’s failure to respect the transposition deadline for a particular directive. Once 
the Member State communicates the new implementation legislation – providing coverage 
for the whole directive and all national jurisdictions, the case is closed.  Non-conformity 
concerns cases where Member States adopt and communicate implementing legislation, but 
after conformity check, it becomes visible that areas of non-conformity or gaps still exist. 
Finally, the bad application category refers to cases where a directive has been transposed 
by a Member States which has communicated the national implementation instrument, but 
concerns exist over the incorrect application or the complete absence of implementation. As 
outlined by art. 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) the first step of this 
procedure is informal (not described in the TFEU), the Commission approaching the 
Member State in question with a Letter of Formal Notice (lettre de mise en demeure) which 
signals a possible violation of obligations under EU law and requests for an answer to be 
submitted, usually within two months. If the response is deemed unsatisfactory or is absent, 
the formal procedure is initiated with a Reasoned Opinion being sent. A similar deadline of 
two months is formulated, the Commission stating in its opinion where the exact breach of 
EU law exists and requiring the state in question to take all necessary steps in order to fully 
comply with the legislative act. Both the Letter of Formal Notice and the Reasoned Opinion 
are prepared by the relevant services of the Commission, and each formal step, including 
closure, requires a formal decision of the Commission sitting as a College. If the Commission 
deems the national response as insufficient, it can make a proposal to refer the Member 
State to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  If during the pre-1992 era, the EU lacked the 
appropriate means to react to persistent non-compliance, even ECJ judgements playing 
more the role of “naming and shaming” instruments (several ‘second judgements’ for one 
case being issued in the absence of sanctions),  with the Maastricht Treaty fines were 
established as a new instrument in the Commission’s armoury.  Under Art. 260 TFEU 
(former Art. 171 Treaty on the European Union) and based on a Commission proposal for a 
lump sum or penalty payment, the ECJ may impose fines in ‘second proceedings’, not 
exceeding the amount specified by the Commission, if it finds that the Member State 
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concerned has not complied with the judgement of the first proceeding823. In 2005, the 
Commission updated its method of calculating penalties guiding it according to three main 
aspects: the seriousness of the infringement, its duration, and the need to ensure that the 
penalty itself is a deterrent to further infringements. The Communication also specified that 
sanctions needed to be foreseeable and respect the principles of proportionality as well as 
of equal treatment among the Member States. The calculation basis for daily penalty 
payments put forward by the Commission was thus formed of the multiplication of a 
standard flat-rate (revised by the Commission every three years) by a coefficient for 
seriousness and for duration. The result obtained would be again multiplied by an amount 
fixed by country (or the ‘n’ factor) which would be calculated by taking into account the 
capacity of a Member State to pay (its GDP) and the number of votes it has in the Council824. 
Together with the penalty by day of delay, the Commission reserved the right to impose a 
lump sum that would penalise the continuation of the infringement between the first 
judgement of non-compliance and the judgement delivered under Art. 260. With the 2005 
Communication, the Commission decided that in cases where Member States would rectify 
the infringement after referral to the ECJ but before the delivery of the judgement (with the 
Court no longer being able to impose a penalty payment because such a decision would 
have lost its purpose), a lump sum payment penalising the duration of the infringement (up 
to the time the situation was rectified) would still be imposed. In 2015, this lump sum was 
set at Euro 839.000 for Bulgaria and of Euro 1.855.000825. However, the literature on EU law 
compliance has revealed that together with the slow development of the use of the ‘hard’ 
powers by the Commission, a clear tendency to make use of soft pressure in order to 
increase compliance can be observed826.  As such, as Falkner observes, between November 
1993 and November 2011, the overall number of ECJ judgements for infringement involving 
penalties did not surpass 10, and even in the case of less wealthy states (such as Greece 
which was involved in five of the cases of imposed fines), the penalties imposed did not 
                                                          
823 European Union (2012): Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Official Journal of the European Union No. C326/26/10/2012, p. 161.  
824 European Commission (2005): Communication from the Commission – Application of Article 228 of the EC 
Treaty (Brussels, European Commission), SEC(2005)1658.  
825 European Commission (2015): Communication from the Commission – Updating of data used to calculate lump 
sum and penalty payments to be proposed by the Commission to the Court of Justice in infringement proceedings 
(Brussels, European Commission), C(2015)5511final.  
826 See M. Hartlapp (2007): “On Enforcement, Management and Persuasion: Different Logics of Implementation 
Policy in the EU and the ILO”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 653-74.  
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represent a major strain for the concerned Member States’ budgets827. The study also 
demonstrated that the hardest means at the EU’s disposal to assure compliance are not 
effective enough, situation which has led the Commission to combine the hard instrument of 
fines with soft pressurising. Tactics such as ‘naming and shaming’ thus are deemed to be 
quite successful when the press and the electorate see precious tax money being spent on 
fines. The extent to which this strategy would be sufficient on the long term to uphold the 
EU’s rule-of-law prestige however is debatable, as well as the tendency to recur more often 
to softer means of tackling non-compliance. In fact, in 2011 the Lisbon Treaty further 
strengthened the Commission’s enforcement powers by introducing the ‘fast track’ 
penalisation option according to which the Commission can ask for a fine in the first 
proceedings for non-implementation of a Directive and no longer needs a reasoned opinion 
before Court seizure in second proceedings828. In 2012, the Commission referred 12 
Member States (Poland, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Hungary) to the ECJ for the late transposition 
of directives with a request for financial sanctions under Art. 260 (3) TFEU (35 cases). In 
2013, 9 Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, the UK, Austria, Cyprus, 
Poland and Portugal) were involved in 14 such decisions, while the number in 2014 
dropped to 3 countries involved (Belgium, Finland, and Ireland). However, the Commission 
did not propose the Court to apply any lump sum payments, despite the institution 
observing in its 2014 Monitoring Report that by achieving complete transposition at a very 
late stage in the judicial procedure, the involved Member States benefit of an undue 
prolongation of the transposition deadline829.  
 
6.1. Non-compliance with EU laws – Romania and Bulgaria’s track 
records in a larger context 
 
This section seeks to explore non-compliance patterns observed in the cases of Romania 
and Bulgaria since their EU accession up until 2015 and to contrast them to those pertaining 
                                                          
827 G. Falkner (2016): “Fines against Member States: An effective New Tool in EU Infringement Proceedings?”, 
Comparative European Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 36-52.  
828 S. Andersen (2012): The Enforcement of EU Law. The Role of the European Commission (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press), pp. 113-15.  
829 European Commission (2015): Monitoring the Application of Union Law. 2014 Annual Report (Brussels, 
European Commission), p. 21.  
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to a group of Member States that would be representative enough for the EU as a whole, 
enabling us to build a pertinent assessment.  While the data allows us to build a 
comparative evaluation, we are interested in obtaining a better understanding of the 
transposition track-record of Romania and Bulgaria and not necessarily to put forward a set 
of variables that would explain implementation delay across all Member States. The 
academic literature focusing on the transposition and implementation of EU law is 
extensive830 and while this study could offer some light concerning the track record of the 
two countries analysed here, its main objective is to provide an image of the extent to which 
Romania and Bulgaria have respected their membership obligations, analysis which is 
extended across various policy instruments ranging from soft to hard law.  
In the theoretical chapter we have put forward a series of hypotheses that would aid us in 
obtaining a clear view of Romania and Bulgaria’s compliance track-record after their EU 
accession and to place this record in a larger, comparative context. In this sense, we have 
created a database reuniting all infringement cases registered between 2007 and 2015 for 
Romania, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Italy and Poland. Taking into 
consideration the extensive amount of information to be collected even for the restricted 
period of eight years, we did not have the possibility to put forward at this stage a cross-
national analysis that would include all 28 EU member states. Nevertheless, in order to 
assure a representative sample, the dataset was constructed based on several criteria of 
state selection. The criteria account for the distinction between accession dates (i.e. 
founding, older and newer member states), the size of populations (differentiated according 
to the data provided by the European Commission831) type of legal system (i.e. civil law vs. 
common law), type of political system (i.e. federal vs. unitary structures) and evidenced 
compliance performance (relatively low vs. high numbers of infringements).  
As we have discussed in the previous section, European hard law is sustained by monitoring 
and enforcement means, making an approach based on the logic of calculation on member 
states’ side the natural theoretical framework to apply when assessing national 
transposition. As the main objective of the study is to evaluate domestic change as a 
response to Europeanization pressure in Romania and Bulgaria, the study will be based on a 
                                                          
830 For a review of the quantitative studies of compliance with EU law see D. Toshkov (2010): “Taking Stock: A 
review of Quantitative Studies of Transposition and Implementation of EU Law”, EIF Working Paper No. 
01/2010 (Vienna, Institute for European Integration Research).  
831 Eurostat (2013): Population on 1 January 2013, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001.   
262 
 
dataset that clusters the population of instances of delay in transposition (translated as 
cases of non-communication) and incorrect application into national legislation of European 
directives (non-conformity and bad application) covered by the Annual Reports on 
Monitoring the Application of Community Law in the first eight years since having obtained 
EU membership (2007-2015). However, while restricting the dataset only to information on 
the transposition record of the two member states will allow us to test relationships 
between delay in integrating European directives into national legislation and different 
institutional variables (both EU directive specific variables and national implementing 
measure specific variables) in these two cases, we would not be able to extend our 
observations to the European level and to argue whether the proposed variables exert 
similar effects both in Romania and Bulgaria’s case and the other EU member states. Thus, 
the objective in this case is to explore the impact of the selected variables upon 
transposition for the two study cases and not to put forward a theoretically grounded model 
that would explain transposition delay at the EU-level.  
 
Table 5 Selection criteria for representative Member States 
Member 
States 
Romania Bulgaria United 
Kingdom 
Germany Sweden Italy Poland 
Size Big Small Big Big Small Big Big 
Legal 
System 
Civil law Civil law Common 
law 
Civil law Civil law Civil law Civil 
law 
Political 
structure 
Unitary Unitary Federate 
& 
devolved 
Federal Unitary Devolved Unitary 
Accession 2007 2007 1973 Founding 
Member 
1995 Founding 
Member 
2004 
 
When discussing non-compliance with European legislation, Börzel et al.832 group rational 
choice perspectives into the category of enforcement approaches putting forward the 
essential linking assumptions and a set of hypotheses which they draw from power-based 
                                                          
832 T. Börzel, M. Dudziak, T. Hofmann, D. Panke, C. Spungk (2007): “Recalcitrance, Inefficiency, and Support for 
European Integration: Why Member States Do (not) Comply with European Law”, Center for European Studies 
Working Paper, No. 161 (Cambridge, Harvard University), p. 10.  
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theoretical claims. The leading premise of enforcement approaches is that states choose not 
to comply with international norms and rules because they are not willing to bear the costs 
of change. It follows that incentives for defection need to be offset by increasing external 
constraints in the form of institutionalised monitoring and sanctioning which will exert 
either material (economic sanctions or financial penalties) or immaterial costs upon states 
(loss of reputation and credibility)833. The response to these additional costs will be 
dependent either on the EU specific political power or the economic power of nation states, 
the expectation being that the less powerful EU member states are, the more sensitive they 
are to external enforcement constraints and the less likely they are to infringe EU 
legislation. Our analysis will explore this hypothesis, but will focus only on member states’ 
direct EU specific political power, as Börzel et al. study shows that greater economic power 
did not substantially affect a country’s compliance record834. The proxy for the EU specific 
political power will be the proportion of votes under QMV (qualified majority voting) in the 
Council of Ministers and alternatively we will also consider the relative frequency with 
which a Member State is in a pivotal position under QMV (i.e. in the position of turning a 
losing coalition into a winning one) or what is known in the literature as the Shapley-Shubik 
index. This latter figure will be taken from Barr and Passarelli’s mathematical analysis of 
the distribution of power in the Council of Ministers under the voting rules established by 
the Treaty of Nice (50% of the member states vote in favour, at least 260 of the possible 352 
votes are cast and the majority represents minimum 62% of the total population)835.  The 
Shapley-Shubik country-specific power index calculated for the European Union comprising 
28 Member States is also included in the table below, based on the estimations done by 
Antonakakis et al and taking into consideration the regime shift brought by the Treaty of 
Lisbon836.  Hence, one of the hypotheses which will be tested in order to explore Romania 
and Bulgaria’s transposition record will be the following: 
Ha: The less powerful an EU member state is, the less likely it is to infringe EU legislation. 
 
                                                          
833 J. Tallberg (2002): “Path to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union”, International 
Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp, 609-43, p. 612.  
834 T. Börzel, M. Dudziak, T. Hofmann, D. Panke, C. Spungk (2007): “Recalcitrance, Inefficiency, and Support for 
European Integration: Why Member States Do (not) Comply with European Law”, p. 18.  
835 J. Barr, F. Passarelli (2009): “Who has the Power in the EU?”, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 
339-366. 
836 N. Anatonakakis, H. Badinger, W. Reuter (2014): “From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States’ Power, 
Efficiency and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers”, Department of Economics Working Paper no. 175, 
(Vienna, Vienna University of Economics and Business), p. 38.  
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Table 6 Number of Votes in Council and Shapley-Shubik Power Index 
Member 
State 
Romania Bulgaria United 
Kingdom 
Germany Sweden Italy Poland 
Votes 14 10 29 29 10 29 27 
SSI 0.040 0.028 0.087 0.087 0.028 0.087 0.080 
SSI (EU 
28) 
0.038 0.017 0.112 0.149 0.020 0.107 0.067 
Source: J. Barr, F. Passarelli (2009): “Who has the Power in the EU?”, Mathematical Social Sciences; N. 
Antonakakis, H. Badinger, W. Reuter (2014): “From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States’ Power, 
Efficiency and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers”, Department of Economics Working Paper no. 175.  
 
According to this hypothesis we would expect that for the period under analysis, Bulgaria, 
Sweden and Romania to have the lowest number of infringement cases, and by extension 
the lowest number of ECJ referrals. However, as shown in the table below the number of 
infringement cases against Romania has been relatively high compared to that of older 
Member States with more votes in the Council of Ministers such as the United Kingdom and 
Germany. In this sense, the 2014 Monitoring Report for the Application of EU law also 
observed that while in 2014 the number of new complaints made against the country by 
members of the public fell compared to the previous year, it remained high, Romania being 
ranked the 9th Member State with 149 complaints and the 2nd in the group of countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe837.  
 
 
                                                          
837 European Commission (2014): Monitoring the Application of Union Law – Part II: Member States. 2014 Annual 
Report (Brussels, European Commission), p. 153.  
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Figure 12 Infringement Cases 2007-2015 
Source: Dataset comprising all infringement cases (excluding closed cases and withdrawals) registered between 
2007-2015. Data based on the European Commission’s annual reports “Monitoring the Application of Union 
Law” and the European Commission’s platform for infringement proceedings.  
 
 
 
Figure 13 New Complaints made by Public in 2014 
Source: European Commission (2014): Monitoring the Application of Union Law – Part II: Member States. 2014 
Annual Report (Brussels, European Commission). 
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Figure 14 New Complaints in Central and Eastern Europe 2014 
Source: European Commission (2014): Monitoring the Application of Union Law – Part II: Member States. 2014 
Annual Report (Brussels, European Commission). 
 
What needs to be observed here is that in contrast to Romania’s high number of 
infringement cases, when turning to the referrals to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
the period under analysis, the European Commission referred Romania in only 9 instances 
since the country’s accession to the EU, 5 of which were in the policy field of environmental 
protection, 3 in the energy field and one in the area of Communication Networks, Content 
and Technology. Comparatively, Bulgaria was referred between 2007 and 2015 to the 
European Court of Justice on 12 instances, 5 cases being in the policy field of environmental 
protection, 3 in the energy field, one in the field of competition policy and one similar to 
Romania in the area of Communication Networks, Content and Technology.  
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Figure 15 Total number of ECJ Referrals 2007-2015 
Source: Data based on the European Commission’s annual reports “Monitoring the application of Union Law” 
and the European Commission’s platform for infringement proceedings.  
 
Both in the case of Romania and in that of Bulgaria the referrals concerning legislation in 
the Communication Networks, Content and Technology policy regarded the implementation 
of the Single European Emergency Number 112, with Romania facing difficulties in securing 
caller location information to emergency services for mobile calls, and Bulgaria not making 
the emergency number available nationwide. According to the Universal Service 
Directive838, Member States are obliged to ensure that users of fixed and mobile telephones 
(including payphones) are able to call 112 free of charge, that calls to this number are 
appropriately answered and handled, that national emergency services are able to establish 
the location of the person calling the 112 number and that citizens and visitors are informed 
of the existence of the emergency number. The European Commission has reported the 
launch of 17 infringement proceedings against Member States over the European 
Emergency Number, at the date of writing all closed following corrective measures839. Thus, 
the cases brought against Romania and Bulgaria did not mark a difference in terms of the 
implementation problems encountered by the other Member States in our sample. In this 
sense, both Poland and Italy were referred to the ECJ for the slow implementation of the 
                                                          
838 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Universal Service and Users’ Rights 
to Electronic Communications Networks and Services as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC.  
839 As reported by the Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-rules-112.  
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Emergency Number System. Subsequent European Commission reports have also revealed 
that both in the case of Romania840 and of Bulgaria841 the dismissal of the chairpersons of 
the National Regulatory Authorities raised concerns over the independence of the 
institutions. But probably the referrals that have generated the most public attention at the 
national level for both Romania and Bulgaria have been in the case of the two directives842 
that form the so-called Third Energy Package.  The two directives843 which were due to be 
transposed by Member States by March 2011, aimed at effective unbundling of energy 
production and supply interests from the network, increased transparency of retail markets 
and strengthening of consumer protection rules and more effective regulatory oversight by 
independent market watchdogs. For the first objective the energy package provides for 
three basic models for unbundling with Member States having the option to decide for one 
of the following: ownership unbundling, the independent system operator and the 
independent transmission system operator. Under the first model, all integrated energy 
companies would have to sell off their electricity and natural gas grids, no supply or 
production company not being allowed to hold a majority share in a transmission system 
operator. Under the second model, the supply company can still own the physical network, 
but it has to leave the entire operation, maintenance and investment to an independent 
company, and under the final one the supply company can own and operate the network, 
but its management must be done by a subsidiary that would make all financial and 
technical decisions independent from the parent company. In order to ensure an effective 
competition on the energy market, the package also put forward the third party access 
principle that requires operators of transmission networks to allow any electricity or gas 
supplier non-discriminatory access to the transmission network. In order to transpose the 
energy package, Romania opted for the independent system operator unbundling model, as 
its transmission system is in public property (its Transmission and System Operator for 
electricity being CNTEE Transelectrica SA, company where the state owns 58% of the 
                                                          
840 European Commission (2010): 15th Progress Report on the Single European Electronic Communications Market 
– Romania Chapter (Brussels, European Commission), SEC(2010) 630 final.  
841 European Commission (2008): 13th Progress Report on the Single European Electronic Communications Market 
– Bulgaria Chapter (Brussels, European Commission), SEC(2008)356.  
842 Directive 2009/72/EC concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC; Directive 2009/73/EC concerning Common rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas 
and Repealing Directive 2003/55/EC.  
843 On the impact of the Third Energy Package see P. Eikeland (2011): “The Third Internal Energy Market 
Package: New Power Relations among Member States, EU Institutions and Non-state Actors?”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 243-63.  
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shares and the rest of 42% are traded on the Romanian stock exchange or owned by other 
investors). However, the implementation of the model has not been smooth, in 2013 the 
country being referred to the ECJ for not transposing into its national legislation among 
others the provision regarding the separation of the transmission company from the 
operation and maintenance of the grid. In this sense, Member States must ensure that the 
same person or persons are not exercising direct or indirect control over an undertaking 
performing any of the functions of production or supply and exercise, directly or indirectly 
control over a transmission system operator or over a transmission system. In order to 
implement this requirement the Romanian Government transferred Transelectrica from 
one minister to another (from the Economy to the Finance Ministry), but this shift did not 
translate into compliance with the spirit of the directive package, as suspicions that 
employees from the Finance Ministry were exercising direct control over some electricity 
companies were revealed844. Moreover, several other provisions from the electricity energy 
directive had not been transposed into national legislation: no regulations were in place 
that would stipulate that energy suppliers are required to inform customers of their rights, 
regarding the obligation of distribution operators to assure the long-term ability of the 
system to respond to electricity demands, regarding the procedures and criteria for the 
authorisation of new energy entities into the market, as well as technical safety criteria for 
energy generation installation, distribution systems and equipment for the direct 
connection to the network of consumers etc. The European Commission decided at the end 
of 2014 to withdraw the referral against Romania for both directives of the Third Energy 
package.   
Bulgaria on the other hand opted for the Independent transmission system operator model, 
with one vertically integrated, fully state-owned company (The Bulgarian Energy Holding - 
BEH) retaining the central role, and its subsidiary, the National Electricity Company (NEK) 
holding generation assets representing 45% of the installed generation capacity. In 2013, 
the Commission referred Romania to the ECJ for failing to fully transpose the electricity and 
gas Directives, in particular the provisions relating to the protection of consumers and the 
                                                          
844 C. Pîrvoiu (2013): “Comisia Europeana vs. Romania: Autoritatile Romane au fost Actionate in Judecata pentru 
ca nu au Respectat Directivele privind Piata Energiei. Procesul se Afla pe Rolul Curtii Europene de Justitie, iar 
Amenda pe care o Risca Romania este de 60.000 Euro pe zi”/”The European Commission vs. Romania: The 
Romanian Authorities on Trial for not Respecting the Energy Market Directives. The Trial is Pending at the 
European Court of Justice, and the Fine that Romania risks is of Euro 60.000 per day”, HotNews.ro (11 
September), available at http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-energie-15558804-comisia-europeana-romania-
autoritatile-romane-fost-actionate-judecata-pentru-nu-respectat-directivele-europene-privind-piata-energiei-
procesul-afla-rolul-curtii-europene-iar-amenda-care-risca-romania-.htm.  
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requirements for clearly specified tasks attributed to the Energy regulator (the Romanian 
Energy Regulatory Authority)845. Bulgaria, together with Estonia and the United Kingdom846 
(and later Poland) were referred to the ECJ in January 2013 for the partial transposition of 
the directives of the third energy package. Bulgaria’s energy policy has marred by inefficient 
management practices and heavy political involvement in the decision-making of state-
owned energy enterprises. As mentioned above, Bulgaria has opted for the Independent 
transmission system operator model, which meant that the ownership of the grid was to be 
transferred from the state-owned NEK to the Electricity System Operator (ESO). However, 
due to the mismanagement of the NEK (the company accumulating a debt of BGN 3.5 billion 
by the end of 2014) the transfer was inevitably delayed. Moreover, the independence of the 
state regulator – the State Energy and Water Regulatory Commission (SEWRC) has been 
affected in time through political pressure and frequent changes of leadership847. However, 
Romania and Bulgaria have not been the only Member States lagging behind in fully 
transposing the Third Energy Package. In 2011, the European Commission opened 38 
infringement proceedings against 19 Member States. Because of the technical complexity as 
well as the sovereignty costs implied by the energy package, the Commission assumed a 
highly active role in ensuring the correct application of legislation by conducting its own 
systematic non-conformity assessment of national transposition measures for all 28 
Member States, and has opened EU Pilot cases against several Member States in order to 
clarify and discuss potential non-conformity problems848.  With these aspects in mind, we 
would conclude that again Romania and Bulgaria’s track records are not distinctive from 
those of other Member States, even if the variables determining the transposition delay 
have mainly revolved around mismanagement of state-owned energy companies.  
 
                                                          
845 European Commission (2013): “Internal Energy Market: Commission refers Romania to Court for Failing to 
Fully Transpose Rules”, Press Release IP/13/260 (Brussels, European Commission).  
846 European Commission (2013): “Internal Energy Market: Commission Refers Bulgaria, Estonia and the United 
Kingdom to Court for Failing to fully Transpose EU Rules”, Press Release IP/13/42, (Brussels, European 
Commission). 
847 R. Stefanov, T. Galev, M. Tsanov, M. Vladimirov, N. Gantcheva (2014): Energy Sector Governance and Energy 
(In)Security in Bulgaria (Sofia, Center for the Study of Democracy), p. 15.  
848 European Commission (2014): Enforcement of the Third Internal Energy Market Package (Brussels, European 
Commission), SWD(2014) 315 final, pp. 3-5.  
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Figure 16 Infringement cases - Romania 2007-2015 
 
Figure 17 Infringement Cases - Bulgaria 2007-2015 
Source Fig. 16 & 17: Data based on the European Commission’s annual reports “Monitoring the Application of 
Union Law” and the European Commission’s platform for infringement proceedings.  
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During the reference period, both Romania and Bulgaria were referred to the ECJ on 5 
instances (each) for the delayed transposition or bad application of directives in the 
environmental protection policy area. Similar to the infringement track records of the other 
Member States included in the sample, the two countries had the largest number of 
infringement cases in the environment policy filed.  Representatives of the Romanian 
institution of the Governmental Agent for the Representation of Romania to the European 
Court of Justice have cited in this sense that the high costs of transposition and correct 
application as well as the highly technical character of European legislation in this sphere 
have been identified as the main factors that induce longer periods of time for the 
assimilation of EU law at the national institutional level849.  Thus, both Romania and 
Bulgaria follow the same European pattern of implementation when looking at directives in 
the environmental policy, all countries in our sample for example with the exception of Italy 
registering the largest number of infringement cases in this area.  
 
 
Figure 18 Poland - Infringement Cases 2007-2015 
Source: Data based on the European Commission’s annual reports “Monitoring the Application of Union Law” 
and the European Commission’s platform for infringement proceedings.  
                                                          
849 Author’s interview with the Departmental Chief within the institution of the Governmental Agent for the 
Representation of Romania to the European Court of Justice on the 6th of December 2013.  
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Figure 19 Germany - Infringement Cases 2007-2015 
 
 
Figure 20 United Kingdom - Infringement Cases 2007-2015 
Source Fig. 19 & 20: Data based on the European Commission’s annual reports “Monitoring the Application of 
Union Law” and the European Commission’s platform for infringement proceedings.  
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Returning to our initial hypothesis that less powerful EU Member States are less likely to 
infringe EU legislation, when tested on our sample and on the total number of infringement 
proceedings during the reference period, we could not find enough evidence to be able to 
sustain a correlation. What has been observed at this point is the fact that despite an 
increase in the number of proceedings initiated by the European Commission, Romania has 
been referred to the ECJ for infringement of EU law less frequently than any other country 
in our sample. A similar situation has been observed in the case of Bulgaria as well. 
Considering however, the fact the Romanian and Bulgarian national media have followed 
with great attention the referred cases, in some instances the potential penalties that the 
countries would be obliged to pay per day of delay being communicated as well, we could 
assume that the electorate pressure has played a role in keeping the numbers down. 
Moreover, in the case of Romania the monthly reporting by the institution of the 
Governmental Agent for the Representation of Romania to the European Court of Justice of 
the number of infringement cases initiated and their stages has somewhat contributed to 
sustaining this transparency which in turn has led to a so far relatively good track record.  
If we were to consider the impact of internal variables such as the number of veto points or 
of more technical factors such as the goodness of fit, a rational choice institutionalist 
theoretical framework would start off by assuming that strategic and rational of actors 
pursue exogenous and fixed policy interests operate in an institutionalised environment 
which can either constrain them (e.g. through monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for 
free-riding) or enable them (e.g. minimise transaction costs for cooperation)850. As mirrored 
by hypothesis Ha, domestic institutional change will vary across member states and this 
phenomenon can be accounted for by the degree of economic vulnerability and political 
capacity. However, there is a third factor identified by Schmidt in the form of misfit that 
represents an important part of the driving force for institutional change851.  Rational actors 
will attempt to upload their policies to the EU level with the aim of lowering the costs of 
adaptation which they will suffer when implementing (‘downloading’) norms and 
procedures established as mandatory by supranational structures. If member states are not 
successful in uploading their preferences, they will oppose the high costs of adaptation with 
both the correctness and timeliness of the transposition process being affected.  
                                                          
850 See F. Scharpf (1997): Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, 
Westview Press).  
851 V. Schmidt (2002): “Europeanization and the Mechanism of Economic Policy Adjustments”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 6, pp. 894-912.  
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A caveat must be introduced here, noting that not only rational choice institutionalism uses 
this variable, but the historical branch of institutionalism as well, the assumption 
substantiating the concept being that the ‘stickiness’ of deeply entrenched national policy 
tradition and administrative routines will impede reforms aiming to alter them852. The 
difference between the two perspectives on ‘misfit’ is also highlighted by the estimated 
probability for domestic change to occur, with the historical institutionalist 
conceptualisation focusing more on the limited capacity that the EU would have in breaking 
path dependent national structures. 
In line with investigations of non-compliance that account for this factor853, we will thus test 
the goodness of fit variable, translated as a proxy that distinguishes between situations 
where transposition is realised through a completely new national implementing measure 
versus transposition through the modification of existing national legislation. The thought 
behind the addition of this variable is that amendments will display a higher fit between 
directives and national legislation.  
Hb: Evidence of a certain degree of fit will lower transposition delay.  
However, noting the previous studies that have underlined that the goodness of fit is not 
decisive (and thus not sufficient as a stand-alone variable) in explaining the implementation 
of individual directives854, we will refer to the realm of domestic politics and a number of 
national implementing measure specific variables will be used in order to explore the 
factors that have either a positive or negative impact upon the transposition process. The 
motivation behind this option is again theory-led, rationalist approaches to Europeanisation 
drawing attention to mediating institutional characteristics such as the number of veto 
points in a country’s institutional structure and the presence of supporting formal 
institutions as increasing, respectively decreasing national resistance to change.  
                                                          
852 K. Thelen, S. Steino (1992): “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics” in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, F. 
Longstreth (eds.) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 1-32;E. Immergut (1998): “The Theoretical Core of New Institutionalism”, Politics and 
Society, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 5-34.  
853 F. Duina (1997): “Explaining Legal Implementation in the European Union”, International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 155-79; C. Knill (1998): “European Politics: The Impact of National 
Administrative Traditions”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1-28; T. Börzel, T. Risse (2000): “When 
Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change”, European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 4, No. 15.   
854 M. Haverland (2000): “National Adaptation to European Integration: the Importance of Institutional Veto 
Points”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 83-103; G. Falkner, O. Trieb, M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber (2005): 
Complying with Europe? The Impact of EU Minimum Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 289-291.  
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More concretely, it is expected that the presence at the national level of multiple veto points 
within the institutional structures and decision-making processes can empower actors with 
diverse interests to avoid constraints and adaptation costs leading to increased resistance 
to change. By way of alternative, the existence of formal institutions that would provide 
actors with the material and ideational resources to exploit new opportunities will increase 
the likelihood of change855. In order to translate these claims into variables, we consider the 
type and the number of the legal instruments that are used to implement European 
directives into national legislation as explanatory factors for variance as well as probability 
of compliance. The study is particularly interested in understanding and accounting for 
compliance variation across EU policy areas in Romania and Bulgaria and in integrating the 
observed direction/tendency into the larger European context, especially as we remark a 
fairly wide range of legislative acts, with legislative delegation to the government being 
allowed in Romania, but not in Bulgaria.  
Hc: Delay in transposition will decrease as the number of actors (veto points) involved in 
the making of the instrument of national implementation decreases;  
Hd: More implementing measures used to transpose EU directives will make delays in 
transposition larger. 
We consider hypotheses Hb, Hc and Hd to be interrelated, our assumption being that a 
wider number of national implementation measures implies a larger number of actors 
involved in the legislative process. Applied to our sample, this assumption was observable 
for directives being transposed through more than 5 national implementation measures. In 
the case of Bulgaria we have observed that the number of days of delay for a directive 
transposed into national legislation through one national implementation measure was of 
roughly 189. For instances where more than 10 national implementation measures were 
quoted as transposing a directive our sample indicated that the average number of days of 
delay spiked to 1210 days. For Romania, the average number of days of delay in cases 
involving one national implementation measure was of 165, while for directives transposed 
through more than 10 national implementation measures the average number of days was 
of 681. However, in Romania’s case variation was substantially higher than in the case of 
Bulgaria, with instances where a directive transposed only through 2 national 
                                                          
855 T. Börzel, T. Risse (2000): “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change”, p. 3.  
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implementation measures registered 1958 days of delay856 and at the other end where only 
9 days of delay were registered for the transposition of a directive through 8 national 
implementation measures857.  While indeed, more implementation measures statistically 
add to the number of days of delay – and this has been visible in our sample as well, we also 
need to take into account the complexity of the transposed legislation as well as the salience 
of the subject of each directive. But referring back to the outliers identified in our sample for 
Romania, in the case of the Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal 
treatment among service providers from any EU member state was transposed through 2 
measures of implementation, the latest one being adopted in 2013, an independent study 
revealed that the internalisation of this piece of legislation followed a ‘copy-out’ approach 
which resulted in abstract and confusing legislative provisions858. As such, the Romanian 
legislator did not consider the content of the recitals of the Directive (which do not have an 
independent legal value, but set important guidelines for determining the scope of the 
provisions), and merely transposed the provisions without defining the concepts of ‘goods’ 
and ‘services’ (the directive providing the definition in recital 11 ).  
When turning to the cases referred to the ECJ, out of Romania’s 9 referrals, 4 directives 
required more than 5 national implementation measures (varying from 6 to 50 quoted 
measures) and the average delay in these instances reached 1487 days. Out of Bulgaria’s 12 
ECJ referrals, in 4 cases directives were transposed through more than 5 national 
implementation measures (varying from 6 to 20 quoted measures) and the average delay 
for these cases reached 1793 days. Based on the facts so far presented, we would argue that 
while we have observed a pattern of larger delays for directives transposed through more 
than 5 national implementation measures, and in the majority of cases involving more 
actors, we also need to consider the outliers. Thus, a more qualitative approach for a 
smaller sample would offer a clearer image of the correlation between the number of actors 
involved in the legislative process, the number of implementation measures and the 
duration of transposition delay. In terms of the hypothesis tying political power with the 
proclivity towards delayed or bad application of EU law, we have observed that for the 
                                                          
856 This was the case of Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women in the access to and supply of goods and services.  
857 This was the case of Directive 2009/52/EC providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures 
against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals.  
858 S. Burri, A. McColgan (2009): Sex Discrimination in the Access to and Supply of Goods and Services and the 
Transposition of Directive 2004/113/EC (Utrecht, European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender 
Equality).  
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reference period we could not find substantial evidence to sustain it. Whilst having good 
track records in terms of the ECJ referrals compared to the rest of the Member States in the 
sample, we would also need to consider the tendency towards direct assimilation of EU 
legislation in both countries and the low frequency of Romanian and Bulgarian lobbying at 
the EU level (explained in the theoretical chapter of this study).   
So far, our hypotheses have had a rational choice institutionalist foundation. However, 
rational choice institutionalism is not without its critics, a number of drawbacks are 
frequently emphasised by the academic literature. Firstly, because of the over-reliance on a 
functionalist understanding of institutions – regarded as effective means for facilitating 
international cooperation (as actors rely on each other to achieve their goals) by preventing 
short-term defections that might jeopardise long-term interests (leading to suboptimal 
outcomes) – it is hard for the theoretical perspective to account for ‘dysfunctional 
institutions’859. Secondly, while the deductive nature of this approach makes it a useful 
framework for capturing the range of reasons individual actors would normally have for 
action in an institutional setting and the likely outcomes of these actions, it finds anomalies 
(instances when actors depart from an incentive-based logic) problematic to explain860. In 
this regard, placing itself in opposition to the methodological individualism and to the 
restricted understanding of institutions that create the fundament of rational choice 
analyses, sociological institutionalism – as well as the normative approach to the new 
institutionalism – have gradually provided an alternative theoretical account of the political 
and social world. In cases of national compliance with supranational norms in the absence 
of an external enforcement mechanism to prevent free-riding, sociological institutionalism 
assumes that individuals unconsciously enact cognitive templates as they are guided by a 
common understanding of what socially accepted behaviour is. Hence, for sociological 
institutionalists, compliance and enforcement appear to be nonissues. We emphasise 
‘appear’ as recent rationalist contributions provide new avenues for theoretical explanation 
of incremental institutional change, Mahoney and Thelen arguing for a distributional 
approach that would envisage institutions as having built in the dynamic tensions and 
                                                          
859 P. Hall, C. Taylor (1996): “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 
5, p. 952.  
860 See F. Scharpf (1997): Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, 
Westview Press).  
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pressures for change861. The new modes of change proposed by the authors take the form of 
displacement (removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones), layering (new 
rules introduced alongside existing ones), drift (changed impact of existing rules due to 
shifts in the environment), and conversion (changed enactment of existing rules due to their 
strategic redeployment) and they allow for more flexibility in accounting for the differences 
in veto possibilities and the extent of discretion in institutional enforcement862. 
Nevertheless, it is the sociological branch that introduces complex explanatory variables 
such as coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism (with a specific interest in the latter 
mechanism of policy transfer)863 in order to explain the domestic effects associated with 
Europeanisation. We thus turn now to a brief discussion of the main theoretical claims of 
this perspective.  
In this sociological reading, the EU is regarded as a platform for new ideas, meanings, rule 
and norms that member states are to absorb/internalise. To facilitate this process two 
mediating factors have the capacity to encourage change: norm entrepreneurs and co-
operative informal institutions. The former act as ‘change agents’ either lobbying for new 
ideas and norms deriving from the EU level (advocacy groups) or by developing and 
circulating causal ideas that help create state interests and preferences (epistemic 
communities). The latter are embodied by co-operative political cultures which ease 
consensus-building in the decision-making process. The impact of co-operative informal 
institutions will be tested in our analysis of the transposition record in Romania and 
Bulgaria by starting from the assumption that the degree of compliance relates with the 
extent to which “rule addresses accept the legitimacy of the rule of law and consider 
compliance with legal norms as demanded by a logic of appropriateness”. The hypothesis 
will thus be: 
He: The lower the support for the rule of law, the larger the delay in transposition will be. 
In order to operationalise this variable we will use the World Bank Rule of Law dimension 
of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The Rule of Law index captures “perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
                                                          
861 J. Mahoney, K. Thelen (2010): “A Theory of Gradual institutional Change” in J. Mahoney, K. Thelen (eds.) 
Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 10.  
862 J. Mahoney, K. Thelen (2010): “A Theory of Gradual institutional Change” in J. Mahoney, K. Thelen (eds.) 
Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, p. 18.  
863 C. Radaelli (2000): “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change”, European 
Integration Online Papers, Vol. 4, No. 8.  
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well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.  We opt for this particular indicator as it 
assures inclusiveness by aggregating data collected from surveys of firms and households, 
as well as from assessments of a variety of commercial business information providers, 
non-governmental organisations and public-sector bodies.   
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Figure 21 Rule of Law indicators 2007-2014 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators – Rule of Law – 2007-2014 values, ranging from -2.5 
(signalling low degree of confidence in and of adherence to the rules of society, in the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts) to 2.5.  
 
From the table above we can observe that we have three performance clusters with 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany registering for the reference period positive 
values ranging from 1.6 to 2 for the Rule of Law indicator, Poland and Italy (cluster two) 
ranging from 0.3 to 0.8, and Romania and Bulgaria (cluster three) from negative values to 
0.1. According to hypothesis He we would expect to observe fewer infringement cases for 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany, and substantially more for Romania and 
Bulgaria. The data gathered in our sample has shown that compared to Romania, Poland 
and Italy, the three countries in the first cluster indeed have had better compliance track-
records. When extending the comparison between cluster two and three, we observe in fact 
a reversed situation, the countries registering a better values for the Rule of Law indicator 
having more infringement cases initiated against them by the European Commission. 
Moreover, if we were to take into consideration the number of ECJ referrals, the hypothesis 
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is again challenged with cluster one and two registering more referrals than the countries in 
cluster three. Here again, we would need to consider the impact of transposition in the 
absence in some cases of an inter-institutional dialogue that would assure the adaptation of 
the spirit of directives to the existing legal and institutional context. Thus, we would 
consider that attention paid to this particular aspect would lead to a fruitful research 
avenue that would better contextualise the compliance track-record of Romania and 
Bulgaria.  
6.2. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have attempted to explore how the two EU Member States have 
performed in implementing EU legislation since their accession date, to understand in 
which policy areas we are observing the largest number of infringement proceedings and 
ECJ referrals and how these track records compare to other EU Member States. We have 
also attempted to formulate a series of hypotheses grounded in rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism in order to identify potential relevant 
variables that would account for the compliance track records. We have observed that the 
first hypothesis that contended that less powerful EU Member States are less likely to 
infringe EU legislation could not be sustained by the results generated by our sample. The 
number of actors involved in the legislative process and the overall number of national 
implementation measures to transpose a directive have had limited explanatory power as 
well. While we have observed a clear tendency of larger delay durations in cases where 
directives were transposed through more national implementation measures, we were able 
to identify outliers (especially for Romania) that provided relevant details regarding EU law 
assimilation practices. The overall analysis has demonstrated however, that the post-
accession backslide effect that was foreseen by part of the academic literature did not 
materialise. A backslide effect – understood in the context of the current chapter - would 
presuppose both an increase in the transposition deficit of the country but more 
importantly an increase in the number of referrals to the European Court of Justice for 
incorrect or non-application of EU law. However, based on the dataset that includes all 
infringement cases between 2007 and 2015, we could observe the following:  
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- compared to older Member States with more votes in the Council of Ministers (such as the 
United Kingdom and Germany), the total number of infringement cases for Romania has 
been high over the period of study (being the third country in the dataset after Poland and 
Italy in terms of the number of infringement cases); 
- when considering the number of Court referrals however (arising after a direct dialogue 
with the European Commission over the possible violations of obligations under EU law), 
both Romania and Bulgaria have registered the lowest number of instances of referrals 
(Romania for 9 cases and Bulgaria for 12, compare to over 80 for Poland, over 50 for Italy 
and over 40 for Germany) in the period of study out of all of the countries included in the 
dataset;  
- the most numerous cases of infringement both for Romania and in Bulgaria are registered 
in the Environmental policy area, situation similar to nearly all Member States comprised in 
the dataset and explained by the large adaptation costs and complexity of EU law 
application in this area.  
With these observations in mind, we would contend that the manifestation of backsliding 
would presuppose a corroboration of an increased number of infringement cases with a 
high number of Court referrals. We would also expect for an increase of Court referrals in 
cases involving directives politically sensitive for national governments (such as EU social 
policy directives to give one example). However, for Romania and Bulgaria the majority of 
Court referrals were for directives in the policy field of environmental protection, followed 
by directives in the energy field (a situation again common for all EU Member States). With 
these observations in mind, we would contend that no clear evidence of backsliding can be 
identified neither in the case of Romania, nor that of Bulgaria.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
7.1. Empirical contributions 
 
The thesis has provided an assessment of the progress registered by the two countries in 
assuming their EU membership obligations. In order to reflect the complexity of these 
obligations, our analysis has included both soft and hard legal instruments. The first 
instrument taken as level of analysis was the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. Here 
we have observed that despite similar political instability Romania has managed to perform 
substantially better than Bulgaria, its anti-corruption institutional framework being quoted 
in the EU Anti-Corruption Report as an example of good practices. In order to account for 
the difference in outcomes, we have elaborated a theoretical framework based on historical 
institutionalist concepts. In exploring the extent of post-accession Europeanisation, we have 
observed that Bulgaria and Romania’s performance in progressing towards their national 
targets set under the Europe 2020 Strategy has been rather limited, the policy analysis done 
in this study showing that in both countries there are no clear and politically assumed 
strategies towards coordinating the employment and education lines of action. Bulgaria 
faces today the highest percentage of population at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion out of 
the country’s total population (48% according to Eurostat), an employment rate below the 
EU average (at 61% in 2014 according to Eurostat compared to the EU average of 64.9%), 
and a very low expenditure on research and development of 0.6% of the GDP. Romania is in 
a very similar situation, with public spending on research and development hovering at 
0.3% of the GDP, 40.4% population at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion and the 
employment rate as well below the EU average in the context of an emigration wave that 
saw to the total population count fall from 21.700.000 in 2002 to 19.900.000 in 2014864. In 
both countries active employment policies have not been adequately constructed so that 
                                                          
864
 Institutul Naţional de Statistică (2014): Anuarul Statistic al României/ Romanian Statistical Yearbook 
(Bucharest, INSSE).  
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they would efficiently address the effects of the economic crisis, professional training and 
education opportunities have not been coordinated with labour market needs and so far 
steps taken to correct these shortcomings have not produced substantial effects. While the 
monitoring and evaluation undertaken under the Europe 2020 Strategy has been beneficial, 
country-specific recommendations providing the stage for naming and shaming, the 
visibility of these recommendation as well as of concerns has been limited at the national 
level.  We have also attempted to explore how the two EU Member States have performed in 
implementing EU legislation since their accession date, to understand in which policy areas 
we are observing the largest number of infringement proceedings and ECJ referrals and 
how these track records compare to other EU Member States. We have formulated a series 
of hypotheses grounded in rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism 
in order to identify potential relevant variables that would account for the compliance track 
records. We have observed that the first hypothesis that contended that less powerful EU 
Member States are less likely to infringe EU legislation could not be sustained by the results 
generated by our sample. The number of actors involved in the legislative process and the 
overall number of national implementation measures to transpose a directive have had 
limited explanatory power as well. While we have observed a clear tendency of larger delay 
durations in cases where directives were transposed through more national 
implementation measures, we were able to identify outliers (especially for Romania) that 
provided relevant details regarding EU law assimilation practices. The overall analysis has 
demonstrated however, that the post-accession backslide effect that was foreseen by the 
academic literature did not materialise.  
 
7.2. Theoretical and methodological contributions 
 
The present research endeavour has strived to put forward a new theoretical model 
attached to the concept of ‘Europeanisation’. In this sense, the model starts off by setting a 
clear definition of the process to be explored, understanding it as a complex ‘top-bottom’ 
and ‘bottom-up’ process in which domestic polities, politics and policies are shaped by 
European integration and in which domestic actors use European integration to shape the 
domestic arena. We then differentiate between the pre-accession phase and the post-
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accession stage, with the former implying the presence of EU directly influenced changes at 
the national level, while in the case of the latter change is to be expected as a consequence 
of the assumed responsibility of membership. In the phase of post-accession 
Europeanisation a wide range of variables can influence the depth and pace of domestic 
change such as the presence of national political elites open to EU influence, and where 
equilibriums are in place the presence of potential lock-in effects. Here, however our model 
proposes the inclusion of the variable nature of EU policy instruments, the theoretical 
chapter of this study showing that different modes of governance are likely to generate 
specific behaviours and hence outcomes. In this sense, Coman and Crespy argue that by 
modelling Europeanization as a process whose dynamics and temporality are shaped by 
actors (bias towards agency), domestic change - understood to occur as a result of external 
European pressure - has been deemed as short-termed, piecemeal or incremental. While 
recognising the value of this approach, the authors argue that the transition from 
incremental to structural change can only be accommodated by a research design that 
would take into consideration not only the ability and intentionality of national actors to 
adapt to Europe, but also the potential of EU policy instruments to lead to a more profound 
transformation865. The next step in the model is the identification of EU modes of 
governance and attributed modes of actor behaviour in connection to them. As such, one 
general categorisation reunites coercion, framework regulation, targeting and voluntarism.  
In this sense, we based the theoretical model on a starting premise that in the case of ‘hard’ 
adaptational pressure which is manifest in coercion and framework regulation modes of 
governance we would expect the rationale for domestic institutional change to range from 
persistence-driven (when the directives’ level of detail is high) to performance-driven 
(when directives would allow for more freedom). In the case of ‘soft’ forms of governance 
(targeting and voluntarism) we would expect a more responsive mode of behaviour at the 
member state level, with exemplary performers in achieving the common benchmarks 
being identified as model-givers to be copied. When returning to our study cases, these 
abstract hypotheses translated into the assumption that under monitoring specific to the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism or the Europe 2020 Strategy, the most probable 
mode of behaviour would be responsive. In contrast, under monitoring for compliance with 
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 R. Coman, A. Crespy (2014): “Still in Search of Europeanization: From Limited to Structural Change?”, in 
R. Coman, T. Kostera, L. Tomini (eds.) Europeanization and European Integration from Incremental to 
Structural Change (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan). 
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EU law, we would expect a persistence-driven behaviour. We specifically focus on the post-
accession period, as we intend on differentiating between incentives for rule abidance 
associated with maximising gains (when the transformative power of the EU is strongly 
connected to the candidate countries’ objective of obtaining EU membership during the pre-
accession, the opening and the course of accession negotiations866) and constraints and 
incentives that generate specific patterns of behaviour which are determined by the 
institutional path taken by a state. Two sets of additional hypotheses are put forward in 
order to complete the theoretical model: one for soft and one for legally-binding 
instruments. As we are focusing on post-accession compliance with externally devised 
benchmarks and norms, we also need to address the backsliding hypothesis which 
considers that once within the European Union, the Member States analysed by this study 
would abandon or even reverse the reforms they have introduced in order to qualify for 
membership. An initial evaluation of the progress made by the two countries under the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism demonstrates that despite severe political 
instability in the period of reference (2007-2015), no institutional and legislative 
backsliding has been identified. This state of affairs produces a rather paradoxical situation 
whereby the country has improved its capacity to curb corruption year upon year, but has 
done so in a politically instable context.  In order to explain this dissonance, we have put 
forward a historical institutionalist explanatory model. We postulate thus that European 
pressure exercised during the pre-accession period can create what the literature on critical 
junctures refers to as permissive conditions for substantial change to occur. Permissive 
conditions are understood as easing the constraints of structure (institutional stasis) and 
changing “the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or contingency and 
thus the prospects for divergence”867.  These conditions are generated through a range of 
pressure mechanisms that include increased monitoring, gate-keeping and differentiation 
strategies, provision of institutional models, financial assistance and twinning. However, 
while the emergence of these causal conditions is paramount, they are not sufficient for 
divergence from a previously set path. For a critical juncture to be triggered, we need 
productive conditions to be present as well. Productive conditions are aspects of a critical 
                                                          
866
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 H. D. Soifer (2012): “The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 45, No. 
12, pp. 1572-97, p. 1574.  
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juncture that “shape the outcomes that emerge and are locked in when the window of 
opportunity marked by permissive conditions comes to a close”868. As permissive and 
productive conditions are necessary, but insufficient if present individually, for a critical 
juncture to be triggered, we need both conditions to be present, while the absence of both 
types will translate into status quo, any change in this case being precluded. The presence of 
permissive conditions and the absence of productive ones will create crisis without change, 
or a case of “missed opportunity”. Finally, we contend that the absence of permissive 
conditions, but the presence of productive ones will mark a phase of incremental change869. 
However, while a critical juncture is expected to produce consequences in the form of a 
legacy, the unit of analysis critically affected can differ from each case. Thus, during a critical 
juncture while the macro structure can be affected, many other institutions can remain 
unchanged, the duration of the conjuncture being part of the reason for which variation 
across the levels of analysis is determined. The causal force of critical junctures is 
determined by their duration, their prolongation bearing the possibility that political 
decisions will be hindered or forced in other directions by structural constraints870.  The 
same set of hypotheses can be used when analysing the domestic impact of the Europe 2020 
Strategy. However, as we have observed in the chapter dedicated to this instrument, we 
have not found substantial evidence to consider policy coordination under the Lisbon and 
Europe 2020 Strategies to have created permissive conditions for critical junctures to be 
facilitated. Finally, in assessing the particularities of non-compliance in the case of Romania 
and Bulgaria, we have used a set of hypotheses grounded on rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism. While similar explorations of relevant variables that would explain the 
propensity of delay or timely transposition, grounding such an endeavour in a theoretical 
framework provides us with a starting point to testing the explanatory relevance  of theory 
in such endeavours.  
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7.3. Limitations of the study 
 
The study has been based on a mix-method approach that reunited the use of descriptive 
statistics, semi-structured interviews, and document analysis. The amount of collected data 
has meant that while the possibility of more in-depth testing of a wider set of hypotheses 
was possible, due to time constraints each analysis revolving around a policy instrument 
could only have a general character. Moreover, difficulties have been encountered in 
securing an equal amount of interviews for Bulgaria as for Romania. Language barriers as 
well as cabinet reshufflings during the period in which interviews were conducted meant 
that identified contact persons occupying key official positions, especially in the Justice 
Ministry, could not be reached. In order to correct this imbalance, alternative solutions 
were identified such as in the case of Bulgarian MEPs public speeches and interventions in 
the European Parliament regarding the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism were 
consulted.  
7.4. Future research avenues 
 
As very few studies have analysed the transposition record of Romania and Bulgaria since 
their accession, we consider that a future research avenue which could be explored would 
be the construction of a larger data set comprising all Member States and the extension of 
the number of variables to be tested in order to account for transposition delay at the EU 
level. Moreover the theoretical model put forward for Europeanisation could be further 
expanded and improved so that further contributions to the Europeanisation literature and 
the historical institutionalist theory would be done. 
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Annex 1 
Interview List 
 
 Laura Stefan, Anti-corruption expert, former director in Romanian Ministry of 
Justice, 27 November 2013 and follow-up interview 
 Otilia Nutu, Policy analyst World Bank and Expert Forum - 26 November 2013 
 Iulia Cospanaru, Deputy Director Transparency International - 7 January 2014 
 Emilia Gane, Head Department EU Legal Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 
December 2013 
 Madalina Manolache, Director in Romanian Ministry of Justice 12 November 2013 
 Cristian Preda , Member of the European Parliament, 16 September 2014 
 Daniel Buda, Member of the European Parliament , 16 September 2014 
 Marian Jean Marinescu, Member of the European Parliament , 17 September 2014 
 Norica Nicolai, Member of the European Parliament , 16 September 2014 
 Philip Gounev, Former Deputy Minister of Interior, Expert Centre for the Study of 
Democracy, 29 January 2014 
 Antoinette Primatarova, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Programme 
Director at Centre for Liberal Strategies, 4 February 2014 
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